Normandy campaign (see Maps 73 and 74; for the Normandy landings see OVERLORD). In the spring of 1943 the Anglo-American Allies decided to launch a cross-Channel attack and invade German-occupied Europe on 1 May 1944. The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) specified certain assets for the operation, codenamed OVERLORD, and Lt-General Frederick Morgan, appointed chief of staff to the as yet unnamed supreme allied commander (see COSSAC), headed a small Allied staff and drew up an outline plan. The document was ready by August, and the CCS, meeting at the Quebec conference (see QUADRANT), approved it despite Morgan's warning of the need for additional resources and more divisions on a wider front to give the landings a better chance of success.

Because the Americans were eventually to furnish 60 divisions for the campaign in western Europe while the British and Canadians together could provide no more than 20, President Roosevelt in December designated General Dwight D. Eisenhower Supreme Allied Commander of the Expeditionary Forces (see SHAEF). Churchill placed Montgomery at the head of the Twenty-First Army Group, the top British-Canadian ground command for the crossing and subsequent fighting. Eisenhower invited Montgomery to be his commander of the Allied ground forces for an indefinite length of time, and Montgomery agreed. He served under Eisenhower as did Admiral Ramsay and Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory, in charge, respectively, of the Allied naval units and the tactical air forces (those in direct support of the ground forces). Eisenhower's deputy Allied commander, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, loosely co-ordinated the tactical air and the US and RAF strategic air forces, the strategic air forces being directed by Spaatz and Harris.

Allied bombardment preparing for OVERLORD began in January 1944, as planes destroyed bridges, railway yards, and industrial and military targets. In the process, they contributed to a huge deception plan codenamed FORTITUDE. Its purpose was to persuade the Germans to expect Allied landings in the Pas de Calais, across the narrowest part of the Channel, by a fictitious army group under Patton, who, the Germans inferred would lead the invasion. There were fake subordinate headquarters and camps, sham equipment and communications; the British also manipulated captured German agents to disseminate false information and employed ULTRA intelligence to check the extent to which the Germans were swallowing the story (see also XX-committee).

In reality, the Allies were planning to land on the coast of the Baie de la Seine. Eisenhower and Montgomery increased the strength of the initial assault. They expanded the amphibious forces from three to five divisions, two British, one Canadian, and two American, to move across five beaches, UTAH, OMAHA, JUNO, SWORD, and GOLD; used three airborne divisions, two American and one British, to secure the invasion flanks; and employed certain special operations such as the attack on the strongly defended Pointe du Hoc. They enlarged the frontage to approximately 80 km. (50 mi.), from Ouistreham, Caen's port, on the left, to the vicinity of Ste Mère Eglise, where half the Americans, who were on the right, would be closer to Cherbourg and therefore in a better position to capture this major port. But enlarged assault forces required additional facilities, particularly landing craft and ships, and, to be sure of having sufficient equipment on hand, the Allies postponed the invasion for a month, setting 5 June, when tidal and weather conditions would be most suitable, as D-Day.

The objective of Morgan's blueprint, what OVERLORD was supposed to accomplish, was to be achieved in three months. After coming ashore, the Allies were to extend inland and take possession of a lodgement area, that part of western France bounded by the Seine and Loire rivers, together with the Paris–Orléans gap that, is, lower Normandy, all of Brittany, and parts of Maine and Anjou. By conquering that region, the Allies would have enough (1)ports to sustain and nourish their augmenting forces;(2)sites for airfields from which to support the ground operations;(3)room to manœuvre to utilize the superior Allied mechanized forces; and(4)space in which to locate headquarters, installations, depots, and the other formations of modern armies. Once in the lodgement area, the Allies would halt and prepare to attack to the German border, then strike towards the Ruhr, the industrial heart of Germany.

The organizations participating in OVERLORD planned in detail how they were to get ashore. The headquarters of Bradley's First US Army and Dempsey's Second British Army, together with their subordinate units, trained their men and devised their procedures for the landings. All was in readiness early in June, when a storm arose over the Channel. High winds and driving rain made crossings impossible. Assured by meteorological intelligence which came from reports from weather stations in Greenland and elsewhere in the west, of a turn for the better, Eisenhower deferred the invasion for 24 hours and set D-Day for 6 June.

Across the Channel, on the Continent, the Germans awaited an invasion but lacked knowledge of its time and place. Rundstedt, C-in-C in the west, had a mobile theatre reserve force situated in a central location ready to speed to the landing sites and throw the invaders into the sea. Under him, Rommel, in command of Army Group B, believed it would be impossible to turn the Allies back once they had a foothold. Allied planes had gained complete air superiority and were bound to destroy the central reserve travelling to the beaches to repel the landings. Allied naval gunfire was sure to prevent the Germans from regaining the coast. It was therefore necessary, Rommel believed, to defeat the Allies at the water's edge. To that end he had, from November 1943, directed the construction of the Atlantic Wall, fortifications which included artillery pieces, pillboxes, underground troop shelters, beach obstacles such as element C and booby traps.

Rundstedt and Rommel presented their different methods of meeting an invasion to their Führer. Unable to choose which solution he preferred, Hitler tried to implement both with the result that neither commander was satisfied with the means he had received. Rundstedt thought his reserve too small; Rommel's defences were far from finished and, he thought, too weakly manned.

Rommel controlled two armies, the Seventh stationed in Normandy and Brittany, and the Fifteenth in the Pas de Calais, the latter fixed there by the FORTITUDE deception. The Germans were so convinced of an eventual Allied arrival in northern France that, long after the landings in Normandy, they believed them to be a diversion designed to draw German forces away from the main effort, which was still to strike the Pas de Calais.

