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Nuremberg Trials
NUREMBERG TRIALSThe Nuremberg trials were a series of trials held between 1945 and 1949 in which the Allies prosecuted German military leaders, political officials, industrialists, and financiers for crimes they had committed during world war ii. The first trial took place in Nuremberg, Germany, and involved twenty-four top-ranking survivors of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (Nazi Party). The subsequent trials were held throughout Germany and involved approximately two hundred additional defendants, including Nazi physicians who performed vile experiments on human subjects, concentration camp commandants who ordered the extermination of their prisoners, and judges who upheld Nazi practices. World War II began in 1939 when Germany invaded Poland. Over the next few years, the European Axis powers (Germany, Italy, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania) successfully invaded and occupied France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Greece, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Finland, and the Netherlands. But when adolf hitler's troops invaded the Soviet Union, the Nazi war machine stalled. By the end of the war, the Axis powers were battered and beleaguered, and in 1945 they unconditionally surrendered to the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France (the four Allied powers). Although the surrender of the Axis powers brought the war to its formal conclusion, the Third Reich had left an indelible imprint on the world. During Germany's attempted conquest and occupation of Europe and Asia, the Nazis slaughtered, tortured, starved, and tormented over six million Jews and countless others—including Catholics, prisoners of war, dissenters, intelligentsia, nobility, and other innocent civilians. As part of their systematic effort to extinguish persons they deemed subversive, dangerous, or impure, the Nazis constructed concentration camps around Europe where they murdered their victims in gas chambers and incinerated their bodies in crematories. Persons who escaped this fate were deported to Nazi labor camps where they were compelled upon threat of death to work for the Third Reich. The Allies had been discussing the idea of punishing war criminals since 1943 when U.S. president franklin d. roosevelt, British prime minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet premier joseph stalin signed the Moscow Declaration promising to hold the Axis powers, particularly Germany, Italy, and Japan, responsible for any atrocities they committed during World War II. In 1944 Roosevelt and Churchill briefly entertained the idea of summarily executing the highest-ranking members of the Third Reich without a trial or legal proceeding of any kind. However, by June of 1945, when delegations from the four Allied powers gathered in London at the International Conference of Military Trials, the U.S. representatives firmly believed that the Nazi leaders could not be executed without first being afforded the opportunity to defend themselves in a judicial proceeding. Principles of justice, fairness, and due process, delegates from the United States argued, required no less. U.S. leaders also feared that the Allies would be perceived as hypocritical for denying the vanquished powers the same basic legal rights that were denied to those persons summarily executed by Germany, Italy, and Japan during the war. On August 8, 1945, the four Allied powers signed a convention called the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis Powers, which set forth the parameters by which the accused would be tried. Under this convention, which is sometimes referred to as the London Agreement or Nuremberg Charter, the Allies would conduct the trials of leaders of the European Axis powers in Nuremberg, and would subsequently prosecute lower-ranking officials and less important figures in the four occupied zones of Germany. American military tribunals in the South Pacific, under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, tried accused Japanese war criminals. The London Agreement also established the International Military Tribunal (IMT), which was a panel of eight judges, two named by each of the four Allied powers. One judge from each country actively presided at trial, and the other four sat on the panel as alternates. The four Allied powers also selected the prosecutors, who agreed to pursue a conviction against the defendants on behalf of the newly formed united nations. Under the Nuremberg Charter, each defendant accused of a war crime was afforded the right to be represented by an attorney of his choice. The accused war criminals were presumed innocent by the tribunal and could not be convicted until their guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, the defendants were guaranteed the right to challenge incriminating evidence, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and introduce exculpatory evidence of their own. The court appointed interpreters to translate the proceedings into four languages: French, German, Russian, and English. Written evidence submitted by the prosecution was translated into the native language of each defendant. When considering the admissibility of particular documents or testimony, the IMT was not bound by technical rules of evidence common to Anglo-American systems of justice. The tribunal retained discretion to evaluate hearsay and other forms of evidence that are normally considered unreliable in the United States and Great Britain. The IMT made all of its decisions by a majority vote of the four judges. On issues that divided the judges equally, the president of the court, Lord Justice Geoffrey Lawrence from Great Britain, was endowed with the deciding vote. In all other situations, a vote cast by Lawrence carried no greater weight than a vote cast by Soviet judge Ion Nikitchenko, French judge Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, American judge francis biddle, or any of the alternates. The IMT's decisions, including any rulings, judgments, or sentences, were final and could not be appealed. Neither the defense nor the prosecution was permitted to challenge the legal, political, or military authority of the court. The IMT said that its jurisdiction stemmed from the London Agreement that was promulgated by the Allies pursuant to their inherent legislative powers over the conquered nations, which had unconditionally surrendered. According to the tribunal, each Ally possessed the unqualified right to legislate over the territory that it occupied. By establishing the IMT, the court said, the Allies "had done together what any one of them might have done singly." The IMT was given authority to hear four counts of criminal complaints: conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Count I encompassed conspiracies to commit crimes against peace, whereas count II covered persons who committed such crimes in their individual capacities. Crimes against peace included the planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of aggressive