Baius and Baianism
BAIUS AND BAIANISM
Baius (de Bay, Michel), theologian; b. Mélin l'Évêque (Hennegau), Belgium, 1513; d. Louvain, Sept. 16, 1589. This article will present a summary of his life, an account of his doctrine, and a list of his chief errors.
Life. Baius began his philosophical studies at the University of Louvain in 1533, and became a master of arts in 1535. His theological studies occupied the years from 1536 to 1541. From 1544 to 1550, he taught philosophy at the University, and during this period received his licentiate (1545) and master's degree (1550) in theology. In 1551 he was named Regius Professor of Sacred Scripture.
With his friend, Jan Hessels, he inaugurated new methods in theology. Neglecting the doctrine on original sin and justification of the great scholastics and of the fifth (1546) and sixth (1547) sessions of the Council of Trent, they laid almost exclusive emphasis on Scripture, as they understood it in their interpretation of the anti-Pelagian writings of St. Augustine. Conflict arose between Baius and Hessels, on the one hand, and older colleagues such as Ruard Tapper and Josse Ravesteyn on the other. The new methods were combined with new doctrinal positions. On June 27, 1560, the Sorbonne condemned 18 theses extracted from notes taken by Baius's students. Baius's reply and defense broadened the conflict. The Cardinal Legate, Giovanni Commendone, sought the intervention of Rome, but Pius IV merely imposed silence on both sides. In 1563 Baius and Hessels were sent as theologians of the King of Spain to the Council of Trent, but did not exercise a prominent role.
Between 1563 and 1566 Baius published various opuscula that contain his essential doctrine and system. Excerpts from these works were condemned by the Universities of Alcalá and Salamanca. The Spanish condemnations caused grave concern in Rome. After a thorough examination of these writings, Pius V on October 1, 1567, condemned 79 propositions (H. Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum 1901–79) in the papal bull exomnibus afflictionibus. These condemned theses are contained, for the most part, in Baius's works, but the bull did not mention him by name. The formal condemnation following the 79 theses was written without punctuation and proclaimed: "…quas quidem sententias stricto coram Nobis examine ponderatas quamquam nonnullae aliquo pacto sustineri possent in rigore et proprio sensu ab assertoribus intento haereticas erroneas…damnamus." According to whether a comma is placed after "possent" or after "intento," the condemnation has two quite different meanings. With the comma placed after "possent," it has the following meaning: "We condemn as heretical, erroneous, etc., in the sense intended by their authors and according to the strict use of the terms employed, the aforesaid opinions, after a close scrutiny of them has been conducted in our presence, even though some of them might in one way or another be defended." If the comma is placed after "intento," the clause "… in the sense intended by their authors and according to the strict use of the terms employed…" should be placed at the end of the whole sentence. This is the famous problem of the comma pianum, which has never been settled. Modern research tends to show that the pope, while certainly condemning the 79 theses, did not wish to embarrass Baius and to make his submission more difficult [cf. É. van Eijl, "L'Interprétation de la Bulle de Pie V portant condamnation de Baius," Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique 50 (1955) 499–542].
Baius at first submitted, but in 1569 he sent a protest to the pope. After a new hearing, Pius reiterated his first condemnation of the 79 theses. Baius was ordered not only to submit, but to express a formal disavowal of all the condemned propositions. In 1575 he became chancellor of the University. In 1580 Pope Gregory XIII published the bull Provisionis nostrae confirming the condemnation of Pius V. The new papal condemnation was promulgated solemnly at Louvain by Cardinal Toletus, March 21, 1580. Baius and the entire faculty of Louvain submitted. To put an end to any further controversy, the faculty, at the instigation of the papal nuncio, Bonomini, composed a document entitled Doctrinae eius (quam certorum articulorum damnatio postulare visa est ) brevis et quoad fieri potest ordinata et cohaerens explicatio (1586). This document is a clear exposition of the positive doctrine opposed to the condemned propositions, and, after four centuries, still remains an excellent source for understanding correctly the exact meaning of the condemnation.
In the last years of Baius's life, the renowned controversy between the faculty of Louvain and the Jesuits arose. It is difficult to establish whether, or to what extent, Baius contributed to the composition of the faculty's censure against Leonard Lessius, SJ, in 1587, but he certainly had a share in its wide diffusion. Baius died in union with the Church.
Doctrine. An accurate understanding of the principal truths of Christianity depends, according to Baius, on a correct answer to two questions: (1) What was the nature of the first man's original integrity before his fall from original justice? (2) What is to be thought of the so-called virtues of sinners and infidels among Adam's posterity? For, without exact answers to these questions, one will neither recognize the corruption of human nature by original sin, nor will one be able to evaluate properly the restoration of human nature through Christ (De prima hominis iustitia, Praefatio ).
