Camp David Summit (2000)

CAMP DAVID SUMMIT (2000)

failed israeli–palestinian negotiations, mediated by the united states (11 july–24 july 2000).

At the initiative of President Bill Clinton and Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak, an Israeli–Palestinian summit was convened at the U.S. presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland, on 11 July 2000 to discuss the final-status issues foreshadowed by the 1993 Oslo Accords regarding such issues as Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, Palestinian refugees, and the borders of a Palestinian state. Because no official records or documents were exchanged, most public knowledge about the discussions comes from some of the participants and the media.

Regarding Jerusalem, Israel reportedly proposed turning some Palestinian villages and neighborhoods over to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and allowing Palestinian autonomy in the Muslim and Christian quarters within the Old City, with Israel retaining sovereignty over the rest of East Jerusalem and the Old City. The Palestinians reportedly proposed that East Jerusalem should be capital of the new Palestinian state and that Israel should withdraw to its pre-June 1967 borders, in accordance with UN Resolution 242.

On the issue of refugees, the Palestinians maintained the 3.7 million Palestinian refugees should have the right of return to their homes in what is now Israel or the right to receive compensation, in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 1948. Israel rejected the right of return as a demographic threat to its Jewish character and denied that Israel had any legal or moral responsibility for the refugee problem. However, it would permit the return of a large but limited number of refugees to the state of Palestine under Israeli supervision and would allow some Palestinians to return to Israel as a family reunification measure.

Regarding Jewish settlements (of which there were in 1999 some 125, with about 200,000 settlers), Israel apparently proposed annexing some 10 percent of the West Bank territory, in which some 80 percent of the settlers lived, and ceding the remaining 90 percent to the Palestinians. The Palestinians disputed these figures because they did not include Jerusalem, parts of the Jordan Valley (which the Israelis wanted to lease for a long period), and other areas. The Palestinians were prepared to accept Israeli annexation of the largest West Bank settlement blocs, although they objected to the size, in exchange for an equal amount of territory in Israel of similar arable quality. After fourteen intense days of negotiations, the parties could not bridge their differences.

In the months and years following the summit, each side blamed the other for the failure. In a failed effort to ensure Barak's reelection, President Clinton publicly blamed Yasir Arafat, despite the fact that he had promised the Palestine Liberation Organization chairman—who had been reluctant to come to the summit because he said the parties were not prepared—that he would not be blamed if the discussions broke down. Barak also vigorously blamed Arafat, who he said was intent on the destruction of Israel, even though Arafat had championed the two-state solution embodied in the Oslo Accords in 1993 and had recognized Israel and endorsed UN Resolution 242 a dozen years before. The Palestinians blamed Barak, even though he was politically courageous in making far-reaching proposals, a number of which broke long-standing Israeli taboos, such as sharing Jerusalem, returning 90 percent of West Bank lands, and swapping territory.

The media and public of all sides accepted their governments' respective official versions, even though each was a distortion of what happened at Camp David. In reality, all three sides contributed to the breakdown of the negotiations. Barak wasted several months negotiating with Syria; reneged on a third partial redeployment of troops from the West Bank and on handing over three villages near Jerusalem to the PA; continued to confiscate Palestinian land for Jewish settlements and access roads; and allowed for the increase of settlers in the territories, all of which raised suspicions among Palestinians about his sincerity. At Oslo, Barak's negotiating style—refusing to negotiate directly with Arafat, revising supposedly final offers, and presenting take-it-or-leave-it proposals—further alienated the Palestinians, who viewed him as arrogant. His demand for sovereignty over the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount was difficult for Arafat to accept for fear of Palestinian, Arab, and international Muslim reaction. In addition, Barak's offer, while generous from an Israeli point of view, would not have allowed for a contiguous and independent Palestinian state.

The Palestinians, on the other hand, in addition to being unprepared, seemed bereft of any strategy, were internally divided, and—most significantly—did not make serious, clear, and specific counteroffers to the Israeli side. Arafat—whose popularity was declining due to his inability to stop the settlement expansion and the obvious corruption in the PA, and who feared a trap by the Israelis and the Americans—was reluctant to make major concessions and seemed more interested in surviving the negotiations than in viewing them as a historic opportunity for peace.

The Americans ignored the extent to which settlement expansion had poisoned the peace process among the Palestinians and insisted on convening a meeting for which none of the parties was truly prepared. Although they were supposed to be honest brokers, their position—due to domestic pressure and the cultural and strategic relationship between the United States and Israel—was so close to the Israelis' that at times they presented Israeli positions. It was not until after Camp David that the United States presented its own position, called the Clinton proposals, on 23 December 2000. After the failure at Camp David, Palestinian and Israeli teams resumed negotiations in Taba, Egypt, and thanks to Clinton's suggestions, considerably narrowed their differences. The process begun at Camp David might have thus ended successfully, but time ran out when—against the backdrop of the escalating violence of the al-Aqsa intifada—Clinton left office on 20 January 2001 and Barak was defeated by Ariel Sharon in the Israeli elections of 6 February 2001.

see also aqsa intifada, al-; arafat, yasir; barak, ehud; clinton, william jefferson; haram al-sharif; oslo accord (1993); palestine liberation organization (plo); sharon, ariel; united nations and the middle east.

Bibliography

Enderlin, Charles. Shattered Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, 1995–2002. New York: Other Press, 2003.

Malley, Robert, and Agha, Hussein. "Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors." New York Review of Books : 9 August 2001.

Pressman, Jeremy. "Visions in Collision: What Happened at Camp David and Taba?" International Security, 28, no. 2 (fall 2003), 5–43. Available from <http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/pressman.pdf>.

Sontag, Deborah. "Quest for Middle East Peace: How and Why It Failed." New York Times : 26 July 2001.

Philip Mattar