war in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances. Crimes against peace differed from other war crimes, the tribunal said, in that they represented the "accumulated evil" of the Axis powers. Count III consisted of war crimes committed in violation of the laws and customs of war as accepted and practiced around the world. This count aimed to punish those individuals who were responsible for issuing or executing orders that resulted in the plundering of public and private property, the wanton destruction of European cities and villages, the murder of captured Allied soldiers, and the conscription of civilians in occupied territories for deportation to German labor camps. Count IV consisted of crimes against humanity, including murder, extermination, enslavement, and other inhumane acts committed against civilian populations, as well as every form of political, racial, and religious persecution carried out in furtherance of a crime punishable by the IMT. This count aimed to punish the most notorious crimes committed by the Nazi regime, such as genocide and torture. Early in the trial, however, the IMT ruled that the court did not have authority to try the defendants for crimes they committed before 1939 when World War II began. Many of the prospective Nazi defendants were dead or could not be found after the war. Adolf Hitler, the totalitarian dictator of Germany who was the emotional and intellectual catalyst behind most of the war crimes committed by the Nuremberg defendants, Heinrich Himmler, head of the SS (Schutzstaffel, or Black-shirts, the Nazi organization in charge of the concentration camps and the Gestapo, the German secret police), and Paul Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi minister of propaganda, had all killed themselves during the final days of the war. benito mussolini, totalitarian dictator of Italy, was shot and hung by his own people in Milan in April 1945. Other German officials such as Karl Adolf Eichmann, a lieutenant colonel in the SS who was the architect of Hitler's "final solution" to exterminate the Jewish population in Europe and Asia, and Dr. Josef Mengele, a physician who performed barbaric experiments on prisoners at the concentration camp in Auschwitz, Poland, eluded the Allies by fleeing Germany after the war. Not all of the Nazi leadership was able to escape justice. Twenty-four Nazi officials were indicted under the Nuremberg Charter for war crimes. The tribunal convicted eighteen of the defendants and acquitted three defendants (Dr. Hjalmar H. G. Schacht, president of the German Central Bank, Hans Fritzsche, propaganda minister for German radio, and Franz von Papen, vice chancellor of Germany). One defendant (Dr. Robert Ley, leader of the Nazi Labor Front) committed suicide before the proceedings began; one defendant (Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, a German military industrialist) was deemed mentally and physically incompetent to stand trial; and one defendant (Martin Bormann, Hitler's secretary and head of the Nazi Party Chancellery) was tried and convicted in absentia because his whereabouts were unknown. The trial began on November 20, 1945, and concluded on October 1, 1946. Thirty-three witnesses testified for the prosecution. Eighty witnesses testified for the defense, including nineteen of the defendants. An additional 140 witnesses provided evidence for the defense through written interrogatories. The prosecution introduced written evidence of its own, including original military, diplomatic, and government files of the Nazi regime that fell into the hands of the Allies after the collapse of the Third Reich. robert h. jackson, an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, led the prosecution team. President harry s. truman had asked Jackson to assemble a staff of U.S. attorneys to investigate alleged war crimes and present evidence against the defendants. Jackson was joined on the prosecution team by Roman Rudenko, François de Menthon, and Sir Hartley Shawcross, the chief prosecutors for Russia, France, and Great Britain, respectively. Each of the four powers employed a number of assistant prosecutors as well. Jackson commenced the trial with an opening statement that is considered one of the most eloquent in the annals of jurisprudence. "The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish", Jackson said, "have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored because it cannot survive their being repeated…. That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that power has ever paid to reason." Hermann Goering was the most powerful surviving member of the German government to be tried at Nuremberg. Goering had been elected president of the Reichstag (the German parliament) in 1932. After Hitler was named chancellor of Germany in 1933, Goering was appointed minister of interior for Prussia where he created the Gestapo and established the first concentration camps. In 1935 Goering became chief of the Luftwaffe (the German air force), and two years later he was made commissioner of the Four Year Plan, an economic program designed to make Germany self-sufficient in preparation for the ensuing Nazi blitzkrieg. After Germany's invasion of Finland in 1939, Goering was elevated to Reich marshall, the highest military rank in Germany, and designated as Hitler's successor in the event of Hitler's death. The IMT convicted the Reich marshall on all four counts and sentenced him to death. The prosecution demonstrated that Goering had helped plan and direct the invasions of Poland and Austria. Other evidence indicated that Goering had ordered the Luftwaffe to destroy a business district in Rotterdam, Netherlands, even though the city had already surrendered. Goering was also implicated in the extermination of Polish intelligentsia, nobility, and clergy, the execution of British prisoners of war, the deportation of foreign laborers to Germany, the theft of art from French museums, and the suppression of domestic political opposition. Additionally, Goering admitted on cross-examination that he was responsible for promulgating laws that had facilitated the persecution of Jews throughout Europe. Rudolph Hess was another influential Nazi official prosecuted at Nuremberg. Hess was a longtime friend of Hitler. In 1923 the two joined forces in an unsuccessful attempt to incite a Nazi revolution in a Munich tavern. Although Hitler was arrested and convicted of treason for his role in the so-called beer hall putsch, German interest in the Nazi movement grew after the publication of Mein Kampf, a manifesto Hitler dictated to Hess while serving his prison term. Mein Kampf planted the seeds of Aryan supremacy, German nationalism, anti-Semitism, and totalitarian government, seeds that Hess later cultivated in his capacity as deputy führer to the Third Reich. During the Nuremberg trial, the prosecution offered evidence that Hess had signed orders authorizing the persecution of European Jews and the ransacking of churches. Documents signed by Hess and meetings he attended reflected his support for Hitler's plan to invade Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Hess originally asserted a defense of amnesia to these charges, claiming that he had forgotten the entire period of his life in which he had acted as deputy führer. However, Hess withdrew this defense upon realizing that he would not stand trial with the other defendants if he were diagnosed as incompetent. Hess was convicted of counts I and II and sentenced to life imprisonment. Joachim von Ribbentrop, Germany's foreign minister during World War II, was convicted on all four counts and sentenced to death. When he took the witness stand, the prosecution asked him if he considered Germany's invasions of Poland, Denmark, Norway, Greece, France, and the Soviet Union "acts of aggression." In each case Ribbentrop answered in the negative, arguing that such invasions were more properly described as acts of war. Confronted with evidence that he had urged the German regent of Hungary to exterminate the Jews in that country, Ribbentrop responded only by saying that he did not use those words exactly. Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner was the head of the Reich Central Security Office, the Nazi organization in charge of the Gestapo and the SD (Sicherheitsdienst, Security Service, the German intelligence agency) and was second in command to Himmler at the SS. Kaltenbrunner faced a mountain of evidence demonstrating that he visited a number of concentration camps and had personally witnessed prisoners being gassed and incinerated. One letter signed by Kaltenbrunner authorized the execution of Allied prisoners of war, and another letter authorized the conscription and deportation of foreign laborers. Laborers who were too weak to contribute, Kaltenbrunner wrote, should be executed, regardless of their age or gender. Kaltenbrunner received a death sentence after being convicted under counts III and IV. Alfred Rosenberg was the Nazi minister for the occupied Eastern European territories. Rosenberg told Axis troops that the accepted rules of land warfare could be disregarded in areas under his control. He ordered the segregation of Jews into ghettos where his subordinates murdered them. His signature was found at the bottom of a directive approving the deportation of forty-five thousand youths to German labor camps. Cross-examined about his role in the unlawful confiscation of Jewish property, Rosenberg claimed that all such property was seized to protect it from Allied bombing raids. Rosenberg was found guilty on all four counts and sentenced to death by hanging. Hans Frank, the governor-general of Poland during German occupation, was sentenced to hang after being convicted on counts III and IV. Frank described his administration's policy by stating that Poland was "treated like a colony" in which the Polish people became "the slaves of the Greater German World Empire." The tribunal found that this policy entailed the destruction of Poland as a national entity, the evisceration of all political opposition, and the ruthless exploitation of human resources to promote Hitler's reign of terror. While on the witness stand, Frank confessed to participating in the Nazis' systematic attempt to annihilate the Jewish race. Wilhelm Frick, the German minister of interior, was found guilty on counts I, II, and III and sentenced to be hanged. Frick had signed decrees sanctioning the execution of Jews and other persons held in "protective custody" at the concentration camps and had given Himmler a blank check to take any "security measures" necessary to ensure the German foothold in the occupied territories. The tribunal also determined that Frick exercised supreme authority over Bohemia and Moravia and was responsible for implementing Hitler's policies of enslavement, deportation, torture, and extermination in these territories. Wilhelm Keitel, field marshall for the High Command of the armed forces, was sentenced to die after being found guilty on every count. On direct examination Keitel admitted that there were "a large number of orders" bearing his signature that "contained deviations from existing international law." He also conceded that a number of atrocities had been committed under his command during Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union. As a defense to these charges, Keitel asserted that he had been following the orders of his superiors when committing these crimes. Yet some witnesses testifying on behalf of the defense tended to undermine this assertion. Alfred Jodl, chief of the operations staff for the armed forces, also received the death sentence after being convicted on every count. During the early stages of World War II, Jodl had been asked to review an order drafted by Hitler authorizing German troops to execute all Soviet military commissars captured during the Nazi invasion of Russia. Aware that this order was a violation of the customs, practices, and laws governing the treatment of prisoners during times of war, Jodl made no attempt to dissuade Hitler from issuing it. Jodl was also found responsible for distributing an order that authorized the execution of Allied commandos caught by the Axis powers and for mobilizing the German army against its European foes. Julius Streicher, an anti-Semitic propagandist, was found guilty of count IV and sentenced to death. Author, editor, and publisher of Der Stuermer, a privately owned Jew-baiting newspaper, Streicher held no meaningful government position with the Axis powers during World War II. Yet the tribunal determined that circulation of Streicher's racist newspaper had fueled the Nazis' maniacal hatred of Jews and fomented an atmosphere in which genocide was acceptable and desirable. The prosecution introduced an article Streicher had published during 1942 in which he described Jewish procreation as a curse of God that could only be lifted through a process of political and ethnic emasculation. Albert Speer, Nazi minister of armaments, received a prison term of twenty years after being convicted on counts III and IV. Speer had fascinated Hitler long before the war with his architectural prowess, designing buildings that were both immense and imposing. After the war began, however, Speer's primary obligation was to supply the German armed forces with military supplies, equipment, and weapons. Thus, Speer became a lynchpin in the Nazi military empire. In an effort to maintain this empire, the prosecution demonstrated, Speer had repeatedly cajoled Hitler to procure foreign labor to work in his weapons factories. Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart, an Austrian who was appointed by Hitler to govern Austria and the Netherlands during German occupation, was found guilty on counts II, III, and IV and sentenced to death for his confessed mistreatment of racial minorities in those territories, including the deportation of more than 250,000 Jews to Germany. Seyss-Inquart also assisted Hitler's takeover of Austria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Baron Konstantin von Neurath, Reich protector of Czechoslovakia, was convicted on all four counts and sentenced to fifteen years in prison for participating in the Nazi militarization campaign. Hoping to immunize the Nazi regime from its obligations under international law, Neurath had advocated Germany's withdrawal from the league of nations and denounced the Versailles Treaty that had formally concluded world war i. Neurath was also implicated in various brutalities committed against the Czechoslovakian civilian population. Baldur von Schirach, governor of occupied Vienna and leader of the Hitler Youth, was convicted on count IV and sentenced to a twenty-year prison term. The IMT determined that Schirach had provided the visceral foundations for the militarization of Germany's youngest Nazis through psychological and educational indoctrination and had conspired with Hitler to deport Viennese Jews to Poland where most of them met their death. Fritz Sauckel, the plenipotentiary general for the allocation of labor, was convicted on counts III and IV and sentenced to death for his central role in the Nazi forced labor program that enslaved more than eleven million Europeans. Erich Raeder served as Germany's naval commander and chief until 1943 when he resigned due to a disagreement with Hitler, and he was succeeded by Karl Doenitz. Both Raeder and Doenitz were indicted under counts I, II, and III for war crimes committed on the high seas, and both were convicted based in part on evidence that they had authorized German submarines to fire on Allied commercial ships without warning in contravention of international law. Doenitz was sentenced to a ten-year prison term, and Raeder received a life sentence. Walther Funk, Nazi minister of economics, also received a life sentence for financing Germany's aggressive warfare and for exploiting foreign laborers in German industry. The IMT declared four Nazi organizations to be criminal: the SS, the SD, the Gestapo, and the Nazi Party. A team of Allied attorneys, including American Telford Taylor, subsequently prosecuted individual members of these organizations. Three Nazi organizations were acquitted: the SA (Sturmabteilung, the paramilitary organization also known as the Brownshirts or Stormtroopers), and the general staff and High Command of the German armed forces. The Nuremberg trials made three important contributions to international law. First, they established a precedent that all persons, regardless of their station or occupation in life, can be held individually accountable for their behavior during times of war. Defendants cannot insulate themselves from personal responsibility by blaming the country, government, or military branch for which they committed the particular war crime. Second, the Nuremberg trials established that individuals cannot shield themselves from liability for war crimes by asserting that they were simply following orders issued by a superior in the chain of command. Subordinates in the military or government are now bound by their obligations under international law, obligations that transcend their duty to obey an order issued by a superior. Orders to initiate aggressive (as opposed to defensive) warfare, to violate recognized rules and customs of warfare, or to persecute civilians and prisoners are considered illegal under the Nuremberg principles. Third, the Nuremberg trials clearly established three discrete substantive war crimes that are punishable under international law: crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and crimes in violation of transnational obligations embodied in treaties and other agreements. Before the Nuremberg trials, these crimes were not well defined, and persons who committed such crimes had never been punished by a multinational tribunal. For these reasons the Nuremberg convictions have sometimes been criticized as ex post facto justice. The Nuremberg trials have also been criticized as "victor's justice." Historians have observed that the Allied nations that tried and convicted the leading Nazis at Nuremberg did not come to the table with clean hands. The Soviet Union had participated in Germany's invasion and occupation of Poland and had been implicated in the massacre of more than a thousand Poles in the Katyn forest. Bombing raids conducted by the United States and Great Britain during World War II left thousands of civilians dead in cities like Dresden, Germany, and Nagasaki and Hiroshima, Japan. President Roosevelt had implemented a relocation program for more than 100,000 Americans of Japanese descent that confined them to concentration camps around the United States. The Nuremberg trials were not typical partisan trials, though. The defendants were afforded the right to counsel, plus a full panoply of evidentiary and procedural protections. The Nuremberg verdicts demonstrate that these protections were taken seriously by the tribunal. The IMT completely exonerated three defendants of war crimes and acquitted most of the remaining defendants of at least some charges. Thus, the Nuremberg trials, while not perfect, changed the face of international law, both procedurally and substantively. further readingsConot, Robert. 1983. Justice at Nuremberg. New York: Carrol & Graf. Davidson, Eugene. 1997. The Trial of the Germans. Columbia: Univ. of Missouri Press. Gilbert, G. M. 1995. Nuremberg Diary. New York: Da Capo Press. Green, L.C. 1995."Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law." Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 5. Lippman, Matthew. 1991."Nuremberg: Forty-five Years Later." Connecticut Journal of International Law 7. Persico, Joseph. 1994. Nuremberg: Infamy on Trial. New York: Penguin Books. Taylor, Telford. 1992. The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials. New York: Little, Brown. cross-references |
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Cite this article
"Nuremberg Trials." West's Encyclopedia of American Law. 2005. Encyclopedia.com. 28 May. 2012 <http://www.encyclopedia.com>. "Nuremberg Trials." West's Encyclopedia of American Law. 2005. Encyclopedia.com. (May 28, 2012). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3437703133.html "Nuremberg Trials." West's Encyclopedia of American Law. 2005. Retrieved May 28, 2012 from Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3437703133.html |
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Nuremberg trials
Nuremberg trials. The post-war legal proceedings at Nuremberg are best viewed as falling into two closely related categories. The first covers hearings conducted there between November 1945 and October 1946 before an International Military Tribunal (IMT) jointly established by the USA, the USSR, the UK, and France. This action against 22 major German war criminals was complemented by an eleven-power prosecution and judgement of Japanese leaders at the broadly comparable Far East war crimes trials. The second category embraces a series of ‘Subsequent Proceedings’, also held at Nuremberg and lasting until the spring of 1949. In them nearly 200 other prominent Nazis were tried before US Military Tribunals which operated within the American zone of occupation (see Allied Control Commissions) under the terms of Control Council Law Number Ten.
