Lend-Lease, or lease-lend, was the programme by which the USA provided the bulk of its aid to nations fighting Germany, Italy, and, eventually, Japan during the Second World War. In lieu of credits and loans, the US Government supplied to over 38 nations whatever goods were certified by President Roosevelt as ‘in the interest of national defense’. The only legal limitations were his own judgement, and the need for Congressional appropriations to pay for the goods. Repayment was to be as ‘the President deems satisfactory’, an extraordinarily broad grant of authority (both quotations from the text of the legislation).

The need for a scheme like Lend-Lease lay in the experience of the USA in the aftermath of the First World War. Whatever the facts, Americans perceived European actions after that conflict as a rejection of US leadership. That frustration, combined with the international crisis of the great depression, made Americans reluctant to get involved in Europe's political crises—even adamantly against doing so—a policy popularly labelled ‘isolationism’, but better called nationalism.

In the midst of the economic collapse of the 1930s, and as Mussolini and Hitler began to threaten the status quo, Congress constructed a series of legislative barriers designed to prevent the nation from being drawn into a European war by greedy industrialists and bankers as had supposedly happened in 1917. The Neutrality Acts initially prevented belligerents from purchasing war materials in the USA, while the Johnson Debt-Default Act prohibited nations from borrowing money if they had not paid all their First World War war debts—something only Finland had done. By the time hostilities began in Europe in 1939, Roosevelt and his closest advisers had privately chosen sides, but saw no need to move the nation towards intervention, particularly in the face of intense domestic opposition. As a result, the neutrality laws were modified enough to permit nations at war to buy even military goods, but only on a strict (pay) cash-and-carry (them in your own ships) basis. British and French preparedness benefited, as did the American economy.

But cash was in increasingly short supply in the western European ‘democracies.’ The depression had seen a collapse of international trade, a situation that worsened with the disruption of war. Then, in June 1940, the French surrender left the UK facing Germany and Italy alone. Preparing to combat an invasion of the British Isles as well as defending key positions in North Africa and the Middle East strained British financial resources to the limit, and beyond.

But Americans, even Roosevelt, found it difficult to believe that the vast British Empire was short of cash. Not until Churchill instructed treasury officials to open the books to the Americans did Roosevelt and his treasury secretary, Henry Morgenthau Jr., conclude that the UK had to have some kind of credits, loans, or subsidies. After all, Roosevelt and most Americans still hoped to avoid all-out involvement in the war, but that depended on the UK's success—or at least survival.

Substantial American aid to the UK faced two hurdles. The Johnson Debt-Default Act seemed small, even silly, in the shadow of German militarism, but Americans remained embittered by their First World War experience and viewed the refusal of the Europeans to pay their debts as a serious breach of faith. Underlying that resentment was the fear that aid would bring the nation into war rather than help to avoid it. One of Roosevelt's advisers told him: ‘It seems to me that we Americans are like the householder who refuses to lend or sell his fire extinguisher to help put out the fire in the house that is right next door’ (Kimball [see below], p. 77). But anti-interventionist Senator Burton Wheeler warned that ‘you can't put your shirt-tail into a clothes wringer and then pull it out suddenly while the wringer keeps turning’ (ibid., p. 58).

Events suggest that both were correct—the USA was being shortsighted in not helping put out a fire that might spread, yet that help once extended constituted an economic declaration of war that virtually ensured American involvement. But in the autumn of 1940, Roosevelt still temporized. Public opposition to intervention, inadequate military preparedness, and a sneaking suspicion that the expected German invasion of England (see SEALION) would succeed all blended to make him cautious. He had stretched presidential authority as far as he dared, or wanted, with the destroyers-for-bases agreement and special government loans to expand American war production plants. Yet British officials, from the ambassador to treasury representatives, came to Washington with their hands out. ‘Britain's broke,’ warned the British ambassador, Lord Lothian (1882–1940), and Morgenthau agreed. Assets such as India, the Suez Canal, and post-war trade prospects did not translate into cash. Churchill, while writing one of his histories a year earlier, had summed it up: ‘Money—above all, ready money. There was the hobble which cramped the medieval kings; and even now it counts somewhat’ (The Birth of Britain, London, 1956, p. 474).

