Yugoslavia 1. Introduction
Founded on 1 December 1918 as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Yugoslavia united for the first time the bulk of the South Slav lands of the disintegrating Habsburg Empire with the previously independent kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro. Those who inspired the foundation of the new state, which in 1941 covered an area of 247,542 sq. km. (95,550 sq. mi.) with an estimated population of 15.97 million, believed it must have a common national identity as well as a common government; but their doctrine of Yugoslav ‘national oneness’ served in practice to abet the assertion by the country's largest people, the Orthodox Serbs, and their dynasty, the Karadjordjevićes, of dominion over the rest. Far from fostering ‘national oneness’, Serbian centralism stimulated feelings of national separateness. Whether under ineffectual parliamentary rule between 1918 and 1929 or royal dictatorship thereafter, the country was riven by national and constitutional dissension. The Catholic Croats, the second most numerous nation, were least reconciled to their subordinate status in a unitary state, but the other Yugoslav peoples, including the Serbs, and the many national minorities also had fundamental grievances.
Yugoslavia declared itself neutral in September 1939, but that did not spare it from Axis and Allied pressure or from an intensification of its domestic quarrels. The two were interrelated. The Serbs, recalling their comradeship in arms with France and the UK on the Salonika Front in 1915–18, were both overwhelmingly pro-Allied in sentiment and inclined to feel that no war could be fought successfully without them. Serb domination of the Yugoslav officer corps, and the anglophilia of the Regent Prince Paul (1893–1976), reinforced the government's portrayal of its neutrality to the Allies as a temporary expedient, necessitated by the country's strategic vulnerability and economic subordination to the Axis, as well as by the faint heartedness of the non-Serbs.
The leaders of the other Yugoslav peoples were both more impressed by Axis power than were the Serbs and less keen to fight for a state and regime which they did not really regard as theirs. The Slovenes, for whom no alternative was on offer, were expected to remain loyal. But radical Croat nationalists had not been satisfied with the belated granting of home rule in August 1939; and even the mainstream Croatian Peasant Party, despite entering government, remained susceptible to Italian blandishments concerning statehood. The Macedonian Slavs (classed as Serbs in the inter-war years) tended to look to Bulgaria as a possible liberator. The Slav Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina (claimed by both Serbs and Croats as co-nationals) were another doubtful element, while some Montenegrins (also defined as Serbs) hankered after a restored independence under Italian patronage. Finally, the large Albanian, German, and Hungarian national minorities constituted potential
fifth columnists if and when their putative motherlands should beckon.
2. Domestic life and economy
By 1940 the German Reich possessed both a stranglehold on Yugoslavia's foreign trade and an enhanced share of the ownership of its important mines of non-ferrous metals. The dependency of an underdeveloped economy on the export of its peasant proprietors' agricultural surpluses gave Germany political influence as well as economic control. Prince Paul's government felt obliged not only to meet Germany's ever-increasing demands for foodstuffs and
raw materials, but also to make the occasional anti-Semitic gesture. Meanwhile, the progressive absorption of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria into the Axis camp (Albania was already there) meant that Yugoslavia was virtually surrounded by hostile states with claims on its territory. The UK was in no position either to contest Germany's economic domination or to outbid the Axis in making offers to Yugoslavia's neighbours. Nor could London make good the country's deficiencies in armaments and aircraft. Prince Paul sought to find a counterweight in the Soviet Union, but Stalin was unwilling to push his rivalry with Hitler in the Balkans to the point of jeopardizing the
Nazi–Soviet Pact.
Before the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia in April 1941 the Germans had developed elaborate schemes for the economic exploitation of Yugoslavia, as for south-eastern Europe generally. In the event, however, they sought merely to maintain their hold over those mines (of copper, chrome, lead, zinc, and bauxite), rich lowland agricultural areas, and lines of rail, road, and river communication which were deemed essential to their war effort. Even where a facility fell within the zone of occupation of one of their allies, as in the case of the bauxite mines near Mostar, the Germans demanded and got control over the installation and its output.
