Collective behavior is the field of sociology that focuses on the sequences and patterns of interaction that emerge in problematic situations. The phenomena studied range from responses to disaster, the disorderly street mob, or the radical social upheaval to the peaceful and comparatively trivial shifts in the orientations of individuals and small groups that, occurring en masse, can produce major changes in taste, fashion, or public opinion. Indeed, subtle shifts of sentiment and opinion, in themselves difficult to detect, are often the first signs of more explosive occurrences such as panics, booms, crazes, psychic epidemics, and revolutionary uprisings.
Problematic situations are defined here as those in which participants lack adequate guides to conduct. Whenever imagery that is conventionally accepted or officially sanctioned fails to take account of, or runs counter to, deeply felt sentiments or common perceptions of reality, people create currents of agitation by their actions. They are stirred from the planes along which they normally move and remain agitated until they settle back again into a pattern resistant to further change. What takes place during the interlude is elementary collective problem solving rather than structured social action.
What initially attracted much interest to collective behavior was the element of drama almost invariably present in certain “mass” phenomena, whether in the form of novelty, bizarre behavior, exaggerated emotionality, violence, extremist ideology, or some kind of oddity. But fascination with and criticism of these unusual and “irrational” aspects of collective behavior soon gave way to more basic sociological concerns. Collective problem solving, it was observed, occurred not only in the midst of widespread chaos, confusion, and uncertainty but also in the most highly institutionalized settings. Some elementary aspect is actually present in every social encounter, since the behavior of the participants is never completely determined by prior expectations associated with the positions they occupy in stable social structures. Therefore, in this more theoretical sense, collective behavior is in fact ubiquitous, and every analysis that focuses on the dynamic (and therefore problematic) aspects of interaction deals to that extent with collective behavior phenomena.
The nature of collective behavior. Every elementary collective behavior episode involves a partial derailment of social interaction from its normatively structured or expected course. The significance of the derailment is more evident when it affects a large number of people who are agitated and actively concerned over some condition that they are trying to alleviate or redress. Although normative standards continue to have some influence on the direction in which activities unfold, the interaction is characterized by relatively greater spontaneity, volatility, and transitoriness than it would be if the behavior of the participants were more securely anchored in recognized norms.
To say that elementary collective behavior occurs spontaneously is to point to the role played in its initiation by individuals who experience greater subjective freedom or psychological compulsion to express unconventional ideas, to engage in unconventional behavior, or otherwise to deviate from established standards. But a lowering of the threshold of inhibition does not imply a total loss of the capacity for critical self-appraisal, even in states of extreme agitation. Few participants even in a highly excited crowd are acting either randomly or blindly; fewer still are governed by an impulse irresistible in any absolute sense. In fact, collective behavior can be, and often is, the product of highly self-conscious individual actions; for instance, bizarre as a fad may appear to the outsider, faddists themselves often act deliberately and see nothing strange in their actions. Hence, what happens in collective behavior is spontaneous in that it is rarely the product of prior consensus or design.
Volatility refers to the explosive force with which intense affect, intemperate opinions, or clear misapprehensions of reality are sometimes communicated and acted out. It also refers to the instability of responses under these conditions. Once the situation is “unfrozen” and orientations are no longer firmly anchored in conventions, participants begin to pay more attention to cues directly inferred from the behavior of others. Leadership passes to individuals because their actions are congruent with the prevailing psychological atmosphere. As a collective mood develops, the responses to directives from established authorities become uncertain and participants can get caught up in a vicious cycle of self-validating definitions. Thus, the more widespread a rumor, the more acceptance it gains; or fashions, once adopted, can reach the height of absurdity—yet both may be abandoned and forgotten not long after.
The elementary and spontaneous phase of agitation or enthusiasm is always of transitory duration. Spontaneous acts of defiance can, to be sure, spark a movement of radical protest; a charismatic prophet can bring divine inspiration to his following. However, unless an organized nucleus or core group continues to arouse and provoke the participants, their interactions are not likely to become form-defining. The behavior, if satisfying and followed by desirable consequences, will quickly congeal into new conventions with their own supporting structure and legitimate basis, though the spirit will soon pass out of these initially spontaneous forms.
All social conduct rests on a fabric of common meanings, on an imagery shared by relevant persons. This represents the collective definition of the situation. The processes by which such a definition arises or changes to support new and disjunctive behavior are best observed in situations that are inherently unstable, namely, where the presence of an element of choice, novelty, crisis, attrition, competitiveness, or conflict creates a problem. The collective definitions that develop in these situations tend to be highly dependent upon what participants themselves feel and directly experience at the given moment.
Choice implies the existence of alternatives and the freedom to select but no generally accepted criterion for making the selection. A novel situation is created by unfamiliar circumstances that have no precedents in the experience of participants. Crisis arises from extraordinary demands during an emergency that threaten to overtax the capacity of some organized group. Attrition develops when collective effort weakens as the result of a persistent and apparently irremediable difficulty. A competitive situation is one in which the reward structure, perceived as favoring an individual solution, interferes with a cooperative solution. Finally, conflict arises when one party attempts to enforce a dominant claim whose legitimacy is challenged by another.
When any of the above situations becomes problematic for many people, the conventionally accepted imagery will lose its authenticity. It may leave important areas of ambiguity, or it may be deliberately questioned and contradicted by some of those involved. The collective redefinition which then takes place provides the key to the new behavior likely to emerge. Though most problematic situations combine several elements—choice, novelty, etc.—each of these entails its own dynamic in generating a particular incident, episode, or movement clearly recognizable as collective behavior.
In the pure choice situation, the preference for one or the other of several alternatives reflects essentially subjective moods or tastes. Without an accepted utilitarian criterion to govern personal choice, people will orient themselves to the inferred appraisals of other persons, that is to say, to some transitory definition of what is “fitting” or in “good taste.” Such a situation gives rise to fashion. Not only the choice of dress but also all kinds of consumption, conduct, and intellectual, artistic, and even political pursuits become subject to fashion to the extent that the selections are functionally irrelevant, passing fancies whose chief value lies in the image of up-to-dateness which they convey. Once the new standard has diffused, most others will feel compelled to conform.
Novel situations brought about by changes in external life conditions or within the structure of the group also involve choices, but—in contrast with the pure choice situation—the selection among the alternatives is sought in terms of functionally relevant assessments. An innovation compatible with cultural definitions and social commitments can gain acceptance solely on the basis of its demonstrated effectiveness, because it requires only minor modifications in the collective image. Another innovation, whose acceptance would have far-reaching implications for several areas of behavior and belief, will need the support of prestigeful individuals to demonstrate its utility and thus to overcome resistance and inertia. This is all the more necessary where a collective decision is the only means of implementation. The propaganda and proselyting efforts by which images are manipulated to support an innovation are important attributes of social movements, which by their collective action seek to reconstitute the social order in some significant way.
The problematic aspects of the crisis situation (and of attrition) involve not so much choice and decision as coordination and control. An emergency calls for quick and decisive action. Though there is always a risk that the initial response to a crisis will be based on less than a full and accurate assessment of what is happening and of what needs to be done, the element of novelty in a crisis caused by an unprecedented situation is likely to aggravate any confusion. Often communication channels break down from the overload; activities cannot be fully coordinated. Hence the interpretations people make will be based to an unusual degree on chance observations, hearsay, and other unofficial sources of information. The transmission of “rumors” should be viewed as an improvised effort to elicit responses that will contribute to a working definition of the situation, and not primarily as a product of cognitive error.