German reconnaissance planes and boats were unable to penetrate the Allied screens and see what was going on in the UK, so there was no way of judging the imminence of an Allied descent. The storm sweeping across the Channel early in June persuaded the Germans of the impossibility of a crossing on the 6th.

Meticulously synchronized, the complex parts of OVERLORD unfolded as thousands of ships and planes escorted, protected, and carried Allied soldiers across the Channel and caught the Germans completely by surprise. Allied paratroopers, followed by glidermen, about 23,000 in all, dropped into Normandy and, though widely dispersed in many places, quickly secured the invasion flanks. Ships and boats deposited more than 130,000 soldiers on the invasion beaches, and the troops had relatively little difficulty gaining a foothold, except at OMAHA where a German division had recently moved for training exercises: Allied intelligence became aware of its presence too late for the planners to change the assault zones and not until the early evening of D-Day was OMAHA in Allied hands. Overall casualties on that date were under 5,000, far fewer than anticipated.

Their coastal defences penetrated, the Germans set into motion a train of events to turn the tables. They strengthened their positions and prevented the Allies from advancing inland. They committed the central reserve, and also tried to bring additional troops from Brittany and southern France—but not from the Pas de Calais—to the combat area. Their aim was to launch a devastating, decisive counter-attack and drive the Allies into the sea.

Sabotage by French resistance as well as bombings and strafings by Allied aircraft hampered German efforts to reinforce the front. Allied planes caught Rundstedt's central reserve as it was moving and wiped out the headquarters, killing and wounding staff officers and knocking out tanks and vehicles. Damage to railways and bridges delayed German troop movements. Towards the end of June, both Rundstedt and Rommel were privately admitting their inability to mount a concentrated counter-attack or to drive the invaders from the Continent. Summoned to meetings with the Führer on 17 June at Soissons, north-east of Paris, and again on 29 June at Berchtesgaden, the field marshals requested freedom to order local withdrawals instead of holding stubbornly, as Hitler insisted, to defensive positions. Hitler refused permission and shortly afterwards relieved Rundstedt, replacing him with Kluge. He also warned Rommel pointedly about what he called defeatism. On 17 July, three days before the attempt on Hitler's life (see Schwarze Kapelle), an Allied plane strafed Rommel's vehicle and sent it crashing into a ditch. Rommel was badly injured, but he was making a miraculous recovery in September when Hitler discovered that he was implicated in the assassination plot and gave him two alternatives: trial by the People's Court and the inevitable disgrace of his family, or suicide. Rommel chose suicide.

Meanwhile the Allies, in addition to bringing more troops, equipment, and supplies across the Channel, had pushed several kilometres inland. More importantly, they extended laterally along the coast and closed the gaps between their individual beaches, thereby creating a consolidated, stronger, and safer beachhead.

In mid-June, the Americans in the Cotentin drove to the western shore and isolated Cherbourg. Turning north, they fought through the ring of forts protecting the port. By 30 June, they had captured it, as well as the tip of the Cherbourg peninsula. The Germans had thoroughly destroyed the harbour and its machinery, and had scuttled ships to block the marine roadstead, and it took engineers six weeks to clear the rubble and repair the docks. Only then could the Allies begin to unload cargoes there.

At the beginning of July, a situation resembling a stalemate hung over the front. The Allies had advanced generally about 32 km. (20 mi.) into the interior and were bogged down. Incessant rain and low clouds prevented Allied aircraft and spotter planes from finding and blasting German defenders. A storm in the Channel around 20 June had halted supply operations along the invasion beaches for several days, had severely damaged the two artificial harbours towed across the Channel and installed offshore (see MULBERRIES), one so badly that it had to be abandoned, and had driven hundreds of craft ashore where they broke up. Although more than 800,000 soldiers were on the French side, the build-up of forces on the Continent had fallen behind schedule. Even these numbers found it difficult to obtain space, for the beachhead was one-fifth the size projected by pre-invasion plans, too small to accommodate the organizations in Normandy. Far too few airfields existed. To gain more room, the Allies altered their shipping programme and sent more combat troops and fewer logistical units to Normandy to expand the beachhead.

In the Cotentin, the Americans opened an offensive to the south, hoping to gain first Coutances, about 32 km. ahead, then Avranches, about 48 km. (30 mi.) beyond that, but progress was disappointingly slow and frustrating, measured in metres and high casualties. The bocage, low-lying country with high hedgerows, offered insufficient routes of advance and canalized American movements, which the Germans easily countered. Avranches, even Coutances, seemed as distant as Berlin.

Caen, a D-Day objective, still remained in German hands. British and Canadian troops deployed in a large semicircle around the edge of the city were unable to enter. As long as the Germans held Caen, they denied access to the plain stretching southwards for just over 30 km. (18 mi.) to Falaise, excellent ground not only for armoured warfare but also for constructing airfields. When operation EPSOM, which utilized the newly arrived 8th corps to try and envelop the city, failed at the end of June, Montgomery turned to the strategic bombers for help.

The Allies had already used heavy bombers in a directly supporting role in Italy, once in February against the Benedictine abbey on Monte Cassino, and again in March against the town of Cassino, but had achieved no success. The importance of Caen led to another attempt. On the evening of 7 July, bombers demolished the city and permitted British and Canadian soldiers to move into the streets. The Germans withdrew from its northern part and, on the other side of the River Orne which flows through the city, re-established defensive positions.