The ‘Independent State of Croatia’ (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, or NDH) which was set up by the Germans after their occupation of the country, was also compelled to supply Germany with such of its products as the Germans required, and to pay the costs of the German and Italian occupation forces. In the rump of Serbia, the value of the minerals and foodstuffs taken by the Germans was simply offset against the huge occupation costs imposed on the Belgrade government. This was not necessarily disadvantageous to peasant farmers in areas of food surplus. They tended to prosper as forcible requisitioning was abandoned in favour of bulk purchases. The residents of cities and towns might also prosper financially, but they were also vulnerable to being rounded up for execution in reprisals or deportation to Germany. Several hundred thousand Yugoslavs were sent to work in the Reich: some as
prisoners-of-war (all Serbs), some as volunteers, and some as forcible deportees. The Germans also employed
forced labour in some of the mines under their control.
The Italians, in contrast, discovered that their share of the Yugoslav spoils was an economic liability, and even had to be fed from Italy. The Bulgarians and Hungarians concentrated on integrating their portions by expelling post-1918 Serb colonists and imposing their own teachers and administrators. In Macedonia this provoked native resentment, both on account of the high costs to be paid and the absence of the expected opportunities for advancement by the local intelligentsia.
3. Government
(a) Pre-occupation
After King Alexander (1888–1934) was assassinated, Prince Paul ruled on behalf of the young King Peter II (1923–70). Paul moderated but did not dismantle his late cousin's dictatorship. The prospect of war had moved the Prince Regent to grant home rule to Croatia. Yet his failure, simultaneously, either to restore democracy or to devolve powers to the other national-historical units ensured that Yugoslavia entered the wartime period as disunited as ever.
The Italians' failure to subdue the Greeks following Mussolini's invasion in October 1940 (see
Balkan campaign) compelled Hitler to come to the Duce's rescue. This meant, in turn, that Yugoslavia had to be enrolled in the Axis. The Germans did not need Yugoslav help or the use of Yugoslav territory to attack Greece, but they did require a guarantee of access via Bulgaria and the isolation of the British. From November Hitler began bludgeoning Prince Paul to sign the
Tripartite Pact.
The prince, hoping for deliverance by the outbreak of Nazi–Soviet hostilities, played for time, failing to appreciate that it was running out. He wavered until early March 1941 when, after submitting to a harangue from Hitler at
Berchtesgaden, he concluded that the only alternative to signing the pact was state suicide.
Yugoslav ministers journeyed to Vienna to sign the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941. It committed Yugoslavia to little more than acquiescence in Germany's conquest of Greece; the various let-out clauses and the bribe of a post-war acquisition of Salonika remained secret. Demonstrations against the Axis erupted in Serbia and Slovenia. Conspirators drawn from the army, air force, and Serbian nationalist groups seized power in Belgrade in the early hours of 27 March, abolishing the regency, and proclaiming King Peter to have come of age. Serbs took to the streets to celebrate the recovery of their honour and the prospect of a just war alongside the UK and Greece. Communists among them shouted instead for an alliance with Moscow. From London Churchill hailed the Yugoslavs' recovery of their ‘soul’. Croats sulked at home over such folly and expected the worst.
An all-party government was established under the presidency of the conspirators' nominal leader, General Dušan Simović. It seemed an impressive embodiment of Yugoslav unity, but its cohesion was illusory. The makers of the coup had acted to expunge the dishonour which partnership with the Axis would do to Serbian traditions: the politicians whom they summoned to share power had other concerns. The representatives of those Serb parties which had been in opposition since 1929 were as hostile to the iniquities of Prince Paul's domestic policy as they were to his appeasement of the Axis. They resented, in particular, the manner in which Croatia had won autonomy. On the other hand, Vladko Maček, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party and vice-premier of Paul's ousted government, made his participation in the new cabinet conditional upon its reaffirmation of both Croatian home rule and Yugoslavia's adherence to the Tripartite Pact. This was agreed as the enormity of the country's peril sank in.
Hitler was enraged by the insult dealt to him by the coup. Within a few hours he had issued Directive No. 25, decreeing Yugoslavia's obliteration and assigning secondary roles in its conquest to Italy and Hungary. The invasion, on 6 April 1941, took place simultaneously with the German attack on Greece (see
Balkan campaign).
