Biological Warfare

█ JUDYTH SASSOON

Biological warfare, as defined by the United Nations, is the use of any living organism (e.g. bacterium, virus) or an infective component (e.g., toxin), to cause disease or death in humans, animals, or plants. In contrast to bioterrorism, biological warfare is defined as the "statesanctioned" use of biological weapons on an opposing military force or civilian population. Biological weapons include pathogenic viruses, bacteria, and biological toxins. Of particular concern are genetically altered microorganisms, which are engineered to target a specific group of people.

Early History of Biological Warfare

Examples of the use of biological weapons exist in ancient records. In the sixth century b.c., Assyrians poisoned enemy wells with ergot, a toxin derived from mold that grows on rye. Other records of battles document the use of diseased corpses to poison wells. In 1346, plague-infected corpses and carcasses were catapulted into Kaffa, a city in current day Crimea, by the Tartar army. The epidemic that resulted may have eventually led to the great Black Plague that afflicted Europe. In 1710, the Russian army used a similar military strategy when it invaded Sweden. The Spanish are reported to have contaminated French wine with blood taken from people suffering from

leprosy in the mid-1400s. In the seventeenth century, a Polish general filled artillery shells with the saliva from rabid dogs.

Smallpox was used as a biological weapon several times during the colonization of the Americas. The Spanish explorer Pizarro gave blankets infested with the virus to natives in South America in the fifteenth century. Sir Jeffery Amherst presented blankets contaminated with the smallpox virus to native Americans during the French and Indian war between 1754 and 1767. The epidemic that followed resulted in the surrender of a strategic fort to the English. A Southern doctor is reported to have sold clothing contaminated with smallpox to the Union Army during the Civil War.

Modern History of Biological Warfare

During the twentieth century, modern scientific methods led to the development, refinement, and stockpiling of weapons of biological warfare by governments throughout the world. During World War I, Germany developed a biological warfare program based on the bacterium Bacillus anthracis and a strain of Pseudomonas known as Burkholderia mallei, which causes glanders disease in cattle. Dr. Anton Dilger, a German agent living in Washington D.C., reportedly grew anthrax and glanders bacteria in his home and then inoculated thousands of horses and cattle that were shipped to Allied troops in Europe. Many of the animals perished and hundreds of the troops exposed to these animals were secondarily infected by the diseases.

During World War II, prisoners in German Nazi concentration camps were infected with pathogens, such as Hepatitis A, Plasmodia spp., and two types of Rickettsia bacteria, during studies allegedly designed to develop vaccines and antibacterial drugs. A large reservoir in Bohemia was poisoned with sewage by the German army in 1945.

Between 1918 and 1945, the Japanese government conducted extensive biological weapon research at Unit 731 in occupied Manchuria, China. Prisoners of war were infected with a variety of pathogens, including Neisseria meningitis (meningitis), Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Shigella spp. (shigellosis), and Yersinia pestis (black plague). Estimates are that over 3,000 prisoners died as a result of infection by these biological pathogens or execution following such infections. In 1941, the Japanese released an estimated 150 million potentially plague-infected fleas from aircraft over cities in China and Manchuria. After these infectious agents were released, outbreaks of plague occurred in many Chinese villages. In addition, approximately 10,000 illnesses and 1,700 deaths occurred among Japanese troops.

Driven by reports of Japanese and German programs to develop biological weapons, the Allies embarked on vigorous efforts to develop their own biological weapons during World War II. Britain produced five million anthrax cakes at the UK Chemical and Biological Defense Establishment at Porton Down with the intent of dropping them on Germany to infect the food chain. These weapons were never used. British open-air testing of anthrax weapons in 1941 on Gruinard Island in Scotland rendered the island inhabitable for five decades.

The United States government's biological warfare facility was headquartered at Fort Detrick in Maryland beginning in 1942. Weapons were also tested and produced in Colorado, Arkansas and Utah. Many different agents were studied including the bacteria that cause anthrax, plague, botulism, Q fever, and staphylococcal infections. Several viruses were also included in the research. The U.S. Army conducted a study in 1951–1952 called "Operation Sea Spray" to study wind currents that might carry biological weapons. As part of the project design, balloons were filled with Serratia marcescens (then thought to be harmless, but easily identifiable) and exploded over San Francisco. Shortly thereafter, there was a corresponding dramatic increase in reported pneumonia and urinary tract infections in the region.

