Leyte Gulf, battle of, series of naval actions during the Pacific war which took place on 24/25 October 1944 when Japanese naval forces attempted to destroy US landings on the Japanese-occupied Filipino island of Leyte (see Philippines campaigns). It was the biggest naval battle ever fought and saw the introduction in numbers of kamikaze pilots (see Map 64).

Once the C-in-C of the Japanese Combined Fleet, Admiral Toyoda, knew where the Americans intended to land he implemented the SHO-GŌ (Victory Operation) Plan. This envisaged Admiral Halsey's much more powerful Third US Fleet which included 16 carriers, being lured north out of the way while a pincers movement crushed both the landing forces and Vice-Admiral Thomas Kinkaid's smaller Seventh US Fleet guarding them. It nearly worked, for a change in the key of the Japanese naval code (see ULTRA, 2), and strict adherence to radio silence, denied the Americans any foreknowledge of Toyoda's plans.

In tactical command of this, the last throw of the dice for the Japanese Navy, was Vice-Admiral Ozawa. His Mobile Force contained nearly all the warships Japan had left afloat including the two giant 72,800-ton battleships Yamato and Musashi, five other battleships, and sixteen cruisers. It was divided into two striking forces, commanded by Vice-Admiral Kurita and Vice-Admiral Shima Kiyohide, and Ozawa's decoy force, which included four carriers. Ozawa's task was to lure Halsey northwards while the two striking forces formed the pincer. Part of Shima's force, along with some of Kurita's ships commanded by Vice-Admiral Nishimura Shōjō, was ordered to penetrate the Gulf via Surigao Strait, while Kurita himself approached via San Bernardino Strait. The rest of Shima's force was employed in escorting reinforcements to Leyte, and this later lost two ships to US aircraft.

Halsey's Third Fleet comprised Vice-Admiral Marc Mitscher's Task Force 38 (see Task Force 58) which was protected by Vice-Admiral ‘Chink’ Lee's battleships and cruisers. Despite losing the carrier Princeton to land-based aircraft three of TF38's four task groups (the fourth had withdrawn to refuel) launched air strikes against Kurita on 24 October as he crossed the Sibuyan Sea. They sank one battleship and damaged other vessels, and made Kurita temporarily reverse course. This caution put him behind schedule, but over-optimistic reports of the damage he had sustained led Halsey to assume that Kurita was no longer a menace. So when Ozawa was sighted he sent both TF38 and Lee north to destroy him.

The trap was set, but one arm of the Japanese pincers soon crumbled when Nishimura, followed at a distance by Shima, entered Surigao Strait that night and was attacked first by PT boats, then by destroyers, and finally by Kinkaid's battleships and cruisers. Nishimura was killed and eventually only one destroyer from his force survived. Shima prudently retired without fighting, but later lost two ships in air attacks. However, the other arm of the pincer, formed by Kurita's force, which emerged next morning from San Bernardino Strait, was not detected until it encountered one of Kinkaid's escort carrier groups under Rear-Admiral Clifton Sprague off Samar Island. Surprise was mutual, but Kurita, judging American forces in the area to be much stronger than they were, ordered his ships to attack independently. This proved to be an error, for in the battle which followed—the first daylight surface naval action of the Pacific war since the Java Sea battle in February 1942—two Japanese cruisers were sunk by aircraft, and another was crippled by destroyer's torpedoes. But the heavily outgunned Sprague lost two of his escort carriers (one of them to a kamikaze), two destroyers, and one destroyer escort, and other ships were damaged. The situation appeared desperate when, to the amazement of the Americans, Kurita, plagued by doubt and hesitation, and probably short of fuel, broke off the engagement and retired through the San Bernardino Strait.

When Halsey received Kinkaid's first call for help he ordered one of Mitscher's task groups south to attack Kurita. But bent on totally annihilating Ozawa, whose four carriers had been sunk by Mitscher, he did not detach Lee to block Kurita's escape. However, just when Lee's battleships were within range of the remnants of Ozawa's force, Halsey was forced by Kinkaid's plight to send Lee south. It was a decision he later bitterly regretted. For though a smaller force did pursue Ozawa, sinking two more ships while a US submarine torpedoed another, the Japanese escaped total destruction, while Lee was too late to trap Kurita.

After the war the Japanese navy minister said the Japanese defeat at Leyte was ‘tantamount to the loss of the Philippines. When you took the Philippines, that was the end of our resources.’ See also sea power.

Bibliography

Falk, S. , Decision at Leyte (New York, 1966).