Impressed by this triumph, Bradley thought of applying the technique to help him move ahead at least to Coutances. But first he had to be free of the soggy meadows of the Cotentin and move to higher, drier ground around St Lô so that he could use tanks. He mentioned this notion to Montgomery, who encouraged him. Dempsey then suggested a comparable British effort to reach Falaise. Montgomery at first demurred but later told Dempsey to plan an attack. What Montgomery conceived was a one-two punch, a British blow followed by an American crack. Together they would perhaps pierce the defences, forge ahead, and quickly gain a substantial piece of the lodgement area.

Dempsey's offensive (GOODWOOD) had a less than clear-cut objective. Ostensibly in pursuit of Falaise, it jumped off on 18 July after heavy preparatory bombing, secured the rest of Caen, and gained about 5 km. (3 mi.) down the road to Falaise. The British were about to penetrate the German lines when fierce resistance stopped further progress, and, when a thunderstorm broke on the afternoon of 20 July, Montgomery called off the effort. The British had lost 4,000 men and 500 tanks, more than one-third of the tanks they had in Normandy.

Bradley, who had finally moved his army ahead about 11 km. (7 mi.) after two weeks of heavy fighting, which cost 40,000 casualties, now had the dry ground he needed around St Lô. He was supposed to start his attack (COBRA) on 21 July, but a continuing downpour imposed delay. The weather seemed to clear momentarily on 24 July, and some bombers carried out preliminary strikes. The real bombardment came on the following day, and although it appeared at first to have had little effect, it shattered the German defences. American infantry and armour sped through the opening and headed for Coutances.

Two days later it was apparent that the Americans had demolished the German left flank. Bradley set his immediate sights on Avranches and turned his First US Army headlong to the south. On 30 July, with many German units in the Cotentin falling back in confusion, the Americans seized Avranches, withstood a counter-attack, and went on to capture a still intact bridge at Pontaubault. This was a most valuable acquisition, for it opened the way westwards into Brittany, southwards to the River Loire, and eastwards to the River Seine and the Paris–Orléans gap. Possession of the OVERLORD objective, the entire lodgement area, seemed to be more than likely in the near future.

Crerar's First Canadian Army headquarters had become operational on the Continent on 23 July under Montgomery and assumed control of the left or easternmost part of the Allied front, its first major objective eventually being Falaise. In the American zone, Bradley turned over the First US Army to Courtney Hodges and activated and stepped up to command the Twelfth US Army Group. On 1 August, Patton's Third US Army entered the campaign on the right or westernmost part of the Allied line. Thus Montgomery and Bradley each directed two armies, respectively Dempsey's and Crerar's, and Hodges's and Patton's, but Montgomery remained in command of the Allied ground forces pro tem.

Except for a relatively narrow corridor around Avranches, which the Germans were unable to plug, they held firm all along the line elsewhere, exhibiting neither panic nor desperation. Although all the senior commanders thought it time to start at least thinking of eventual withdrawal from Normandy, even from France, Hitler directed them to prepare a large-scale offensive westwards through Mortain to regain Avranches on the Cotentin west coast. Success would re-establish the German left flank and restore a continuous front line. It would also separate the First and Third US Armies and create opportunities for further offensive activity, even to roll up and destroy the Allied right.

Meanwhile, Patton sent a corps westwards into Brittany. In sunny weather, and against hardly any resistance, American troops advanced rapidly. The entire Third Army was supposed to seize the major ports, particularly St Malo, Brest, and Lorient, which were expected to be the main entrances for American manpower and goods arriving directly from the USA. But no more than a corps was needed, for the Germans had fled from the interior to the ports. However, it would take a reinforced division two weeks of heavy fighting to capture St Malo; three divisions more than a month to reduce and take Brest; and one division to isolate and pen up the Germans in Lorient and St Nazaire for the rest of the war. Brittany became a backwater, for the opportunity to drive southwards from Avranches to the River Loire and to swing eastwards to the River Seine and the Paris–Orléans gap was too tempting to disregard. The Allies cast their sights to the east. Starting the movement, one of Patton's corps proceeded southeastwards from Avranches to the successive objectives of Mayenne and Le Mans and reached the latter, 120 km. (74 mi.) away, in less than a week.

That was when the Germans struck Hodges's First US Army when, in the early morning hours of 7 August, they launched what they called their Avranches counter-attack. Parts of four armoured divisions penetrated American lines, retook Mortain, and gained about 11 km. (7 mi.). When daylight came, the tankers pulled off the roads, camouflaged their tanks, dug foxholes, and awaited the inevitable retaliation. Allied planes were out in force, and RAF rocket-firing Typhoons and Hurricanes were particularly effective. Of 70 German tanks estimated in the operation at the start, only 30 remained operable at the end of the day.

Although the Germans continued their pressure in the Mortain area for four more days, they made no further progress. The US infantry division directly involved held stubbornly, the corps commander quickly marshalled nearby organizations to buttress the defences, and about 700 Americans, who had excellent observation over the region from a hill they stubbornly retained, even though German troops surrounded and continuously stormed the place, called down effective artillery fire. These, plus the air effort, stopped what the Americans called the Mortain counter-attack.

Meanwhile, 5 km. (3 mi.) south of Caen, late on 7 August, Crerar opened a major operation. Montgomery had instructed him to cut off some Germans in front of Dempsey's army and also to disrupt the German withdrawal from Normandy that Montgomery expected. To those ends, Crerar mounted a massive and meticulously planned armoured attack preceded by a heavy bombardment. Despite some collisions and confusion in the darkness, the effort moved well and gained several kilometres down the road to Falaise, then ran out of steam at daylight. A Canadian and a Polish armoured division, both untested in combat, tried to recharge the endeavour. All sorts of difficulties, including simple inexperience, lack of co-ordination, and, more telling, a short bombing by Allied planes in close support took the edge off. Although the fighting continued until 10 August, little more was accomplished.