The former Soviet Union was implicated in several incidents involving the development and release of biological agents. In 1979, an accidental release of a small amount of anthrax spores occurred at a bioweapons facility near the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk. At least 77 people were sickened and 66 died. All the affected people were some 4 kilometers downwind of the facility. Sheep and cattle up to 50 kilometers downwind became ill. Immediately following the incident, the Soviet government declared that the cause of the illnesses was contaminated meat. However, in 1992 Russian President Boris Yeltsin took responsibility, stating that the accident was the result of military research at the microbiology facility. Between 1975 and 1983, Soviet forces allegedly used "yellow rain" in military operations in Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan. This substance, T2 toxin or trocothecene mycotoxin, is derived from the Fusarium fungi and is extremely damaging to the intestinal tract. The Soviet government has denied the use of T2 toxins, claiming that the yellow rain was the result of defecating bees.

In 1991, the Iraqi government admitted the existence of a biological weapons program within their military. They built bombs containing the botulinum toxin, anthrax and aflatoxins. Iraqi scientists also studied the uses of wheat cover smut, ricin and the toxins produced by Clostridium perfringens for biological weapons.

Diplomacy and biological warfare. The first diplomatic effort to limit biological warfare was the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. This treaty, ratified in 1925, prohibited the use of biological weapons; however, it was not effective as Germany, the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union all had biological weapons programs up to the 1960s. More than 140 countries, including the United States, signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production, and the Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, also called the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1972, with limited success. Although the United States formally stopped biological weapons research in 1969 (by executive order of then President Richard M. Nixon), the Soviet Union carried on biological weapons research until its demise. Despite being a signator to the BWC, the Iraqi government allegedly continued its buildup of biological weapons into the twenty-first century.

Following the Iraqi war, however, anticipated stockpiles of biological weapons were not immediately found.

█ FURTHER READING:

ELECTRONIC:

Rhode Island Department of Health: Bioterrorism Preparedness Program "History of Biological Warfare and Current Threat" <http://www.healthri.org/environment/biot/history.htm> (March 12, 2003).

Arizona Department of Health Services: Epidemiology and Surveillance "History of Biowarfare and Bioterrorism" <http://www.hs.state.az.us/phs/edc/edrp/es/bthistor2.htm> (March 12, 2003).

SEE ALSO

Anthrax Weaponization
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Bioterrorism
Chemical Warfare
Infectious Disease, Threats to Security
Viral Biology
Weapons of Mass Destruction

Biological warfare

Biological warfare (previously called germ warfare) is the use of diseasecausing microorganisms as military weapons. One of the earliest recorded uses of biological weapons occurred in the fourteenth century. Invading Asian armies used a device called a catapult to hurl bodies of plague (a deadly, highly contagious disease caused by a bacterium) victims over city walls to infect the resisting townspeople. It is thought that this practice resulted in the spread of the Black Death throughout Europe, killing millions of people in four years.

Toward the end of the French and Indian Wars in North America (1689–1763), a British military officer is said to have given blankets infected with smallpox germs to a tribe of Native Americans, resulting in their infection with the often fatal disease.

In more modern times, an outbreak of inhalation anthrax (a disease caused by inhaling the spores of the anthrax bacterium) in a city in Russia resulted in over 1,000 deaths in 1979. It is thought that this outbreak may have resulted from an accident at a biological warfare facility.

Biological warfare is among the least commonly used military strategies. Most military leaders have been reluctant to release microorganisms that might cause an uncontrolled outbreak of disease, affecting not only the enemy but friendly populations as well.

Microorganisms used as biological weapons

The microorganisms generally considered suitable for biological warfare include viruses, bacteria, protozoa, and fungi. Toxins (poisonous chemicals) produced by microorganisms also are considered biological weapons. These agents are capable of causing sickness or death in humans or animals, destroying crops, or contaminating water supplies.

Various bacteria have been used or experimented with as biological weapons. Anthrax is an infectious disease that can be passed from cattle and sheep to humans. Inhaling anthrax spores can result in a deadly form of pneumonia. During World War II (1939–45), Japan and Great Britain built and tested biological weapons carrying anthrax spores, and the inhalation of anthrax may still be a threat as a biological weapon today.

