Mobilization

Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing troops, materiel, and equipment for active military service in time of war or national emergency. As such, it brings together the military and civilian sectors of society to harness the total power of the nation. It is the mechanism that facilitates the successful prosecution of any conflict.

The modern process of preparing armies for war originated in the mid‐nineteenth century. Inherent in the modern usage of the term is the concept of a large national force, as opposed to the smaller professional forces of earlier times—armies that depended upon a warrior class maintained in almost perpetual readiness. As they developed generally, and in response to the Napoleonic Wars, European nations shifted to marshaling the entire nation‐state for war, and building large national armies. The term mobilization was first used in the 1850s to describe the preparation of the Prussian Army for deployment. Since then, it has become commonplace for governments, or states, to raise volunteers and employ conscription to create mass forces. Mobilization of the state harnesses the national economy to the military machine in order to conduct war.

For the United States, the Civil War brought the draft, mass armies, and massive economic changes. With full public support, both Northern and Southern governments raised volunteers, and within a year or two turned to conscription to help field national armies. Both governments tied their militaries to their respective economic bases to sustain the war effort for a prolonged period.

In the years following, America industrialized, expanding markets and interests beyond its own borders. International presence and wartime experience in Cuba and the Philippines kept military issues at the forefront of American policy. Although the armed forces were maintained at a relatively low level, reorganization in 1903 brought a General Staff to oversee the U.S. Army; planning and mobilization became regular missions.

In May 1917, President Woodrow Wilson approved the Selective Service System, which remained an instrument for raising armies in war and the Cold War until 1973. That solved the problem of recruiting and maintaining large national armies, but did not address the other half of the mobilization process. Producing equipment, supplies, and facilities turned out to be a far greater challenge. By sheer economic strength, at the end of World War I, the United States had built an army over 3.5 million strong with equally huge equipment surpluses.

The United States took some lessons from the staging and conducting of World War I. The warmaking had been so massive that an effort was made to standardize at least some of the procedures. The National Defense Act of June 1920 gave the assistant secretary of war responsibility for planning for industrial mobilization and for procurement through the War Department. Planning was done in the War Plans Division of the General Staff. Two initiatives were significant. One was the establishment of the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board in 1922, which brought the two services together to formulate joint strategy. The second was the creation of the Army Industrial College, which gave officers the opportunity to examine mobilization. Plans and studies followed. In these, availability of supplies and equipment determined the rate at which troops could be absorbed. However, they assumed that production would adjust to strategic plans—expanding and contracting as necessary—and that only one mobilization plan would cover a variety of possible contingencies. Gradual changes in preparedness or a measured transition to a mobilized state did not exist. Manpower and materiel were considered separately.

By the end of the 1930s, plans went beyond the role of the army to examine how the nation should organize the control of industry in war. In 1936, the War Resources Administration was designated responsible for control of wartime finance, trade, labor, and price control. By 1939, industrial mobilization plans stipulated that the War Resources Administration be established as soon as it became practical to do so. Economic mobilization was no longer tied to the outbreak of hostilities.

The army began developing defensive plans in the mid‐1930s, addressing the size and composition of an initial defense force and its support. They sought to mesh production schedules and to bring together rates of troop and materiel mobilization. They also provided for a small, well‐equipped emergency force to ensure security during general mobilization. That was sound enough to become the permanent basis for mobilization. The plans provided for detailed unit and individual training programs, as well as manuals and associated training materials. They established a system for mobilizing men and equipment already available.

The United States began mobilizing for World War II by the end of 1939, despite the American public's alienation from military participation in world affairs. The depression had produced much idle and obsolete industrial capacity. The Roosevelt administration encouraged private expansion of facilities for war production through accelerated depreciation and government financing. Lend‐Lease also helped stimulate production. Mobilization sped up in 1941, expanded dramatically in 1942, and peaked in 1943.

Although the United States has historically relied on mobilization to meet its wartime needs, with the start of the Cold War it began to maintain higher levels of military forces in peacetime and to deploy them in close proximity to potential enemies. American strategy assumed a short warning time to respond to its major threat, the Soviet Union. The ebb and flow of the Cold War was such that public consensus allowed the military to maintain a large active force in high state of readiness, with sizable stocks of supplies for logistics support.

