Belgium 1. Introduction
Belgium, a constitutional monarchy of 8.2 million people, entered the Second World War, as it had the
First, as a neutral state. After the
Versailles settlement of 1919, the country had concluded a series of diplomatic and military alliances with the western powers but in 1935 and 1936 the tripartite Socialist–Catholic–Liberal government, supported by King
Léopold III, renounced these agreements and declared the goal of Belgium's foreign policy to be the defence of its territory. This ‘policy of independence’ was both a response to the collapse of the system of collective security and an attempt to rally all sections of the nation behind a policy of enhanced national defence.
The Belgian state dated from a diplomatic settlement of 1839 and, though its rapid economic growth during the 19th century and participation in the First World War had fostered a sense of patriotism and national unity, there remained strong tensions among its socially, ethnically, and ideologically diverse populations. The principal division was linguistic. Belgium was divided between the Dutch-speaking Flemish provinces of the north (Antwerp, Limburg, East and West Flanders) and the French-speaking Walloon area in the south (Liège, Namur, the Hainaut, and the Luxemburg). The latter, together with the francophone populations of the capital city, Brussels, and the largely French-speaking bourgeoisie of Flanders, had long controlled much of the wealth and administration of the country, but during the 1920s and 1930s they had faced mounting pressure for greater rights from a Flemish nationalist movement, the Vlaamsch Nationaal Verbond (VNV), which in 1940 had some 25,000 members and 17 seats in parliament.
2. Government, domestic life, and economy
(a) Pre-occupation
The government, headed by Hubert Pierlot (1883–1963), as prime minister, reacted to the outbreak of war in September 1939 by reiterating its resolve to defend the country against attacks from any quarter. The army was initially deployed along both the German and French frontiers but there could be little doubt as to the principal threat to Belgium and, after invasion alerts in November 1939 and January 1940, preparations to repulse a German attack were reinforced. The German invasion on 10 May 1940 (see
FALL GELB) did not therefore take the Belgian authorities by surprise. Intelligence from their Berlin embassy had predicted the offensive and the army was in a high state of alert. Nor did the outcome of the campaign at first seem a foregone conclusion. The German airborne attack and motorized offensive, however, rapidly overwhelmed the Belgian defences (see
armed forces, below) and on 25 May the king and his principal ministers, including Pierlot and the foreign minister, Paul-Henri Spaak (1899–1972), met at the château of Wynendaele to assess the critical military situation. The events at this tense meeting were to determine much of the course of Belgian politics both during and after the war and remain a subject of considerable controversy. None of those present doubted the need to end the untenable military situation but, while the ministers advocated that the king and the government should withdraw to France to continue the struggle alongside the Allies, King Léopold argued that the impossibility of continuing the conflict on Belgian soil should mark the end of Belgian involvement in the war and stated his determination to remain in the country and share the fate of his defeated troops.
Léopold negotiated a surrender of the Belgian forces on 28 May and returned to his palace at Laeken outside Brussels where he remained as a self-proclaimed prisoner for the next four years. The ministers travelled to France, where they declared the king to be unable to reign by virtue of his imprisonment and at an improvised session of the Belgian parliament at Limoges on 31 May they echoed Allied criticism of Léopold's actions. Bitterness between the two sides ran deep, not least because the dispute revealed the tensions between the monarch and a political élite whose failure to provide strong government for the country he had long deplored. Thus, when in June the
fall of France led the ministers to abandon their hopes of continuing the war and seek a
rapprochement with the king, Léopold rebuffed their advances. He, like almost all Belgians at this time, believed the war to be at an end and hoped by negotiations with the Germans to restore a measure of Belgian independence and, if possible, to create a new government within Belgium.
(b) Government of occupation
At a meeting with Hitler at
Berchtesgaden on 19 November 1940, Léopold sought guarantees as to the future status of Belgium in the hope that this would open the way to a more general political settlement between the two countries. Hitler, however, was preoccupied by the continued military conflict and refused to be drawn on the future he envisaged for Belgium. The meeting, therefore, ended inconclusively and Léopold returned to Belgium where, until his deportation to the German Reich in June 1944, he remained a mute though not uninfluential political force. He continued to rebuff all approaches from those whom he regarded as the ‘traitors’ of the Belgian government-in-exile in London (see below) and a number of the members of his entourage appeared to give encouragement to the advocates of a New Order within Belgium. Support for the king had been overwhelming in the summer of 1940 but, as the war continued, it declined rapidly and his stance became ever more clearly at odds with much of the Belgian population.