The toxin that causes botulism (pronounced BOTCH-uh-liz-um), a rare but deadly form of food poisoning, is regarded as one of the most powerful nerve poisons known to science. Ingestion of a very tiny amount can cause death. The toxin has been tested by the U.S. Army as a coating for bullets and as an ingredient in aerosols (for release into the air).

Brucellosis (pronounced broos-uh-LOHS-us) is a bacterial disease transmitted from animals to humans either by direct contact or by drinking the milk of infected goats and cows. It can be used as a biological weapon that does not kill people but makes them so ill that they are unable to resist an attack.

Words to Know

Microorganism: An organism so small that it can be seen only with the aid of a microscope.

Plague: A contagious disease that spreads rapidly through a population and results in a high rate of death.

Toxin: A poisonous substance produced by an organism.

Saxitoxin is a powerful poison produced by one-celled organisms called dinoflagellates (pronounced dye-no-FLAJ-uh-lets) that live in coastal waters. When present in large numbers, the organisms turn the water a reddish color (called red tides). Shellfish contaminated with saxitoxin can cause partial paralysis or even death in humans who eat them and have been considered for use as biological weapons by American military scientists.

Staphylococcus (pronounced staff-luh-KOCK-us) is any of several strains of bacteria that can cause mild to severe infection in humans. The more dangerous strains are the ones most often tested as possible biological weapons. Staphylococcus toxin can be dried and stored for up to a year without losing its effectiveness.

Tularemia (pronounced two-luh-REE-mee-uh) is a plaguelike bacterial disease often transmitted through insect bites. In humans, tularemia can cause fever, chills, headache, chest pain, and difficulty breathing. At one time, the U.S. Army considered tularemia as of the most promising of all biological weapons.

Genetically engineered weapons

The development of genetic engineering in the second half of the twentieth century has presented the possibility of creating even more dangerous forms of existing microorganisms—forms that could be used as biological weapons. Genetic engineering is the process of altering the genetic material of living cells in order to make them capable of (1) manufacturing new substances, (2) performing new functions, (3) being more easily produced, or (4) holding up well under storage.

The use and control of biological weapons

In 1925, the Geneva Protocol, a treaty banning the first use of biological and chemical weapons in war, was signed and ratified or officially approved by many nations, but not Japan or the United States (the U.S. government did not ratify the treaty until April 1975, some 50 years later). The treaty did not, however, prohibit the use of these weapons in response to an initial biological or chemical attack from an opponent.

Following the signing of the treaty, some nations, including Japan and the United States, conducted their own research on biological weapons, explaining that such studies were necessary in order to develop defensive measures against the use of such weapons by others.

The most serious violator of the Geneva Protocol was Japan, The Japanese military used biological warfare during the 1930s and 1940s in its conquest of China. In addition, captured American soldiers were used by Japan during World War II as test subjects in biological weapons experiments.

In the decades following World War II, the United States maintained a large and aggressive program of biological weapons research. Experiments and tests of biological agents were conducted at dozens of American army bases. In 1969, President Richard Nixon announced that the United States was discontinuing further research on biological and chemical weapons.

In 1972, eighty-seven nations (including the United States) signed the Biological Weapons Convention Treaty, which banned the development, testing, and storage of such weapons. The treaty was entered into force three years later. By 2000, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the treaty being entered into force, over 160 nations had signed the treaty; more than 140 of those had also ratified it. However, in 1982, President Ronald Reagan had declared that the world situation justified research on biological and chemical weapons and that the United States would return to a more ambitious program in this area.

As of the end of the twentieth century, over 450 repositories that sold and shipped plague, anthrax, typhoid fever, and other toxic organisms were located throughout the world. The shipment of pathogenic (disease-causing) organisms is not governed by international laws or treaties. Harmful bacteria can be grown in a garage or a backyard, and guidelines on growing bacteria are instantly available on the Internet. In a typical year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) investigates about four times as many biological attack threats in the United States as either chemical or nuclear threats. Clearly, law enforcement by local, state, and federal authorities must be strengthened against the possibility of biological disaster.

