MIRANDA V. ARIZONA

Miranda v. Arizona was a landmark decision, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), in the field of criminal procedure. In Miranda, the U.S. Supreme Court declared a set of specific rights for criminal defendants. The Miranda warning, named after Ernesto Miranda, one of the petitioners in the case, is a list of rights that a law enforcement officer must read to anyone arrested for a criminal act.

Before the High Court's decision in Miranda, the law governing custodial interrogation of criminal suspects varied from state to state. In many states statements made by criminal defendants who were in custody and under interrogation by law enforcement officials were admissible at trial, even though the defendants had not been advised of their legal rights. If the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statements indicated that the suspect made the statements voluntarily, it did not matter that officers had not apprised the suspect of his legal rights.

The totality of the circumstances rule was effective even if a defendant was in custody. Generally a defendant was considered in custody if the person was not free to leave the presence of law enforcement officers. The basic legal rights for criminal defendants subjected to custodial interrogation included the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and the right to counsel, this latter right established by the Court two years earlier in escobedo v. illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 (1964).

The Miranda case involved four criminal defendants. Each of the defendants was appealing a conviction based in part on the failure of law enforcement officers to advise him, prior to custodial interrogation, of his right to an attorney or his right to remain silent.

Ernesto Miranda, the first defendant listed in the case, was arrested on March 18, 1963, at his home in Arizona and taken to a Phoenix police station. At the station witnesses identified Miranda as a rapist. Police then brought Miranda to an interrogation room where he was questioned by two police officers.

The officers did not tell Miranda that he had a right to an attorney, and Miranda confessed to the crime in two hours. Miranda wrote a confession on a piece of paper and signed the paper. At the top of the paper was a typed statement saying that Miranda had made the confession voluntarily and with full knowledge of his legal rights. Miranda was convicted of rape and kidnapping in an Arizona state court. The circumstances involving the other three defendants were similar, all three confessing after a period of custodial interrogation without the assistance of legal counsel.

The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear appeals from all four defendants, joining the appeals into a single review. A divided Court affirmed the California Supreme Court's decision against one of the defendants and reversed the guilty verdicts against Miranda and the other two.

The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice earl warren, began with a review of police interrogation activities and a detailed formulation of new rules for law enforcement personnel.

The opening of the Miranda majority opinion set a grave tone:

The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.

The Court described in detail the unfairness and coercion used by some law enforcement officers engaged in interrogation. The majority also took note of deceptive practices in interrogation. For example, officers would put a suspect in a lineup and tell the person that he or she had been identified as a suspect in the instant crime as well as other crimes even though no such identifications had taken place. The suspect would confess to the instant crime to avoid being prosecuted for the fictitious crimes. The majority noted that these examples were exceptions, but it also stated that they were sufficiently widespread to warrant concern.

The Court then outlined the now-familiar procedures that law enforcement officers would have to follow thereafter. They would have to tell persons in custody that they have the right to remain silent, that they have the right to an attorney, that if they cannot afford an attorney the court will appoint an attorney, and that anything they say can be used in a criminal prosecution.

Ultimately, the Court held that statements made by a criminal suspect in custody would not be admissible at trial unless the suspect had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his legal rights after being apprised of the various legal rights and after being given an opportunity to exercise those rights. The majority assured the law enforcement community that it did not intend to hamper criminal investigations and prosecutions. The Court pointed out that interrogations were still a perfectly legitimate investigative tool, that questioning a suspect without advising the suspect of legal rights before taking the suspect into custody was still legitimate, and that volunteered statements were likewise legitimate.

Justice tom clark dissented to the decisions with respect to all defendants except the one whose conviction was upheld. According to Clark, the Court should have continued to accept the totality of the circumstances test for determining whether a defendant's statements or confession were made voluntarily. Clark concluded that only the defendant whose conviction was upheld gave a confession that was not voluntary.

Justices john m. harlan, potter stewart, and byron r. white dissented in all the cases. In an opinion authored by Harlan, the dissent argued that the majority had exaggerated the evils of normal police questioning. According to Harlan, "Society has always paid a stiff price for law and order, and peaceful interrogation is not one of the dark moments of the law."