The high level of activity demanded by a crisis cannot be sustained indefinitely. An attrition situation induces emotional adaptation of one kind or another to persisting and extreme demands. In the case of continuing threat, the inherent danger often comes to be minimized by a growing collective disbelief about its actual presence. The illusion that war is impossible (“unthinkable”) because our weapons are too destructive is one form such adaptation can take. More often, the persistent problem that defies a solution promotes fatalism as a justification for apathy. Or the cumulative irritability aroused in these circumstances can be displaced against whatever targets are available. Likewise, it can be converted into hysterical beliefs and symptoms that interfere with effective collective action to deal with the source of the difficulty.
Competition and conflict
Individual responses to a competitive situation and collective responses to conflict have a special propensity for generating a vicious cycle of reciprocal reactions whereby the initial condition that the responses are intended to alleviate is instead aggravated. For example, competitive scare buying in anticipation of future short-ages raises prices, thus confirming the expectation and justifying still more anticipatory purchases. Collectively these responses help produce the short-ages individuals had anticipated. In like manner, reactive interaction between antagonists who feel threatened escalates whatever conflict already exists. The image of the opponents changes; they become transformed into enemies. Fear, hostility, and suspicion magnify the original source of dispute, often to the point where violence and treachery are condoned and an open test of strength must precede any serious negotiations.
In terms of social control, competition or conflict can lead either to a crisis or to an attrition situation. Unfettered competitive dumping on the stock market, for example, can drop prices and create a crisis of confidence; prolonged conflict to the point of stalemate is inevitably accompanied by signs of serious attrition on both sides, even to a point where continued exertion no longer seems worthwhile.
Each of the problematic situations described above generates changes in the collective imagery (redefinitions) that legitimate changes in established social forms and lead to the emergence of new group properties. The problem-solving activity causes both temporary disruptions and permanent modifications of social structure. To understand the collective dynamics of these transformations, one must look not to the accidental attributes of the forms themselves but to the processes of trans-formation and the effects they have in different circumstances.
The first of these processes is convergence, either physical or behavioral. It results in a focalized response. Other collective responses develop from different processes, which may occur either concurrently or in temporal sequence. Demoralization culminates in an atomized response; collective defense in a solidary response; polarization in a reactive response; mass conversion in an apostate response; and crystallization in a schismatic response. To study processes is to depict the collective dynamics by which a particular incident, outburst, or movement develops.
Some collective behavior is nothing but the outcome of convergence. In physical convergence, the actual movements of people who flock to the scene of an accident, rush to get on the same train, make a pilgrimage to the same shrine, or take their vacations at the same resort produce “crowds.” Behavioral convergence refers to individual actions that coincide solely in being oriented toward the same object, as among those who purchase the same product, interest themselves in the same event, or adopt the same behavior, without all of the participants necessarily being in physical contact or even in communication with one another. Purely behavioral convergence by a sufficiently large number of individuals (or local groups) produces a “mass” rather than a crowd (Blumer 1939).
Sometimes convergence is the accidental product of independent but simultaneous actions by individuals (or local groups) that just happen to coincide; at other times, the convergence is largely imitative and occurs in stages. In either case, convergence is essentially an ecological phenomenon that does not depend on a cooperative response but merely on the exercise of individual (or unit) choices. Yet the convergence of choices can have serious implications. Accidental physical convergence, as in a traffic jam or during a disaster, creates bottlenecks, which constitute a problem and require special effort to resolve. At the same time, the density of any crowd and the difficulties in controlling it increase the likelihood that interaction will be derailed. Once such a multitude gets out of hand, new behavior often spreads by imitation, but accidental convergence, unless it becomes imitative, usually produces only the most transient forms of interaction. The spread of a fashion or fad, or the gradual acceptance of a new implement, technique, or policy, illustrates convergence that is both behavioral and imitative. Rapid diffusion of an innovation is usually made possible by a novel element that both attracts the attention of people and appeals to their hankering.
The simplest way to define demoralization is as the process by which morale is undermined. Morale is a condition or state that measures the capacity of members of a collectivity to pursue, despite disruptive influences, a socially legitimate objective. Groups, organizations, movements, and even whole societies have varying levels of morale. When morale is high, members of a collectivity individually or collectively confronted with a problematic situation will continue to exert themselves to cooperate. Demoralization sets in when changes in the perceived balance of rewards make cooperation no longer seem attractive or worth the effort. It leads to the atomization of responses.
By and large, the cohesiveness of a group, as well as the confidence its members have in the efficacy of any joint endeavor, will be adversely affected by prolonged and serious frustration, deprivation, threat, and other types of adversity. Moderate stress, however, promotes learning without causing loss of confidence in the collective enterprise. It gives the members an opportunity to rehearse and internalize the responses appropriate for overcoming specific difficulties they encounter. In general, when group morale is high, fear of failure (“letting the group down”) will help counter fears of personal harm or injury, whose disruptive effects on performance are potentially greater. But the effects of severe or prolonged stress tend to become cumulative. They make focal to each individual the risks he personally faces, and ultimately weaken the group ties that can be invoked to counter the effects of harm anxiety. As studies of military groups and of communities in disaster have shown, the relationship between stress and demoralization is essentially curvilinear. Danger successfully weathered without serious loss or damage usually increases solidarity and the capacity to cope with similar situations.
The solidary response signifies the successful development of a collective defense against demoralization through the spontaneous coalescence of individual reactions. Most collective defenses are socially structured. All societies develop standard practices that function as mechanisms for containing anxieties, practices that are analogous and correspond to the characterological defenses of individual persons. Similarly, societies provide ritualistic occasions during which certain expressions in contradiction to moral standards are evoked. The latter function as safety valves for blocked emotions. In their ritual version such excesses tend to be explicitly condoned, but during an organized demonstration, a strike, or a celebration, behavior that is worrisome or even repugnant to authorities may simply be permitted to take its natural course. The process of collective defense represents the coalescence of behavior to serve as a spontaneously shared mechanism of defense against demoralization. Particularly in an emotionally charged group atmosphere, where there is considerable tension between the desires of individuals and the demands of group membership, any successful disguise or neutralization of this tension produces an elementary solidarity conducive to the acting out of impulses or to making demands whose open expression would not be tolerable.
Among the more common expressions of collective defense are bodily symptoms, convulsive laughter, and action based on hysterical beliefs. These can quickly become collective when the real source of anxiety, experienced by all, is poorly understood or cannot be acknowledged because of existing taboos. Disturbances that appear irrational—like witch hunts, nativist phenomena, violent mob action, and even some religious revivals—are typical of the forms collective defenses may take when institutional means for resolving tensions on the intrapersonal and interpersonal levels are lacking. The members of a mob typically refer to some norm of justice, personified by their particular heroes or violated by the villain against whom vengeance or redress is sought, which their action is intended to uphold.
A solidary response achieved on the subgroup level at the expense of over-all consensus constitutes, in terms of the larger social system, a polarized or reactive response. The process of polarization develops from the reactive escalation of antagonisms that progressively harden divergent viewpoints into partisan commitments. Through mutual withdrawal, participation and communication gradually come to be confined within each sector, and mutually dependent but opposing definitions of the situation emerge.
Factional alignments that coincide with already existing social divisions have a high potential for polarization. The issues that emerge merely rein-force the cleavages already endemic within the collectivity, particularly if the effects of a persisting difficulty or of a disaster have very different effects on these segments. In such a case, the many issues that emerge will tend to coincide with the single dominant axis of polarization. Conversely, a highly pluralistic structure—whether in a society or in an organization—will tend to produce shifting coalitions that moderate the intensity of conflict on any single point. Only an issue with far-reaching moral ramifications can generate sufficient pressure to force all individuals to choose one of two sides and to disrupt all competing group allegiances that cut across the particular factional alignment.