[See also Bacteria; Chemical warfare; Poisons and toxins; Virus ]

biological warfare The deliberate spread of agents that cause disease is not just subject matter for thrillers, nor a concern of recent origin. History is replete with examples. The Greeks and Romans provide some of the earliest through their practice of polluting drinking water supplies with corpses. Emulation of this activity occurred in both the American Civil War and the Boer War. Thus cholera and typhoid, both water-borne diseases, may have been two early biological warfare agents.

A more calculated approach, perhaps, was the throwing of the bodies of plague victims over the walls of cities under siege. This stratagem was employed successfully both by the Tartars against the Genoese in the Crimean War of 1346, and in the Russo-Swedish Wars of 1710. Equally scheming was the request of the then British commander-in-chief in North America, Sir Jeffrey Amherst, to encourage the spread of smallpox among ‘disaffected tribes of Indians’. Unbeknown to the commander, a subordinate had similar thoughts, handing over, as presents to hostile chiefs, two blankets and a handkerchief from the smallpox hospital. The desired effect followed. In unvaccinated cases some 30% die of the disease within 9–12 days.

More sophisticated methods for spreading bacteria and viruses are now available to the military. The secret lies in ensuring that the organisms are live and viable after dissemination from a grenade, shell, bomb, or missile, or from the spray tank of an aircraft drone. All of these devices have been investigated for their usefulness as delivery vehicles, with some being more effective than others, suitability being as much a feature of the agent being carried as of the battlefield conditions.

Viability both before and after weaponization are equally important for candidate biological warfare agents. Most biological agents have a limited life, with their activity continually declining in storage unless steps are taken to slow the process down. Low-temperature storage or freeze-drying will help retain activity.

Bacteria or viruses would usually be delivered in a finely-dispersed aerosol with liquid droplet sizes ranging from 1 to 5 micrometres — small enough to enable penetration deep into the lungs. Agents unstable in aerosols might be spread in a powder or slurry, efficiency of dispersal being a key requirement.

Candidate biological warfare agents are those that resist environmental degradation through changes in temperature, humidity, or ultraviolet light. Even anthrax, long a favourite biological warfare agent, and renowned for its environmental persistence, will not survive under all circumstances. The wrong temperature, rate of temperature change, or degree of humidity will prevent anthrax bacteria forming spores, the spores being a form of hibernation in which the bacteria can survive more extreme environmental changes, yet retain infectivity.

Anthrax has a considerable biological warfare pedigree. The infectivity of the bacteria was studied on Russian and Chinese detainees, following deliberate contamination by Japanese scientists; some 3000 human subjects in total died as a result of Japanese experimentation, with a range of bacteria and viruses, at Camp 731 in Manchuria during 1938–45. The fruits of this research boosted the US offensive biological warfare programme. Japanese scientists received immunity from prosecution for war crimes by the US in exchange for research results. Less is known about the Soviet programme, but the accidental venting into the air of less than 1 g of anthrax from a military, microbiology laboratory, in Sverdousk in April 1979, led to at least 64 deaths. Thus, it would appear that anthrax was also a part of the Soviet biological warfare programme.

Prior to 1969, the US had an offensive biological weapons programme, with at least eight bacteria and viruses in munitions. A unilateral decision by President Richard Nixon led to their destruction between 1970–1, paving the way for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, acquisition, or retention of weapons based on bacteria, viruses, or toxins.

The former Soviet Union was a signatory to this Convention, and as such was obliged to disarm. However, as late as 1992, evidence from scientists defecting to the West indicated that an offensive biological warfare programme, run by the State Security Service, the KGB, was still functioning. This programme was stopped by the Russian Federation President, Boris Yeltsin, shortly after it became public knowledge.

No international mechanism exists to police the BWC. Negotiations under the auspices of the UN Conference on Disarmament are continuing to secure a treaty with powers analogous to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Formidable obstacles will need to be overcome before a treaty is ready for signature.

Given the support the CWC received from the chemical industry world-wide, negotiators will be looking to the pharmaceutical industry for equal encouragement to help secure a more robust biological weapons treaty. Culture facilities, such as those employed by the pharmaceutical industry, are required to produce the quantities of agents needed for biological weapons. Attempts were made by Russian scientists, at the Institute of Especially Pure Biopreparations in St Petersburg, to increase the infectivity of plague for use as a biological warfare agent. The plague bacterium under research at this vaccine production facility had developed resistance to sixteen different antibiotics. There is concern that other scientists may be tempted to try to alter the performance characteristics of more candidate biological warfare agents. The expertise and technology necessary to perform this work is becoming more prevalent.

