Reflexivity

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REFLEXIVITY

REFLEXIVITY is a potent and popular concept; it is also a problematic and paradoxical one. The term is problematic because it is so popular today; it is used in several different disciplines to refer to a wide variety of mental, verbal, and performative phenomena that nonetheless share a family resemblance. Reflexivity is a paradoxical concept because the type of self-referential activity—consciousness of self-consciousness—that it denotes involves the epistemological paradox so well discussed by Gregory Bateson (1972, pp. 177–193) and Rosalie L. Colie (1966, pp. 6–8), in which the mind by its own operation attempts to say something about its operation—an activity difficult both to contemplate and to describe without conceptual vertigo and verbal entanglements.

In the most general sense, the terms reflexive, reflexivity, and reflexiveness "describe the capacity of language and of thought—of any system of signification—to turn or bend back upon itself, to become an object to itself, and to refer to itself" (Babcock, 1980, p. 4). This is anything but the rarefied activity it might at first seem, for reflexivity has come to be regarded as a sine qua non of human communication. When, for example, Kenneth Burke defines humanity in the first chapter of Language as Symbolic Action (1966), he describes as "characteristically human" this "'second-level' aspect of symbolicity or 'reflexive' capacity to develop highly complex symbol systems about symbol systems, the pattern of which is indicated in Aristotle's definition of God as 'thought of thought,' or in Hegel's dialectics of 'self-consciousness'" (p. 24).

The adjective reflexive first appeared in English in 1588; it was used as early as 1640 to refer to the capacity of mental operations to be "turned or directed back upon the mind itself." Regarding things grammatical, reflexive has been used since 1837 to describe pronouns, verbs, and their significations that are, as the Oxford English Dictionary says, "characterized by, or denote, a reflex action on the subject of the clause or sentence." With reference to mental operations, the adjective is frequently confused and used interchangeably with its near synonym, reflective. To be reflexive is to be reflective; but one is not necessarily reflexive when one is reflective, for to reflect is simply to think about something, but to be reflexive is to think about the process of thinking itself. In its present usage, reflection does not possess the self-referential and second-level characteristics of reflexivity. Such was not always the case, and the terminological confusion arises because Locke, Spinoza, and Leibniz, as well as subsequent philosophers, used the term reflection to denote the knowledge that the mind has of itself and its operations, in contrast to mere "thinking" about matters external to the mind itself.

A related confusion occurs with the term self-consciousness, which denotes primary awareness of self rather than the consciousness of self-consciousness characteristic of reflexivity—what Fichte described as the "ability to raise oneself above oneself," in contrast to "vain self-reflection." The latter phrase raises yet another terminological tangle and, in this instance, a negative connotation that must needs be dispensed with: the association of reflexivity with narcissism and solipsism. By definition, both involve self-reference and self-consciousness, but both are forms of "vain self-reflection" without any second-level awareness of that self-absorption. Unlike reflexivity, neither narcissism nor solipsism partakes of epistemological paradox, ironic detachment, or, hence, the ability to laugh at oneself. Reflexivity involves what Maurice Natanson defines as "methodological solipsism," that is, the examination of all experience from the perspective of the self-aware ego, in contrast to "metaphysical solipsism," which claims that the individual is the sole reality (1974b, pp. 241–243). As Merleau-Ponty pointed out in a discussion of modern painting in Signs (Evanston, 1964), reflexivity "presents a problem completely different from that of the return to the individual." Rather, like Husserl's concept of the transcendental ego, it involves the problem of knowing how one thinks and communicates, of "knowing how we are grafted to the universal by that which is most our own" (p. 52).