While polarization produces a strain toward consistency that sharpens endemic divisions and increases their salience, the process of mass conversion involves a drastic reorganization of experience through the assimilation of culturally and ideologically disjunctive attitudes and the development of new group affiliations to sup-port them. In short, mass conversion culminates in collective apostasy.
Despite its evident historic significance, the dynamics of mass conversion and apostasy are poorly understood. The acceptance of a new ideology and of “culture change” seems to hinge on “critical” life experiences. Novelty, crisis, and attrition highlight inadequacies in prevailing imagery and weaken traditionally binding commitments. But the positive adherence to a new ideology by an individual involves a status change and the severance of existing interpersonal ties, or at least their redefinition. By the same token, collective apostasy entails parallel status movements, as when mass migrations, coercive acculturation, or structural change in the stratification system forces many people, more or less at the same time, to adapt to a new milieu.
The importance of status change is perhaps best documented by reference to ideological conversion (“brainwashing”) fostered by techniques of coercive indoctrination in a controlled milieu. Here individuals are isolated together from their normal social relationships. But the crucial mechanism of conversion is to be found in the inevitable disruption of status relations by the succession of generations. Not only do unique “historical” experiences shared by members of one generation influence the way the present is viewed, but the “rising” generation is always under pressure to redefine its relation to the older generation, whose members are “on the way out.” Disjunctive ideological changes are most likely to occur where the power monopoly of an older cohort prevents a younger one from asserting what it considers as its rightful claim. Sometimes, however, military defeat, economic depression, and other calamities bring status deprivation primarily to the old, who then transmit deviant ideological images to younger people whose status relations are not directly affected by the new conditions. [SeeGenerations.]
The earliest articulation of dif-fuse unrest into ideologically deviant tendencies occurs within schismatic groups—gangs, sects, and other sectarian associations that usually recruit among alienated individuals disenchanted with culture-forming institutions. Such groups offer these individuals a fellowship and understanding they do not find elsewhere in the society. The nuclei of such groupings form by a process of crystallization that involves a conscious act of disaffiliation. Thus the activities and beliefs of sectarians do not naturally evolve from group relations linked to other statuses they occupy in society; rather, being a sectarian presupposes a willingness to subordinate all competing social relationships to the demands of the schismatic group.
As a consequence of their self-imposed insulation, the world of the radical sectarians is correspondingly narrowed. Common access to ecstatic experience and esoteric wisdom, not available to outsiders, promotes a mentality with low tolerance for dissent and invites frequent internal schisms to preserve the purity of the group from contamination. In the gang, the rejection of the dominant order is expressed in contempt for social constraints imposed by outsiders, but contempt may be coupled with a concern for reform or exploitation of the existing order. The rigoristic sect, by contrast, turns its attention away from a world defined as corrupt; its members seek a purer morality, some-times realizable only in the hereafter. Sometimes the two forms exist together, as among the medieval Brethren of the Free Spirit, who, by virtue of their doctrine of immanence, believed that each of them incorporated the divine principle and hence was no longer subject to any law higher than himself. [SeeSects and cults.]
In the schismatic group, one observes the direct influence of the deviant with charisma whose “inspired” message exerts a magnetic appeal to the culturally déraciné, to those suffering from marginality and downward mobility, and those who find in it a legitimized outlet for their intrapsychic conflicts. Thus, the schismatic group may offer a reliable source of support for pathological tendencies (for example, the adolescent gang leader’s paranoid projections confirmed by gang codes). Schismatic groups are properly encompassed under collective behavior because (1) they form through the spontaneous sharing of sentiments expressed in fluid and transient patterns of interaction, whether or not these crystallize thereafter; (2) given the total commitment and fanaticism of their members, they provide the active cells and core groups of social movements, whose agitation and proselytizing efforts are directed, explicitly or unintentionally, toward the reconstitution of the social order in some significant way.
Crowd episodes are strategic research sites in which to observe collective problem-solving activity in its natural setting. Any large gathering of people at one place can properly be designated as a crowd; yet the behavior of such a gathering arouses interest primarily when participants, reacting to the presence of others, engage in some highly emotional, unusual, or disapproved activity or when this activity results in some significant harm or damage to persons or to property. Responsibility for this orientation can be traced to the nineteenth-century progenitors of the theory of the crowd—the collective psychologists, among whom Gustave Le Bon (1895) was the best-known, though certainly not the most systematic, thinker. Their speculations, spawned in decades of political disturbance, increasing industrial conflict, and rising patriotic fervor, dwelled on the “psychological crowd” and the “mass” as forms of collective behavior through which the lower orders exerted their will by sheer numbers. By metaphorical ex-tension, these concepts then came to be applied not only to the actions of street mobs but to all traces of irrationality evident in even the most central institutions of bourgeois society, such as the parliament, the press, and the money markets. Caught up in the pathological contagion of the crowd, men were thought to be transformed and to be removed from the influence of society and culture, while all institutions responsive to the influence of large numbers (the “mass”) were thereby corrupted. [SeeMass society.]
The current theory of the crowd has only gradually freed itself from this mystique. Before it could do so, such diverse phenomena as riots, revolutionary crowds, lynch mobs, marauding mobs, collective revelry, solemn assemblies, excited audiences, noisy demonstrations, hysterical outbursts, panic flights, competitive stampedes, and so forth had to be viewed in their specific historical, social, and cultural settings instead of being attributed directly to the peculiar psychological forces inherent in large numbers. Although the images and collective definitions guiding participants may be changed, elaborated, and intensified within the crowd situation, they rarely spring full-blown from these interactions. The problem is to distinguish analytically between the ecological basis of crowd behavior, including the images and ideas that bring people to the scene, and the collective processes that account for its dynamic. Hence most crowds, far from being a simple antithesis to organized society, actually originate within some established group or express cleavages and divisions existing within the society at large.
Collective processes in crowd episodes
Any unusual event occurring in a public place which many people traverse or where they congregate will quickly attract a large number of onlookers. By their physical convergence, those drawn to the scene collectively form a “crowd.” Ordinarily their interactions will have no significance beyond momentary curiosity, which is satisfied once they have found out what is going on. There is some collective redefinition, but it does not culminate in what is usually thought of as crowd behavior.
When the physical convergence of a multitude results from individual actions of persons intent on gaining some highly valued object in scarce supply, the ecology of participation has significance beyond the mere focalization of responses. In an escape mob or a competitive stampede, for example, the efforts of individuals to attain their objectives are intensified as they become aware of the breakdown of social control. Their coincidental movements toward a narrow passageway to safety, toward some esteemed idol, or to gain some competitive advantage produce crowding that interferes with the movements of other individuals toward the same objective. While behavior on any individual’s part can continue to be purposeful and adaptive, the interaction of all these individuals together results in chaos and disorder. It is because the individual responses remain atomized that the pattern, collectively, becomes one of demoralization. Collectively, these responses preclude concerted or cooperative action; the affective ties that may have united the participants before cease to be binding.
The individualistic crowd depicted here hardly provides an adequate model for the study of crowd behavior. First, its occurrence, like that of the crowd of onlookers, has a highly accidental character and hinges on very special ecological circumstances. Though the formation of an escape mob, for instance, is facilitated in situations where group ties are weak to begin with, such disengagement of individuals from their social obligations is more typically expressed in apathetic withdrawal, low personal esprit, violation of norms in private, psychiatric malaise, etc. Second, participants in other crowd episodes, as in a riot, a lynching, or a looting expedition, usually manifest some sense of common purpose. The psychic unity of the “crowd,” no matter how rudimentary, signifies some degree of structuring that the individualistic crowd cannot develop unless the behavior of participants is reoriented and thereby ceases to be “individualistic.” Third, many disorders treated as “crowds” involve behavioral rather than physical convergence. The collective pattern results as the behavior of a group in one area is repeated in other areas. A spate of racial incidents throughout a city adds up to a “race riot”; the cultivation of the paroxysms characteristic of chorea minor by many groups comes to be defind as an epidemic of “dancing mania.”