The Nuremberg IMTIn the Moscow Declaration, issued after the Moscow conference in October 1943, Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill made clear their determination to punish the principal Nazis, but left entirely vague all questions of procedure. As the war moved towards its close, the desirability of mounting full-scale legal proceedings remained in dispute. Though controversy occurred even in Washington, it was the US government which emerged as the strongest supporter of a comprehensive trial. The British cabinet, on the other hand, tended to oppose this option. It heeded the view of Lord Simon (1873–1954), the Lord Chancellor, that the fate of the German leadership cadre was essentially ‘a political, not a judicial, question’, and that summary process would provide a simpler (and potentially less embarrassing) solution. Not until May 1945 did the view of the Americans (supported eventually on this issue by the USSR) decisively prevail and the four-power London Agreement, signed on 8 August, two days after the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, settled the ground rules for a major trial. These were embodied in a charter, which included provision for the establishment of a special tribunal comprising one judge, and one alternate, from each of the signatory states. The members then chose the senior British representative, Lord Justice Lawrence, to preside over what his colleague Norman Birkett called ‘the greatest trial in history’.On 6 October 1945 the prosecutors appointed by the four powers published their joint statement of indictment. With Hitler, Himmler, and Goebbels all dead, that document listed 24 others as defendants. However, by the time that the proceedings actually began in November, Robert Ley had committed suicide and the industrialist Gustav Krupp had been deemed unfit to plead. All the remaining accused (see Table) reached the dock, except for Bormann who could not be found either alive or dead and was tried in absentia. The prisoners had been selected largely to represent the major administrative groupings within the Third Reich. This approach reflected the original American plan to put heavy stress on the need for obtaining declaratory judgements of criminality against certain indicted Nazi organizations. But, once the trial was under way, this theme became subordinated to more directly human issues, concerning especially the degree of responsibility attaching to each of the individual prisoners. Those in the dock were, in personality and demeanour, a motley crew. Göring, weaned from drugs and in better mental and physical condition than for some years past, almost revelled in his position of primacy over the others. Certainly he surprised observers by the scope of the shrewdness and intelligence which he brought to bear on his self-justifications, which formed (as the writer Janet Flanner reported) ‘the complicated narrative of a brain without a conscience’. As for the leading representatives of the army and navy— Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, and Dönitz—these were consistent in expressing a defiant pain at having their obedience to military duty interpreted as cause for criminal prosecution. The old conservatives Neurath and Papen, together with the banker Schacht, manifested similar haughty indignation at finding themselves bracketed with a bully like Frick or a vulgar mediocrity like Sauckel. The cold brutality of Kaltenbrunner, leading survivor from the SS, was starkly evident; so too was that of Hans Frank, the broken ‘butcher of Poland’. The impression made by Speer on the courtroom was more subtle and confusing, as he sought to project himself as a decent man misled—through the irresistible spell of the Führer, the promptings of youthful ambitions, and the moral tunnel-vision that so readily afflicts the technocrat. There were other defendants such as Ribbentrop, Funk, and Rosenberg who seemed notable principally for their spinelessness; and, as for Streicher and Hess, even their sanity stood in question. Each of the accused was tried under at least two of the four broad headings devised for the indictment. Count One covered the formulation or execution of ‘a common plan or conspiracy’; Two, ‘crimes against peace’; Three, ‘war crimes’; and Four, ‘crimes against humanity’. The American prosecuting team concentrated on the first category, and the British on the second; the Soviet and French representatives assumed principal responsibility for establishing guilt under both the remaining headings, dividing their task with reference to offences in eastern and western Europe respectively. Among these counts, the third had the firmest base in precedent. It built upon the efforts of the Hague and Geneva Conventions to deal with violations of the laws or customs of war. These were defined under the Nuremberg charter especially in terms of ‘murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners-of-war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity’.