The German attack to the west, the Canadian attack to the south, and the availability of one of Patton's corps at Le Mans, able to attack to the north, gave Bradley an idea. Eisenhower, who was visiting, thought the notion promising, so on 8 August Bradley telephoned Montgomery and proposed to trap the Germans at Mortain. If the Canadians moved south to Falaise and Patton's soldiers north 49 km. (30 mi.) to Alençon, then beyond Alençon for another 45 km. (28 mi.) to Argentan, there would be only 23 km. (14 mi.) separating the Canadian and American forces. Closing the jaws completely would form a pocket and encircle an estimated 21 German divisions west of Falaise and Argentan. Although Montgomery had his eyes fixed on the Seine, he approved Bradley's proposal. The interior armies, Dempsey's and Hodges's, Montgomery specified, would continue their pressure to destroy German cohesion and to herd them into the trap being set by Crerar and Patton.

Consequently, Patton's corps turned north from Le Mans on 10 August and against virtually no opposition drove through Alençon and reached the outskirts of Argentan by the evening of 12 August, thereby threatening a flank attack on the German forces around Mortain and, in addition, menacing most of the German combat formations in Normandy with encirclement. Preparations were under way to capture Argentan and proceed towards Falaise when, in one of the most controversial decisions of the campaign, Bradley halted further movement to the north. Many explanations of his action have been advanced since then, among them the desire to avoid a head-on clash between the Americans and Canadians and the supposed presence of time bombs dropped by the air forces in the territory between the two armies. But the real reason seems to have been concern over a German intention to launch a huge breakout attack against Patton's men in the Argentan area.

The German need to gather forces for this effort led Hitler to acquiesce in some local withdrawals around Mortain on the evening of 11 August, and that brought the battle there to an end. Although the Germans were never able to execute their breakout attack, they built up their southern shoulder and began to send supply and administrative units eastwards through the Argentan–Falaise gap to safety.

The Canadians attacked again on 14 August, and again bombs dropped short disrupted the effort. Still, by the end of the day, the Canadians had moved ahead more than 6 km. (3.7 mi.) down the road and were about the same distance from Falaise. Two days later, they fought their way into the town.

Meanwhile, Patton, upset over being halted at Argentan, persuaded Bradley on 14 August to let him send the bulk of his Third US Army to the east. On the following day, half the corps at Argentan moved towards Dreux, another corps headed for Chartres, and a third drove towards Orléans. Despite a second stop order by Bradley, which temporarily delayed Patton's virtual road march, these objectives were in hand on 18 August. The lodgement area was as good as won.

The Germans, in the meantime, fighting desperately to hold their defensive positions despite the repeated blows from Dempsey's and Hodges's men, finally received permission from Hitler on 16 August to withdraw. He had been shocked by the Allied French Riviera landings the day before and further upset by the loss of Falaise that day. Most of the combat troops in Normandy, somewhere between 150,000 and 200,000 men, were penned into an enclosure resembling an elongated horseshoe about 65 km. (40 mi.) long and 20–5 km. (12.4–15.5 mi.) wide, much of it under Allied artillery fire and air bombardment. In a carefully organized and highly disciplined movement, which lasted four nights, the Germans withdrew to the east, and by the night of 18 August had reduced the length of the pocket to an area about 9 by 11 km. (5.6 by 6.8 mi.). They were also getting troops out through the Argentan–Falaise gap. The Allies had, by the same date, constricted that opening to 5–8 km. (3–5 mi.).

Montgomery had asked Bradley to eliminate the gap and to close the pocket by sending Americans to meet Canadians and Poles at the small towns of Trun and Chambois. On the evening of 19 August, when American and Polish soldiers made contact in Chambois, they shut the trap. But the Germans, helped by rain and a heavy mist and covered by an attack launched from outside the pocket, continued to escape eastwards for two more days.

The Germans had suffered a grievous defeat. They lost somewhere between 25,000 and 50,000 men who were taken prisoner and another 5,000 to 10,000 killed. The terrain in the Falaise area held the charred and destroyed remains of German weapons, equipment, and vehicles, and the bloated bodies of thousands of dead horses. Those who escaped headed towards the Seine, determined to salvage as many troops and headquarters cadres as they could. They had to deal with additional Allied efforts to cut them off and to block their flight to and across the Seine, but the Germans later characterized these as badly executed and weakly pursued.

On 18 August, Patton had sent the two-division corps at Dreux to Mantes-Gassicourt, 60 km. (37 mi.) downstream from Paris. During the night of 19 August, one division crossed the Seine, the first Allied crossing of the river. This was in conformity with a significant Eisenhower decision. Believing the lodgement area to be as good as taken in about ten days less than the 90 specified by the OVERLORD plan, Eisenhower, contrary to the pre-invasion planning, determined to forgo a halt at the Seine. Because the Germans were so soundly defeated and on the run, so obviously falling back in a large-scale withdrawal, he decided the Allies would instead strike immediately for the German border.