The Luftwaffe inaugurated the Axis offensive with punishing raids on Belgrade (killing some 5,000 people in the supposedly ‘open city’) and the main military airfields. These set the king, government, and High Command in flight, disrupted communications, and destroyed from the outset any possibility of a concerted defence. German forces in Bulgaria struck deep into Macedonia, cutting off by 8 April the Yugoslavs' line of retreat towards Greece and nullifying the premise of their strategic plan. The Wehrmacht then turned its attention to Belgrade (which fell on 13 April) and the north and west of the country. As German troops entered Zagreb on 10 April the Ustaša—Croat Fascists led by Ante
Pavelić—were permitted to declare the independence of Croatia, Maček having spurned German offers that he do so. Italy and Hungary invaded on 11 April to claim their shares of the spoils. (Bulgaria was not obliged to fight for its share.) In total, the Axis invaders employed 52 divisions, 24 of which were German, and their casualties were negligible. The Germans, for example, lost only 151 dead.
Although the Yugoslavs offered occasional local resistance, and some effort was made to attack the Italians across the Albanian frontier, their rout was complete. It took the Germans longer to locate men competent to sign an instrument of surrender than it did to create the conditions of chaos that made Yugoslav capitulation inevitable. The king and most of his ministers fled by air to Greece on 14 and 15 April. Simović left behind instructions to seek an armistice (blaming the Croats' defection for the need), but it was, in effect, an unconditional surrender which was signed in Belgrade on 17 April.
(b) Government under occupation
Hitler had sketched out the lineaments of the country's occupation and partition on 12 April. This was now put into effect (see Map 111). The aim of the new regime was to secure for Germany what it required in the area (principally, control over the main lines of communication and certain economic assets) while rewarding (and making use of) the Reich's allies and those Yugoslav peoples thought by Hitler to be amenable to his purposes. It was also designed to give expression to Nazi racial doctrines (e.g. Germanization for northern Slovenia, now incorporated into the Reich; ‘Aryan’ status for the Croats and Slav Muslims of an independent Croatia which included Bosnia and Herzegovina; self-government for the German minority in Banat) and to eradicate the very idea of a South Slav state. This meant that the Serbs, as the Yugoslav
Staatsvolk and authors of the insult of 27 March, were singled out for condign punishment. Hitler did not originally intend that the rump of Serbia should have even a spurious statehood. The establishment during the summer of a
Quisling regime under General Milan Nedić came in response to a predictable outbreak of Serbian rebellion.
The rebellion happened, above all, because of the Ustašas' initiation in May 1941 of a campaign of terror and genocide against greater Croatia's nearly two million Serbs. (The far smaller numbers of Jews, gypsies, and communists were, of course, also targeted for destruction.) The Ustašas' aim was to produce an ethnically and ideologically ‘pure’ Croatia by expelling to Serbia, converting to Roman Catholicism, and murdering its ‘oriental’ minorities in roughly equal proportions.
Less predictable was the dissatisfaction and rivalry which soon came to prevail among both Hitler's allies (who wanted more than they had got) and the Yugoslav beneficiaries of his largesse (who gradually found reasons to repent of their initial enthusiasm for the ‘new order’). The super-nationalistic pretensions of the NDH had in any case been crippled at the outset by its enforced cession of much of Dalmatia to Italy and by the designation of an Italian prince as Croatia's future king. The subsequent revelations of Ustaša barbarism against Croatia's Serbs and of the nullity of NDH ‘independence’ completed its delegitimation. The oppressive Bulgarian regime in Macedonia eventually disabused people there also of their inclination to regard Sofia as a deliverer. Hitler's ‘new order’ (see
Germany, 4) was, in fact, to prove a principal cause of both the resistance struggle and the accompanying civil wars, as well as of the Axis powers' inability to extirpate the former while making use of the latter.
(c) Government-in-exile
King Peter and his ministers arrived in London in June 1941 to find themselves regarded as heroes. Their army's performance in April may have been lamentable, but that did not appear to have diminished Allied admiration for their March defiance of Hitler. The fragmentary reports of ongoing resistance which filtered out of their homeland in July and August and, by September, of the self-proclaimed leadership of it by Colonel Draža ( Dragoljub) Mihailović, the foremost of the Serb royalist officers who called themselves Četniks, enhanced their sense of being no mere collection of impotent exiles. They set about promoting Mihailović's cause (and their own) among the Allies and made him a general. They also nourished hopes of using the thousand or so of their servicemen who had joined the British evacuation from Greece to Egypt as the nucleus of an army to be raised among Yugoslav emigrants in the Americas. With forces fighting both at home and in the Near East, they were confident of translating Allied pledges to restore Yugoslavia into reality.