In Western philosophy, reflexivity has been recognized at least since Socrates as an inevitable if not always welcome companion of thought. A human being is not only an animal who thinks, but who also—certainly if a philosopher—thinks about thinking, and thinks of him or her self as a thinker: "to be a questioner in reality is to locate oneself as part of the questionable and also as the source of questions" (Natanson, 1974a, p. 233). Philosophers have tended to explain this paradoxical state of affairs in two related ways. The first and most familiar is "the two-in-one that Socrates discovered as the essence of thought and Plato translated into conceptual language as the soundless dialogue eme emauto —between me and myself" (Arendt, 1977, p. 185). While the participants in this dialogue have been variously named—me and myself, I and me, self and other, self and soul, "naked self" and "selfsame," I and Thou—philosophers from Socrates to Arendt have similarly described the dynamics of thinking as an exchange between an experiential or perceiving self and a reflexive or conceptual self. In all cases, the viewpoint of the latter is regarded as a higher form of consciousness, and it is frequently regarded as transcendent, if not explicitly divine. Hence, the second mode of explaining reflexivity and its seeming transcendence of human symbol systems—its thought-trains by which one could take one's way out of the world—is to equate it with the divine. To give but a few examples: In Platonic dialectic, a movement toward the abstract was equated with a movement toward the divine; Aristotle similarly defined God as "thought of thought"; Augustine's reflexive or "selfsame" self is the mind illuminated by God; and, for Kant and Hegel, ultimate meaning, if not divine, is nonetheless described respectively as "transcendental reflection" and "absolute knowledge." While acknowledging this affinity between reflexivity and the higher forms of consciousness in religion, philosophers since Hegel have argued that reflexivity is beyond any particular system of belief, that "thinking is equally dangerous to all creeds" (Arendt, 1977, p. 176).

More recently, phenomenological philosophers such as Schutz and Merleau-Ponty have "grounded" reflexivity by conceiving of it as embodied institution tied to temporality and situation, rather than as transcendental constitution. Far from being a philosopher's prerogative, reflexivity so conceived is nothing more nor less than the process of rendering experience meaningful—the inevitable and necessary "framing" that everyone engages in. Phenomenological discussions of reflexivity as a series of exchanges between subject and object, or between individual consciousness and social reality, recall not only the Socratic conception of thought as internal dialogue but also the conception of the self as reciprocal, dialogical, and reflexive as formulated by American pragmatic philosophers and psychologists, notably Peirce, James, Mead, and Cooley.

In Mind, Self, and Society (1962), social psychologist George Herbert Mead defines reflexiveness as "the turning back of experience of the individual upon himself," asserting that "it is by means of reflexiveness that the whole social process is brought into the experience of the individuals involved in it" and that "reflexiveness, then, is the essential condition, within the social process, for the development of mind" (p. 134). Mead's concept of "reflexiveness" as a dialogue between a personal "I" and a social "me" is closely related to Cooley's formulation of the "looking-glass self" and to Jacques Lacan's more recent description of "le stade du miroir," for Mead indicates that the achievement of identity involves mirroring, or the assumption of a specular image; the individual "becomes a self in so far as he can take the attitude of others and act toward himself as others act" (p. 171). The self, therefore, "as that which can be an object to itself, is essentially a social structure" (p. 140); or, in Charles Sanders Peirce's terms, it is a semiotic construct: "When we think, then, we ourselves, as we are at that moment, appear as a sign" (Philosophical Writings of Peirce, New York, 1955, p. 233). Thus described, the self, like the world, is a text embedded in and constituted by (as well as constitutive of) interconnected systems of signs, of which the most important and most representative is language.

While Peirce asserts that reflexivity is perforce semiotic, subsequent semioticians, linguists, and philosophers have argued that all systems of signification are inherently and necessarily reflexive. As Fredric Jameson summarizes in The Prison House of Language (Princeton, 1972), "Every enunciation involves a kind of lateral statement about language, about itself, and includes a kind of self-designation within its very structure" (p. 202). Because of its descriptive usefulness, the metalinguistic or metacommunicative model has become pervasive in discussions of all forms of reflexivity. It would be wrong, however, to regard linguistic self-reference as either the cause or the explanation of reflexivity. As Robert Nozick has recently pointed out, reflexive self-knowledge is a basic phenomenon without which neither cognition nor communication is possible, and it is pointless to argue which comes first (1981, p. 82).