Trying to harass the Germans crossing to the far bank of the Seine, three American divisions pushed down the left or near bank and with great difficulty, because of fierce German resistance to protect their crossing sites, reached Louviers and Elbeuf downstream on 25 August and closed off about 100 km. (60 mi.) of the river to the Germans. The British and Canadian armies also struck hard at the Germans heading for the Seine, attaining its lower reaches at the end of the month. But they too encountered heavy resistance as the Germans fought to guard their crossings. Although the Allies believed all the bridges to be destroyed, between 19 and 31 August the Germans managed, again by marvellous organization and discipline, to get 240,000 men across the Seine, and as these troops streamed across northern and north-eastern France towards Belgium, Luxemburg, and Germany, the Allies launched a pursuit. Patton's Third US Army initiated it on 21 August by crossing the Seine at Melun and Fontainebleau and racing to crossings of the River Yonne at Montereau and Sens. The army rolled through Troyes, and on the last day of the month, as fuel supplies dwindled, then vanished, arrived at the River Meuse and captured bridges at Verdun and Commercy intact. The army was then almost 300 km. (186 mi.) beyond the Seine.

Meanwhile, Leclerc's French armoured division, included on the Allied troop list specifically for this purpose, liberated Paris on 25 August to the great joy of the inhabitants, of French nationals everywhere, and of untold numbers of people throughout the world (see also Paris rising).

Elsewhere, Dempsey's British, Crerar's Canadian, and Hodges's US armies instituted pursuit operations in the last week of August and made spectacular progress. As the month came to an end, Crerar's troops were working up the coast, isolating and reducing the Channel ports; Dempsey's men were heading for Belgium and would soon reach Brussels; and Hodges's units were dashing towards eastern Belgium and Luxemburg. The surge of these armies would come to an end during the second week of September.

To the Allies at the end of August, the war seemed about to be over and won. In consonance with that optimism, the CCS meeting again in Quebec (see OCTAGON) switched some resources originally scheduled for Europe to the Pacific theatre. Nobody seemed to be aware of the supply crisis—the inability to move goods, mainly fuel, from the invasion beaches to the combat troops quickly enough (but see Red Ball Express)—which was about to shut down offensive operations. That, together with the approach of winter and the German re-establishment of a cohesive line of defence from the Channel to Switzerland, what the Germans called the ‘Miracle in the West’, would insure continuation of the conflict.

Although Eisenhower's decision on 19 August to cross the Seine at once indicated the end of the OVERLORD operation, a symbolic event closed the Normandy campaign on 1 September. On that day, Eisenhower assumed command of the Allied ground forces, and Montgomery received promotion to field marshal. No one suspected that eight more months of hard fighting lay ahead before the Allies won the war.

For the fighting in north-west Europe from 1 September 1944, see Scheldt Estuary, MARKET-GARDEN, Ardennes campaign, and Germany, battle for. See also French Riviera landings.

Martin Blumenson

Bibliography

Blumenson, M. , Breakout and Pursuit (Washington, DC, 1963).
Bradley, O. R. , A Soldier's Story (New York, 1951).
D'Este, C. , Decision in Normandy (New York, 1983).
Eisenhower, D. D. , Crusade in Europe (New York, 1983).
Hamilton, N. , Monty: Master of the Battlefield (London, 1983).

Normandy, Invasion of (1944).On the morning of 6 June 1944, a radio broadcast announced the start of the invasion of Normandy: “Under the command of General Eisenhower, Allied naval forces, supported by strong air forces, began landing Allied armies this morning on the northern coast of France.”

But this was not the beginning of the operation. Its roots can be traced back to September 1941, when, after the British evacuation from Dunkirk in northern France, Winston S. Churchill and the British chiefs of staff directed Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten to begin planning for the invasion of Europe. This mission was transferred in March 1943 to British Lt. Gen. Frederick Morgan, who was appointed chief of staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate). He assembled a joint British‐American planning staff, which became known as COSSAC.

For another year, COSSAC continued to refine and develop plans for an assault landing in France. While the Pas de Calais appeared to be the logical target—closest to England, its beaches were easily defensible—the Germans had heavily fortified the area, and no large ports were nearby. Normandy had relatively undefended beaches and Cherbourg was an excellent port. Thus the choice was made.

Initially, it was hoped to make the landings in 1942, but over Russian objections the North Africa Campaign was chosen instead. Despite American objections in 1943, a lack of landing craft and the need for troops for the Italian campaign postponed Operation Overlord, the code name for the liberation of northwestern Europe.

The Normandy invasion was a joint enterprise. In December 1943, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower was named Supreme Allied Commander. He asked Gen. Bernard Law Montgomery to be the ground force commander during the invasion phase. Sir Bertram Ramsay would be the naval commander; Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder became Eisenhower's deputy and would coordinate the air effort.

Montgomery felt that the projected three‐ to five‐division assault was inadequate for the task and the beaches were too far from Cherbourg (its capture essential to secure a flow of supplies). Eisenhower agreed. However, he lacked landing craft to expand the attack. The landing day was postponed from May to early June, allowing the accumulation of landing craft and aircraft to support an expanded assault and follow‐up forces.

Two field armies would make the assault (see map of the Normandy invasion) Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley's First American Army, consisting of VII Corps and V Corps, on the west and the Second British Army to the east. On the American beaches, the Fourth U.S. Infantry would assault on Utah Beach (V Corps). Behind Utah Beach, the U.S. 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions would land to protect the west flank and secure causeways crossing the flooded area inland from the beach.

Meanwhile, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, commanding German Army Group B and responsible for repelling any invasion of northwestern Europe, had been feverishly strengthening the beach defenses. But the Allies' deception plan, Operation Fortitude, which included a phantom army near Dover, commanded by Gen. George S. Patton, complete with false radio messages and inflatable rubber tanks, had convinced Hitler and his General Staff that the Allies would land at the Pas de Calais, the most direct route to Germany. This belief was so strong that when the Normandy landings occurred, they were considered diversionary, and important reinforcements—including Panzer divisions—remained idle in the north until long after the D‐Day landing.