Defences against biological warfare agents will always be limited. Predicting the likely agent(s) that will be used in war is guesswork, and hence vaccination, even if it were possible for a few, can never provide complete protection. Given the continuing interest in biological warfare, and the evidence that Iraq had produced significant quantities of several bacteria, including anthrax, a prescriptive treaty is long overdue. A new treaty will need to ensure that developing countries still have access to technology; that commercial sensitivities are taken into account; and that there are sufficient powers of inspection to detect illicit manufacture. Without a robust treaty, military defence budgets will escalate, but no sum of money will be sufficient to guarantee protection. Only a disarmament regime can provide this security.

Alastair Hay

Biological warfare

Biological warfare, as defined by The United Nations, is the use of any living organism (e.g. bacterium, virus) or an infective component (e.g., toxin), to cause disease or death in humans, animals, or plants. In contrast to bioterrorism , biological warfare is defined as the "state-sanctioned" use of biological weapons on an opposing military force or civilian population.

Biological weapons include viruses , bacteria , rickettsia , and biological toxins. Of particular concern are genetically altered microorganisms , whose effect can be made to be group-specific. In other words, persons with particular traits are susceptible to these microorganisms.

The use of biological weapons by armies has been a reality for centuries. For example, in ancient records of battles exist the documented use of diseased bodies and cattle that had died of microbial diseases to poison wells. There are even records that infected bodies or carcasses were catapulted into cities under siege.

In the earliest years of the twentieth century, however, weapons of biological warfare were specifically developed by modern methods, refined, and stockpiled by various governments.

During World War I, Germany developed a biological warfare program based on the anthrax bacillus (Bacillus anthracis ) and a strain of Pseudomonas known as Burkholderia mallei. The latter is also the cause of Glanders disease in cattle.

Allied efforts in Canada, the United States, and Britain to develop anthrax-based weapons were also active in World War II During World War II, Britain actually produced five million anthrax cakes at the U.K. Chemical and Biological Defense Establishment at Porton Down facility that were intended to be dropped on Germany to infect the food chain. The weapons were never used. Against their will, prisoners in German Nazi concentration camps were maliciously infected with pathogens, such as hepatitis A, Plasmodia spp., and two types of Rickettsia bacteria, during studies allegedly designed to develop vaccines and antibacterial drugs. Japan also conducted extensive biological weapon research during World War II in occupied Manchuria, China. Unwilling prisoners were infected with a variety of pathogens, including Neisseria meningitis, Bacillus anthracis, Shigella spp, and Yersinia pestis. It has been estimated that over 10,000 prisoners died as a result of either infection or execution following infection. In addition, biological agents contaminated the water supply and some food items, and an estimated 15 million potentially plague-infected fleas were released from aircraft, affecting many Chinese cities. However, as the Japanese military found out, biological weapons have fundamental disadvantages: they are unpredictable and difficult to control. After infectious agents were let loose in China by the Japanese, approximately 10,000 illnesses and 1,700 deaths were estimated to have occurred among Japanese troops.

A particularly relevant example of a microorganism used in biological warfare is Bacillus anthracis. This bacterium causes anthrax. Bacillus anthracis can live as a vegetative cell, growing and dividing as bacteria normally do. The organism has also evolved the ability to withstand potentially lethal environmental conditions by forming a near-dormant, highly resistant form known as a spore. The spore is designed to hibernate until conditions are conducive for growth and reproduction. Then, the spore resuscitates and active metabolic life resumes. The spore form can be easily inhaled to produce a highly lethal inhalation anthrax. The spores quickly and easily resuscitate in the warm and humid conditions of the lung. Contact with spores can also produce a less lethal but dangerous cutaneous anthrax infection.