Leyte Gulf, Battle of (1944).Leyte Gulf—23–25 October 1944—the largest naval battle in history, was precipitated by the U.S. invasion of the Philippines during World War II. Carrying out the landings at Leyte were the amphibious ships of the Seventh Fleet commanded by Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid; providing cover against the Japanese Imperial Navy were the fast carriers and battleships of the Third Fleet under Adm. William F. Halsey. This divided American command, with no common superior nearer than Washington, afforded the weaker Imperial Fleet an opportunity.

Operation Sho‐I, a typically complex Japanese plan, called for closely coordinated movements by four separate forces. To lure Halsey's Third Fleet away, the Japanese dangled far to the north four aircraft carriers, which had lost most of their planes in June during the earlier Battle of the Philippine Sea. Meanwhile, Vice Adm. Takeo Kurita's central force, composed of the strongest gun ships, including the giant battleships Yamato and Musashi, was to pass through San Bernardino Strait and fall upon Kinkaid's transports and supply ships from the east. The Japanese southern force, composed of two weaker groups of gun ships, would advance through Surigao Strait and assail the American landing from the south.

The battle started badly for the Japanese when their central force was ambushed on 23 October by submarines, which sounded the alarm and sank two cruisers. Alerted to the approach of Kurita, Halsey's aviators concentrated on the Musashi, sinking that battleship and compelling the central force to reverse course. Halsey next sighted the Japanese carriers, and thinking that Kurita was in retreat, headed north with his entire force. Unobserved, Kurita soon doubled back and slipped through San Bernardino Strait.

Simultaneously, the Japanese gun ships making up the southern force approached Surigao Strait. They ran headlong into Kinkaid's warships: destroyers, cruisers, and six old battleships, five of which were veterans of the attack on Pearl Harbor. In history's last clash between battleships, the Japanese were routed early on 25 October at trifling cost to the Americans.

But at sunrise the same morning, the larger Japanese gamble seemed to have paid off. Kurita's ships fell on the few American vessels steaming to the east of Leyte Gulf: six small escort carriers with their spare destroyer screen. Tailored to the support of ground troops, these American vessels were ill‐prepared to deal with the largest ships in the Imperial Fleet. Yet off the island of Samar, American sailors fought for over two hours with such skill and bravery that Kurita, after losing three heavy cruisers to torpedoes, and believing he confronted Halsey's Third Fleet, ordered withdrawal. Having sunk only the escort carrier Gambier Bay and three smaller ships, Kurita limped back through San Bernardino Strait leaving untouched the vital American transports and landing craft at Leyte.

Overall, the American triumph was not unalloyed. Kurita's appearance off Leyte had compelled Halsey to break off his pursuit of the remainder of the Japanese northern force, although not before his aviators had sunk all four of the enemy carriers. The Japanese also won some successes with their land‐based aircraft. On 24 October, a dive‐bomber hit the torpedo storage area of the light carrier Princeton, setting off explosions that sank the ship. The next day, the first kamikazes of the war damaged five escort carriers and sank a sixth, the St. Lô.

Still, the battle was an overwhelming defeat for the Imperial Fleet. Of the 282 warships engaged (216 American, 2 Australian, and 64 Japanese), the Japanese lost 4 carriers, 3 battleships, 10 cruisers, and 11 destroyers. American losses totaled one light carrier, two escort carriers, and three destroyers. For all practical purposes, the Japanese navy had ceased to exist as an organized fighting force.
[See also Navy, U.S.: 1899–1945; World War II: Military and Diplomatic Course; World War II: U.S. Naval Operations in: The Pacific.]

Bibliography

C. Vann Woodward , The Battle for Leyte Gulf, 1947.
Samuel E. Morison , History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 12: Leyte: June 1944–January 1945, 1963.
Edwin Hoyt , The Battle for Leyte Gulf, 1972.
Thomas J. Cutler , The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 23–26 October 1944, 1994.

Malcolm Muir, Jr.

LEYTE GULF, BATTLE OF

LEYTE GULF, BATTLE OF (23–25 October 1944). As the first step in recapturing the Philippines, a huge American armada descended on Leyte Island in mid-October 1944. The invasion force, Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet, included some seven hundred vessels and five hundred aircraft. Supporting it was the Third Fleet, under Admiral William F. Halsey, with nearly one hundred warships and more than one thousand planes. Japan's sixty-four warships, operating under a defensive plan called Sho (Victory), immediately countered. From the north, aircraft carriers under Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa would lure Halsey away so that Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's battleships and Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima's cruisers could attack the exposed American amphibious assault units in Leyte Gulf.