Another dissent by White argued that the majority had gone too far in imposing such procedural requirements on the law enforcement community. White predicted that the new procedures would prevent the early release of the truly innocent because they discourage statements that would quickly explain a situation. According to White, the procedures were "a deliberate calculus to prevent interrogations, to reduce the incidence of confessions and pleas of guilty and to increase the number of trials." "I have no desire whatsoever," wrote White, "to share the responsibility for any such impact on the present criminal process."

The Miranda case was remarkable in at least two ways. The opinion mandated important procedural changes that had to be followed by every law enforcement official across the country. In addition, the majority opinion's survey of interrogation tactics sent a rare notice to the law enforcement community that the Court was aware of, and would not tolerate, abuse in interrogation.

Two years after the decision in Miranda, congressional anger at the decision led to the passage of 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501 (1996), which restored voluntariness as a test for admitting confessions in federal court. The u.s. justice department, however, under attorneys general of both major political parties, refused to enforce the provision, believing the law to be unconstitutional. The law lay dormant for several decades until the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1999 ruled that Congress had the constitutional authority to pass the law. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999).

The Supreme Court disagreed with the Fourth Circuit. In a 7–2 decision, the Court ruled that because Miranda had been based on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Congress did not have the constitutional authority to overrule the decision through legislation. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000). In addition, the Court refused to overrule Miranda. Chief Justice william h. rehnquist, who has been a frequent critic of the decision, wrote the majority opinion that upheld the decision. According to Rehnquist, the ruling had become "part of our national culture" with respect to law enforcement.

However, the Miranda holding has been pared down by the High Court. In 1985 the Court held that if a defendant makes an incriminating statement without the Miranda warning and then later receives the Miranda warning and confesses, the confession should not be excluded from trial (Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222 [1985]).

In Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1990), the Court held that the Miranda warning is not required when a suspect who is unaware that he or she is speaking to a law enforcement officer gives a voluntary statement. In Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 123 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993), the Court held that a prisoner can not base a habeas corpus petition on the failure of law enforcement to give Miranda rights before interrogation.

In Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986), however, the Court appeared to return to the totality of the circumstances test. In Moran, a lawyer representing a criminal suspect, Brian Burbine, called the police station while Burbine was in custody. The lawyer was told that Burbine would not be questioned until the next day. In fact, Burbine was questioned that day, and he confessed, without requesting the lawyer and after being told his Miranda rights. According to the Court, the conduct of the police fell "short of the kind of misbehavior that so shocks the sensibilities of civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion into the criminal processes of the States." Although law enforcement had not given Burbine a full opportunity to exercise his right to an attorney, a 6–3 majority of the Court concluded that, on the facts of the case, the incriminating statements were made voluntarily and that excluding them was therefore not required.

In 2002, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider a case involving the question of whether police officers are required to give criminal suspects their Miranda rights even if the suspects are never brought to trial. In 1997, Oliverio Martinez, a farm worker, was shot and injured by police officers during a struggle. A police sergeant, Ben Chavez, questioned Martinez for 45 minutes while the latter lay in a hospital bed. Chavez never gave Martinez his Miranda warnings, and Martinez insisted that he did not want to answer the questions.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that this questioning violated Martinez's constitutional rights, thus allowing him to recover under 42 U.S.C.A. section 1983 (Supp. 2003). Martinez v. City of Oxford, 270 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a sharply divided Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision on appeal. chavez v. martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994, 155 L. Ed. 2d 984 (2003). Although the Court in Chavez did not overrule Miranda, the Court further limited the scope of the decision by holding that the failure by the officer to read Martinez's Miranda warnings did not violate Martinez's constitutional rights and could not be used as a basis for recovery under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. According to the Court, per Justice clarence thomas, Miranda warnings merely offer protection against violations of constitutional rights, but the failure to provide these warnings is not itself a constitutional violation. Moreover, because Martinez was never required to be a witness against himself in a criminal trial, the fact that the officer asked coercive questions did not violate Martinez's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, according to the Court.

further readings

Einesman, Floralynn. 1999. "Confessions and Culture: the Interaction of Miranda and Diversity." Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 90 (fall).

Klein, Susan R. 2001. "Miranda's Exceptions in a Post-Dickerson World." Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (spring): 567–96.

Lane, Charles. 2002. "Justices Ponder the Reach of Miranda Rights Ruling." Washington Post.

Thomas, George C., III. 2000. "The End of the Road for Miranda v. Arizona? On the History and Future of Rules for Police Interrogation." American Criminal Law Review 37 (winter).

