Executive Orders 9835 and 10450 (1947, 1953)

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EXECUTIVE ORDERS 9835 AND 10450 (1947, 1953)

As a result of domestic political and security pressures after 1945, Presidents harry s. truman and dwight d. eisenhower instituted sweeping loyalty investigations of federal workers. Truman's Executive Order 9835, affecting over two million employees, established loyalty review boards in executive departments to evaluate information provided by Federal Bureau of Investigation or Civil Service Commission investigations and informants. The basic standards for dismissal required "reasonable grounds for belief in disloyalty," which included evidence of affiliation with groups on the attorney general ' slist of subversive organizations. Critics who alleged widespread subversion nevertheless demanded more stringent measures, and Truman's Executive Order 10241 (April 28, 1951) altered the criterion to one of "reasonable doubt" of loyalty. The change effectively shifted the burden of proof to the accused or suspected employee. Eisenhower, however, later complained that the Truman program reflected "a complacency … toward security risks," such as homosexuals and alcoholics, and in April 1953, he issued Executive Order 10450 that made security, not loyalty, the primary concern.

The loyalty probes produced new bureaucracies, with agendas of their own and standards and practices that varied widely in different departments. Between 1947 and 1956, approximately 2,700 employees were dismissed and another 12,000 resigned because of the inquiries. After 1953, the security program provided for immediate suspension without pay, and many employees undoubtedly resigned to avoid the stigma of combating the charges, however flimsy. Then, too, the program's shroud of secrecy, including the use of unknown informants, made challenges difficult.

The Supreme Court responded cautiously to the program. In Bailey v. Richardson (1951) an evenly divided bench sustained Bailey's dismissal even though she had been denied an opportunity to confront her accusers. The same day, in joint anti-fascist refugee committee v. mcgrath, the Court questioned the procedures for compiling the attorney general's list of subversive organizations, yet did not prevent its continued use. Some individuals successfully challenged their dismissals, but courts carefully avoided broader constitutional issues. In Peters v. Hobby (1955) the Supreme Court overturned a medical professor's dismissal because his position was nonsensitive, yet the Justices ignored Peters's challenge against secret informers. Similar reasoning was employed in Cole v. Young (1956) to reverse the discharge of an employee who had challenged the use of the attorney general's list as a violation of rights of association. The real turning point came in Service v. Dulles (1957) when the Court reversed the dismissal of one of the "China Hands" who had been purged from the State Department. Finally, in Greene v. McElroy (1959), Chief Justice earl warren condemned the use of "faceless informers," unknown to the accused. Without determining constitutional issues, the Court held that the government's evidence must be disclosed to the individual to give him an opportunity to refute it.

Although the Court's decisions undoubtedly demonstrated that abusive, illegal governmental actions could be brought to account, such challenges required extraordinary individual persistence and courage as well as financial and emotional cost. For all the government's efforts, the results were dubious. Judith Coplon, convicted of passing Justice Department documents to a Soviet agent, had escaped the program's net. And in 1954, the Civil Service Commission acknowledged that no communist or fellow traveler had been uncovered in its probes.

Stanley I. Kutler
(1986)