By early December 1940, Roosevelt was ready to act. SEALION had been postponed, rumours had surfaced of a German move towards the Balkans and the USSR (though the British insisted they were still Hitler's primary target), and full American aid held out the promise of success without having to send American troops to fight in Europe. The president instructed his cabinet to come up with a solution, then left for a short Caribbean cruise. Churchill, by then in regular telegraphic correspondence with Roosevelt, added his eloquent plea: ‘You may be assured that we shall prove ourselves ready to suffer and sacrifice to the utmost for the Cause, and that we glory in being its champion. The rest we leave with confidence to you and to your people, being sure that ways and means will be found which future generations on both sides of the Atlantic will approve and admire.’ Grand phrases aside, the prime minister promised a fight to the end if only (and perhaps only if ) the Americans would provide the wherewithal.

Ten days later, on 17 December, at a carefully planned presidential press conference, the fire-hose analogy resurfaced as Roosevelt suggested a way to give the UK that wherewithal, without calling it loans, credits, or subsides. He claimed he had a new idea that would get ‘rid of the silly, foolish old dollar sign’, proposing that the USA should lend its garden hose to help its neighbour put out the fire—and if the hose were damaged in the fight, then there would be ‘a gentleman's obligation to repay in kind’ instead of an invoice for the dollar amount.

A few days later, on 29 December, Roosevelt put Churchill's grand if unrealistic commitment into specific terms, arguing that the USA should become the ‘Arsenal of Democracy’. Secretary of War Henry Stimson warned that ‘we cannot permanently be in the position of toolmakers for other nations which fight’, but Americans seemed comforted by the thought of protecting their security without having to go to war. The unlikelihood of the UK having the strength to defeat Hitler (as opposed to merely surviving) was raised only by the so-called isolationists, who were already tarred as unrealistic appeasers or even as pro-Nazi (see America First Committee).

Putting the fire-hose concept into legislation was the treasury department's job, though Roosevelt attached two broad guidelines. First, the debate in and out of Congress was to appear full and unrestricted—though that did not mean full candour on his part. The president needed broader public support as he moved to aid the UK, and only a ‘Great Debate’ would give him the mandate he sought. Second, Roosevelt wanted a bill that gave him the widest possible latitude to decide what nations to aid, what goods to send, and what to ask as repayment.

He got pretty much what he wanted. The debate over H.R. 1776 (so numbered by the Parliamentarian of the House to make it sound more patriotic) was long and full, and served to heighten public awareness of the geopolitical crisis in Europe. Congress did require that Lend-Lease appropriations be made annually and that regular reports be submitted, thus establishing some semblance of oversight. But administration spokesmen refused to discuss the possibility of military intervention or even the need to use US warships to convoy Lend-Lease goods—a refusal that was as much a matter of indecision within the government as it was a desire to avoid the issues. Opponents unsuccessfully tried to prohibit aid to the USSR and attached a meaningless statement that the legislation did not authorize convoying, but on 11 March 1941 the bill passed easily in a vote that generally followed party lines, as Democrats overwhelmingly supported the president.

At that point, Lend-Lease took on two separate lives. The first was as an extraordinary aid programme that supplied the sinews of war to the Grand Alliance and others; the second was what is best called the politics of Lend-Lease. The programme was a remarkable success as a straightforward subsidy for US allies. As American war production expanded in what was truly an economic revolution, Lend-Lease provided the means and organization to deliver the goods. The Office of Lend-Lease Administration (OLLA, officially created in August 1941), briefly headed by Roosevelt's alter ego Harry Hopkins, and then by businessman and later secretary of state Edward Stettinius, handled its task with great enthusiasm and reasonable efficiency. As with so much in the Roosevelt administration, initiative was more important than official channels, and OLLA took charge.

The logistics of Lend-Lease delivery were as crucial to the programme as production, and a good deal more difficult. The physical task of delivering hundreds of thousands of tons of goods was staggering. Merchant ships carried the bulk of the matériel from the USA in convoys, much of it to British ports for trans-shipment to its final destination. Shipments to the USSR were usually taken by the Arctic convoys from the UK to Murmansk in the north, or from the USA to the Persian Gulf and thence by a new rail line built from Persia into the USSR. Lend-Lease aircraft were flown across the Atlantic, usually ferried by civilian pilots—some of them women (see Atlantic Ferry Organization); those heading for the USSR or the Middle East were ferried across central Africa (see Takoradi air route) though some were flown from Alaska across the Bering Strait. Lend-Lease for China as well as for Anglo-American forces fighting in South and South-East Asia went through Indian ports, which proved serious bottlenecks that required the expansion of rail and road facilities. At the outset, Lend-Lease was limited by two factors: US production could not meet the demands of the American military, and merchant shipping was in very short supply. By 1943, both those limits were overcome as shipments reached $10 billion that year and $11 billion the next.