Count Four constituted a more innovatory extension of Count Three, adapting it to circumstances of total conflict hardly envisaged when the law on ‘war crimes’ was first evolved. By referring to ‘crimes against humanity’, the prosecutors intended to convey that the Nazis had descended to quite unprecedented levels of systematized barbarity. As defined by the charter, this offence encompassed ‘murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where perpetrated’. Taken together, Counts Three and Four spanned the area where the Nuremberg prosecution was most successful in obtaining verdicts of guilt from the IMT. Here the quantity and scope of the incriminating material, including photographic as well as documentary evidence concerning the extermination camp system (see OPERATION REINHARD), was such as to provide the main basis for the twelve death sentences eventually decreed by the judges. Critics of Nuremberg have often argued, with good cause, that the trial would probably have been tidier and more effective had it concentrated simply on these third and fourth categories of indictment. Counts One and Two certainly proved more awkward for the prosecutors and judges alike to handle. The offence of ‘conspiracy’—covering not just the substantive crime but also its preparation, as virtually a separate and additional matter—was based on a concept familiar only to the American and British lawyers involved. The stress placed on it by the trial planners from the USA in particular was such as to encourage at Nuremberg a constant, complex, and fascinating distortion of evidence from both sides. It gave the prosecutors extra motive for exaggerating the overall coherence of Nazi policy-making, while conversely supplying the defendants with added reason to seize every opportunity of overstating the confused nature of their responsibilities and, above all, the scale of their ignorance about what had been happening under the Reich. Viewed thus, the courtroom transcripts often look like the first rough sketch for much later debates between the ‘intentionalist’ and the ‘structuralist’ interpreters of such topics as the evolution of Nazi foreign policy or the path towards the Final Solution. The judges themselves swiftly sensed the difficulties raised by the conspiracy accusation. They eventually ruled that it would be pursued only in respect to the period starting from Hitler's ‘Hossbach’ meeting of November 1937, at which he reiterated to a group of his followers his intention of nursing a policy of aggressive expansion (see Lebensraum), and only in association with the offences alleged under Count Two. That area of accusation became the most problematic of all. The indictment defined it as embracing ‘the planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of wars of aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements, and assurances’. It listed these wars as the ones launched by Germany against Poland, the UK, and France in 1939; against Denmark, Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg in 1940; and against Yugoslavia, Greece, the USSR, and the USA in 1941. But the reference to violations of international law during the preparatory planning of these aggressions meant that Count Two, in close association with the conspiracy charge under Count One, drew the court into tangled issues of historical as well as legal judgement concerning the origins of the Second World War. The prosecutors felt obliged to contend that various compacts from the inter-war period had indisputably evolved into a legal consensus about crimes against peace, which should now for the first time be enforced through penal sanctions. There was little difficulty in proving Hitler to have been by far the most aggressive actor on the European diplomatic scene during the 1930s. But the formal criminality of his pre-war foreign policies was much more disputable, as Simon (fearful of counter-charges about ex post facto legislation) had made amply plain to the British cabinet in April 1945. Pivotal to Count Two was the Kellogg–Briand Pact for the renunciation of war, signed in 1928 and subsequently ratified by all major and most minor states. This made no reference to penalties, and provided no clear definition of ‘aggressive war’. All the same, at Nuremberg the pact was accorded seminal importance. Was it however, as one of the defence lawyers argued, a significance belied by the attitudes and practices of all the main powers as these actually developed through the 1930s? The record of that decade was indeed littered with complications for the IMT. Prosecutors piously invoked the aims of the League of Nations, a body to which the USA had never belonged and from which the USSR was eventually expelled. As for the British and French governments, certain aspects of their reaction to Mussolini's Abyssinian invasion suggested some condoning of aggression. While the defendants were repeatedly castigated for not seeing where Mein Kampf pointed, the bearing of this criticism upon Allied policy-makers was neglected. As Schacht later wrote in his memoirs, ‘How were the German people supposed to realize that they were living under a criminal government when foreign countries treated this same government with such marked respect?’ In 1938 Anglo-French protests against the German annexation of Austria had been remarkably tame, and the participation of Chamberlain and Daladier in the Munich agreement left these figures open to the charge of having been accessories (however reluctant) to criminal action. As E. L. Woodward, historical adviser to the foreign office, was still warning the trial planners in August 1945: ‘Up to September 1, 1939, His Majesty's government were prepared to condone everything Germany had done to secure her position in Europe.’ Even deeper embarrassment was caused by the Nazi–Soviet Pact on 23 August 1939, and above all by its cynical ‘secret protocol’ which gave the USSR a free hand to launch its own aggression against eastern Poland, the Baltic States, and Finland. Moreover, once the Nuremberg indictment had included the German attack on Norway (see Norwegian campaign), Whitehall was keen to prevent the defence from probing too deeply into discussions of 1939–40 concerning the case for a pre-emptive British landing, if necessary even against Norwegian resistance. At these points, and at others concerned with the subsequent conduct of the war, the prisoners predictably did whatever they could to discredit the Nuremberg proceedings as mere ‘victors' justice’. After the Allies' own strategic air offensives, the prosecutors found it increasingly awkward to press home charges involving ‘wanton destruction of cities’; and, as the judges of the IMT explicitly conceded, the trial soon revealed that Germany's policy of unrestricted submarine warfare had been broadly matched by Anglo-American practices (see Laconia). Still wider problems stemmed from the Soviet presence in the courtroom, which meant that one nakedly totalitarian regime—with its own Stalinist record of mass murders and deportations, and of rigged trials (seeMoscow trials, for example)—was passing judgement on another. In eastern Europe the war had clearly been waged with utter callousness, from both sides. Supremely indicative of this was the Katyń Forest massacre. Though the USSR insisted on including this slaughter of Poles in the indictment, by the close of the trial it was more than ever evident that the atrocity had been committed not in 1941, as alleged, but in 1940 when the Smolensk region was still under Soviet rather than Nazi control. The tribunal itself made no concluding reference to the matter—a silence which was, in its own way, thunderously loud. Historians now know, especially from the papers of the principal American judge, Francis Biddle (1886–1968), a good deal about the secret processes by which the fate of the defendants was eventually determined. There was a certain measure of haggling and horse-trading (most notably, to avoid Biddle making public his view that Dönitz should be acquitted on the charges as formulated), but the main impression is one of great care and general fairness within the sometimes compromising framework imposed by the charter. Throughout the trial the judges, guided by Lord Justice Lawrence's