Both the idea that reflexivity consists of the self representing itself to itself and the notion that all forms of representation involve self-reference or reflexivity are present in the plural in the concepts of collective representations and cultural performances, as defined and discussed by sociologists and anthropologists since Durkheim. In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), Durkheim defined collective representations, such as a clan's mythic ancestor, as forms in which the group "represents itself to itself," implying that the collective symbolization process as expressed in myths and rituals includes within its operations consciousness of itself. In recent decades, Claude Lévi-Strauss has argued not only that myths are sociocultural metacommentaries but that all myth is "meta-" insofar as its implicit if not explicit subject is the emergence of language or communication. In his earlier work on ritual and ritual symbols, Victor Turner (1974) suggested that liminal periods are reflexive moments when society "takes cognizance of itself" and reflects on the order of things through symbolic disordering, through the "analysis and recombination of the factors of culture into any and every possible pattern" (p. 255). In later works (1979, 1982, 1984), Turner argued that all genres of cultural performance (ritual, myth, theater, narrative, games, etc.) are instances of plural reflexivity because they are self-critiques and reflections upon, rather than simply reflections of, the structures and strictures of the everyday world. Clifford Geertz (1973) has similarly asserted not only that religion is a reflexive cultural system that provides "models of" and "models for" self and society but that illicit, secular cultural performances such as Balinese cockfights are stories that a group "tells itself about itself" (pp. 93, 448). While not all collective representations—verbal, visual, and performative—are religious, it is no surprise that many of them are, for as Robert Bellah states in Beyond Belief (New York, 1970), religion has been "the traditional mode by which men interpreted their world to themselves" (p. 246)—the "pattern of patterns" or epitome of plural reflexivity.

If, as has already been implied, it is difficult to discuss reflexivity without discussing religion, the reverse is equally true. Regardless of whether one considers religion as a system of belief and body of texts or as praxis and experience, one is concerned with the interpretation of the moral complexities and paradoxes of human social and individual life—thus, with signs about signs, with reflexive self-reference. In myths, humans not only render an account of themselves and their world, they testify to the power of language to make a world and to create gods. In rituals and sacred symbols, humans embody and reenact these comprehensive ideas of order, and every time sacred words and deeds are retold and represented, these primal interpretations are interpreted and criticized yet again.

Quite apart from the metadiscourse about religion—explicit reflexivity—that has developed in the great religious traditions in the form of systematic theology, religious history, and textual hermeneutics, every religious system is implicitly reflexive. The communication of the highest truths and the most sacred order of things is invariably accompanied by the subversive self-commentary of aporiae (liminal disorder in such diverse forms as Ndembu monsters, Sinhala demons, Zen koan s, Pueblo clowns, Midrash tales, and Christ's parables). Such ambiguous and paradoxical elements generate reflexive processes that redirect thoughtful attention to the faulty or limited structures not only of thought, language, and society but of religion itself (cf. Colie, 1966, p. 7).

In addition to this ineluctable reflexivity of religion's collective representations and plural expressions, many singular religious practices are explicitly reflexive. Contemplation, meditation, prayer, and confession all have in common a withdrawal from the world and a bending back toward the self. Frequently, the reflexive character of such practices is marked by their literal or figurative association with mirrors, with specula, reminding us not only that mirrors reflect the essence of things and are crucial to the achievement of identity (Fernandez, 1980, pp. 34–35) but that "as in mirror images, self-reference begins an endless oscillation between the thing itself and the thing reflected, begins an infinite regress [or progress]" (Colie, 1966, p. 355). Such mirroring frequently occurs as well in language itself, for careful analysis of sacred discourse reveals a markedly higher proportion of metalinguistic verbs in contrast to everyday speech.

In sum, reflexivity is not a consequence of social complexity or the degree of religious articulateness; it is an essential and inevitable dimension of all religious experience. The power of religious consciousness that humans keep trying to explain is probably not its prescriptive, descriptive, or explanatory force but its reflexiveness—religion offers a system of interpretation of existence that is itself subject to interpretation, and that is infinitely compelling.

Bibliography

Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, Thinking. New York, 1978. Arendt's final work is a rich, challenging analysis of humanity's mental activity; it brings together and reflects upon the major insights of the Western philosophical tradition into the nature of thought and its reflexive and dialogic structure.

Babcock, Barbara A., ed. Signs about Signs: The Semiotics of Self-Reference. Special issue of Semiotica 30 (1980). An interdisciplinary collection of essays that examine reflexive forms and processes in a variety of genres and cultural traditions, with an introduction that summarizes the meanings and uses of reflexivity.

Bateson, Gregory. "A Theory of Play and Fantasy." In Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York, 1972. This seminal formulation of the paradoxical metacommunicative or reflexive frame essential to all forms of play has inspired much subsequent work on metacommunication and framing, notably Erving Goffman's Frame Analysis (New York, 1974).