After the Normandy landings in June 1944 (see OVERLORD), a second set of limits began to affect the programme. Stettinius had relied on the justness of his cause in the bureaucratic infighting of wartime Washington, but by 1944, OLLA had been absorbed into the Foreign Economic Administration, a vast, inchoate organization with little sense of purpose or esprit de corps. Moreover, both the state and treasury departments reasserted their power as the time came for post-war planning. Coincidentally, Congressional support for huge Lend-Lease appropriations began to slip as Americans thought more and more about conversion to peacetime pursuits.

Whatever the programme's problems, Lend-Lease was a rousing success. A precise dollar figure cannot be determined since the value of the dollar changed during the war, and the worth of services and technological transfers can only be estimated. But between $42 and $50 billion of aid-food, military goods, oil, industrial production, and services-went to America's wartime allies (see Tables 1 and 2). The UK, the original beneficiary, and its empire received about half that total, the USSR, about $10 billion, France (mostly de Gaulle's Free French movement) some $3.5 billion, and China over $2 billion—the latter a relatively small amount because of a combination of hazardous supply routes (in particular the Hump air route), a weak Chinese military performance, and shifting US military priorities in the Pacific. Irrespective of sheer quantity, much of the aid was crucial to the war effort. Lend-Lease trucks helped put the Red Army on wheels as it rolled across eastern Europe; Lend-Lease munitions armed soldiers from North Africa to New Guinea; Lend-Lease food helped maintain the Home Front from London to New Delhi. In addition, some $8 billion of ‘reverse’ Lend-Lease—mainly technology transfers, and raw materials from the British and French empires—went to the USA.

Even while Lend-Lease functioned as an aid and exchange programme, it took on its second life—as a political programme. Almost as soon as the bill became law, state department officials began to use it as a lever to force broad changes in the world's political economy. Repayment was to be in concessions, not kind. The American position surfaced during the Placentia Bay conference, but the 1941–2 negotiations for a Master Lend-Lease Agreement with the UK set the tone. The state department insisted that their ally open its markets, at home and in the empire, to unrestricted American trade and commerce. With the UK so dependent on the USA for both wartime and post-war economic help, the British negotiator, John Maynard Keynes, had to acquiesce. The Imperial Preference System (special trade and tariff privileges among members of the British Empire) was the initial target, but the concept was pursued in conferences on the international wheat market, post-war civil aviation, and the monetary agreements made at Bretton Woods.

Lend-Lease to the USSR posed special problems from the outset. Roosevelt, wary of domestic criticism and aware that no significant aid could arrive before the 1941 battle for Moscow was decided, waited over four months after the German invasion in June 1941 (see BARBAROSSA) to declare the USSR eligible for Lend-Lease, although he provided symbolic aid before that (see also Three-Power conference). American strategists knew that only the Red Army could defeat Hitler on the ground, and Lend-Lease helped do just that. It constituted only about 7% of what the USSR itself produced during the war, but did allow the Soviets to concentrate their production where they were most efficient.

Lend-Lease, Table 1: Lend-Lease aid in millions of dollars

Lend-Lease, Table 2: Lend-Lease aid—by category

Warren Kimball

Bibliography

Dobson, A. P. , US Wartime Aid to Britain, 1940–1946 (New York, 1986).
Herring, G. C. , Aid to Russia, 1941–1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1973).
Kimball, W. F. , ‘The Most Unsordid Act’: Lend-Lease, 1939–1941 (Baltimore, Md., 1969).
Stettinius, E. R., Jr. , Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory (New York, 1944).

Lend-Lease Act (1941)

Warren F. Kimball

Excerpt from the Lend-Lease Act

The President may ... , when he deems it in the interest of national defense, ... sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government [whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States] any defense article.... The terms and conditions ... shall be those which the President deems satisfactory.

The Lend-Lease Act of 1941 (55 Stat. 31) initiated a program of military aid by which the United States provided goods and services to its allies in the fight against Germany, Italy, and later Japan during World War II. Under the terms of "lend-lease," these allies would repay the United States not in money but by returning the goods or using them in support of the cause, or by a similar transfer of goods.