Periods of special stress and tension have been marked by both a rise in crowd activity and an increased tendency toward demoralization. Thus, collective disturbances in custodial institutions, such as prison riots, tend to coincide with administrative changeover; outbreaks of the dancing mania in medieval Europe and Japan have been related to epidemic scourges and social dislocations; peaks of rioting in France, England, and Mexico have been shown to occur together with a sharp increase in the price of bread or a drop in wages; interethnic mob violence has its background in the competition for jobs, housing, or public facilities and benefits. The fact that the same precipitating conditions are associated with both a tendency toward demoralization and with outbursts of crowd activity points to a link between the two. Therefore, the physical suffering and status deprivations that contribute to demoralization appear to be necessary but not sufficient conditions for the increased activity of “crowds.”
The second critical element is to be found in the adequacy of socially structured defenses for coping with stress. The activity developed by crowds can be understood as a spontaneously shared defense against demoralizing tendencies whenever acceptable modes for coping with anxiety generated within a situation are lacking. Through collective rather than individual action some of the stress experienced by individuals is transferred to the larger social system. This process whereby individuals and groups collectively defend themselves against demoralization can be observed en masse as well as among physical contact groups.
Three major elements involved in collective defense against the demoralizing effects of stress are situationally sanctioned collective license, mass hysteria, and the coercive enforcement of norms by illicit and extralegal methods of intimidation. A single episode or incident can involve all three elements, but the element predominating will vary according to the nature of the anxieties generated and the manner in which a collective response develops.
The licentious crowd. Collective license is usually triggered by the impulsiveness of some individuals who, lacking effective personal controls, are forever seeking opportunities for self-indulgence. Such personalities are exceedingly skillful in sizing up situations that permit them to violate norms while minimizing the risk of punishment or even having to face up to the full implications of antisocial acts. Large assemblages, especially after they have gotten a bit out of hand, attract persons with whose pathological dispositions these initial acts may coincide. Psychopaths, always found in prison populations, frequently touch off major disturbances; the probability of a disturbance can be inferred from the number of such psychopaths among the inmates of a prison.
Still, personality obviously represents only a condition that predisposes toward acting out. The effective neutralization of culpability and guilt constitutes an equally important condition: temporarily, at least, normative restraints must be perceived as having for practical purposes become inoperative. The failure of authorities to intervene decisively is of particular importance. It generates the impression that the acts of the “crowd” are at least tacitly condoned. Similarly, the image of authorities as hypocritical or corrupt negates the legitimacy of such intervention but gives tacit sanction to the contravention of norms.
The hysterical crowd. Where hysteria is the predominant element, outbursts more likely involve persons who normally restrain their inclinations toward self-indulgence and impulsiveness but whose defenses are of such primitive character that they verge on panic when environmental pressures build up and habitual defenses are no longer adequate. The point is that the nature of the problem causing the anxiety is obscure to the participants. They feel in danger of being overwhelmed in ways that they cannot themselves accept and which they feel are equally unacceptable to other members of their group. In the classical form of the hysterical epidemic, the anxiety of persons, each of whom experiences inner conflict, is converted into a somatic disturbance, usually of a markedly stereotyped character. The behavioral symptom of the individual first or most shaken gives objective expression to the diffuse anxiety and hence becomes the catalyst around which the collective behavior crystallizes.
A highly repressive setting that offers few opportunities for individualized expression—a strictly supervised boarding school, or nunnery, or reformatory—is most conducive to outbreaks of epidemic hysteria. Many major social dislocations have been accompanied by the massive sharing of psychopathological symptoms. Convulsions, paroxysms, and other forms of hysteria are often deliberately elicited in religious revivals and by prophetic cults or nativist movements that arise as collective responses to stress. These first stammering attempts at collective problem solving are readily superseded by more effective forms of remedial action. The Welsh revival, for example, was replaced within a decade by militant trade unionism in the very areas in which it had its strongest hold. Similarly, the cargo cults of the southwest Pacific and the African prophet phenomena have been the precursors of political movements once new means for the articulation of grievances could be worked out. [SeeNativism and revivalism.]
The acting crowd. The character of crowd behavior as collective defense is most evident when an aggrieved population acts directly and coercively to assert its own norms against established authority or to impose its own conception of justice against deviants defined as a threat. Although such action often involves a deliberate defiance of authorities, the willful violation of laws, and savage acts of intimidation, violence, and destructiveness, it nevertheless represents a method of social control, however primitive the means employed. This type of acting crowd forms when institutional channels for the expression of grievances are ineffective or totally lacking. In such circumstances, crowds can usurp authority simply by virtue of the power that resides in superior numbers. The lynch mob sees that “justice” is done; the mass demonstration forces the recognition of its demands; and acts of destructiveness often succeed in drawing attention to social grievances (for instance, the Luddites destroyed machinery in order to intimidate the owners into complying with standards and practices by which handicraftsmen were trying to protect their interests). As Rudé (1964) in particular has pointed out, most crowds are far from indiscriminate in their selection of objects on which to heap vengeance. Their threats and destructiveness are confined to those who pose some direct or implied danger.
In its disposition to raise nondebatable demands, the acting crowd—much more than the licentious or hysterical crowd—underscores the breakdown of intergroup norms as a condition for its emergence. A rigidly stratified society without channels for airing protests or conducting negotiations to adjust grievances encourages the riot and the revolutionary demonstration as the only effective means of seeking redress. The typical race or ethnic riot is likewise indicative of a degree of polarization before mediating roles and accommodationist institutions have had a sufficient chance to emerge as a means of softening conflict. Each provocation, especially one involving direct action, arouses reactive responses that diminish the faith in orderly procedures and even-handed justice. Many incidents, in themselves of only minor significance, contribute to an atmosphere of suspiciousness in which violence becomes expected. In such an atmosphere, threats and response to threats are likely to reinforce each other, so that hostility on both sides is dramatically increased.
Explaining crowd behavior
The fact that much direct action by crowds arises from the activity of groups leads to the temptation to attribute whatever course is pursued to the influence of instigators and agitators who seek to turn the anxieties and grievances of some susceptible population to their own advantage. Accordingly, a looting crowd is seen as a pillaging expedition led by a few daring individuals; a street brawl becomes a clash between groups led by paranoid leaders; or a political disturbance is denounced as the product of professional sectarian agitation. This class of explanations tends to overlook the internal dynamics by which a single crowd episode can pass through several mutations.
These mutations can be accounted for without recourse to uncanny psychological forces. The composition of a specific crowd supplies clues about the problems its activities mean to resolve. But most urban centers that contain dense populations also harbor many diverse elements who are likely to dilute the unity of purpose of any specific crowd. Thus, the confusion and disorder exploited by some persons as an opportunity for all kinds of license aggravates the anxieties of others and provides a focus for their hysterical fears. Mutations in behavior also occur as responses to the competitive efforts of agents provocateurs to gain the attention of and to influence those present. Most crowds contain not only participants—active and passive—but also victims and innocent bystanders, who respond to rumors and misapprehend the situation or who inadvertently find themselves swept up in the line of march. The involvement of these people in the crowd contributes to its unpredictability. Furthermore, the ecology of a crowd is such that persons experience it from different perspectives and no participant can have an overview of all that is going on. Physical crowding limits the view and confuses the picture. Under the cover of this confusion still other unanticipated acts of collective defense are committed by groups of persons who are reacting to what happens from their own particular perspective.
