Shame

Shame

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Shame occupies an important place both among the emotions and as a key component in social relationships. It might well be called “the master emotion” for reasons to be discussed below. But why so much attention to one emotion? This emphasis has been difficult for many people to follow. What about other primary emotions, such as love, fear, anger, grief, and so on? To the average reader in modern societies, the focus on shame seems arbitrary.

Not so, however, in traditional societies. These societies, because of their exclusive concern with social relationships rather than individuals, overemphasize shame. An excellent introduction to the consciousness of shame in a traditional society can be found in Joan Metge’s 1986 study of the emotion lexicon in the Maori language.

Modern societies, since they emphasize the isolated, self-reliant individual, hide shame. Consciousness of this emotion would betray the extent of each individual’s dependence on the views of others, and therefore the social nature of the self.

C. H. Cooley’s (1864-1929) idea of the “looking-glass self” suggested an elementary link between shame and selfhood: “A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance; and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification (shame)” (Cooley 1922, p. l84).

Erving Goffman (1922-1982), whose work often centered on embarrassment, provided another justification. He argued that embarrassment, and by implication shame, had universal importance in social interaction: “Face-to-face interaction in any culture seems to require just those capacities that flustering seems to destroy. Therefore, events which lead to embarrassment and the methods for avoiding and dispelling it may provide a cross-cultural framework of sociological analysis” (Goffman 1956, p. 266).

Christian Heath further justifies this focus:

Embarrassment lies at the heart of the social organization of day-to-day conduct. It provides a personal constraint on the behavior of the individual in society and a public response to actions and activities considered problematic or untoward. Embarrassment and its potential play an important part in sustaining the individual’s commitment to social organization, values and convention. It permeates everyday life and our dealings with others. It informs ordinary conduct and bounds the individual’s behavior in areas of social life that formal and institutionalized constraints do not reach. (Heath 1988, p. 137)

Beyond these considerations, there is another, broader one that is implied in Goffman’s ideas, particularly the idea of impression management. Most of his work implies that every actor is extraordinarily sensitive to the exact amount of deference being received by others. Even a slight difference between what is expected and what is received, whether too little or too much, can cause embarrassment.

Thomas J. Scheff (2006) followed Goffman’s lead by proposing that embarrassment and shame are primarily social emotions, because they usually arise from a threat to the bond, no matter how slight. The degree of social connectedness, of accurately taking the viewpoint of the other, is the key component of social bonds. A discrepancy in the amount of deference conveys judgment, and so is experienced as a threat to the bond. Since even a slight discrepancy in deference is sensed, embarrassment or the anticipation of embarrassment would be a virtually continuous presence in interaction.

In most of his writing, Goffman’s every-person was constantly aware of her own standing in the eyes of others, implying almost continuous states of self-conscious emotion—embarrassment, shame, humiliation, and in rare instances pride—or anticipation of these states. Their sensitivity to the eyes of others makes Goffman’s actors seem three-dimensional, since they embody not only thought and behavior, but also feeling.

Helen Lynd (1896-1982) was one of the first to focus on shame as a key to personal identity (1958). Silvan Tomkins (1911-1991) devoted an entire book (1963) to describing the concept of shame and its psychological and social functions. Helen Lewis (1913-1987) has shown the key role of unacknowledged shame in failed psychotherapy sessions (1971), and John Braithwaite’s work (1989) on the role of reintegrative shame in restorative justice has attracted a considerable following.

Shame and embarrassment are crucial because they have both psychological and social functions. For brevity, this entry will discuss only the three most important functions. First, for individuals, shame appears to be an automatic signal of moral trespass; the conscience has an instinctive shame component (Scheff and Retzinger 1991). This type of shame can be suppressed, but only at great cost. For most people, shame provides unmistakable signals of where they stand in their moral universe at any particular moment.

Second, normal shame signals the state of the social bond. Embarrassment and other shame signals warn us when the self or other is feeling too close (exposed, violated) or too far (invisible, rejected). If these signals are suppressed or ignored, it may be almost impossible to know where one stands with another person. Interaction takes on a stiff and formal character, with individuals flustered or distracted, which interferes with understanding and trust. Engulfment and isolation produce, and are produced by, the denial of shame. Recognition of shame and embarrassment signals in others is a way of becoming aware of their humanity. Seeing that the other is embarrassed or ashamed is an elemental path toward understanding that they are persons much like ourselves.

It now seems likely that shame is a genetically inherited emotion that is a human universal. Since shame identifies threats to the social bond and to the integrity of the self, it makes sense that sensitivity to shame signals would be adaptive, and that this kind of sensitivity would have survival value for the individual and the group.

Third, shame seems to be the primary regulator of all emotions, including shame itself (shame about shame). This kind of regulation poses no problem with normal shame, because it is easily acknowledged and resolved. As indicated above, it is merely a signal of the state of the bond. But unacknowledged shame can interfere with the resolution of all the emotions, including anger, fear, grief, and shame itself. The basic reason that people hide their emotions is that they have learned to be ashamed of them. The exception is angry displays: Most people, especially men, have learned to flaunt anger and aggression as a way of masking vulnerable emotions (such as fear, shame, and grief) because they have been taught that these emotions are signs of weakness.

Since shame is a self-conscious emotion, persons and groups may fall into traps of self-consciousness that interfere with normal biological, psychological, and social paths that allow the resolution of painful emotions. For example, in the absence of unacknowledged shame, persons and groups with conflicting interests are able to find the most-beneficial or least-destructive compromise. Unacknowledged shame paralyzes both the ability and desire to reach a compromise. For this reason, unacknowledged shame and alienation may be keys to understanding interminable impasses and quarrels (Scheff and Retzinger 1991; Retzinger 1991; Scheff 1994).

For these reasons, pride and shame play an equal part with solidarity and alienation in determining the degree of social integration in a society, its capacity for cooperation and survival under stress, and its potential for fragmentation or violent disruption. Because we live in a highly individualized society, these matters have only recently come to our collective attention. Denial of shame goes hand in hand with denial of interdependence. An accurate and effective social science requires that shame and interdependence be brought to the light of day.

SEE ALSO Alienation; Emotion; Goffman, Erving; Humiliation; Looking-Glass Effect; Self-Consciousness, Private vs. Public; Self-Hatred; Sin; Social Psychology; Stigma

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Braithwaite, John. l989. Crime, Shame, and Reintegration. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Cooley, Charles H. 1922. Human Nature and the Social Order. New York: Scribner’s.

Goffman, Erving. 1956. Embarrassment and Social Organization. American Journal of Sociology 62: 264-271.

Heath, Christian. 1988. Embarrassment and Interactional Organization. In Erving Goffman: Exploring the Interaction Order, ed. Paul Drew and Anthony Wooton. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity.

Lewis, Helen. B. 1971. Shame and Guilt in Neurosis. New York: International Universities Press.

Lynd, Helen M. 1958. On Shame and the Search for Identity. New York: Harcourt.

Metge, Joan. 1986. In and Out of Touch: Whakamaa in Cross Cultural Perspective. Wellington, New Zealand: Victoria University Press.

Retzinger, Suzanne M. 1991. Violent Emotions: Shame and Rage in Marital Quarrels. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Scheff, Thomas J. 1994. Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism, and War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Scheff, Thomas J. 2006. Goffman Unbound! A New Paradigm for Social Science. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.

Scheff, Thomas J., and Suzanne M. Retzinger. 1991. Emotions and Violence: Shame and Rage in Destructive Conflicts. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Tomkins, Silvan. 1963. Affect, Imagery, Consciousness. Vol. 2: The Negative Affects. New York: Springer.

Thomas J. Scheff