OPPOSITION TO FOREIGN AID

President Franklin Roosevelt wanted to aid the Western democracies in their fight against the Nazi and Fascist threat, but political and public opinion was opposed. For one thing, World War I had left a legacy of postwar debts. In addition, in the 1920s Americans were critical of the squabbling and colonial expansion of the European powers and were not inclined to aid even friendly nations. Then the Great Depression and the international economic collapse of the 1930s increased American uneasiness about doling out precious resources. In response to growing threats from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in the 1930s, Congress passed a series of legislative barriers, particularly the Neutrality Acts, designed to prevent the nation from being drawn into another European war by trade and investment ties with belligerent nations. Americans blamed such ties for U.S. involvement in World War I.

When war broke out in September 1939, Congress modified the prohibitions on arms trading with nations at war. But arms purchasers like Great Britain and France still had to pay cash (gold or dollars), which was in short supply as their economies moved from producing exports to arms production. In November 1940 the British Ambassador to the United States told reporters that "Britain's broke." Then, in early December, Prime Minister Winston Churchill sent President Roosevelt an eloquent plea for help, warning that "the moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash."

ROOSEVELT'S PLAN

Even before Churchill's message arrived, Roosevelt was ready to act. The German invasion of Britain had been postponed as Hitler began to look to the East. Large scale American aid held out the promise of a successful war effort against Germany without the participation of American ground troops in Europe. On December 17, 1940, Roosevelt suggested a way to give Britain the aid it needed without creating postwar debts. His new idea, he said, would get "rid of the silly, foolish old dollar sign." As he put it, the United States would lend its garden hose to help its neighbor put out the fire, with the understanding that the neighbor would repay in kind rather than receive an invoice for the dollar amount. The United States should become the "Arsenal of Democracy," Roosevelt said, and Americans seemed comfortable with the concept of paying for security while someone else fought for it. Only the so-called "isolationists" objected that Britain alone, even with American aid, could not defeat Hitler. But these isolationists were already seen as unrealistic appeasers (those willing to make concessions to an aggressor, sacrificing principles) or even as pro-Nazi.

Roosevelt had a two-part plan for translating his garden hose concept into legislation. First, the debate in and out of Congress was to appear full and unrestricted, though he himself might not be fully candid about how much aid he planned to give. Only a "Great Debate" would give him the mandate (an authorization to act) that he sought. Second, Roosevelt wanted a bill that gave him the widest possible latitude to decide which nations to aid, what goods to send, and what to ask for as repayment.

The bill that came under debate in Congress was called H.R. 1776, a number chosen by the Parliamentarian of the House so as to make it sound more patriotic. It was long and full and served to heighten public awareness of the geopolitical crisis in Europe. Congress did require lend-lease be carried out through annual appropriations (funds set aside for a specific purpose) and that it should receive regular reports to establish some semblance of oversight. But administration spokesmen refused to discuss certain awkward issues that seemed to move the nation toward war, especially the convoys needed to protect aid shipments from attack by German U-boats. On March 11, 1941, Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act, which had passed easily in votes that generally followed party lines, as Democrats overwhelmingly supported the president.

SUCCESS OF THE PROGRAM

It took nearly two years for America's industrial potential to reach its peak, but lend-lease was a rousing success. Initially it boosted morale amongst the major U.S. allies, but it quickly began to provide the supplies they needed to fight the war. Wartime estimates, including the value of services and technological transfers, came to between $43 and $50 billion (1945 dollars) of aid to America's wartime allies. Some $8 billion of "reverse" lend-lease—mainly technology transfers and raw materials from the British and French empires—came back to the United States.

Even while lend-lease functioned as an aid and exchange program, it took on its second life as a political program. Almost as soon as the bill became law, State Department officials began to use it as a lever to force broad changes in the world's political economy. The negotiation in 1942 of a Master Lend-Lease agreement with the British included requirements for the United Kingdom to open its empire to free trade—later called free markets. American leaders had deep suspicions that Great Britain remained a major economic rival and so lend-lease was not extended into the immediate postwar period.

During the lend-lease debate, opponents had tried to exclude the Soviet Union from the program. But American strategists knew that only the Red Army could defeat Hitler on the ground, and lend-lease would help do just that. U.S. aid constituted only about 7 percent of what the Soviet Union itself produced during the war, but it did allow the Soviets to concentrate their production in the most efficient manner. Lend-lease to Russia was, for Roosevelt, much more than just a wartime aid program. It could demonstrate the benefits of the American system and promote mutual trust, all key elements in Roosevelt's postwar plans. It was, therefore, presidential policy to promise to give the Russians almost everything they requested. Misunderstandings and resentment resulted when supply requirements to other theaters made it impossible to deliver. The Cold War prevented a formal lend-lease settlement with the Russians until June 1990, when, with the Soviet system on the verge of collapse, a repayment agreement (for nonmilitary goods) was reached.