Finally, the experience in crowds can be related to the conversion process, since it may produce new images (ideological commitments) or new groupings out of which social ferment and social movements grow. It must be pointed out, however, that claims about the number of conversions effected during the crowd excitement of a mass revival have rarely withstood the objective scrutiny of the researcher. As a rule, such conversion experiences mark merely a rite de passage into a new status that the neophyte has eagerly sought; most others among the apparent converts backslide as soon as the excitement fades. On the other hand, crowd action that successfully defies authorities or brings governments tumbling down opens new spheres of participation that were never previously envisaged.
The special mystique with which the crowd has so often been invested—that of a pathological force compelling men to act contrary to their usual behavior—must finally be put to rest and be replaced by a sociological analysis. The main task for such analysis is to find links between the specific content of the impulses, fears, grievances, and demands that characterize the participants in any crowd episode and the conditions under which the crowd comes to form and the goals it pursues. The conceptualization of crowd episodes in terms of collective processes emphasizes the relationship of such apparently irrational outbursts to inadequacies and strains in the social structure. Crowd behavior needs to be studied as collective problem-solving activity within the larger context of social and organizational breakdown and change.
Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang
[Directly related are the entriesFashion; Mass phenomena; Social movements. Other relevant material may be found inAttitudes, article onattitude change; Brainwashing; Cohesion, social; Social control; and in the biography ofLe Bon.]
Blumer, Herbert(1939) 1951 Collective Behavior. Pages 167-222 in Alfred M. Lee (editor), New Outline of the Principles of Sociology. 2d ed., rev. New York: Barnes & Noble.
Gluckman, Max 1954 Rituals of Rebellion in Southeast Africa. Manchester Univ. Press.
Grosser, George H. et al. (editors) 1964 The Threat of Impending Disaster. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. → On the process of demoralization.
Jacques, Elliott 1955 Social Systems as a Defense Against Persecutory and Depressive Anxiety. Pages 478–498 in Melanie Klein, Paula Heimann, and R. E. Money-Kyrle (editors), New Directions in Psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books.
Lang, Kurt; and Lang, Gladys 1961 Collective Dynamics. New York: Crowell.
Le Bon, Gustave (1895) 1947 The Crowd. New York: Macmillan. → First published as Psychologie des foules. A paperback edition was published in 1960 by Viking.
McGill University, Montreal, Department of Sociology and Anthropology 1956 The Formation, Nature, and Control of Crowds, by William A. Westley. Ottawa: Dept. of National Defense, Defense Research Board. → Contains a comprehensive bibliography.
Park, Robert E. (1913–1944)1950–1955 Collected Papers of Robert Ezra Park. 3 vols. Edited by Everett C. Hughes et al. Glencoe, iii.: Free Press. → Volume 1: Race and Culture, 1913–1944. Volume 2: Human Communities: The City and Human Ecology, 1916–1939. Volume 3: Society: Collective Behavior, News and Opinion, Sociology and Modern Society, 1918–1942. → See especially Volume 3.
RudÉ, George 1964 The Crowd in History: 1730–1848. New York: Wiley.
Smelser, Neil J. (1962)1963 Theory of Collective Behavior. London: Routledge; New York: Free Press.
Swanson, G. E. 1953 A Preliminary Laboratory Study of the Acting Crowd. American Sociological Review 18:522–533.
Turner, Ralph H. 1964 Collective Behavior. Pages 382–425 in Robert E. L. Faris (editor), Handbook of Modern Sociology. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Turner, Ralph H.; and Killian, Lewis M. 1957 Collective Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
"Collective Behavior." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. . Encyclopedia.com. (April 28, 2017). http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciences-magazines/collective-behavior
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The term collective wisdom refers to the notion that the totality of knowledge, experience, and skills possessed by the members of a group, whether large or small, typically exceeds that of any individual in the group, and that the members acting in concert are thus capable of judgments, problem-solving, and decision-making that will lead to better outcomes than one could expect of any one of them acting alone. Such a belief, in part, lies at the base of democratically organized groups, as well as larger, more complex social entities. It is also reflected in such popular expressions as, “Two heads are better than one.”
The above presumptions have been objects of skepticism historically, as James Surowiecki (2004) has aptly illustrated in citing the less than charitable views of such notable figures as Henry David Thoreau, Thomas Carlyle, Gustave Le Bon, and Friedrich Nietzsche, all of whom took a dim view of the virtues of collective judgment and action. Surowiecki credits Carlyle, for example, with the observation, “I do not believe in the collective wisdom of individual ignorance” (p. xvi). The derogatory phrase “pooling of ignorance,” which one frequently hears critics ascribe to group decision-making and problem-solving, clearly resonates with Carlyle’s cynicism, as well as that of others.
Underlying the skepticism, unfortunately, is a misrepresentation of the concept. The notion of collective wisdom does not entail the presumption that informed thought, judicious choice, and effective action result in some magical, inexplicable way from the combination of individuals who are not singly capable of these things. Rather, it assumes that the knowledge, experience, and skills of those acting as an entity are often complementary, as well as compensatory. As a result, the entity enlarges its potential for effective judgment, choice, and action. The potential of the group, however, does not exceed the limits of its members. Hence, a group whose members, for instance, lack relevant task-related expertise and ability is not one we would expect to surpass the performance of a single individual who does, let alone a group whose members are all in possession of such expertise and ability. Indeed, evidence supports this presumption (see Beach and Connolly 2005; Shaw 1981).
Collective wisdom was the focus of a good deal of scholarly interest early in the history of social psychology and the concept has continued to attract attention. From the 1920s to well into the 1960s, much attention was paid to questions concerning the relative superiority/inferiority of individuals versus groups in respect to judgment (e.g., Jenness 1932), problem-solving (e.g., Davis and Restle 1963), and learning (e.g., Yuker 1955). Comparative inquiries provided reasonably substantial evidence in support of the presumptions associated with the concept of collective wisdom, as in many cases groups were revealed to make better judgments, show greater effectiveness in problem-solving, and experience larger gains in learning than individuals with whom they were compared. Other later evidence from research on brainstorming further indicated that groups are capable of generating more ideas, as well as a higher proportion of high-quality and novel ideas, than individuals acting alone. Such findings by no means have been unequivocal, however, especially in respect to brainstorming (see Beach and Connolly 2005, Frey 1997; Shaw 1981).
Determining reasons for the discrepancy between the potential collective wisdom affords and the observed performance of groups in particular has been a focus of at least three different areas of scholarly inquiry: diversity of membership, the influence of social variables, and, most recently, collective information-sampling bias. Each offers a different understanding of and insight into the reasons for the inconsistency.
The oldest of the areas of inquiry mentioned is that relating to diversity. Early research had as a focus similarities and differences among the members of groups, initially in respect to abilities and demographic characteristics and later on the basis of personality profiles. On the whole, heterogeneous groups have been found to outperform homogeneous groups (Frey 1997; Shaw 1981). One explanation for why groups do not consistently outperform individuals, then, is suggested by such outcomes. Specifically, groups whose members are too similar to one another have little potential for displaying collective wisdom that exceeds the abilities of any given individual member. Conversely, diversity, while often an asset to a group, can also be a source of disruption that impairs relationships among members and thereby impedes performance (Porter and Samovar 2003).
Social variables can also limit the potential for collective wisdom to operate consistently. This has been demonstrated by Irving Janis’s studies (1972, 1982, 1989) of groupthink, its sources (such as pressure for uniformity, the desire to maintain a harmonious climate, and the undue influence of those in positions of authority), and the heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to which the members of groups often resort when under groupthink’s influence. If the interaction among the members of such groups does not function to overcome the constraints that contribute to the abandonment of rational forms of judgment and choice, one cannot expect to see groups perform more effectively than individuals (Gouran and Hirokawa 1996, 2003). In fact, one would have reason to predict that such bodies might well perform less effectively.