It was not long, however, before divisions appeared in their ranks. These reflected both the unresolved national and constitutional questions which they had brought with them into exile and the weaknesses inherent in their detached and dependent existence. King Peter, the fount of their legitimacy, was immature, impressionable, and wilful. His premier, General Simović, was inept and inconsistent, and soon alienated both cabinet colleagues and the king. News of the Ustašas' massacres of Serbs in the NDH destroyed all trust between Serb and Croat ministers, and of both in their premier, who bungled his handling of this explosive issue. King Peter, meanwhile, had fallen under the influence of junior officers who resented Simović's effort to monopolize credit for the 27 March coup, criticized his conduct of the April war, and accused him of failing to mobilize adequate aid for Mihailović. Despite British reservations, the king dismissed Simović in December and entrusted his government to a distinguished but elderly Serb academic, Slobodan Jovanović. In an effort to undo any consequent damage, the king and Jovanović promoted Mihailović again and made him their war minister. By this action the Yugoslav exiles entrusted their fate to a movement about which they knew little and over which they could exercise even less control.
The dangers of such a policy would not become apparent until August 1942, when the Soviets began to attack Mihailović for collaborating with the Italians and, even worse, at the end of the year, when the British began to reassess their exclusive commitment to him. In the first half of 1942, however, it was
mutinies among the Yugoslav forces in Egypt which did most to undermine the government's prestige. The displaced war minister, the senior officers, and the majority of their men refused to accept the new government's replacement commander. British GHQ, regarding the mutineers as the true authors of the March putsch and the first officer sent out from London as incompetent, refused, in turn, to help the government impose its will. Only the nomination of another commander and
Rommel's June eruption into Egypt put an end to this farce.
The inability of the Yugoslav exiles either to manage their own affairs or to assert their relevance to their compatriots at home by any means other than cleaving to Mihailović led their British hosts to treat them with ever-diminishing respect. Their own efforts to lessen their dependency on the British by strengthening ties with the Americans, Soviets, and
de Gaulle's Free French were unsuccessful. Personal, party, and national dissension among them and the large Yugoslav-American community led to cabinet crises and, in the summer of 1943, to two changes of government. These, however, had more to do with King Peter's determination to defy his ministers' opposition to a wartime marriage than with increasing British reservations about Mihailović. When, by August, the king contrived to provide himself with a non-party government under Bozidar Purić which was prepared to sanction his marriage, the British had come to see him not only as the sole element among the émigrés worthy of their support, but also as the only one likely to repay it.
As the British moved towards abandoning the inactive Mihailović in favour of the more warlike communist partisan leader,
Tito, it was the king's legitimacy, pliability, and assumed popularity with the Serbs that appeared to offer the only chance of reconciling the UK's short-term military requirements with long-term political interests. Having decided in December 1943 to break with Mihailović, Churchill laboured to persuade Tito to work with the king. By doing so, he argued, Tito might acquire international recognition, the material assets of the exile government, and the support of royalist Serbs. He worked simultaneously to compel Peter to dismiss the Purić government (and, with it, Mihailović) and to name a premier willing to deal with Tito. By May 1944 he had succeeded. Ivan Subasić, the former
ban (governor) of Croatia, formed a one-man government charged with effecting a merger between the monarchy and the revolution, and in June he signed an agreement with Tito's Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation (AVNOJ) which envisaged the eventual formation of a united Royal-AVNOJ government.
(d) Post-occupation government
Although Tito could by 1944 expect to take control in most of the country when the Germans withdrew, the Četniks still dominated Serbia. It was with this in mind that he appealed to Stalin in July 1944 to divert the Red Army from its course into Central Europe and to help hasten the conquest of Serbia. Stalin graciously complied; and the Četnik movement, its morale sapped by three years of equivocation over its role, disintegrated under the triple blows of a Partisan–Soviet attack, western Allied abandonment, and King Peter's endorsement of the Partisans. Belgrade was liberated on 20 October. The Red Army then decamped for Hungary, leaving the Partisans (now fighting as a regular army) to finish the job as the Germans and their Yugoslav auxiliaries slowly fell back to the north and west. An internationally recognized coalition government, with Tito as premier and Subasić as foreign minister, had been formed under communist domination in March 1945, but complete liberation did not come until the German surrender in May 1945.