robust good sense, had bothered less with flights of jurisprudential theory than with the requirements of practical wisdom. They announced their verdicts and sentences in the courtroom on 1 October 1946. Two weeks later—with Bormann still missing and with Göring's suicide cheating the hangman by a few hours—ten defendants went to the gallows. On last-minute instructions from Moscow the main Soviet judge, General I. Nikitchenko, dissented publicly from the failure to add Hess to that number, and from the three acquittals. He also expressed the view of the USSR that the Reich cabinet, together with the General Staff and High Command, should have been retained on the list of organizations that were finally deemed criminal which included the SS and the ‘Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party’. Those who mounted the Nuremberg trial accepted that much of its success would have to be gauged by the impetus which, in the longer term, it might give to the development of a proper system of international criminal law—one which would enable the world community to take effective judicial action against those who waged aggressive war or pursued genocidal policies. On that topic, much has been spoken since 1945 and very little actually achieved. The biggest difficulty remains the fact that proceedings of the Nuremberg type are attractive to governments only when the identity of victors and vanquished is conveniently settled in advance. In its more immediate aims, however, the IMT registered a firmer achievement. The trial's imperfections undoubtedly weakened its beneficial impact upon the German public, and gave comfort to those ardent to purvey neo-fascist myths. But far fewer fantasies developed than after 1918, and far fewer than would have been the case had the advocates of summary execution won the day in 1945. On balance, the IMT played a positive role in detailing the horrors of Nazism both before and during the Second World War, and thus in creating better prospects for democratic stability within the emerging Federal Republic. Finally, it needs to be emphasized that the Nuremberg trial, however flawed, gave those who stood in its dock an infinitely better hearing than anyone ever received before a Nazi court, or indeed amidst the infernal conditions of Auschwitz or Treblinka where even the pretence of legal forms was so murderously abandoned. Subsequent proceedings at NurembergThe principles and procedures evolved for the main legal action at Nuremberg were also applied, in broadly similar terms, to other war crimes trials conducted by various Allied powers operating on a more individual basis. Most particularly, Control Council Law Number Ten of December 1945 entitled any of the four forces that were actually occupying post-war Germany to arrange its own zonal prosecutions. Although the Soviet authorities made no use of this specific provision, it did supply the basis upon which, for example, British Military Courts operated at Hamburg, Wuppertal, and elsewhere with regard to defendants such as General von Manstein. That same inter-Allied agreement also empowered the Americans, as occupiers of Germany's south-eastern zone, to launch a second phase of proceedings at Nuremberg.There, between November 1946 and April 1949, US Military Tribunals settled the fate of a further 185 defendants. Though the responsibility for prosecution and judgement now rested with a single power, the variety and scale of the offences alleged were sufficient to lead international lawyers to regard these proceedings as the most significant supplement to the work of the earlier Nuremberg court and to that of the Tokyo IMT (see Far East war crimes trials). The Americans organized the new set of hearings into twelve different trials, whose titles are usually cited in the following shorthand form:1. The Medical Case, charging senior Nazi doctors with having conducted experiments upon the inmates of concentration camps;2. The Milch Case, involving forced labour and medical experimentation at Dachau;3. The Justice Case, concerning abuses of legal process within the Third Reich;4. The Pohl Case, directed against SS officers involved in the administration of concentration camps and of slave labour-programmes;5. The Flick Case, involving industrialists' complicity in the confiscation of Jewish property and in the use of forced labour;6. The I. G. Farben Case, probing similar offences by officials of the leading chemicals manufacturer;7. The Hostages Case, bearing upon ill-treatment of civilians in south-eastern Europe;8. The RuSHA Case, mounted against officials of the SS Race and Settlement Office implicated in the policies of genocide;9. TheEinsatzgruppen Case, concerning SS units responsible for mass murder;10. The Krupp Case, again focusing on the industrial exploitation of slave labour and confiscated property;11. The Ministries Case, directed against officials from the foreign office and other departments who had been engaged in laying the diplomatic, economic, and other foundations for Hitler's ‘New Order’ (see Germany, 4);12. The High Command Case, charging senior military figures with offences against prisoners-of-war, and against civilians in occupied areas.Overall, the dozen trials conducted by US military tribunals at Nuremberg resulted in the acquittal of 35 defendants (though some of those later faced German denazification courts) and the release of a further 19 on various other grounds. Death sentences were implemented against 24 of those charged, while 20 were condemned to gaol for life and 87 to shorter terms of imprisonment. Michael Biddiss Bibliography Gilbert, G. M. , Nuremberg Diary (London, 1948). |
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Cite this article
I. C. B. DEAR and M. R. D. FOOT. "Nuremberg trials." The Oxford Companion to World War II. 2001. Encyclopedia.com. 28 May. 2012 <http://www.encyclopedia.com>. I. C. B. DEAR and M. R. D. FOOT. "Nuremberg trials." The Oxford Companion to World War II. 2001. Encyclopedia.com. (May 28, 2012). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O129-Nurembergtrials.html I. C. B. DEAR and M. R. D. FOOT. "Nuremberg trials." The Oxford Companion to World War II. 2001. Retrieved May 28, 2012 from Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O129-Nurembergtrials.html |
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Nuremberg Trials
Nuremberg Trials (Germany) Proceedings against some of the leading figures of the Nazi regime held before a military tribunal composed of American, British, French, and Russian judges in the town where the annual mass rallies of the Nazi Party had been held 1933–8. The four charges were conspiracy against peace, crimes against peace, violation of the law and customs of war, and crimes against humanity. In the first, most famous trial (20 November 1945–1 October 1946), twelve were sentenced to death, among them Ribbentrop, Keitel, Jodl, Streicher, Bormann (in absentia), and Göring (who committed suicide before the execution). Three were acquitted, while seven received long prison sentences, such as Speer, Hess, Dönitz, and von Schirach. Also accused were the Nazi organizations (the SS, the Security Service, and the Gestapo), which were declared criminal. The main suit was followed up by twelve further trials of 177 people altogether, of whom twenty-four were sentenced to death, though only half of those executions were carried out. By 1966, all those convicted to a prison sentence had been released, with the notable exception of Hess. The trials raised substantial legal objections, as the accused had broken few laws in the execution of their crimes, while the charges such as ‘crimes against peace’ were ill-defined. In fact, the trial and the interrogations conducted in its run-up revealed a singular unwillingness on the part of all the accused (with the notable exception of Göring) to accept responsibility for their crimes. The trial revealed many details about Nazi atrocities, but its effect on the population was ambiguous. It allowed many Germans to project their culpability onto the accused. Once these had been convicted, it strengthened the popular mood to let bygones be bygones, that the necessary retribution had been done, and that the ‘zero hour’ of German history could commence.