Finally, and most recently, some scholars have begun to focus on an interesting phenomenon in group interaction that has further explanatory value in accounting for the inconsistently demonstrable superiority of groups as compared to individuals: collective information-processing bias (see Beach and Connolly 2005; Propp 1999; Stasser and Titus 1985). There has been much evidence of a tendency for the members of groups to focus in decision-making and problem-solving discussions on the information they all have in common rather than information they as individuals uniquely possess. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to expect that a group would be more likely to arrive at better decisions and more effective solutions to problems than the most knowledgeable, experienced, and able individual member.
In conclusion, scholarship has established through empirical evidence that collective wisdom is a property of groups. It is not, however, a property that universally enables a group to surpass the performance or exceed the wisdom of its most competent member. How well it functions to assist groups in maximizing their performance depends on the amount they possess, as well as the extent to which other counteracting variables become intrusive.
SEE ALSO Attitudes; Attitudes, Political; Conformity; Decision-making; Democracy; Elitism; Groupthink; Knowledge; Nietzsche, Friedrich; Rational Choice Theory; Rationality; Social Judgment Theory; Social Psychology; Thoreau, Henry David
Beach, Lee Roy, and Terry Connolly. 2005. The Psychology of Decision Making: People in Organizations. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Davis, James H., and Frank Restle. 1963. The Analysis of Problems and Prediction of Group Problem Solving. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 66 (February): 103–116.
Frey, Lawrence R. 1997. Individuals in Groups. In Managing Group Life: Communicating in Decision-Making Groups, eds. Lawrence R. Frey and J. Kevin Barge, 52–79. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Gouran, Dennis S., and Randy Y. Hirokawa. 1996. Functional Theory and Communication in Decision-Making and Problem-Solving Groups: An Expanded View. In Communication and Group Decision Making, 2nd ed., eds. Randy Y. Hirokawa and Marshall Scott Poole, 55–80. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Gouran, Dennis S., and Randy Y. Hirokawa. 2003. Effective Decision Making and Problem Solving in Groups: A Functional Perspective. In Small Group Communication Theory and Research: An Anthology, 8th ed., eds. Randy Y. Hirokawa, Robert S. Cathcart, Larry A. Samovar, and Linda D. Henman, 27–38. Los Angeles: Roxbury.
Janis, Irving L. 1982. Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. 2nd rev. ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Originally published as Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).
Janis, Irving L. 1989. Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management. New York: Free Press.
Jenness, Arthur. 1932. The Role of Discussion in Changing Opinions Regarding a Matter of Fact. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 27: 279–296.
Porter, Richard E., and Larry A. Samovar. 2003. Communication in the Multicultural Group. In Small Group Communication Theory and Research: An Anthology, 8th ed., eds. Randy Y. Hirokawa, Robert S. Cathcart, Larry A. Samovar, and Linda D. Henman, 230–238. Los Angeles: Roxbury.
Propp, Kathleen M. 1999. Collective Information Processing in Groups. In The Handbook of Group Communication Theory and Research, eds. Lawrence R. Frey, Dennis S. Gouran, and Marshall Scott Poole, 225–250. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Shaw, Marvin E. 1981. Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small Group Behavior. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Stasser, Garold, and William Titus. 1985. Pooling of Unshared Information in Group Decision Making: Biased Information Sampling during Discussion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 48 (6): 1467–1478.
Surowiecki, James. 2004. The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies, and Nations. New York: Doubleday.
Yuker, Harold E. 1955. Group Atmosphere and Memory. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 51 (1): 17–23.
Dennis S. Gouran
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Contemporary usage of the term collective memory is largely traceable to Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), who wrote extensively in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912) about commemorative rituals, and to his student, Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945), who published a landmark study on The Social Frameworks of Memory in 1925. For Halbwachs, who accepted Durkheim’s sociological critique of philosophy, studying memory is not a matter of reflecting on the properties of the subjective mind; rather, memory is a matter of how minds work together in society, how their operations are structured by social arrangements: “It is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories” (Halbwachs 1992, p. 38). Halbwachs thus argued that it is impossible for individuals to remember in any coherent and persistent fashion outside of their group contexts. Group memberships provide the materials for memory and prod the individual into recalling particular events and into forgetting others. Groups can even produce memories in individuals of events that they never experienced in any direct sense. Halbwachs thus resisted the more extreme intuitionist subjectivism of philosopher Henri Bergson (1859–1941) (whose work had nevertheless led Halbwachs to his interest in memory), as well as the commonsense view of remembering as a purely—perhaps even quintessentially—individual affair.
In contrast to Halbwachs’s discussion in The Social Frameworks of Memory, however—in which he argues that what individuals remember is determined by their group memberships but still takes place in their own minds—in The Legendary Topography of the Holy Land (1941) and elsewhere Halbwachs focused on publicly available commemorative symbols, rituals, and representations. This more Durkheimian discussion in turn undergirded Halbwachs’s contrast between “history” and “collective memory” not as one between public and private but as one based on the relevance of the past to the present: Both history and collective memory are publicly available social facts—the former “dead,” the latter “living.” Halbwachs alternately referred to autobiographical memory, historical memory, history, and collective memory. Autobiographical memory is memory of those events that we ourselves experience (though those experiences are shaped by group memberships), while historical memory is memory that reaches us only through historical records. History is the remembered past to which we no longer have an “organic” relation—the past that is no longer an important part of our lives—while collective memory is the active past that forms our identities.
While rightly credited with establishing “collective memory” both as a concept and as a subject for sociological research, Halbwachs is far from the only scholar to have thought systematically about the (changing) relationship between the past and the present. Before Halbwachs, the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) had distinguished among original history (eyewitnessing and chronicling), reflective history (scientific), and philosophical history (teleological). Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) in turn distinguished among antiquarian, monumental, and critical uses of the past.
In contemporary scholarship, the so-called history of mentalities has pursued a “collective psychology” approach to cultural history, seeing images of the past as part of “the whole complex of ideas, aspirations, and feelings which links together the members of a social group” (Goldmann 1964, p. 17), and thus forms an important topic for historical investigation. In Germany, many historians and social scientists have revived an older, philosophical concept of “historical consciousness” (Geschichtsbewusstsein ) to guide analysis, linking it to concerns about “the politics of history” (Geschichtspolitik ), which indicates both the role of history in politics and the role of politics in history. Yet another camp has employed the awkward yet insightful term mnemohistory, which “unlike history proper … is concerned not with the past as such, but only with the past as it is remembered” (Assmann 1997, p. 9). Mnemohistory thus calls for a theory of cultural transmission that helps us understand history not simply as one thing after another nor as a series of objective stages, but as an active process of meaning-making through time, “the ongoing work of reconstructive imagination” (Assmann 1997, p. 9). Yet another similar argument comes out of the hermeneutic tradition, particularly as articulated by German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002), in which the meaning of life can be found in our ongoing making and remaking of self-consciousness through interpretation without end.
