Lying

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LYING

Lying may be defined as the making of a declarative statement to another person that one believes to be false, with the intention that the other person believe that statement to be true, and the intention that the person believe that one believes that statement to be true. Lying may be distinguished from other forms of intentional deception insofar as it involves the use of conventional signs arranged to make a statement. Intentional deception using natural signs, such as fake smiling, shamming a limp, or wearing a disguise, does not count as lying. Intentional deception using conventional signs that are neither spoken nor written, such as deceptively nodding one's head, sending deceptive smoke signals, or deceptive signaling by semaphore, does count as lying, at least insofar as one is making a statement.

Lying requires that a statement be made; hence that form of deception that consists in withholding a statement from another person with the intention that the other person infer a believed falsehood—sometimes called a lie of omission or a concealment lie—does not count as lying. Exaggerating, being misleading, hedging, or being evasive, with the intention that the other person infer a believed falsehood, also does not count as lying. Lying does not require that the statement that is made is false, but it does require that the statement made is believed to be false rather than merely not believed to be true, or believed to be possibly false or probably false. Lying does not require that the other person is real, only that the other person is believed to be a person and is believed to be real. This does not resolve the questions of whether one can lie to no other person in particular (for example, by publishing a believed false account of an event), or whether there can be intrapersonal lying (for example, an earlier self lying to a later self).

The most important philosophical discussions of lying are to be found in St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Immanuel Kant. Aquinas differed from Augustine and Kant in holding that making a declarative statement to another person that one believes to be false is sufficient for lying; no further deceptive intention is needed. All three held that lying is wrong and that one should never lie; however they distinguished between not lying or being truthful, which is required, and being candid or volunteering believed truths, which is not. Augustine and Aquinas held that some lies, such as lies told to save the lives of innocents or lies told to avoid being defiled, that do not harm the particular person(s) lied to, are less egregious than other lies, such as malicious lies and lies told in the teaching of religion. All three argued that lying is a perversion of the faculty of speech, the natural end of which is the communication of thoughts. Augustine and Kant argued that in telling a lie one harms oneself, and undermines trust in society; hence there can never be a harmless lie. Kant also argued that a person cannot consent to being told a particular lie; hence in lying to another person one is necessarily treating that person as a mere means to one's end.

See also Deontological Ethics; Duty; Kantian Ethics; Moral Rules and Principles; Self-Deception; Virtue and Vice.

Bibliography

Adler, J. E. "Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating" Journal of Philosophy 94 (1997): 435–452.

Aquinas, St. Thomas. "Question 110: Lying." In Summa Theologiae, edited by Thomas Gilby. Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1969.

Augustine, St. "On Lying and Against Lying." In Treatises on Various Subjects, edited by R.J. Deferrari. New York: Fathers of the Church, 1952.

Bok, S. Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life. 2nd ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1999.

Chisholm, R. M., and T. D. Feehan. "The Intent to Deceive." Journal of Philosophy 74 (1977): 143–159.

Frankfurt, H. G. "The Faintest Passion." In Necessity, Volition, and Love. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Kant, I. Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, edited by Mary Gregor and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Mahon, J. E. "Kant on Lies, Candour, and Reticence." Kantian Review 7 (2003): 101–133.

Mannison, D. S. "Lying and Lies." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1969): 132–144.

Siegler, F. A. "Lying." American Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1966): 128–136.

James Edwin Mahon (2005)

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