Over the next few months the communists consolidated their power, took revenge on those of their enemies who had failed to escape to Italy or Austria, and began to remake their country in the image of the only other authentically revolutionary Marxist-Leninist state—the USSR.
4. Armed forces
(a) Army
The Yugoslav Army's war establishment was 1.2 million, with a further half-million in the reserves. At the end of March 1941, when both a ‘general activation’ (not mobilization) and a new war plan were promulgated, the army's strength stood at 700,000. At least half of its 110 light tanks were obsolescent. Despite relatively lavish expenditure on defence in recent years, this was an army which still moved at the pace of a bullock cart and was led by men whose conceptions had advanced little since 1918. The army's only possible advantage over the Wehrmacht lay in the use it might make of its rugged native terrain, but that was vitiated by demoralization, disaffection, and paralysis in the face of German might. At less than half-strength and with its dispositions in flux on account of the new war plan, the Yugoslav Army was no match for its enemies in April 1941. A Yugoslav infantry battalion composed largely of ex-Italian prisoners-of-war of Slovene nationality was later formed in Egypt.
(b) Navy
The Yugoslav Navy had an old German training cruiser, four modern destroyers—a fifth was under construction—four submarines, sixteen old torpedo boats, and a number of miscellaneous craft including a seaplane tender. None was lost to enemy action but the cruiser seaplane tender, and three of the destroyers were captured. The fourth destroyer was scuttled by its crew. A submarine, two torpedo boats, and eleven seaplanes of the Yugoslav Fleet Air Arm escaped to Alexandria where they were used for local patrol duties. Later, a number of small British warships were manned with Yugoslav crews based on Malta. Their return, along with vessels seized by the Italians in 1941, was sought by Tito in 1944.
(c) Air Force
With a total of 419 aircraft the airforce comprised one fighter and one bomber air brigade, each with two wings; two mixed air brigades, each with one wing of fighters and one of bombers; and a bomber air brigade of two wings. There were also seven squadrons of obsolete army aviation aircraft. The aircraft were of mixed British, French, and German types, some modern, some not. The fighter air brigade which protected Belgrade was equipped mostly with Hurricanes and Me109s, and these inflicted some losses on the Germans when the Luftwaffe raided the capital on 6 April 1941. Altogether, 49 Yugoslav aircraft were lost in the air and 85 on the ground before the
armistice. About 50 escaped to Greece, some of which eventually reached Egypt. The bulk of the several hundred air force personnel who reached Egypt mutinied against the Jovanović
government-in-exile early in 1942. The mutineers were eventually enrolled in the RAF Volunteer Reserve. Most returned to the Yugoslav colours in 1944 when the UK began to train fighter squadrons for Tito.
5. Resistance and civil war
Resistance to the Axis was to be expected in lands where the traditions of fighting alien rule were still living parts of most people's national identities. Fragments of the army and gendarmerie, who adopted the traditional Serbian name of Četniks (from
četa, regiment), had taken to the hills as the magnitude of their defeat became obvious in April 1941. There they regrouped, awaited developments, and rallied gradually to the command of Mihailović. The communists, or Partisans as they came to call themselves, were also organizing themselves under their party secretary since 1937, Josip Brož Tito, though they too were few in number. Unlike the Serb loyalists, they were awaiting the revolutionary situation they trusted Soviet entry into the war would unleash. Both movements sought to take control and advantage of the spontaneous and inchoate Serb risings which the Ustaša pogroms were provoking in the Independent Croatian State, or NDH. Not wanting to be left out, and encouraged by the Soviet Union's entry into the war and the communists' consequent call to arms—as well as by the Germans' earlier transfer of front-line troops to the east—the Serbs of Montenegro and the rump of Serbia rose in rebellion in July and August. Such unity as these various local uprisings possessed was not destined to endure, as their would-be leaders, the communists and the Serb officers, were fighting for different ends. These, in turn, implied different strategies.