After the surrender of 28 May 1940, the victorious German authorities rapidly imposed an occupation regime on Belgium. The frontier cantons of Eupen, Malmédy, and St Vith, which had been transferred from Germany to Belgium in 1919, had been reincorporated into the Reich by a special Führer decree on 18 May 1940. The remainder of Belgium, together with the French departments of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais, was ruled by a Wehrmacht military administration or
Militärverwaltung. Its nominal head was
General von Falkenhausen, but most decisions were the responsibility of the president of the military administration (
Militärverwaltungschef) Eggert Reeder. The various other German authorities in Belgium including the foreign ministry and the
SS were subordinated to Reeder's military administration and, though
Himmler among others always resented this military supremacy and sought to enact his own policies within the country, Reeder, who proved to be a skilful administrator, was able to repulse most of these challenges to his authority. Only in July 1944, shortly before the German retreat from Belgium, did the military administration finally give way to a civil administration (
Zivilverwaltung) headed by Reich Commissioner Grohé (see also
Germany, 4).
Racial and practical concerns determined that Reeder's priorities as the
de facto ruler of Belgium were threefold. In accordance with an order of Hitler of July 1940 he sought to support the Germanic Flemish population while according no favours to the francophone Walloons. This policy was, however, always mitigated by his two other concerns: to ensure that Belgian industry contributed to the German war effort and to administer Belgium with the minimum deployment of German manpower. These priorities obliged Reeder and his colleagues to work closely with the existing Belgian authorities. A law passed by the Belgian parliament on 10 May 1940 had delegated wide powers to civil servants to administer the country in the absence of their political superiors and, consequently, during the occupation the senior officials of each government department, the
secrétaires-généraux, became in effect the administrators of much of the life of occupied Belgium. Conflict between these civil servants and the military administration soon developed over a number of contentious issues, but such disputes never destroyed the system of German indirect rule and, as the war progressed, Reeder and the
secrétaires-généraux became to some extent allies. They agreed on the need to maintain industrial and agricultural output and ensure law and order, and also sought to defend the political status quo against the attacks of the SS and their collaborationist allies and of radical elements within the resistance.
The power exercised during the occupation by the
secrétaires-généraux mirrored the more general influence exerted by the social and economic élite. Though the national politicians had been excluded, many of the other notables of Belgian life retained or even enhanced their positions. In the economic sphere, a group of leading bankers and industrialists (the Comité Galopin) regulated much of the pattern of economic activity, encouraging the production of essential materials and allowing trade with Germany while seeking to prevent the subordination of Belgium's economy to the German war machine. Similarly, the Catholic Church was treated with considerable respect by the Wehrmacht authorities who allowed the clergy and the Catholic education system to operate largely unhindered (see also
religion).
As elsewhere in German-occupied Europe, pro-German collaborationist groups also developed in Belgium (see
collaboration). In Flanders, the Flemish nationalists of the VNV, under the direction of Staf De Clercq and subsequently of Hendrik Elias, emerged in 1940 as close allies of the German authorities. Many supporters of the VNV were appointed to positions of responsibility in central and local government and members of the movement served in German military units in Belgium and on the Eastern Front. In francophone Belgium, the small quasi-fascist Rexist movement led by
Léon Degrelle also supported the German cause. It was initially shunned by the Wehrmacht authorities, but, after it established a Légion Wallonie which fought with some distinction on the Eastern Front, it became a close ally of the SS within Belgium.
Though subjected to serious dislocation and German exploitation, the Belgian economy continued to operate during the occupation. Certain industrial sectors, such as the substantial arms industry, were taken under German control but most other enterprises remained in Belgian hands. The Belgian authorities encouraged agricultural and industrial output and the material sufferings of the population were relatively modest compared with those experienced in other parts of Europe. Nevertheless, there was some serious deprivation, notably in the early years of the war when severe food shortages were only very imperfectly compensated for by a substantial black market.
Daily life in occupied Belgium was a mixture of enhanced individualism and a heightened sense of solidarity. The experience of occupation varied greatly between different regions, but for the majority of the population the struggle to find sufficient food, fuel, and clothing acquired a primary role in their lives. The pattern of daily life was disrupted in many ways. Travel was often difficult and Allied bombing of railway junctions in the lead-up to the liberation caused substantial damage as well as costing many civilian lives. Families were frequently split up by the events of the war: in addition to the many thousands of men who were arrested by the German authorities or were deported (or volunteered) to work in the Reich, some 70,000 largely francophone
prisoners-of-war remained interned in camps in Germany throughout the war as a result of Hitler's decision to liberate only those Belgian soldiers who were of Flemish origin.
For some Belgians, especially the young, the war provided unprecedented opportunities for adventure and freedom from social constraints, but for most life was hard and remorselessly drab. Cultural life was dominated by a desire for escapism and the boom in demand for popular literature, films, spectator sports, and swing dance music all reflected this trend. Some aspects of the occupation, such as the food shortages, heightened divisions between town and country and between a relatively prosperous
haute bourgeoisie and the majority of the population; but in general the war years eroded the traditional barriers of class, language, and religion. Whether in the resistance (see below) or in more prosaic aspects of daily life, the occupation threw people into contact with each other and enabled them, through a shared antipathy to the Germans and to the sufferings of the war, to work together.