Lend-lease, what Churchill had called "the most unsordid act," was an immensely successful wartime aid program, one that set the stage for the U.S. foreign aid programs that followed. Lend-lease was designed to help win the war without leaving behind a residue of war debts and recriminations, and it did just that.

See also: Neutrality Acts.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dobson, Alan P. US Wartime Aid to Britain, 1940–1946. New York: St. Martin's, 1986.

Herring, George C. Aid to Russia, 1941–1946. New York: Columbia University Press, 1973.

Kimball, Warren F. The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1941. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969.

LEND-LEASE

LEND-LEASE, a program of providing U.S. military and economic assistance to nations fighting the Axis powers in World War II. After the fall of France in June 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt worried that if Great Britain were defeated by Nazi Germany, the United States would stand virtually alone against the fascist powers. Isolationist sentiment and unpreparedness for war discouraged American entry into the conflict directly, while U.S. law (the Johnson Debt-Default Act of 1934) required nations at war to pay cash for American military supplies. When Prime Minister Winston Churchill warned Roosevelt that Britain would not survive without further military assistance but was running out of funds, Roosevelt developed the idea of "lending" the British the necessary supplies. On 17 December 1940 he explained the

principle to newsmen using the famous analogy of lending one's garden hose to a neighbor whose house is on fire, before the fire should spread. On 29 December he sought to build public support by arguing in a national radio address that America should become "the great arsenal of democracy." Congress debated the Lend-Lease Act, named House Resolution 1776 to lend it a patriotic aura, and passed the measure on 11 March 1941.

The Lend-Lease Act greatly increased executive power by authorizing the president to "sell, transfer title to, or otherwise dispose of" military supplies to countries selected by the president. Roosevelt had sought such broad language in order to be able to extend the program to the Soviet Union, which his cabinet expected would soon be attacked by Germany. Repayment was to be in kind or in the form of any "indirect benefit" to the United States. By eliminating the need for cash payments, Lend-Lease made it possible to deliver large quantities of vital matériel for the fight against the Axis powers while avoiding the kind of recriminations over unpaid war debts that lingered after World War I.

Under the Lend-Lease program, from 1941 to 1945 the United States provided approximately $50 billion in military equipment, raw materials, and other goods to thirty-eight countries. About $30 billion of the total went to Britain, with most of the remainder delivered to the Soviet Union, China, and France. The program was administered by top Roosevelt aide Harry L. Hopkins until October 1941, then formalized under the Office of Lend-Lease Administration under Edward R. Stettinius. In September 1943, Lend-Lease was placed under the Foreign Economic Administration, headed by Leo T. Crowley. The program was terminated by President Harry S. Truman in August 1945 at the end of the war, an action resented by Soviet leaders, who believed the cutoff in aid was intended to gain diplomatic concessions.

The provision of large quantities of aid to Great Britain accelerated American involvement in the conflict with Germany because it constituted a declaration of economic warfare against Germany, and it led to the organization of naval convoys to deliver the aid, convoys that came into direct confrontation with German submarines. Whether this was Roosevelt's secret intention is a subject of debate. While Churchill gratefully described Lend-Lease as "the most unsordid act in the history of any nation," the program clearly served American interests by allowing other countries to do the actual fighting against the Axis while the United States improved its own military readiness.

The Lend-Lease program substantially bolstered the military efforts of both Britain and the Soviet Union, although in the Soviet case, the overall importance of Lend-Lease has been disputed. Soviet histories tend to play down the value of the American contribution, while some American histories have argued that the Soviet Union would have been defeated without Lend-Lease aid (even though the threat of collapse was greatest in 1941–1942, before the bulk of Lend-Lease aid arrived). Whether or not American assistance was indispensable to Soviet survival and success on the battlefield, it does seem to have improved Soviet offensive capabilities against the German military after 1942.

The United States negotiated on a bilateral basis with individual countries to determine the form of repayment, if any, for Lend-Lease aid. Approximately $10 billion in goods, in kind and in cash, was repaid to the United States, chiefly by Great Britain. The Roosevelt and Truman administrations considered the fighting carried out by their allies to have been sufficient "indirect" repayment for the bulk of the assistance, and the cost of other aid was simply written off. Lend-Lease assistance was provided to some countries for political ends, as in the case of those Latin American nations that were not directly involved in the war effort but received limited quantities of military equipment as an inducement to side with the Allies. With its conversion of loans to grants and the use of aid for diplomatic or political purposes, Lend-Lease helped create a precedent for U.S. foreign aid programs in the postwar era.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dobson, Alan P. U.S. Wartime Aid to Britain, 1940–1946. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.