One of the "attractive" aspects of anthrax as a weapon of biological warfare is its ability to be dispersed over the enemy by air. Other biological weapons also have this capacity. The dangers of an airborne release of bioweapons are well documented. British open-air testing of anthrax weapons in 1941 on Gruinard Island in Scotland rendered the island inhabitable for five decades. The US Army conducted a study in 1951-52 called "Operation Sea Spray" to study wind currents that might carry biological weapons. As part of the project design, balloons were filled with Serratia marcescens (then thought to be harmless) and exploded over San Francisco. Shortly thereafter, there was a corresponding dramatic increase in reported pneumonia and urinary tract infections. And, in 1979, an accidental release of anthrax spores, a gram at most and only for several minutes, occurred at a bioweapons facility near the Russian city of Sverdlovsk. At least 77 people were sickened and 66 died. All the affected were some 4 kilometers downwind of the facility. Sheep and cattle up to 50 kilometers downwind became ill.

The first diplomatic effort to limit biological warfare was the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. This treaty, ratified in 1925, prohibited the use of biological weapons. The treaty has not been effective. For example, during the "Cold War" between the United States and the then Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s, the United States constructed research facilities to develop antisera, vaccines, and equipment for protection against a possible biological attack. As well, the use of microorganisms as offensive weapons was actively investigated.

Since then, other initiatives to ban the use of biological warfare and to destroy the stockpiles of biological weapons have been attempted. For example, in 1972 more than 100 countries, including the United States, signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production, and the Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Although the United States formally stopped biological weapons research in 1969 (by executive order of then President Richard M. Nixon), the Soviet Union carried on biological weapons research until its demise. Despite the international prohibitions, the existence of biological weapons remains dangerous reality.

See also Anthrax, terrorist use of as a biological weapon; Bacteria and bacterial infection; Bioterrorism, protective measures; Bioterrorism; Infection and resistance; Viruses and response to viral infection

biological warfare (BW) was employed only by Japan during the China incident and, on a minuscule scale, by the Polish Home Army (see Poland, 4) which in 1943 killed a few hundred German soldiers and Gestapo agents with typhoid-fever microbes and lice.

During the 1930s the Japanese formed two BW units, both of which had various branches. Unit 100 was created to develop and employ BW for sabotage purposes while Unit 731, or Ishii Detachment—named after its commanding officer, Lt-Colonel (later lt-general) Ishii Shiro, an army physician—was formed to develop and wage BW on a much larger scale. It was established in Manchukuo in 1936 under the command of the Kwantung Army, and, using a cover name, the Kwantung Army Epidemic Prevention and Water Supply Unit, it developed such weapons as a porcelain bomb which could deliver plague fleas unharmed to their target; the Ha bomb, to spread anthrax or tetanus on the battlefield, its anti-personnel shrapnel creating wounds infected with these bacteria; and the Uji bomb, for use against civilians and feeding herds. To develop these fearful weapons hundreds, perhaps thousands, of petty criminals and Chinese prisoners-of-war were used in fatal experiments, but that Allied service personnel were also used as guinea pigs has not so far been substantiated. When the Soviet Army invaded Manchukuo in August 1945 the Japanese destroyed the buildings of Unit 731, obliterated all evidence of BW research, and evacuated the staff.

Though there is no conclusive evidence, a Japanese suicide squad from the unit probably contaminated the River Khalka with typhus, paratyphus, and cholera during the fighting with Soviet troops there in August 1939 (see Japanese–Soviet campaigns); and cholera, typhus, and plague were disseminated in and around the Chinese port of Ningpo in October 1940 and plague-infested fleas and grain were dropped on to Changteh city in 1941, causing several epidemics.

A more lethal employment of BW by the Japanese occurred in the China Incident when the germs of cholera, dysentery, typhoid, plague, anthrax, and paratyphoid were used against Chiang Kai-shek's forces during Japanese advances into Chekiang and Kiangsi provinces in 1942, causing not only ‘inestimable’ casualties to the Chinese but accidentally infecting 10,000 Japanese troops as well. During the same campaign 3,000 Chinese prisoners-of-war were allegedly given food injected with typhoid and paratyphoid before being returned to their own lines. Plans were also made to attack US forces with plague fleas after they had captured Saipan, but the ship with the team sent to accomplish this was sunk.