(c) Government-in-exile
Prevented by the German authorities from returning to Belgium, Pierlot and his colleagues languished at Vichy throughout the summer of 1940. One minister, Marcel-Henri Jaspar, rebelled in June against the attitude of his colleagues and journeyed to London where, like
de Gaulle, he used the
BBC to declare his determination to continue the military struggle. His unilateral action was promptly disavowed by the Belgian government in France, but Jaspar remained undaunted and, in collaboration with a small group of predominantly socialist refugees in London, he proclaimed the formation of a new pro-British government on 5 July 1940. This alarmed his erstwhile colleagues and Albert De Vleeschauwer, the colonial minister in the Pierlot government, hurried from Lisbon to London to prevent British recognition of the rival administration. Thanks especially to his assurances that the considerable economic resources of the Belgian Congo would be made available to the British cause, London withheld recognition of the Jaspar government; but the rebel minister and his supporters did not abandon their efforts and throughout the summer a complex struggle was pursued between De Vleeschau-wer, aided by the finance minister Camille Gutt, and Jaspar and his allies for the backing of the British authorities. After the failure of their attempts to initiate a dialogue with King Léopold and the Germans, Pierlot and Spaak arrived in England where, with De Vleeschauwer and Gutt, they announced on 31 October the reconstitution of the Belgian government. This Pierlot government gradually won official recognition from the Allied authorities as the legal government of Belgium.
Contact between the Pierlot government in London and occupied Belgium developed considerably during the war. While in the summer of 1940 Belgian public opinion had overwhelmingly supported the king, by 1941 the government-in-exile had become for most Belgians the legitimate representative of their nation. This change owed less to the somewhat tarnished reputation of the government's principal figures than to its identification with the Allied cause. The government concluded co-operation agreements with Britain in January 1941 and subsequently became a signatory of the
United Nations Declaration. Pierlot and his colleagues were not without their critics among the Belgian refugee community but the government gradually grew in stature and a steady trickle of escapers from Belgium enabled its bureaucracy in Eaton Square in central London to be expanded. Radio Belgique was established in 1940 to broadcast to occupied Belgium and in the latter years of the war the Pierlot administration participated in discussions on economic and political reconstruction with other exiled governments which contributed significantly to the post-war enthusiasm for European integration.
The development of Belgian armed forces in exile was severely restricted by a shortage of manpower. In October 1940 a number of somewhat heterogenous elements were formed into a battalion based at Tenby in Wales; by 1941 they amounted to some 3,000 men of whom only 1,600 were equipped. At the end of 1942 the Pierlot government decided to form the nucleus of a new Belgian Army under the command of Major Jean Piron. The Piron Brigade was constituted in 1943 and by 1944 it had an effective strength of some 2,000 men. In August 1944 it was transferred to France and subsequently participated in the Allied liberation of Belgium and the battle of Arnhem (see
MARKET-GARDEN). Small Belgian commando and
Special Air Service units, numbering fewer than 300 men, were also formed within the British armed forces; a Belgian unit was created in the RAF by 1942 with a total strength of 1,200 men of whom 200 were killed; some 300 men served in the Section Belge of the Royal Navy and two small warships—
Godetia and
Buttercup—were manned by Belgian officers and men.
The Belgian Congo remained under Allied control throughout the war and its armed forces (the Force Publique), composed of some 40,000 men, participated in the
East African campaign. After the Allied liberation of 1944, the Belgian and Allied authorities rapidly constituted a new Belgian Army in which approximately 75,000 men served during the remaining months of the war.
(d) Liberation and the post-occupation government
Most of Belgium's territory was rapidly liberated in early September 1944. The speed of
liberation precluded any prolonged power vacuum and the excesses experienced in certain other countries were largely avoided. The Pierlot government's prompt return was facilitated by the absence of the king, who had been deported to Germany in June 1944, and his brother, Prince Charles, was installed as regent. The government did not, however, enjoy universal support. Its failure to deal energetically with the purging of collaborators and with the problems of food and coal supplies was widely criticized and, though it was remodelled to include certain new figures drawn from the resistance, it was seen by many as an outmoded relic of the pre-war political order. Its problems came to a head in November 1944 when it sought to force resistance units to surrender their weapons. Pierlot and his colleagues had to rely on Allied assistance and Maj-General Erskine, head of the
SHAEF mission in Belgium, made it clear that he would not tolerate any challenge to the government. Eventually, after a violent demonstration outside parliament, almost all resistance fighters were disarmed.