No matter what the specific conceptualization, what may be called social memory studies (Olick and Robbins 1998) has become a prominent feature of scholarly discourse in recent decades, when Western societies in particular have been experiencing a sort of “memory boom” (Winter 2006). Indeed, explaining this boom has been an important topic for social memory studies. Scholars have variously sought to explain the rise of interest in the past, memory, commemoration, nostalgia, and history in contexts ranging from consumer promotions, popular culture, interior and exterior design, and public space, as well as the rise of reparations, apologies, and other forms of redress in domestic and international politics. Answers have included the decline of the nation-state as a carrier of identity, the end of faith in progress, the rise of multiculturalism, and postmodernity more generally. Most famously, and most generally, the French historian and editor Pierre Nora has claimed that we spend so much time thinking about the past because there is so little of it left: Where we earlier lived lives suffused with pastness— the continuities of habit and custom—we now live disconnected from our pasts, seeing ourselves as radically different than our forebears. In Nora’s terms, where once we were immersed in milieux de mémoire (worlds of memory), we moderns now consciously cultivate lieux de mémoire (places of memory) because memory is now a special topic. In a related manner, the Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm has distinguished between worlds of custom and worlds of “invented tradition.” Since the late nineteenth century, not only have nation-states sought to shore up declining legitimacy by propagating fictional pasts and a sense of their institutions’ ancientness, people have invented the very category of tradition (as opposed to custom): the idea of self-conscious adherence to past ways of acting (whether genuine or spurious) is itself a product of our distance from the past, which has come to be seen as “a foreign country” (Lowenthal 1985).
SEE ALSO History, Social; Identity; Memory
Assmann, Jan. 1997. Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 1989. Truth and Method. 2nd ed. Trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. New York: Crossroad.
Goldman, Lucien. 1964. The Hidden God: Study of Tragic Vision in the Pensées of Pascal and the Tragedies of Ra. Trans. Philip Thody. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, and New York: Routledge.
Halbwachs, Maurice. 1992. On Collective Memory. Trans. and ed. Lewis A. Coser. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds. 1992. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge, U.K. and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lowenthal, David, 1985. The Past is a Foreign Country. Cambridge, U.K. and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Nora, Pierre. 1989. Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire. Representations 26 (Spring): 7–25.
Olick, Jeffrey K., and Joyce Robbins. 1998. Social Memory Studies: From Collective Memory to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices. Annual Review of Sociology 24: 105–140.
Winter, Jay. 2006. Remembering War: The Great War between Memory and History in the Twentieth Century. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Jeffrey K. Olick
"Collective Memory." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. . Encyclopedia.com. (April 28, 2017). http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/applied-and-social-sciences-magazines/collective-memory
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Collective psychology, or human psychological behavior within communities, has been a subject of study in the Bible and among the ancient Greeks, hence since the origins of Western culture. In the nineteenth century, new fields of investigation opened up: schools of anthropology in Great Britain, folk psychology in Germany, and sociology in France. Sigmund Freud's predecessors and contemporaries within these schools of thought were his favorite interlocutors. From the outset, Freud collaborated in his works on individual and collective psychology (see his letters to Wilhelm Fliess dated December 6, 1896; January 24, 1897; and May 31, 1897 [1950a]).
This form of debate, if not actual borrowing, between psychoanalysis and collective psychology continued throughout Freud's work. A vivid and systematic picture thus emerges in which Totem and Taboo (1912-1913a) formed the basis for the Schreber case (1911c) and anticipated "On Narcissism: An Introduction" (1914c); in which Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c) is a response to Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920g) and paves the way for The Ego and the Id (1923b); and in which The Future of an Illusion (1927c) and Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a ) led Freud to develop and elaborate, between 1923 and 1927, his structural theory (the castration complex, the superego, and the theory of anxiety) in Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1926d ).
Some other works also relate to Freud's first topography: Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905c), a contribution to the study of central European Jewish culture; "Obsessive Actions and Religious Practices" (1907b), the first major analogy between individual and collective psychology; and "'Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness" (1908d), in which Freud proposes that society reduce cultural sexual repression as a collective prophylaxis for neurosis. Moses and Monotheism: Three Essays (1939a [1937-1939], one of Freud's last works, brought together and explained the themes developed on collective psychology and went on to analyze Jewish and Christian monotheistic cultures. Finally, there is Freud's work between 1930 and 1932 on U.S. President Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1966).
The nexus between individual and collective psychology is the family, as the origin of the Oedipus complex and of totemism, which connects the transference neuroses with collective manifestations. Previously Freud had investigated more localized analogies of the connection between individual and group, such as analogies between the observances and rituals of obsessive neurotics and those of religion. From Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c) on, he proclaimed collective psychology to be part of psychoanalysis and established his metapsychology on this basis. He discussed the libidinal dynamics of the formation and stabilization of groups in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921c) and explained the economic point of view in The Future of an Illusion (1927c) and Civilization and Its Discontents (1930a ), where he related the economic point of view to hatred and fear. The topography characteristic of groups consists of reduced and simplified forms of the individual psychic agencies of the ego, ego ideal, and superego, as a result of the identifying ties that groups impose: "A primary group of this kind is a number of individuals who have put one and the same object in the place of their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego" (1921c, p. 116). Depending on the form of authority and its degree of symbolic elaboration, these reductions are more or less extreme—hence the importance of the great man, capable of representing the ideal at the highest level of elaboration. There are three paradigmatic groups: the horde, the matriarchy, and the totemic clan (in political science, they correspond to rule by one person, by a few, and by all). They differ according to type of representative of the ideal, which ranges from the flesh-and-blood leader to such symbolic forms as the totem and the stated ideal, which substitute for the leader after the greater or lesser elaboration of his murder.
Freud created or developed some core concepts in the course of this research: primal ambivalence, narcissism, the Oedipus complex (1912-1913a); identifications, the ego ideal, aim-inhibited drives, sublimation (1921c); the superego and guilt feelings, dereliction and its consequences, the conflict between Eros and Thanatos (1927c, 1930a); and splitting of the ego, constructions in analysis (1939a).
Criticisms have abounded, impeding work on almost half of the body of Freud's work. Freud's method of analogy (between individual and collective psychic processes) has not been accepted, nor has his dynamic method. Freud's explicit Lamarckism concerning the transmission of mnemic traces in groups has been rejected. Freud has been criticized for a narrow view of religion that ignores its cultural contributions by considering it as a collective neurosis or delusion. Finally, although Freud considered matriarchy at an early stage (1911f), he neglected other similar figures of identification.
Two further qualifications were formulated by Freud himself: collective psychic processes have to be understood in isolation from any form of therapeutic activity; the analysis of these processes requires the analyst to be separated from groups, especially groups to which the subject belongs, which is difficult to achieve.
Psychoanalysis has made a clear contribution to anthropology, yet collective psychology has mainly been used with small groups in clinical practice. The metapsychological, sociological, and political dimensions of Freud's work have yet to be turned to account.
See also: Alienation; Anthropology and psychoanalysis; Christians and Jews: A Psychoanalytical Study ; Civilization and Its Discontents ; "Claims of Psychoanalysis to Scientific Interest"; "Dreams and myths"; Ego ideal; Fascination; Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego ; Identification; Le Bon, Gustave; Narcissism of minor differences; Otherness; Racism, anti-Semitism, and psychoanalysis; Schiff, Paul; Totem and Taboo .
Bion, Wilfred R. (1961). Experiences in groups. London: Tavistock Publications.
Freud, Sigmund. (1905c). Jokes and their relation to the unconscious. SE, 8: 1-236.
——. (1907b). Obsessive actions and religious practices. SE, 9: 115-127.
——. (1908d). "Civilized" sexual morality and modern nervous illness. SE, 9: 177-204.
——. (1911c ). Psycho-analytic notes on an autobiographical account of a case of paranoia (dementia paranoides ). SE, 12: 1-82.
——. (1911f). "Great is Diana of the Ephesians." SE, 12: 342-344.
——. (1912-1913a). Totem and taboo. SE, 13: 1-161.
——. (1914c). On narcissism: An introduction. SE, 14: 67-102.
——. (1920g). Beyond the pleasure principle. SE,18:1-64.
——. (1921c). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego. SE, 18: 65-143.
——. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1-66.
——. (1926d ). Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety. SE, 20: 75-172.