The Allies did not employ BW but they were certainly preparing to do so if they had to. The UK had ratified the Geneva Convention protocol barring biological weapons, but experiments with anthrax were started in Britain during the 1930s—the Scottish island of Gruinard was not declared decontaminated until 1986—and a programme of producing cattle-feed filled with anthrax, for dropping over Germany, was begun in December 1941. A small anthrax bomb was also developed, which was passed to the Americans for production. They had started research on botulin and anthrax in 1942—the USA had signed the protocol but not ratified it—and by 1944 had reached an advanced stage. By the end of that year the US Chemical Warfare Service had a factory poised to produce 500,000 4 lb. (1.8 kg.) anthrax bombs a month and a method of delivering a botulin solution over a short range had also been devised. Work was in progress, too, on other agents like brucellosis and glanders as well as on chemicals against plants (also developed in the UK), classified at the time as a form of biological, not chemical, warfare.

In February 1944 Lord Cherwell (see Lindemann) recommended that Churchill should request anthrax bombs from the Americans, and later that year, when the V-1 (see V-weapons) caused heavy civilian casualties, the Chiefs of Staff committee assessed the possibility of employing them in 1945 when it was thought they would be available in sufficient quantities. But though it was agreed to share development, production, and intelligence information, British requests for a joint policy on the use of BW—as had been agreed with chemical warfare—were rejected by the USA which, presumably, wanted a free hand to use BW against Japan if the need arose.

When the V-1 became known to the British it was greatly feared that it might be a BW weapon—the normal detonation of the first one was received with relief—and before the Normandy landings in June 1944 (see OVERLORD) an effort was made to deter the Germans from employing BW. Disinformation was leaked to them that self-inoculating syringes containing botulin antidote were being distributed to 100,000 troops participating in the landings, thereby giving the impression that the Allies not only possessed methods of countering BW but were perhaps capable of employing it offensively. However, unlike the UK and USA, and probably the USSR, Germany did not attempt to develop offensive BW weapons, and such development, despite the threat that the Allies might employ it, was expressly forbidden by Hitler though Himmler did attempt to circumvent this ban.

In 1949, at Khabarovsk in eastern Siberia, the USSR tried twelve Japanese connected with developing and employing BW for war crimes. They were all sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, but though the chief medical officer at Mukden prison camp was hanged and its commandant imprisoned, no member of Unit 731 in American hands, including Ishii, was prosecuted. All were given immunity in exchange for the unit's scientific data which were then employed to improve America's own capacity for BW. Details of this deal did not emerge until the 1980s.

Bibliography

Harris, R., and and Paxman, J. , A Higher Form of Killing (London, 1982).
Harris, S. H. , Factories of Death (London, 1994).

Biological Warfare, Advanced Diagnostics

Forensic analysis techniques are often used for other applications. For example, various chromatographic techniques can be used to examine an array of materials, including blood and other forensically-relevant samples.

Technologies that are used to detect biological warfare agents can be relevant to forensic analyses. These include the detection of living bacteria, based on the metabolic conversion of one compound to another by the organisms. Indeed, one novel technology can detect the distinctive aromas emitted by bacteria when they metabolize certain compounds.

Toxins that are produced by bacteria including Bacillus anthracis (the agent of anthrax ) and Clostridium botulinum (which causes the food-borne illness of botulism) can be detected using antibodies targeted specifically for the particular toxin protein. Other poisons (such as ricin ) are likewise detectable.

In the United States, the development of diagnostic capabilities for biological warfare is a government concern. The Advanced Diagnostics Program is funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the United States government (DARPA). Its objective is to develop tools and medicines to detect and treat biological and chemical weapons in the field at concentrations low enough to prevent illness. Challenges to this task include minimizing the labor, equipment, and time for identifying biological and chemical agents.

One area of interest includes development of field tools that can identify many different agents. To accomplish this goal, several groups funded under the advanced diagnostics program have developed field-based biosensors that can detect a variety of analytes, including fragments of DNA , various hormones and proteins, bacteria, salts, and antibodies. These biosensors are portable, run on external power sources, and require very little time to complete analyses.

A second focus of the advanced diagnostics project is the identification of known and unknown or bioengineered pathogens and development of early responses to infections. Many viruses act by destroying the ability of cells to replicate properly. One group funded under the advanced diagnostics program is studying the enzyme inosine 5′-monophosphate dehydrogenase (IMPDH), which produces products that are required for synthesizing nucleic acids, such as RNA and DNA, both of which are essential for proper cell replication. This group seeks to develop novel drugs based on IMPDH, which can cross into cells and thwart viral infection.