Mihailović's movement sought Yugoslavia's restoration as a Serb-dominated monarchy. Its appeal to non-Serbs was thus small. But in the summer of 1941, the popular demand was for resistance; and Mihailović and his commanders went along with it so as to maintain their claim to both wartime and post-war leadership. By the autumn, however, the mass reprisals against Serb civilians (on a ratio of 100 executions for every German soldier killed) which had become Hitler's answer to revolt confirmed Mihailović in his original belief that the uprisings were premature and that the communists were no better than criminals for seeking to provoke and prosecute them. In this assessment lay the seeds of the Četniks'
collaboration with the Axis and a long civil war; although in November the Germans rejected Mihailović's offer to fight the communists in return for arms.
The communists, on the other hand, were fighting for a revolutionary transfer of power. Although this, their ultimate objective, was more or less effectively camouflaged after the spring of 1942, from the start they sought to appeal both individually and collectively to all the Yugoslav peoples. Militarily, they differed from the Četniks by emphasizing unremitting war on the Axis and its Yugoslav helpmates: at first in order to lend assistance to the embattled ‘first country of socialism’, but later because to do otherwise was to serve the enemy and to betray one's own people. They denounced Mihailović, the various Croat and Slovene leaders, and parties who refused to concede their right to command the resistance as collaborators. Most of these anti-communist potential resisters fell into the trap, becoming what the communists alleged they were.
So the lands of the dismembered Yugoslav state became not only the scene of Europe's greatest resistance struggle, but also one of its bloodiest civil wars. Partisans and Četniks fought the occupiers, their servants, and each other in order to win anti-Axis leadership and the right to organize the post-war state. The several regimes and movements involved in collaboration fought the resisters and occasionally each other under the benevolent or worried gaze of their rival Axis patrons. For example, the Serb anti-communist militias organized by the Italians in their zones of occupation (and which also proclaimed their allegiance to Mihailović) not only participated in Axis offensives against the Partisans, but also fought Croatian forces (Ustaša and regulars) armed and directed by the Germans. General Nedić, the Serb Quisling, pressed the Germans to detach eastern Bosnia from the Ustaša state and to re-assign it to Serbia. Meanwhile, in German-occupied eastern Bosnia itself, the local Četniks forged anti-communist alliances with the very elements they had come into existence to oppose—the Ustaša. Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims massacred each other in the name of
religion. Brother fought brother in the name of politics. Most of the 1.2 million Yugoslavs who died in the Second World War perished at the hands of other Yugoslavs.
Mihailović's movement was in the ascendant during 1942. By partially ‘legalizing’ itself with the Nedić regime, it had managed to escape destruction in the German offensive which chased the Partisans out of Serbia at the end of 1941. Its natural appeal to Serbs as a reincarnation of 19th-century insurgencies against the Turks was buttressed by the legitimacy accorded to it by King Peter's government and by the propaganda backing it received from the Allies. Outside narrow Serbia, in Montenegro, Herzegovina, and inland Dalmatia, Mihailović's sub-commanders joined with the Italians in waging war on the communists and/or in keeping the Ustašas at bay. By such means they expected both to preserve themselves and to eliminate their rivals against the day when the Italians, quitting the war, should bequeath their arms, equipment, and control of the coast. The British, unable themselves at this stage to supply the Četniks, did not oppose these arrangements.
The Partisans, however, were recovering from their set backs of late 1941 and early 1942. Their ‘long march’ from south-east to north-west Bosnia in the summer of 1942 translated them from an area in which they had worn out their welcome to one sympathetic to their now less revolutionary demeanour. When they convoked the first meeting of their all-national front, the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation (AVNOJ), in Bihać in November they gave it a moderate and patriotic guise. In the first half of 1943 they survived—just—two great Axis offensives, while inflicting crippling defeats on the Četniks outside Serbia in the process. They also extricated themselves from negotiations with the Germans for an anti-Četnik
modus vivendi without being found out by the British, who had chosen this moment (April) to send their first missions to them. By the end of 1943 they claimed to have more than 200,000 men and women under arms. More importantly, from the Allied point of view, they were credited with holding down some 35 Axis divisions which might otherwise have been available for service on the Italian or Eastern Fronts.
Mark Wheeler
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