The National Security Act of 1947 instituted governmentwide planning by establishing the organizational machinery to implement mobilization and deployment strategy. Management structures include the Department of Defense (DoD), the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The nation's commitment to readiness, in great part, was enabled by the Defense Production Act of 1950, which has since been extended or amended over forty times.

Success in mobilization depends upon the health of the national industrial base, the availability of manpower, the state of international trade, and the condition of the nation's foreign relations. In time of war or urgent national need, it is assumed that the marketplace will provide adequate industrial capacity.

Historically, the National Guard and Organized reserves have been the assets that supported national defense. Currently, America's reserve forces consist of two National Guard components, the army and air guard; and five reserve components, the army, navy, air force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Reserves. The Guard and organized reserves form the basis for expanding the active component in a military emergency. The National Guard and reserves are similar in that during wartime both are federal forces serving under the president. During peacetime, however, while the reserve is a federal force subordinate to the president, the Guard remains subordinate to the governor of each state, unless federalized by the president.

Mobilization levels depend upon the existence of forward bases, the level of industrial infrastructure, prepositioned equipment, industrial preparedness, preparedness planning, and public and congressional support. Ideally, high levels of any or all of those factors ease the entire process. Naturally, all are influenced by perceived threat. Generally, the higher the level of perceived threat, the higher the corresponding levels of support.

There are currently five levels of mobilization, governed by Title 10 of the U.S. code: selective, presidential selected reserve call‐up, partial, full, and total. These levels are not necessarily sequential. One level may precede another, but may not; they need not build upon one another. Certain policies and programs that immediately increase unit resources and readiness are available only when the president and Congress mobilize the reserve components of the armed forces. Conscription supports the expanding force structure, as determined by Congress and the president, but is not tied to any level of mobilization.

Selective mobilization is the expansion of the active forces by activating units and individuals of the selected reserve to protect life, federal property, and functions, or to prevent disruption of federal activities. This includes the call‐up of the National Guard, which can be done only for a specific purpose, such as the suppression of insurrection or conspiracy, prevention of unlawful obstructions or rebellions or abridgments of civil rights, to repel an invasion, or to execute the laws under legal authorities.

Presidential selected reserve call‐up gives the president authority to augment the active force with up to 200,000 members of the reserve component for up to 90 days, with an extension of a further 90 days. It does not require a declaration of national emergency, but does require a report to Congress within twenty‐four hours.

Partial mobilization requires presidential or congressional declaration of national emergency. The total force level could be as high as 1 million members of all services for up to twenty‐four months or less by presidential authority. If the presidential selected reserve call‐up already is in effect, the levels are cumulative; the ceiling is 1 million. A partial mobilization allows all selected reserve units and individuals (individual ready reserve, standby, and retired reserve) to be ordered to active duty.

Full mobilization is the state that exists when all units in the current force structure are called to active duty, fully equipped, fully manned, and sustained. Assumptions are that presidential selected reserve call‐up and partial mobilization have been completed and Congress has declared war or a state of national emergency. All reserve components are ordered to active duty for the duration of the war or emergency plus six months; industrial mobilization is initiated; allies are called on for support according to their treaty commitments.

Total mobilization is the expansion of the active armed force and the activation of additional units beyond the approved force structure. All additional resources, including production facilities, may be mobilized to support and sustain the active forces.

Overall, mobilization reflects American national and military history. As the nation has grown, physically and economically, so has its standing in the international community. Given the size of the armed forces today, their technological level and equipment requirements, and the diversity of threat and mission, the process of mobilization has become both more complex and more significant to the eventual success of the military force.
[See also Demobilization; Militia and National Guard; National Defense Acts; Reserve Forces Act; War Plans.]

Bibliography

Jacques S. Gansler , The Defense Industry, 1980.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mobilization, JCS no. 21, 1983.
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Uri Ra’anan, eds., The U.S. Defense Mobilization Infrastructure, 1983.
Roderick L. Vawter , Industrial Mobilization, 1983.
Hardy L. Merritt and Luther F. Carter, eds., Mobilization and the National Defense, 1985.

Susan Canedy