"Will Miranda Survive? Dickerson v. United States: the Right to Remain Silent, the Supreme Court, and Congress." 2000. American Criminal Law Review 37 (summer).

cross-references

Coercion; Criminal Procedure; Criminal Law; Due Process of Law; Exclusionary Rule; Fruit of the Poisonous Tree.

Miranda v. Arizona (1966), landmark Supreme Court case involving the rights of arrested persons.Prior to Miranda, the “voluntariness” test governed the admissibility of confessions. But determining whether a confession was “voluntary” involved so many variables that the test became extremely subjective. Moreover, trial judges almost always resolved in the government's favor the inevitable disagreements over what tactics police interrogators had utilized. Addressing the shortcomings of the “voluntariness” test, the Supreme Court in Miranda offered a clearer, more manageable alternative.

On the basis of his confession, Ernesto Miranda, an indigent, poorly educated twenty‐three‐year‐old, had been convicted in Arizona of kidnapping and rape. On appeal, the case reached the Supreme Court. Although his two hours of questioning had been comparatively mild, Miranda had not been advised of his right to consult with an attorney, or to have a lawyer present, before answering any questions. Because the confession was obtained under circumstances the High Court found constitutionally unacceptable, Miranda's conviction was reversed.

The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The pre‐Miranda view was that this provision applied only to judicial or other formal proceedings. But in Miranda, a 5–4 majority led by Chief Justice Earl Warren held that the self‐incrimination clause also applied to the informal compulsion exerted by the police during their interrogations after a suspect has been arrested.

In the “interrogation environment,” the Miranda majority concluded, a suspect typically assumed (erroneously) or was misled by the police into believing that he or she had to answer their questions. Thus, unless “adequate protective devices” were utilized to dispel the anxiety and coercion inherent in police interrogation, no statement obtained from a suspect could truly be the product of a free choice. The “adequate protective devices” set down by the Court (unless the government adopted other equally effective means) were the now‐familiar Miranda warnings against self‐incrimination and notification of the right to counsel.

In reality, Miranda is a much more limited ruling than was at first realized. Its principal weakness (or, depending upon one's viewpoint, its saving grace) is that it permits someone subjected to the inherent pressures of arrest and detention to waive his or her rights without obtaining the advice of counsel. Moreover, Miranda permits the police to obtain the waiver of a suspect's rights without the presence of a judicial officer or any disinterested observer and without making any formal record of the “waiver” transaction.

When President Richard M. Nixon, after sharply criticizing Miranda during his successful 1968 presidential campaign, appointed four new Supreme Court justices, many thought Miranda would be overruled. But this did not happen, and by the 1990s the Supreme Court understood Miranda's limited scope. Further, most empirical studies indicated that it had no significant adverse effect on law enforcement. The police, despite their initial anger, had similarly learned to live with the rule.

To some, Miranda remains the “red flag” of the Warren Court's activism in the criminal law area. To others it symbolizes the willingness of the American legal system to treat even the lowliest criminal suspect as worthy of respect and consideration.
See also Civil Rights; Crime.

Bibliography

Yale Kamisar , Police Interrogation and Confessions, 1980.
Liva Baker , Miranda: Crime, Law and Politics, 1983.
Yale Kamisar , Miranda, the Case, the Man, and the Players, Michigan Law Review 82 (February 1984): 1074–92.
Stephen J. Schulhofer , Reconsidering Miranda, University of Chicago Law Review 54 (Spring 1987): 435–61.
Richard A. Leo , The Impact of Miranda Revisited, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 86 (Spring 1996): 621–92.

Yale Kamisar

MIRANDA v. ARIZONA

Opinion of the Supreme Court of Arizona, April 22, 1965 . . . . . . .257

Opinion of the Supreme Court of California, People v. Stewart, March 25, 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .267

Briefs to the U.S. Supreme Court

Brief for Petitioner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .274

Brief for Respondent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .294

Opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, June 13, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . .305

ISSUE

Criminal Procedure

HOW TO USE MILESTONES IN THE LAW

In the opinions^* and briefs^* that follow, the reader is invited to explore the issue of interrogation of criminal suspects and the question of when a suspect's confession to a crime should be admitted at trial. As you read this section, you may wish to consider the following questions:

• Why does the Constitution protect a criminal suspect from being a witness against himself or herself?
• Under what circumstances could a police officer ask an individual questions about a crime without having to give the person the Miranda warnings?
• What is the purpose of the right to counsel?