The invasion started shortly after midnight on 6 June 1944, when units of the British Sixth Parachute Division landed and captured two bridges over the Orne River and Caen Canal. The other British and American airborne units were not so immediately successful. Low clouds, flak, errors in map reading at night—all conspired to scatter them widely. This led the Germans to believe the airborne attack a diversion, thus hampering their countermeasures. Most of the airborne units' objectives were eventually achieved.

Rommel's superior, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, commanding Oberbefehshaber West, and responsible for the defense of Western Europe, at 0400 ordered two Panzer divisions to head for Caen. However, Hitler had kept personal control of the principal western reserve forces, and his permission had to be secured. This delay undoubtedly contributed to the comparatively easy landings on the British beaches.

In the American area, on Utah Beach, the landings went well. The enemy troops manning this portion of the West Wall (or Siegfried Live) surrendered after only three hours and inflicted only 197 casualties among the 23,000 men who came ashore on D‐Day.

On Omaha Beach, a different story unfolded. Preliminary bombardment by heavy bombers was mostly ineffective as low‐lying clouds led them to overshoot the targets for fear of hitting Allied assault troops. Many of the landing craft sank in heavy seas on their ten‐mile run to shore. Only about one‐third of the first landing wave reached the beach and practically none of the amphibious tanks did. Ashore, men huddled behind the sea wall. The situation became so chaotic that at one point General Bradley contemplated withdrawing the troops and diverting succeeding assaults to other beaches. But by nightfall things had greatly improved. Individual acts of heroism, the initiative taken by small units, and the accurate fire and close‐in support of Allied destroyers and other naval vessels suppressed enemy fire, enabling units to scale the cliffs and clear the enemy from the high ground. Thirty‐four thousand troops landed that day, but at a high cost, for over 2,500 became casualties.

In the British sector the landings were successful, but one of the principal objectives, the strongly defended communications hub of Caen, was not captured for another month.

By the end of D‐Day, more than 130,000 men had landed from the air and the sea at the cost of some 9,000 casualties. But the beachhead now had to be expanded to make room for supplies en route, airfields had to be built, the port of Cherbourg had to be captured and rehabilitated, and the lodgment area had to be made secure for the breakout to win northwestern Europe.

The U.S. VII Corps on 8 June attacked toward Cherbourg along the St. Mère Eglise–Montebourg highway, but stout German resistance with strong artillery support slowed their advance. Although the attack to the north continued, the emphasis shifted to the west. The veteran 9th Infantry Division cut the west coastal road by the 18th, and on the 19th, it joined the Corps attack to the north.

The Cherbourg defenses, in a rough semicircle about five miles in radius, were reached by the 4th, 79th, and 9th Infantry Divisions by the evening of 21 June and by the 9th Infantry Division a day later. But it took six more days of hard fighting, assisted by naval bombardment, before organized resistance in the city ceased. By the end of June the area was cleared and the American units were moving south, where VIII Corps had been holding a line across the base of the peninsula.

The Germans had so wrecked Cherbourg Harbor that it would be many months before appreciable tonnage could be landed there. Meanwhile, two artificial harbors (code‐named “mulberries”) and over‐the‐beach landings would have to suffice. On 19 June, a storm hit the coast and wrecked the mulberries: the American one was damaged beyond repair and the British one put out of action for several weeks. Still, over‐the‐beach operations proceeded better than expected, and by the end of June, over 1 million men and supplies to sustain them had been landed.

The successful lodgment in Normandy provided the base for the breakout at St. Lô on 25 July and the rapid clearing of German forces in France and Belgium. Had the invasion of Normandy failed, the defeat of Germany could have been delayed several years. This was a decisive battle in the history of the West.
[See also France, Liberation of; World War II: Military and Diplomatic Course.]

Bibliography

E. Bauer , The History of World War II, 1966; repr. 1984.
Charles B. MacDonald , Mighty Endeavor, 1969; rev. ed. 1986.
John Keegan , Six Armies in Normandy, 1982.
Carlo D’Este , Decision in Normandy, 1983.
Max Hastings , Overlord: D‐Day and the Battle for Normandy, 1984.
David D. Chandler and James Lawton Collins, Jr., eds., The D‐Day Encyclopedia, 1994.

James L. Collins, Jr.

NORMANDY INVASION

NORMANDY INVASION, Allied landings in France on 6 June 1944 (D Day), the prelude to the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. Known as Operation Overlord, the invasion was scheduled for 5 June but was postponed because of stormy weather. It involved 5,000 ships, the largest armada ever assembled. Although more men went ashore on the first day in the earlier Allied invasion of Sicily, it was overall the greatest amphibious operation in history.

Under command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, with General Bernard L. Montgomery as ground commander, approximately 130,000 American, British, and Canadian troops landed on beaches extending from the mouth of the Orne River near Caen to the base of the Cotentin Peninsula, a distance of some fifty-five miles. Another 23,000 landed by parachute and glider. Allied aircraft during the day flew 11,000 sorties. Airborne troops began landing soon after midnight; American seaborne troops at 6:30 a.m.; and, because of local tidal conditions, British and Canadian troops at intervals over the next hour. The Allies chose Normandy because of its relatively short distance from British ports and airfields, the existence of particularly strong German defenses of the Atlantic Wall at the closest point to Britain in the Pas de Calais, and the need for early access to a major port (Cherbourg).

On beaches near Caen christened Gold, Juno, and Sword, one Canadian and two British divisions under the British Second Army made it ashore with relative ease, quickly establishing contact with a British airborne division that had captured bridges over the Orne and knocked out a coastal battery that might have enfiladed (heavily fired upon) the beaches. By nightfall the troops were short of the assigned objectives of Bayeux and Caen but held beachheads from two to four miles deep.