A final goal is to develop the ability to continuously monitor the body for evidence of infection. Researchers are addressing this goal in two ways. The first involves engineering monitoring mechanisms that are internal to the body. In particular, groups funded under the initiative are developing bioengineered white blood cells to detect infection from within the body. Often genetic responses to infection occur within minutes of infection, so analysis of blood cells provides a very quick indication of the presence of a biological threat. The second method involves the development of a wearable, non-invasive diagnostic device that detects a broad-spectrum of biological and chemical agents.

see also Aflatoxin; Bacterial biology; Bioterrorism.

Biological Warfare, Advanced Diagnostics

The Advanced Diagnostics Program is funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the United States government (DARPA). Its objective is to develop tools and medicines to detect and treat biological and chemical weapons in the field at concentrations low enough to prevent illness. Challenges to this task include minimizing the labor, equipment, and time for identifying biological and chemical agents.

One area of interest includes development of field tools that can identify many different agents. To accomplish this goal, several groups funded under the advanced diagnostics program have developed field-based biosensors that can detect a variety of analytes including fragments of DNA, various hormones and proteins, bacteria, salts, and antibodies. These biosensors are portable, run on external power sources, and require very little time to complete analyses.

A second focus of the advanced diagnostics project is the identification of known and unknown or bioengineered pathogens and development of early responses to infections. Many viruses act by destroying the ability of cells to replicate properly. One group funded under the advanced diagnostics program is studying the enzyme 5'-monophosphate dehydrogenase (IMPDH), which produces products that are required for synthesizing nucleic acids, such as RNA and DNA, both of which are essential for proper cell replication. This group seeks to develop novel drugs based on IMPDH, which can cross into cells and thwart viral infection.

A final goal is to develop the ability to continuously monitor the body for evidence of infection. Researchers are addressing this goal in two ways. The first involves engineering monitoring mechanisms that are internal to the body. In particular, groups funded under the initiative are developing bioengineered white blood cells to detect infection from within the body. Often genetic responses to infection occur within minutes of infection so analysis of blood cells provides a very quick indication of the presence of a biological threat. The second method involves the development of a wearable, non-invasive diagnostic device that detects a broad-spectrum of biological and chemical agents.

█ FURTHER READING:

ELECTRONIC:

Advanced Diagnostics (DARPA) <http://www.darpa.mil/dso/thrust/biosci/ADVDIAG/index.html> (March 13, 2003).

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Sciences Office <http://www.darpa.mil/dso/thrust/biosci/advdiagn.htm.> (March 13, 2003).

SEE ALSO

Biodetectors
Biological Warfare
Biomedical Technologies
Biosensor Technologies
Bioterrorism
Bioterrorism, Protective Measures

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

Biological warfare is defined as the international use of biological agents or their by-products to harm human populations. Using biological agents to create mass casualties requires more than having the biological agents in hand—the agents must also be disseminated. Technology has made it easier to obtain and distribute harmful microorganisms. Since starting the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program in 1999, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and its partners have developed laboratory protocols for the identification of threat agents and have begun to address the needs of public health in responding to an event.

David A. Sleet

Stephen A. Morse

(see also: Anthrax; Antisocial Behavior; Arms Control; Contagion; Terrorism; War )

Bibliography

Khan, A.; Morse, S.; and Lillibridge, S. (2000). "Public Health Preparedness for Biological Terrorism in the USA." Lancet 356:1179–1182.

Stern, J. (1999). "The Prospect of Domestic Bioterrorism." Emerging Infectious Diseases 5 (July-August, Special Issue).

biological warfare Use of disease microbes and their toxins in warfare. The extensive use of mustard gas during World War I prompted the prohibition of biological warfare by the Geneva Convention (1925). However, many nations have maintained costly research programmes for the production of harmful microorganisms. The microbes include plant pathogens for the destruction of food crops. See also chemical warfare

biological warfare The military use of microorganisms, such as bacteria, viruses, fungi, and other microorganisms, including the agents for anthrax and botulism, to induce disease or death among humans, livestock, and crop plants. Though officially banned in most countries, research continues with the aim of developing virulent strains of existing microorganisms, using genetic engineering and other techniques.

biological warfare warfare involving the use of bacteria, viruses, and other biological agents to kill, sicken, or disorient the enemy.

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

BIOLOGICAL WARFARE. SeeChemical and Biological Warfare .