THIS CASE IN HISTORY

You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say may be used for or against you in a court of law. You have the right to an attorney now or at any time during questioning. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent you, without cost, by the courts. [sample Miranda warning]

In the interest of space, only the opinions of the supreme courts of Arizona and California, which reached different results, and only the briefs in Miranda v. Arizona, are presented.

Law enforcement officers in movies, TV shows, and real life all utter some version of the Miranda warnings prior to interrogating a criminal suspect. In Miranda versus Arizona, the Supreme Court attempted to clarify a criminal suspect's privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, and right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, during interrogation. Miranda, which was actually a review of four similar cases at once, was the Court's attempt to balance the rights of a person accused of a crime with the rights of society to prosecute those who commit criminal acts. Since it was handed down in 1966, the Miranda case has been the subject of continuing analysis and debate, yet its requirements, for the most part, have withstood the test of time.

MIRANDA V. ARIZONA

MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). One of the core concerns of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination is the use of coerced confessions. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court codified this concern by prescribing rules for police interrogation. Specifically, any person who is in custody must be warned, before questioning begins, that: "he has the right to remain silent," "anything he says can be used against him in a court of law," "he has the right to an attorney," and he may consult with his attorney at any time. Only if the individual "knowingly and intelligently" waives these rights—a waiver that may be with drawn at any stage of questioning—may his statements be used against him.

The 5–4 Miranda ruling has always been controversial. Critics contend that these rules hamstring law enforcement, despite Ernesto Miranda's conviction at a retrial where his confession was excluded. The Court created numerous exceptions to the Miranda rules, and Congress attempted to overturn them in a rarely used provision of the 1968 Crime Control Act. The Supreme Court struck down that provision in United States v. Dickerson (2000), saying that the Miranda rules "have become part of our national culture."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brooks, Peter. Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and Literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.

Leo, Richard A., and George C. Thomas III, eds. The Miranda Debate: Law, Justice, and Policing. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998.

White, Welsh S. Miranda's Waning Protections: Police Interrogation Practices after Dickerson. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001.

Jonathan L.Entin

See alsoCivil Rights and Liberties ; Police Power .

Miranda v. Arizona U.S. Supreme Court case (1966) in the area of due process of law (see Fourteenth Amendment ). The decision reversed an Arizona court's conviction of Ernesto Miranda on kidnapping and rape charges. Identified in a police lineup, Miranda had been questioned, had confessed, and had signed a written statement without being told that he had a right to a lawyer; his confession was used at trial. In overturning Miranda's conviction, Chief Justice Earl Warren held that the prosecution may not use statements made by a person in police custody unless certain minimum procedural safeguards were in place. Before questioning, a person must be given what is now known as a "Miranda warning" : that you have the right to remain silent; that anything you say may be used as evidence against you; that you may request the presence of an attorney, either retained by you or appointed by the court; and that you have the right, even after beginning to answer questions, to stop answering or request an attorney. The Miranda decision was one of the most controversial of the Warren Court. Under Chief Justices Warren Burger and William Rehnquist (who as a legal spokesman for the Nixon administration had proposed that Miranda be overturned), a Supreme Court more friendly to police operations limited its scope several times, although failing to reverse its central holding, and in 2000 the Rehnquist court, in an opinion authored by the chief justice, reaffirmed the original decision as a constitutional rule that may not be overturned by an act of Congress. Under a 2010 Supreme Court ruling, when a person has invoked Miranda rights, law-enforcement officials may attempt to resume questioning without a lawyer present 14 days after that person has been released from custody. Civil liberties groups have continued to protest that police routinely omit Miranda warnings.

Miranda v. Arizona (USA) A 1966 US Supreme Court decision under Chief Justice Warren. In 1963 Ernesto Miranda was convicted in Arizona for rape on the basis of a confession given in police custody. The court ruled that Miranda had not been properly warned that any statement which he made could be used against him, that he had the right to remain silent, and that he had the right to consult a lawyer. In consequence, his confession was ruled inadmissible and his conviction overturned. In a second trial, evidence by Mrs Miranda against her husband resulted in another guilty verdict. Parolled in 1972, he died in a bar fight four years later. US police forces have incorporated a ‘Miranda’ warning in arrests since the decision, in the face of protests from legislators, anti-crime campaigners, and Presidents such as Nixon and Reagan.