Colie, Rosalie Littell. Paradoxia Epidemica: The Renaissance Tradition of Paradox. Princeton, 1966. This stunning and comprehensive study of paradox is especially important for illuminating both the reflexive self-reference of paradoxes and the paradoxical nature of self-referential operations.

Fernandez, James W. "Reflections on Looking into Mirrors." Signs about Signs, special issue of Semiotica 30 (1980): 27–40. An especially important discussion of the African use of mirrors and a speculation on the ritual and symbolic significance of this magical object cross-culturally.

Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York, 1973. A selection of this interpretive anthropologist's most important essays on the concept of culture, which are notable for their analysis of cultural systems, institutions, symbols, and performances as reflexive forms and processes.

Hofstadter, Douglas R. Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. New York, 1979.

Hofstadter, Douglas R., and Daniel C. Dennett. The Mind's I: Fantasies and Reflections on Self and Soul. New York, 1981. Like Hofstadter's Gödel, Escher, Bach, this is an important and unconventional meditation on the paradoxical and reflexive nature of thought processes and on the problem of self and self-consciousness.

Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self, and Society (1934). Edited by Charles W. Morris. Reprint, Chicago, 1963. This edition of Mead's lectures presents the outlines of his system of social psychology and his classic formulation of the self as reflexive, as a social construct.

Natanson, Maurice. Phenomenology, Role, and Reason: Essays on the Coherence and Deformation of Social Reality. Springfield, Ill., 1974. (Cited in text as Natanson, 1974a.) This book and Natanson's article cited below are summaries of the major issues in social phenomenology, including the central conception of reflexivity.

Natanson, Maurice. "Solipsism and Sociality." New Literary History 5 (1974): 237–244. (Cited in text as Natanson, 1974b.)

Nozick, Robert. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, Mass., 1981. This speculation on philosophical issues contains a superb chapter, "The Identity of the Self," and the best single, summary discussion available of reflexivity.

Singer, Milton. "Signs of the Self: An Exploration in Semiotic Anthropology." American Anthropologist 82 (September 1980): 485–507. The single most important discussion of Peirce's conception of the self as semiotic and reflexive.

Turner, Victor. Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society. Ithaca, N.Y., 1974. This collection contains several essays that summarize Turner's view of liminality and liminal symbols and their implicit reflexivity.

Turner, Victor. Process, Performance, and Pilgrimage: A Study in Comparative Symbology. New Delhi, 1979. Contains several essays that extend the notion of liminality beyond tribal ritual and examine the public and plural reflexivity of cultural performances.

Turner, Victor. "Dramatic Ritual/Ritual Drama: Performative and Reflexive Anthropology." In A Crack in the Mirror: Reflexive Perspectives in Anthropology, edited by Jay Ruby, pp. 83–98. Philadelphia, 1982.

Turner, Victor. "Liminality and the Performative Genres." In Rite, Drama, Festival, Spectacle: Rehearsals toward a Theory of Cultural Performance, edited by John J. MacAloon, pp. 19–41. Philadelphia, 1984. Like Turner's "Dramatic Ritual/Ritual Drama," this essay expands upon the concepts of liminality and reflexivity and examines a variety of genres of cultural performance as instances of and occasions for metasocial commentary, for public and plural reflexivity.

Turner, Victor, ed. Celebration: Studies in Festivity and Ritual. Washington, D.C., 1982. An interdisciplinary collection of essays that explore the reflexivity of human celebrations through the medium of ceremonial objects.

New Sources

Adams, Matthew. "The Reflexive Self and Culture: A Critique." British Journal of Sociology 54 (June 2003): 221–239.

Gumperz, John, and Stephen Levinson. Rethinking Linguistic Relativity. New York, 1996.

Kripal, Jeffrey John. Roads of Excess, Palaces of Wisdom: Eroticism and Reflexivity in the Study of Mysticism. Chicago, 2001.

Lockie, Robert. "Relativism and Reflexivity." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 11 (Sept. 2003): 319–340.

Schirato, Tony. "Bourdieu's Concept of Reflexivity as Metaliteracy." Cultural Studies 17 (May 2003): 539–554.

Smart, Barry. Facing Modernity: Ambivalence, Reflexivity, and Morality. Thousand Oaks, Calif., 1999.

Barbara A. Babcock (1987)

Revised Bibliography

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