The U.S. First Army under Lieutenant General Omar N. Bradley sent the Fourth Infantry Division of the VII Corps ashore farthest west on Utah Beach, north of Carentan, at one of the weakest points of the Atlantic Wall. The 82d and 101st Airborne divisions landing behind the beach helped insure success. Although the air drops were badly scattered and one division landed amid a reserve German division, most essential objectives were in hand by the end of the day.

Under the V Corps, two regiments of the First Infantry Division and one of the Twenty-ninth landed on Omaha Beach, between Bayeux and Carentan. Sharp bluffs, strong defenses, lack of airborne assistance, and the presence of a powerful German division produced near-catastrophic difficulties. Throughout much of the day the fate of this part of the invasion hung in the balance, but inch by inch American troops forced their way inland, so that when night came the beachhead was approximately a mile deep. At a nearby cliff called Pointe du Hoe, the First Ranger Battalion eliminated a German artillery battery.

The invasion sector was defended by the German Seventh Army, a contingent of Army Group B, under overall command of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt. Deluded by Allied deception measures, based in large part on intelligence known as ULTRA, obtained as a result of the British having broken the German wireless enciphering code, the Germans believed, even after the landings had begun, that a second and larger invasion would hit the Pas de Calais and for several weeks held strong forces

there that might have been decisive in Normandy. German defense was further deterred by difficulty in shifting reserves, because of preinvasion bombing of French railroads, disruption of traffic by Allied fighter bombers that earlier had driven German planes from the skies, and French partisans. The bad weather of 5 June and continuing heavy seas on 6 June lulled German troops into a false sense of security. Reluctance of staff officers back in Germany to awaken the German dictator, Adolf Hitler, for approval to commit reserves and tanks delayed a major counterattack against the invasion. The only counterattack on the first day, by a panzer division against the British, was defeated by fire from naval guns.

At the end of D Day, only the Canadians on Juno and the British on Gold had linked their beachheads. More than five miles separated the two American beachheads; the Rangers at Pointe du Hoe were isolated and under siege; and the Fourth Division at Utah Beach had yet to contact the American airborne divisions. Nevertheless, reinforcements and supplies were streaming ashore, even at embattled Omaha Beach, and unjustified concern about landings elsewhere continued to hamper German countermeasures. By the end of the first week, all Allied beachheads were linked and sixteen divisions had landed; only thirteen German divisions opposed them. By the end of June a million Allied troops were ashore.

Several innovations aided the invasion and subsequent buildup. Amphibious tanks equipped with canvas skirts that enabled them to float provided some early fire support on the beaches, although many of the customized tanks sank in the stormy seas. Lengths of big rubber hose (called PLUTO, for Pipe Line Under The Ocean) were laid on the floor of the English Channel for transporting fuel. Given the code name Mulberry, two artificial prefabricated harbors were towed into position at Omaha Beach and Arromanches. These consisted of an inner breakwater constructed of hollow concrete caissons six stories high, which were sunk and anchored in position, and a floating pier that rose and fell with the tide while fixed on concrete posts resting on the sea bottom. Old cargo ships sunk offshore formed an outer breakwater. Although a severe storm on 19 June wrecked the American Mulberry, the British port at Arromanches survived. A sophisticated family of landing craft delivered other supplies directly over the beaches.

Allied casualties on D Day were heaviest at Omaha Beach (2,500) and lightest at Utah (200).American airborne divisions incurred 2,499 casualties. Canadian losses were 1,074; British, 3,000. Of a total of more than 9,000 casualties, approximately one-third were killed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ambrose, Stephen E. D-Day, June 6,1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994.

Harrison, Gordon A. Cross-Channel Attack. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1951.

Keegan, John. Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris. New York: Penguin, 1994.

Ryan, Cornelius. The Longest Day. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994.

Charles B.MacDonald/a. r.

See alsoD Day ; Navy, United States ; World War II, Air War against Germany ; World War II, Navy in .

Normandy campaign June to Aug., 1944, in World War II. The Allied invasion of the European continent through Normandy began about 12:15 descr='[AM]' on June 6, 1944 (D-day). The plan, known as Operation Overlord, had been prepared since 1943; supreme command over its execution was entrusted to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. In May, 1944, tactical bombing was begun in order to destroy German communications in N France. Just after midnight on June 6, British and American airborne forces landed behind the German coastal fortifications known as the Atlantic Wall. They were followed after daybreak by the seaborne troops of the U.S. 1st Army and British 2d Army. Field Marshal B. L. Montgomery was in command of the Allied land forces. Some 4,000 transports, 800 warships, and innumerable small craft, under Admiral Sir B. H. Ramsay, supported the invasion, and more than 11,000 aircraft, under Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, formed a protective umbrella. While naval guns and Allied bombers assaulted the beach fortifications, the men swarmed ashore. At the base of the Cotentin peninsula the U.S. forces established two beachheads—Utah Beach, W of the Vire River, and Omaha Beach, E of the Vire, the scene of the fiercest fighting. British troops, who had landed near Bayeux on three beaches called Gold, Juno, and Sword, advanced quickly but were stopped before Caen. On June 12 the fusion of the Allied beachheads was complete. The German commander, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, found that Allied air strength prevented use of his reserves. U.S. forces under Gen. Omar N. Bradley cut off the Cotentin peninsula (June 18), and Cherbourg surrendered on June 27. The Americans then swung south. After difficult fighting in easily defendable "hedgerow" country they captured (July 18) the vital communications center of Saint-Lô, cutting off the German force under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. The U.S. 3d Army under Gen. George S. Patton was thrown into the battle and broke through the German left flank at Avranches. Patton raced into Brittany and S to the Loire, swinging east to outflank Paris. A German attempt to cut the U.S. forces in two at Avranches was foiled (Aug. 7–11). The British had taken Caen on July 9, but they were again halted by a massive German tank concentration. They resumed their offensive in August and captured Falaise on Aug. 16. Between them and the U.S. forces driving north from Argentan the major part of the German 7th Army was caught in the "Falaise pocket" and was wiped out by Aug. 23, opening the way for the Allies to overrun N France.

