Spanish‐American War, an important episode in America's entry into world politics and abandonment of political isolation. The war's origins lay in Cuba's struggle for independence, which resumed in 1895, when the Cuban General Máximo Gómez adopted guerrilla tactics. Spanish General Valeriano (“Butcher”) Weyler ordered civilians into concentration camps, which caused much suffering and aroused U.S. public opinion. Spain's premier Mateo Práxedes Sagasta, responding to a proposal by President William
McKinley, eventually accepted partial home rule, but the Cubans held out for independence. On 15 February 1898, the U.S. battleship
Maine blew up in Havana harbor, killing 266 American sailors. Inflamed by a jingoistic press, the American public blamed Spain, forcing McKinley to demand Cuban independence. When Sagasta refused, Congress authorized armed intervention. It also enacted the Teller Amendment, forbidding the U.S. annexation of Cuba.
Neither Spain nor the United States had expected war, and both were unprepared. Spain had garrisons in Cuba and the
Philippines, but minuscule naval strength. Although the United States had only 28,000 regular army troops, it possessed a well‐trained navy and quickly annexed
Hawai'i to bolster its strategic position.
After mutual declarations of war, Admiral William Sampson blockaded Havana, where Spain's main forces were concentrated. On 1 May, Commodore George Dewey (1837–1917), commanding the U.S. Asiatic Squadron, entered Manila Bay and easily destroyed a weak Spanish squadron. This act stirred public enthusiasm, gave Dewey a base, and precluded Spanish raids on U.S. commerce. On 19 May a small Spanish squadron under Admiral Pascual Cervera arrived at Santiago de Cuba, where it was blockaded. A weak Spanish garrison of ten thousand protected the city. McKinley, ordering the regular army to Cuba along with a few volunteers, also secretly conveyed his war aims to Spain through Great Britain. They included Cuban independence, annexation of
Puerto Rico and Guam, and acquisition of a port in the Philippines. Spain ignored this initiative, sending a naval expedition under Admiral Manuel de la Camara to relieve the Philippines.
On 14 June the Tenth Army Corps commanded by Major General William Shafter, seventeen thousand strong, landed in Cuba. On 1 July, Shafter launched an ill‐prepared attack on El Caney and the San Juan hills, guarding Santiago's eastern approach. The Tenth Corps routed some one thousand Spanish defenders after suffering significant losses. Instead of occupying Santiago, as intended, the exhausted attackers fortified the heights and besieged the city. Legends surrounding the mislabeled “Battle of San Juan Hill” contributed to the reputation of Theodore
Roosevelt. Two days later Admiral Cervera sailed from the harbor, but the blockading vessels sank his entire command, with a heavy toll of Spanish lives.
An expedition led by Major General Nelson Miles invaded Puerto Rico on 25 July and raced toward San Juan. Meanwhile Major General Wesley Merritt, commanding troops sent to assist Dewey's operations in the Philippines, prepared to attack Manila. On 13 August, after a mock battle arranged by Dewey to avoid bloodshed and satisfy Spanish honor, the Spanish garrison capitulated.
After the disaster at Santiago, Premier Sagasta ordered Camara's expedition back to Spain, authorized Santiago's surrender, and began peace negotiations. On 12 August Spain suspended hostilities, granted Cuban independence, and ceded Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States. Disposition of the Philippines was left to a peace conference.
Most U.S. casualties in the Spanish‐American War were non‐combat related, but resulted from food poisoning,
yellow fever,
malaria, and other diseases. Despite segregation and racist abuses, several thousand
African Americans fought with distinction in the conflict.
Amid widespread public enthusiasm for acquiring the Philippines, the hesitant McKinley, citing duty and destiny, ultimately decided on annexation. This provision was included in the Treaty of Paris, signed in December, which formally ended the war. The Senate gave its consent on 6 February 1899, two days after Filipinos under Emilio Aguinaldo (1870–1964) seeking independence, attacked the U.S. garrison at Manila, beginning a long insurgency.
The U.S. army governed Cuba until 1902, when it withdrew under the terms of the Platt Amendment (1901). This measure passed by Congress asserted a U.S. right to future intervention in Cuba, restricted Cuba's treatymaking powers, and provided for a U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay. Meanwhile the Filipino insurrection continued until 1902. Of some 125,000 U.S. troops who fought in the Philippines, around 4,000 were killed. An estimated 20,000 Filipino independence fighters died, and civilian casualties were heavy as well. A U.S. Senate committee in 1902 heard testimony of burned villages and Filipino prisoners killed or tortured.
The war that began as a humanitarian crusade on behalf of Cuban independence fostered an imperial spirit that brought the United States a small empire. In the war's aftermath, the
Anti‐imperialist League formed, and Americans debated the relationship between
republicanism and empire. Subsequent historians have seen America's involvement in the war as stemming, variously, from the sensationalism of tabloid journalism, the quest for markets, the need for naval coaling stations, a new spirit of aggressive nationalism, and a fear of being left behind in the race for empire.
See also
Expansionism;
Foreign Relations: U.S. Relations with Asia;
Foreign Relations: U.S. Relations with Latin America;
Hearst, William Randolph;
Journalism;
Protectorates and Dependencies;
Pulitzer, Joseph.
Bibliography
Ernest R. May , Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power, 1961.
Graham A. Cosmas , An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish‐American War, 1971.
David F. Trask , The War with Spain in 1898, 1981.
John L. Offner , An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 1895–1898, 1992.
Joseph Smith , The Spanish‐American War, 1994.
David F. Trask