Original Integrity. Baius answers that according to Sacred Scripture the first man was created in the image and likeness of God and was adorned with all virtues (ibid. ch. 1, 2). The integrity of Adam consisted not only in complete knowledge of the divine law and in full submission to his Creator, but also in the fact that the lower powers of man were subject to his higher faculties, and all the members of his body and their movements were submissive to his will, which was free with true liberty of choice (ibid. ch. 3). Furthermore, man's initial integrity was not an undue (i.e., supernatural) elevation of his nature. For, according to Baius, all perfections that pertain to any class of beings in their origin are natural (ibid. ch. 4). Thus he considers the lack of integrity in fallen man to be an evil; but evil in his view is the privation of what is natural. Hence the evils derived from original sin in Adam's posterity can be termed natural, but only in a very loose sense; namely, inasmuch as they are the result of the transmission through generation of a corrupt nature (ibid. ch. 5, 6). Conversely, if, and to whatever extent, the natural endowments, lost in Adam's sin, are restored to fallen human nature through Christ, they can be called supernatural, but again, only in the loose sense whereby one may designate as supernatural anything derived from a special benefit of God (for example, the miraculous restoration of sight to one who had been blinded), not however, in the sense that this restored integrity is itself supernatural (ibid. ch. 7–10).
Although Baius calls the endowments of man's original state natural, he does not mean that they emanate from the nature of man, considered as a composite of body and soul, as the faculties of intellect and will emanate from the soul; rather, they are communicated directly by God. Nevertheless, he maintains, they belong to man's nature and are demanded by man's natural constitution of soul and body, in this sense, that their lack would be an evil for human nature itself. They are, then, just as natural to man as his soul, which is not the product of the generative act of parents as efficient causes, but must be infused directly by God through creation (ibid. ch. 11).
Adam's Reward. Created in this state of natural integrity, Adam was obliged to obey his Creator, and thus to merit eternal life, i.e., the unending and immediate vision of God. Even as God's unchangeable wisdom established eternal death as the proportionate punishment of human disobedience and sin, the same wisdom established that the first man would have received eternal life as the natural and just recompense for his obedience to God. Thus, the reward of eternal life would have been man's natural end and would have been due solely to man's natural merit, and in no way to grace. Similarly the good angels after their trial received eternal life, not as a grace nor as in any wise unowed, but as the just reward of their obedience (De meritis operum, ch. 1–3).
From this, Baius concludes that God could not have created man without endowing him with integrity and without destining him uniquely to the beatific vision. He thus maintains that a state of pure nature, in which man would have been ordained by God to an end inferior to the direct and immediate vision of God and would have lacked the perfection of integrity, is impossible and chimerical. [See Pius XII, Humani generis Acta Apostolicae Sedis (Rome 1909–) 42 (1950) 570: "Alii veram 'gratuitatem' ordinis supernaturalis corrumpunt, cum autument Deum entia intellectu praedita condere non posse quirt eadem ad beatificam visionem ordinet et vocet."]
Original Sin. Through his sin, Adam lost his integrity, and thereby the possibility of attaining his unique end. His sin with these two consequences was transmitted to all his descendants by the vitiated and disordered generative act whereby all men are conceived (De peccato originis, ch. 1, 2). Original sin consists in the malice of a will that does not love God and His justice, in the rebellion of fallen man's lower nature against his spirit and in ignorance (ibid. ch. 3). Because of original sin, all men, even infants, are subject to the wrath of God and to eternal death. Even as Adam was created in God's favor through no merit of his own, so the newborn infant is the object of God's loathing; because of original sin alone, and not because of any personal commitment, the newborn baby stands in opposition to God and to His law (ibid. ch. 4).
Baius teaches that sin is essentially opposition to the law of God and disobedience to His commands. The question whether sin should be voluntary has nothing to do with its essence, but only with its origin. Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a sin in whomsoever it exists, and is justly imputed as sin by God, merely because it exists (ibid. ch. 7). In the state of integrity Adam could have fulfilled the law easily and with true freedom of choice (De libero hominis arbitrio, ch. 9). By original sin this power was lost completely (ibid. ch. 11).