Bibliography: See G. A. Harrison, Cross Channel Attack (1951); C. Ryan, The Longest Day (1959, repr. 1967); A. McKee, Last Round against Rommel (1964); A. A. Mitchie, The Invasion of Europe (1964); Army Times Ed., D-day, the Greatest Invasion (1969); S. E. Ambrose, D-day, June 6, 1944 (1994); R. J. Drez, Voices of D-day (1994); R. Miller, Nothing Less than Victory (1994); T. A. Wilson, D-day 1944 (1994); A. Beevor, D-day: The Battle for Normandy (2009).

Normandy Campaign (June—August 1944) An Allied counter-offensive in Europe in World War II. A series of landings were made on the beaches of Normandy, France, beginning on 6 June 1944 (D-Day). Five beaches had been designated for the Allied invasion, code-name ‘Operation Overlord’, for which General EISENHOWER was the supreme commander. British and Canadian troops fought across the eastern beaches, the US forces the western. Allied airforces destroyed most of the bridges over the Seine and the Loire, preventing the Germans from reinforcing their forward units. On D-Day plus 14 two vast steel-and-concrete artificial harbours (code-name ‘Mulberry’) were towed across the English Channel. One was sunk by a freak storm, but the second was established at Arromanches, providing the main harbour for the campaign. Meanwhile 20 oil pipelines (code-name ‘Pluto’ — pipe line under the ocean) were laid across the Channel to supply the thousands of vehicles now being landed.

The US forces under General BRADLEY had cut off the Cotentin Peninsula (18 June), and accepted the surrender of Cherbourg. The British army attacked towards Caen, securing it after heavy fighting (9 July) before advancing on Falaise. US troops broke through the German defences to capture the vital communications centre of Saint-Lô, cutting off the German force under ROMMEL. The Germans launched a counter-attack but were caught between the US and British armies in the ‘Falaise Gap’ and lost 60,000 men in fierce fighting. Field-Marshal Model; transferred from the Eastern Front, was unable to stem Patton's advance, which now swept across France to Paris, while Montgomery moved his British army up the English Channel. Paris was liberated by General Leclerc on 26 August, and Brussels on 3 September. By 5 September more than two million troops, four million tonnes of supplies, and 450,000 vehicles had been landed, at the cost of some 224,000 Allied casualties.

Normandy, Invasion of nearly three years in the making, on June 6, 1944, this decisive campaign opened the long-awaited second front in World War II. Codenamed Operation Overlord, the invasion was led by Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower, with ground forces led by British Gen. Bernard Law Montgomery, and air support led by British Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was convinced—by a wood-figure army and inflatable rubber tanks—that the Allies would attack at Calais, the most direct route to Germany. This belief was reinforced by the initial ineffectiveness of the airborne D-Day attack that began early morning on June 6. The seaborne landing at Utah Beach proceeded quickly and with few casualties, while at Omaha Beach, Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley's army battled heavy seas and nearly aborted. Still, by the end of the day, 130,000 troops had landed safely, and in the next three weeks, they expanded the beachhead and built airfields to allow roughly 900,000 more men and requisite supplies to reach northern France. Though the aim of rebuilding the nearly annihilated port of Cherbourg was delayed for months, the successful lodgment in Normandy set the stage for the St. Lô breakout in late July and greatly hastened German surrender.

Normandy campaign (World War II) (June–Aug. 1944) Despite the success of the D-Day landings on 6 June 1944, it was not until 30 July that the Allied troops managed to cut through the German defensive lines in north-west Normandy and begin the liberation of France. Field Marshal Model, transferred from the Eastern Front to replace Rommel after the July Plot, was unable to stem Patton's advance, which now swept across France, while Montgomery moved up the English Channel. Paris was liberated within a month, and the Free French forces under de Gaulle were given the honour of entering Paris first, on 26 August. While southern France was liberated after the ‘Dragoon’ landings on 15 August 1944, the Allied armies swept across northern and eastern France, reaching Brussels on 3 September, by which time the Allies had suffered some 224,000 casualties.

North-West Europe Campaign

OMAHA, codename for assault beach in American sector of the Normandy landings (seeOVERLORD) on which the 1st US Infantry Division (see Big Red One) disembarked on 6 June 1944. It lay between Port en Bessin and the mouth of the River Vire in the Baie de la Seine. By the end of the day 34,250 troops had been landed there, but the Germans nearly prevented the Americans gaining a foothold and caused heavy casualties (about 2,000 against the 200 on UTAH). One of the two artificial harbours (see MULBERRIES) was installed off OMAHA, at St Laurent, but on 20 June a storm destroyed it.

Normandy Campaign Allied invasion of German-occupied France, launched on June 6, 1944 (D-Day). Commanded by Dwight Eisenhower, the invasion was the largest amphibious operation in history. The successful landings were the start of the final campaign of World War II in w Europe.

Normandy Invasion. See D‐Day.