Truth and Reconciliation Committee |
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Cite this article
JAN PALMOWSKI. "Nuremberg Trials." A Dictionary of Contemporary World History. 2004. Encyclopedia.com. 28 May. 2012 <http://www.encyclopedia.com>. JAN PALMOWSKI. "Nuremberg Trials." A Dictionary of Contemporary World History. 2004. Encyclopedia.com. (May 28, 2012). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O46-NurembergTrials.html JAN PALMOWSKI. "Nuremberg Trials." A Dictionary of Contemporary World History. 2004. Retrieved May 28, 2012 from Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O46-NurembergTrials.html |
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Nuremberg Trials
Nuremberg Trials a series of trials held in Nuremberg, Germany, from November 1945 to October 1946. They were held by the International Military Tribunal to indict and try twenty-four former Nazi leaders for committing and conspiring to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity during World War II. Six organizations also were indicted for aiding the Nazis. All of the officers pleaded not guilty. On October 1, 1946, the tribunal declared verdicts, which included three acquittals and the sentencing of four officers to imprisonment ranging from ten to twenty years, three to life imprisonment, and twelve to death by hanging. The tribunal rejected arguments from the defendants that the trials were ex post facto and that only the state, not individuals, were accountable for violations of international law.
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"Nuremberg Trials." The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military. 2001. Encyclopedia.com. 28 May. 2012 <http://www.encyclopedia.com>. "Nuremberg Trials." The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military. 2001. Encyclopedia.com. (May 28, 2012). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O63-NurembergTrials.html "Nuremberg Trials." The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military. 2001. Retrieved May 28, 2012 from Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O63-NurembergTrials.html |
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Nuremberg Trials
Nuremberg Trials (1945–46) An international tribunal for Nazi war criminals. The trials were complex and controversial, there being few precedents for using international law relating to the conduct of states to judge the activities of individuals. The charges were: conspiracy against peace, crimes against peace, violation of the laws and customs of war, crimes against humanity. As a result of the trials several Nazi organizations, such as the GESTAPO and the SS, were declared to be criminal bodies. Individual judgements against the 24 war-time leaders included death sentences, imprisonment, and not guilty. Ten prisoners were executed, while GOERING and Ley committed suicide. Rudolf HESS was sentenced to life-imprisonment.
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Cite this article
"Nuremberg Trials." A Dictionary of World History. 2000. Encyclopedia.com. 28 May. 2012 <http://www.encyclopedia.com>. "Nuremberg Trials." A Dictionary of World History. 2000. Encyclopedia.com. (May 28, 2012). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O48-NurembergTrials.html "Nuremberg Trials." A Dictionary of World History. 2000. Retrieved May 28, 2012 from Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O48-NurembergTrials.html |
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Nuremberg Trials
Nuremberg Trials (1945–46) Trials of Germans accused of war crimes during World War II, held before a military tribunal. The tribunal was established by the USA, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Ten Nazi leaders were executed (including von Ribbentrop). Goering committed suicide before the death sentence could be carried out. Rudolf Hess was one of six men sentenced to life imprisonment. See also Holocaust
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"Nuremberg Trials." World Encyclopedia. 2005. Encyclopedia.com. 28 May. 2012 <http://www.encyclopedia.com>. "Nuremberg Trials." World Encyclopedia. 2005. Encyclopedia.com. (May 28, 2012). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O142-NurembergTrials.html "Nuremberg Trials." World Encyclopedia. 2005. Retrieved May 28, 2012 from Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O142-NurembergTrials.html |
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Nuremberg Trials
Nuremberg Trials. See War Crimes Trials, Nuremberg and Tokyo.
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Cite this article
Paul S. Boyer. "Nuremberg Trials." The Oxford Companion to United States History. 2001. Encyclopedia.com. 28 May. 2012 <http://www.encyclopedia.com>. Paul S. Boyer. "Nuremberg Trials." The Oxford Companion to United States History. 2001. Encyclopedia.com. (May 28, 2012). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O119-NurembergTrials.html Paul S. Boyer. "Nuremberg Trials." The Oxford Companion to United States History. 2001. Retrieved May 28, 2012 from Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O119-NurembergTrials.html |
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