Leyte Gulf, Battle of

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LEYTE GULF, BATTLE OF

LEYTE GULF, BATTLE OF (23–25 October 1944). As the first step in recapturing the Philippines, a huge American armada descended on Leyte Island in mid-October 1944. The invasion force, Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet, included some seven hundred vessels and five hundred aircraft. Supporting it was the Third Fleet, under Admiral William F. Halsey, with nearly one hundred warships and more than one thousand planes. Japan's sixty-four warships, operating under a defensive plan called Sho (Victory), immediately countered. From the north, aircraft carriers under Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa would lure Halsey away so that Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's battleships and Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima's cruisers could attack the exposed American amphibious assault units in Leyte Gulf.

Kurita's force left Borneo on 22 October in two groups. The larger group, under Kurita, would pass through the San Bernardino Strait and enter Leyte Gulf from the north. A smaller force, under Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura, moved through the Sulu Sea toward Surigao Strait—the southern entrance to Leyte Gulf—which he planned to enter simultaneously with Kurita. Early on 23 October, two American submarines attacked Kurita, sinking two heavy cruisers and badly damaging a third. Planes from Halsey's carriers assaulted Kurita the next day, sinking the 64,000-ton superbattleship Musashi and crippling a heavy cruiser. Simultaneously, land-based Japanese aircraft sank one of Halsey's carriers. Kurita, badly shaken, returned to Leyte Gulf too late for his planned rendezvous with Nishimura and Shima.

To the south, Kinkaid intercepted Nishimura in Surigao Strait. The American battleships and cruisers formed a line across the northern end of the strait, while destroyers and torpedo boats were stationed ahead to attack the Japanese flanks. First contact came about midnight of 24– 25 October, and, within a few hours, Nishimura was destroyed. Of seven Japanese vessels entering Surigao Strait, only a damaged cruiser and destroyer managed to escape. Only one U.S. destroyer was damaged, mistakenly struck by American fire. Shima's force, arriving shortly thereafter, was also warmly greeted but escaped with only slight damage. Pursuing American ships and planes sank another cruiser and destroyer before the surviving Japanese force could get away.

Meanwhile, before dawn on 25 October, Kurita's force steamed for Leyte Gulf. Halsey, who should have intercepted him, had rushed north to attack Ozawa, in the mistaken belief that Kurita was crippled and that Ozawa's carriers now constituted the main threat. Shortly after sunrise, Kurita struck Kinkaid's northernmost unit, a small force of escort carriers and destroyers. The tiny American force fought off the powerful Japanese fleet, while American destroyers made repeated attacks to cover the fleeing escort carriers. Suddenly, Kurita broke off his attack. Although he had sunk one escort carrier and three destroyers, he had suffered considerable damage. Aware of the destruction of Nishimura and Shima, and believing that he could no longer reach Leyte Gulf in time to do significant damage, the Japanese commander elected to escape with the remnants of his fleet. Far to the north, on the afternoon of 25 October in the final action of the battle, Halsey struck Ozawa's decoy force, sinking four Japanese carriers, a cruiser, and two destroyers.

The lopsided American victory destroyed the Japanese fleet as an effective fighting force. It also ensured the conquest of Leyte and cleared the way for the invasion and ultimate recapture of the Philippine Islands.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cannon, M. Hamlin. Leyte: The Return to the Philippines. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954.

Falk, Stanley L. Decision at Leyte. New York: Norton, 1966.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. Leyte, June 1944–January 1945.Vol. 12, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Boston: Little, Brown, 1958.

Stanley L.Falk/a. r.