Fallen Man. Nothing more deplorable than the moral condition of fallen man in the system of Baius can be imagined. Even man's indeliberate and inoperative desires, being infringements of the law of God non concupisces (Rom 7.7, "Thou shalt not lust"), are actual sins worthy of eternal punishment (De peccato originis, ch.2). Every sin deserves eternal punishment, because all sins are by their very nature mortal sins (De meritis operum, ch. 2). There is no certainty that God will give the power to perform what He commands. On the contrary, the opinion that God commands nothing impossible finds no support in Augustine, but derives from Pelagius (De peccato originis, ch. 12). The general conclusion, so well summed up in the words of the condemned proposition: "All the works of unbelievers are sins" (Enchiridion symbolorum 1925), is defended by Baius in his De virtutibus impiorum: there is, he says, only one possible end of man, which is the intuitive vision of God, and one way only of loving God, which is charity. Therefore without charity (which presupposes faith) there is only sin (ibid. ch. 5, 8).
Redemption and Justification. Christ came to restore to fallen man the spiritual state that was his due in creation, but which, owing to original sin, is now "grace." Just as fallen man is wholly characterized and determined, before Redemption, by evil concupiscence, so that his every movement and impulse is sin, so redeemed man lives and merits the beatific vision by charity. Charity is "… that motion of the soul whereby we love God and our neighbor" (De charitate, ch. 2), and proceeds immediately from "the touch of God, who is charity" (ibid. ch. 3).
Justification in the sense of "fulfilling all justice" means no more than "having charity," and this proceeds from actual grace; charity may also precede the remission of sins, which is conferred by the Sacraments of Baptism and Penance; charity bears no relation to a habitual state of formal, intrinsic, and permanent justification, as proposed by the scholastics (ibid. ch. 7). The scholastic insistence on charity as a permanent gift was quite mistaken. The origin of charity is a transitory impulse received from God, and this is all that matters, because such an impulse, indefinitely repeated, enables us to live in perfect justice (ibid. ch. 2). Perfect charity is not to be understood by reference "to any sacrament or permanent state" (ibid. ch. 9; cf. Enchiridion symbolorum, 1931–33). Similarly justification is really a continuous process, wherein man performs more and more good works under actual impulses of God, and overcomes more and more the evil desires of concupiscence, i.e., makes progress "toward the remission of sins" (De justificatione, ch. 1).
Merit. This denial of the significance, if not of the existence, of habitual or sanctifying grace, has an important bearing upon Baius's notion of merit, which is solely and exclusively the execution of God's commands, the fulfillment of the law of God. According to Baius, man's operation of itself and alone, i.e., apart from any freedom of choice and apart from the influx of habitual grace and of the infused virtues, merits heaven or hell: heaven if it proceeds from charity, i.e., from a transitory impulse of God, stronger than any opposing evil desire, which brings about the fulfillment of God's law; hell, if it proceeds from the evil desires of concupiscence, which effects the violation of God's law. The patristic and scholastic belief solemnly defined by the Council of Trent (Enchiridion symbolorum 1545–47), that it is our adoption by God as living members of Christ, sharing in His divine nature, which enables us to merit eternal life freely, with true freedom of choice (ibid. 1525–27, 1574), seemed to Baius to be entirely erroneous (De meritis operum, ch. 2). Consequently there is no need for man to be in the state of grace in order that his works be meritorious (ibid. ).
The pharisaism of Baius's doctrine of justification and merit in fallen man is a sharp contrast to the Pelagianism of his doctrine on innocent man before the Fall, and reveals that extraordinary singularity that makes it impossible to call his system by any other name than his own. In endeavoring to set aside all subsequent tradition, even the authentic teaching of the Church, in order to rediscover the pure spirit of St. Augustine, he fell into a disastrous eclecticism.
Chief Errors. (1) Baius set up the anti-Pelagian treatises of Augustine, against the whole body of post-Augustinian thought, as the sole repository of orthodox teaching on grace. (2) He professed to mistrust any attempt to interpret, develop, or modify the doctrine of Augustine by the use of exegetical, historical, philosophical, or psychological progress in human intelligence. (3) He was not afraid, but rather glad, to arrive at conclusions, in matters of faith and morals, that were in open contradiction with all contemporary Catholic views.
The most important of his erroneous opinions are the following: (1) The state of pure nature is a useless fiction of scholastics and involves an insoluble contradiction. (2) The justice and merits of man in the state of original innocence were natural and did not proceed from grace. (3) Fallen man is determined to evil whenever he is not drawn by charity into holiness. (4) God may and does command man to do the impossible without any injustice. (5) Charity, which is the transitory impulse of God, is the only and infallible source of good works and of merit. (6) Man is not now free under the influence of grace.
It was the method of Baius and the conclusions just enumerated that laid the foundations for the much more important heresy of Jansenism.
See Also: augustine, st.; augustinianism; augustinianism, theological school of; elevation of man; free will and grace; grace; grace and nature: jansenism; justice of men; original justice; original sin; pelagius and pelagianism; pure nature, state of; supernatural.
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[p. j. donnelly]