biological warfare

biological warfare The deliberate spread of agents that cause disease is not just subject matter for thrillers, nor a concern of recent origin. History is replete with examples. The Greeks and Romans provide some of the earliest through their practice of polluting drinking water supplies with corpses. Emulation of this activity occurred in both the American Civil War and the Boer War. Thus cholera and typhoid, both water-borne diseases, may have been two early biological warfare agents.

A more calculated approach, perhaps, was the throwing of the bodies of plague victims over the walls of cities under siege. This stratagem was employed successfully both by the Tartars against the Genoese in the Crimean War of 1346, and in the Russo-Swedish Wars of 1710. Equally scheming was the request of the then British commander-in-chief in North America, Sir Jeffrey Amherst, to encourage the spread of smallpox among ‘disaffected tribes of Indians’. Unbeknown to the commander, a subordinate had similar thoughts, handing over, as presents to hostile chiefs, two blankets and a handkerchief from the smallpox hospital. The desired effect followed. In unvaccinated cases some 30% die of the disease within 9–12 days.

More sophisticated methods for spreading bacteria and viruses are now available to the military. The secret lies in ensuring that the organisms are live and viable after dissemination from a grenade, shell, bomb, or missile, or from the spray tank of an aircraft drone. All of these devices have been investigated for their usefulness as delivery vehicles, with some being more effective than others, suitability being as much a feature of the agent being carried as of the battlefield conditions.

Viability both before and after weaponization are equally important for candidate biological warfare agents. Most biological agents have a limited life, with their activity continually declining in storage unless steps are taken to slow the process down. Low-temperature storage or freeze-drying will help retain activity.

Bacteria or viruses would usually be delivered in a finely-dispersed aerosol with liquid droplet sizes ranging from 1 to 5 micrometres — small enough to enable penetration deep into the lungs. Agents unstable in aerosols might be spread in a powder or slurry, efficiency of dispersal being a key requirement.

Candidate biological warfare agents are those that resist environmental degradation through changes in temperature, humidity, or ultraviolet light. Even anthrax, long a favourite biological warfare agent, and renowned for its environmental persistence, will not survive under all circumstances. The wrong temperature, rate of temperature change, or degree of humidity will prevent anthrax bacteria forming spores, the spores being a form of hibernation in which the bacteria can survive more extreme environmental changes, yet retain infectivity.

Anthrax has a considerable biological warfare pedigree. The infectivity of the bacteria was studied on Russian and Chinese detainees, following deliberate contamination by Japanese scientists; some 3000 human subjects in total died as a result of Japanese experimentation, with a range of bacteria and viruses, at Camp 731 in Manchuria during 1938–45. The fruits of this research boosted the US offensive biological warfare programme. Japanese scientists received immunity from prosecution for war crimes by the US in exchange for research results. Less is known about the Soviet programme, but the accidental venting into the air of less than 1 g of anthrax from a military, microbiology laboratory, in Sverdousk in April 1979, led to at least 64 deaths. Thus, it would appear that anthrax was also a part of the Soviet biological warfare programme.

Prior to 1969, the US had an offensive biological weapons programme, with at least eight bacteria and viruses in munitions. A unilateral decision by President Richard Nixon led to their destruction between 1970–1, paving the way for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). This prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, acquisition, or retention of weapons based on bacteria, viruses, or toxins.

The former Soviet Union was a signatory to this Convention, and as such was obliged to disarm. However, as late as 1992, evidence from scientists defecting to the West indicated that an offensive biological warfare programme, run by the State Security Service, the KGB, was still functioning. This programme was stopped by the Russian Federation President, Boris Yeltsin, shortly after it became public knowledge.

No international mechanism exists to police the BWC. Negotiations under the auspices of the UN Conference on Disarmament are continuing to secure a treaty with powers analogous to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Formidable obstacles will need to be overcome before a treaty is ready for signature.

Given the support the CWC received from the chemical industry world-wide, negotiators will be looking to the pharmaceutical industry for equal encouragement to help secure a more robust biological weapons treaty. Culture facilities, such as those employed by the pharmaceutical industry, are required to produce the quantities of agents needed for biological weapons. Attempts were made by Russian scientists, at the Institute of Especially Pure Biopreparations in St Petersburg, to increase the infectivity of plague for use as a biological warfare agent. The plague bacterium under research at this vaccine production facility had developed resistance to sixteen different antibiotics. There is concern that other scientists may be tempted to try to alter the performance characteristics of more candidate biological warfare agents. The expertise and technology necessary to perform this work is becoming more prevalent.

Defences against biological warfare agents will always be limited. Predicting the likely agent(s) that will be used in war is guesswork, and hence vaccination, even if it were possible for a few, can never provide complete protection. Given the continuing interest in biological warfare, and the evidence that Iraq had produced significant quantities of several bacteria, including anthrax, a prescriptive treaty is long overdue. A new treaty will need to ensure that developing countries still have access to technology; that commercial sensitivities are taken into account; and that there are sufficient powers of inspection to detect illicit manufacture. Without a robust treaty, military defence budgets will escalate, but no sum of money will be sufficient to guarantee protection. Only a disarmament regime can provide this security.

Alastair Hay

See also microorganisms; war and the body.