——. (1927c). The future of an illusion. SE, 21: 1-56.
——. (1930a ). Civilization and its discontents. SE, 21: 57-145.
——. (1939a [1934-1938]). Moses and monotheism: Three essays. SE, 23: 1-137.
——. (1950a). Extracts from the Fliess papers. SE, 1: 173-280.
Freud, Sigmund, Bullitt, William C. (1966b [1930-1932]). Thomas Woodrow Wilson, twenty-eighth president of the United States: A psychological study. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Gillibert, Jean. (1985). Le psychodrame de la psychanalyse. Paris: Champ Vallon.
Kaës, René, & Anzieu, Didier. (1976). Chronique d 'un groupe, le groupe du "Paradis perdu": Observation et commentaires. Paris: Dunod.
Porte, Michèle. (1998). Pulsions et politique: Une relecture de l 'événement psychique collectifà partir de l 'œuvre de Freud. Paris: Harmattan.
Scheidlinger, Stuart. (1990). Internalization of group psychology: the group within. Journal of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis, 18, 494-504.
Tuttman, Saul. (1991). Psychoanalytic group theory and therapy: essays in honor of Saul Scheidlinger. Madison, CT: International Universities Press.
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Perhaps the earliest formulations of collective behaviour are to be found in crowd psychology. Gustave Le Bon, in The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (1895), argued that the crowd was a reality sui generis, since ‘it forms a single being, and is subjected to the law of the mental unity of crowds’. He suggested that all individual responses were lost in crowds, and that a ‘collective mind’ emerged which made people ‘feel, think and act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual of them would’. Crowds emerged through the existence of anonymity (which allowed a decline in personal responsibility); in contagion (ideas moving rapidly through a group); and through a suggestibility whereby the unconscious aspects of the personality come to the fore.
Many subsequent studies of crowds, riots, mobs, and similar such collective disturbances—including, for example, contributions by Gabriel Tarde and Sigmund Freud—do little more than elaborate Le Bon's contagion hypothesis. Freud starts from Le Bon's description of the crowd mentality—whereby crowds are seen as impulsive, changeable, and irritable; incapable of sustained attention, criticism, or perseverance; and governed by a sense of omnipotence, exaggerated feelings, magical formulas, and illusions—and explains group participation in terms of the psychoanalytic theories of the instinct-object relationships in the individual and of the primal horde. As he puts it, ‘The uncanny and coercive characteristics of group formation, which are shown in the phenomena of suggestion that accompany them, may … be traced back to the fact of their origin from the primal horde. The leader of the group is still the dreaded primal father; the group still wishes to be governed by unrestricted force; it has an extreme passion for authority … it has a thirst for obedience. The primal father is the group ideal, which governs the ego in the place of the ego ideal’ (‘Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego’). According to Freud, these features together with the loss of consciousness, dominance of the mind by emotions, and the impulsiveness of crowds, ‘correspond to a state of regression to a primitive mental activity’.
A more sociological approach to collective behaviour is evident in Neil Smelser's ‘value-added schema’ (see Theory of Collective Behaviour, 1963
), which suggests that the determinants of collective behaviour are given by the following sequence of events and elements: structural conduciveness (conditions of permissiveness under which collective behaviour is seen as legitimate); structural strain (such as economic deprivation); growth and spread of a generalized belief (for example a mass hysteria, delusion, or creation of a folk devil); precipitating factors (specific events—such as a fight set against the background of an explosive race situation—which confirms the earlier generalized belief); mobilization of the participants for action (via effective leadership, in a social movement, or a single dramatic event such as a rumour of a panic sell by a leading holder of shares in a company); and the operation of social control (which refers to the counter forces set up by the wider society to prevent and inhibit the previous determinants). According to Smelser, the last of these is of particular importance, since ‘once an episode of collective behaviour has appeared, its duration and severity are determined by the response of the agencies of social control’.
Smelser's sixth determinant attaches the same importance to social control as do transactional (notably labelling) theories of deviance. Within the interactionist tradition more generally, special attention has been paid to social typing, and to the way in which role models are created and diffused in the wider society (see, for example, R. H. Turner and and L. M. Killian , Collective Behaviour, 1957
). This volume also includes some of the earliest sociological work on fads and fashions. More recently, the study of the specific conditions under which organized collective actions (such as strikes) take place has been greatly influenced by rational choice theory, following the classic analysis by Mancur Olson (The Logic of Collective Action, 1965)
. See also EXCHANGE THEORY; SUBCULTURE.
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"collective behaviour." A Dictionary of Sociology. . Retrieved April 28, 2017 from Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/collective-behaviour
Collective or mutual responsibility (krugovaia poruka ), often reinforced through legal guarantees or surety bonds.
It is first documented in the medieval period in an expanded version of the Russkaya Pravda that mandated that certain communities would be collectively responsible for apprehending murderers or paying fines to the prince. In the Muscovite period collective responsibility was frequently invoked to make communities collectively responsible for the actions and financial obligations of their members. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, state officials shifted much of the responsibility for apprehending criminals and preempting misdeeds to groups that could monitor and discipline their members. Surety in the form of financial and legal accountability was frequently demanded by the state from groups to insure that their individual members would not shirk legal obligations or responsibilities such as appearing in court, performing services for the state, or meeting the terms of contracts. Although the state moved away from the pervasive application of the principle of collective responsibility in the eighteenth century, it was still used in certain situations such as military conscription and collection of delinquent taxes. Even after the Great Reforms, local police officials retained the right to hold large peasant communes collectively responsible for major tax arrears as a measure of last resort. Although theoretically state officials could inventory and sell individual holdings to cover communal arrears, in practice this occurred infrequently. In Soviet legal procedures collectives could be called upon to monitor and vouch for their members, and individuals accused of committing minor legal infractions could be handed over to a collective for corrective measures as an alternative to incarceration.
See also: great reforms
Dewey, Horace W., and Kleimola, Ann M. (1970). "Suretyship and Collective Responsibility in Pre-Petrine Russia." Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 18: 337–354.
"Collective Responsibility." Encyclopedia of Russian History. . Encyclopedia.com. (April 28, 2017). http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/collective-responsibility
"Collective Responsibility." Encyclopedia of Russian History. . Retrieved April 28, 2017 from Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/collective-responsibility
Subsequently, however, the distinction between collective and individual consumption was much disputed. It is difficult, for example, to see just how services such as education are consumed ‘collectively’—although they may be collectively provided. As used in practice, therefore, the term collective consumption now has no very precise meaning, although it normally refers to services (rather than goods) which are directly provided by state agencies instead of by the market; or, at least, to services provided with considerable state involvement, for example through subsidies or regulation. (In that sense, of course, it is a misnomer—since it does indeed indicate collective provision of services which are then consumed individually.) Later writers have developed more complex classifications of the social organization of consumption, and used these to analyse the nature of urban politics and the role of so-called consumption sector cleavages in social stratification and in determining political attitudes. For an overview see Peter Saunders , Social Theory and the Urban Question (1986)
. See also URBAN SOCIOLOGY.
"collective consumption." A Dictionary of Sociology. . Encyclopedia.com. (April 28, 2017). http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/collective-consumption
"collective consumption." A Dictionary of Sociology. . Retrieved April 28, 2017 from Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/collective-consumption
"collective conscience." A Dictionary of Sociology. . Encyclopedia.com. (April 28, 2017). http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/collective-conscience
"collective conscience." A Dictionary of Sociology. . Retrieved April 28, 2017 from Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/collective-conscience
"collective labour." A Dictionary of Sociology. . Encyclopedia.com. (April 28, 2017). http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/collective-labour
"collective labour." A Dictionary of Sociology. . Retrieved April 28, 2017 from Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-and-press-releases/collective-labour