In February 1945 Pierlot resigned and was replaced by a socialist. Achille Van Acker, who had remained in the country during the war. The major political problem facing the government was now that of the king, who was released from detention at the end of the war. Negotiations were begun between him and Van Acker but they failed to reach an agreement on the conditions for his return to Belgium and Léopold was forced to remain a reluctant exile in Switzerland. This unresolved problem was to cast a long shadow over Belgium's post-war politics and it culminated in the crisis of 1950 when Léopold sought unsuccessfully to regain his throne.
3. Armed forces
Mobilization had begun on 25 August 1939 and by May 1940 Belgium's armed forces amounted to a field army of 18 infantry divisions, 2 divisions of Chasseurs Ardennais (partly motorized), and 2 motorized cavalry divisions, amounting to some 600,000 men in all. It lacked anti-aircraft artillery, its armour amounted to just 10 tanks, and of the 250 aircraft (90 fighters, 12 bombers, 120 reconnaissance planes) at its disposal only 50 were relatively modern types. There was no navy, only a number of small vessels for fishery protection and patrol duties. King Léopold acted as C-in-C of the armed forces and during the winter of 1939–40 limited discussions were initiated with the French and British military commands. After the initial line of defence along the Albert Canal, which centred on the
Eben Emael fortress, had been breached by German airborne attack on 10 May 1940, the king withdrew the bulk of the army to a fortified defensive line east of Brussels (see Map 44). Both British and French troops had entered Belgium on 10 May and they reinforced the new line of defence between Antwerp and Namur (see
Dyle Line). The surprise German attack through the Ardennes, however, rendered this defensive plan useless and within a few days the Belgian forces joined the Allied retreat, abandoning Brussels and other principal centres of population. King Léopold was well aware of the gravity of the situation and as early as 16 May warned the government of the possibility of eventual defeat. Nevertheless, on 24 May the Belgian forces, now grouped in defence of a small area of West Flanders, engaged the Wehrmacht in the only major battle of the campaign. German superiority over the by now demoralized and disorganized Belgian Army was soon apparent and on 28 May the king surrendered. Much blame was wrongly directed at the Belgian authorities for this action at the time, but the Germans considered the Belgian Army tough opponents and the official historian of the 18th German Division spoke of the ‘extraordinary bravery’ of its soldiers. In 18 days of the most bitter fighting Belgian losses amounted to 6,098 officers and men killed and more than 500 missing, and a further 2,000 prisoners-of-war died in captivity.
4. Resistance
Organized resistance movements appeared gradually. Veterans of anti-German activities during the First World War together with small groups of army officers were active from the outset and a number of intelligence networks as well as a substantial clandestine press had emerged by the end of 1940. It was only, however, during the subsequent years that the realization of a possible Nazi military defeat combined with the oppressive policies of the German authorities gradually led significant numbers of Belgians to engage actively in resistance to the German occupation. Participants were drawn from a wide variety of backgrounds but a prominent contribution was made by the Belgian Communist Party which in May 1941 (before the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union) helped to organize a wave of strikes and subsequently founded the Front de l'Indépendence (FI).
One of the distinctive features of resistance in Belgium was the important role played by intelligence networks and escape lines for Allied airmen (see also
MI9). Especially during the latter years of the occupation, much valuable information on German military operations was sent to London and a considerable number of Allied pilots shot down over Belgium were protected and subsequently returned to the UK via escape lines through France and Spain. There were, however, also several substantial armed groupings. The most important of these were the
partisans armés, who operated within the FI, and the more army-officer-dominated Armée Secrète. Both groups benefited significantly from the introduction by the German authorities of labour conscription measures in 1942 which obliged young Belgian men to work in factories in Germany. Many Belgians chose to evade this legislation and they provided a steady stream of recruits for resistance organizations.
Relations between the Belgian government in London and the resistance groups, though often close, were not without their difficulties. The pretensions of the Pierlot government to dictate internal Belgian developments were not always welcomed by resistance groups while the London authorities distrusted both the potentially pro-Léopold sympathies of the Armée Secrète and the ambitions of radical elements within the FI to prepare a national uprising. In the event, the rapid Allied liberation of Belgium in September 1944 offered the armed resistance groups little opportunity to engage the German forces in direct combat; their greatest military achievement on the eve of
liberation was to seize the port of Antwerp and to prevent its destruction by the departing German armies.
5. Merchant marine
Most of the Belgian merchant fleet of some 100 ships evaded capture by the Germans and, under the terms of an accord signed in July 1940, these ships—together with 3,350 sailors—were placed under British control.
Martin Conway
Bibliography
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De Jonghe, E. , L'Occupation en France et en Belgique 1940–1944, 2 vols. (Lille, 1987–8).
Gérard-Libois, J., and and Gotovitch, J. , L'an 40: la Belgique occupée (Brussels, 1971).
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