Kimball, Warren F. The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939– 1941. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969.

Van Tuyll, Hubert P. Feeding the Bear: American Aid to the Soviet Union, 1941–1945. New York: Greenwood Press, 1989.

Max PaulFriedman

See alsoForeign Aid ; World War II .

lend-lease arrangement for the transfer of war supplies, including food, machinery, and services, to nations whose defense was considered vital to the defense of the United States in World War II. The Lend-Lease Act, passed (1941) by the U.S. Congress, gave the President power to sell, transfer, lend, or lease such war materials. The President was to set the terms for aid; repayment was to be "in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory." Harry L. Hopkins was appointed (Mar., 1941) to administer lend-lease. He was replaced (July) by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., who headed the Office of Lend-Lease Administration, set up in Oct., 1941. In Sept., 1943, lend-lease was incorporated into the Foreign Economic Administration under Leo T. Crowley. In Sept., 1945, it was transferred to the Dept. of State. Lend-lease was originally intended for China and countries of the British Empire. In Nov., 1941, the USSR was included, and by the end of the war practically all the allies of the United States had been declared eligible for lend-lease aid. Although not all requested or received it, lend-lease agreements were signed with numerous countries. In 1942, a reciprocal aid agreement of the United States with Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the Free French was announced. Under its terms a "reverse lend-lease" was effected, whereby goods, services, shipping, and military installations were given to American forces overseas. Other nations in which U.S. forces were stationed subsequently adhered to the agreement. On Aug. 21, 1945, President Truman announced the end of lend-lease aid. Arrangements were made—notably with Great Britain and China—to continue shipments, on a cash or credit basis, of goods earmarked for them under lend-lease appropriations. Total lend-lease aid exceeded $50 billion, of which the British Commonwealth received some $31 billion and the USSR received over $11 billion. Within 15 years after the termination of lend-lease, settlements were made with most of the countries that had received aid, although a settlement with the USSR was not reached until 1972.

Bibliography: See W. F. Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act (1969).

LEND-LEASE ACT

Enacted by Congress in 1941 the Lend-Lease Act empowered the president to sell, transfer, lend, or lease war supplies—such as equipment, food, and weapons—to American allies during world war ii. In exchange for the valuable assistance provided under the Lend-Lease Act (55 Stat. 31 [1941]), the Allies were to comply with the terms set by the president for repayment. The Office of Lend-Lease Administration was created pursuant to the act to oversee the implementation of the program, but this function was later transferred to the state department.

Although the Lend-Lease Act was enacted to provide aid to China and the British Empire, eligibility under its provisions was expanded to include all Allies who were essential to the maintenance of the security of the United States. Subsequent reciprocal agreements with countries

where American troops were stationed provided that the troops would receive comparable aid while stationed there.

President harry truman ended the lend-lease program in 1945.

Lend-Lease Act (Mar.1941) An Act passed by the US Congress allowing President Roosevelt to lend or lease equipment and supplies to any foreign state whose defence was considered vital to the security of the USA. Some 60 per cent of the shipments went to Britain and its Dominions as a loan, in return for British-owned military and naval bases leased to the USA and for the accommodation of US troops, especially after the US entry into war in December 1941. About 20 per cent went to the Soviet Union. Altogether 38 nations received lend-lease aid. President Truman ended lend-lease at the end of the war in September 1945.

Lend-Lease Act An arrangement (1941–45) according to which the USA supplied equipment to Britain and its Allies in World War II. It was formalized by an Act passed by the US Congress allowing President F. D. ROOSEVELT to lend or lease equipment and supplies to any state whose defence was considered vital to the security of the USA. About 60% of the shipments went to Britain as a loan in return for British-owned military bases. About 20% went to the Soviet Union.

Lend-Lease Act a law passed by Congress on March 11, 1941, during World War II, allowing the president to “sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of” weapons and materials to help defend nations vital to U.S. security. Suggested by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in December 1940 to help countries fighting the Axis, it provided $31.6 billion to Britain and $11 billion to the USSR.

lend-lease US programme of assistance during World War II. The Lend-Lease Act was passed in March 1941, before the USA became a combatant. It empowered President Franklin D. Roosevelt to transfer military equipment to other countries in the US national interest. The first beneficiaries were Britain and China. The programme was later extended to other allies, notably the Soviet Union.