Kurita's force left Borneo on 22 October in two groups. The larger group, under Kurita, would pass through the San Bernardino Strait and enter Leyte Gulf from the north. A smaller force, under Vice Admiral Shoji Nishimura, moved through the Sulu Sea toward Surigao Strait—the southern entrance to Leyte Gulf—which he planned to enter simultaneously with Kurita. Early on 23 October, two American submarines attacked Kurita, sinking two heavy cruisers and badly damaging a third. Planes from Halsey's carriers assaulted Kurita the next day, sinking the 64,000-ton superbattleship Musashi and crippling a heavy cruiser. Simultaneously, land-based Japanese aircraft sank one of Halsey's carriers. Kurita, badly shaken, returned to Leyte Gulf too late for his planned rendezvous with Nishimura and Shima.

To the south, Kinkaid intercepted Nishimura in Surigao Strait. The American battleships and cruisers formed a line across the northern end of the strait, while destroyers and torpedo boats were stationed ahead to attack the Japanese flanks. First contact came about midnight of 24– 25 October, and, within a few hours, Nishimura was destroyed. Of seven Japanese vessels entering Surigao Strait, only a damaged cruiser and destroyer managed to escape. Only one U.S. destroyer was damaged, mistakenly struck by American fire. Shima's force, arriving shortly thereafter, was also warmly greeted but escaped with only slight damage. Pursuing American ships and planes sank another cruiser and destroyer before the surviving Japanese force could get away.

Meanwhile, before dawn on 25 October, Kurita's force steamed for Leyte Gulf. Halsey, who should have intercepted him, had rushed north to attack Ozawa, in the mistaken belief that Kurita was crippled and that Ozawa's carriers now constituted the main threat. Shortly after sunrise, Kurita struck Kinkaid's northernmost unit, a small force of escort carriers and destroyers. The tiny American force fought off the powerful Japanese fleet, while American destroyers made repeated attacks to cover the fleeing escort carriers. Suddenly, Kurita broke off his attack. Although he had sunk one escort carrier and three destroyers, he had suffered considerable damage. Aware of the destruction of Nishimura and Shima, and believing that he could no longer reach Leyte Gulf in time to do significant damage, the Japanese commander elected to escape with the remnants of his fleet. Far to the north, on the afternoon of 25 October in the final action of the battle, Halsey struck Ozawa's decoy force, sinking four Japanese carriers, a cruiser, and two destroyers.

The lopsided American victory destroyed the Japanese fleet as an effective fighting force. It also ensured the conquest of Leyte and cleared the way for the invasion and ultimate recapture of the Philippine Islands.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cannon, M. Hamlin. Leyte: The Return to the Philippines. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1954.

Falk, Stanley L. Decision at Leyte. New York: Norton, 1966.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. Leyte, June 1944–January 1945.Vol. 12, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Boston: Little, Brown, 1958.

Stanley L.Falk/a. r.

See alsoNavy, United States ; Philippine Sea, Battle of the ; Task Force 58 ; World War II ; World War II, Navy in .

Leyte Gulf, Battle of (23–25 October 1994).The largest and one of the most complex naval engagements in history, this World War II battle represented an all‐or‐nothing gamble by the Imperial Japanese Navy to maintain control of the Philippines in the face of American landings. The Japanese, gravely outnumbered in ships and planes, executed a complex, three‐pronged plan to use their carriers—ships lacking effective striking power because of earlier losses—as decoys to draw off the American battle fleet under Admiral William Halsey, and then to strike with their battleships and cruisers the American transports in Leyte Gulf, located between the eastern Philippine islands of Samar and Leyte.

From the start, the Japanese offensive went awry. American submarines sounded the alarm and inflicted dispiriting losses on the vessels the Japanese had designated as their Center Force as it got to sea. Pummeled by Halsey's carriers, these gunships suffered severely, while those of the Southern Force were virtually annihilated by the aging U.S. battleships guarding Suriago Strait. Fortunes briefly turned when the impotent Japanese carriers to the north managed to lure Halsey away from his blocking position. Grasping this opportunity, the Center Force descended upon the American amphibious ships, protected to the east by a weak detachment of escort carriers and destroyers. Surprised and outgunned, these U.S. warships nevertheless put up such a resolute and skillful fight that the Japanese retreated. Halsey, chasing the carriers, doubled back too late, and some Japanese ships escaped.

Still, Leyte Gulf was a crushing American victory and Japan's fleet never recovered. The worst American casualties, inflicted by Japanese Kamikaze attacks (organized suicide missions) came late in the battle; overall U.S. losses totaled six warships sunk; for the Japanese, twenty‐six.
See also Nimitz, Chester.

Bibliography

Samuel E. Morison , Leyte: June 1944–January 1945, vol. 12 of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, 1963.
Thomas J. Cutler , The Battle of Leyte Gulf, 23–26 October 1944, 1994.

Malcolm Muir Jr.

Leyte , island (1990 pop. 1,689,756), 2,785 sq mi (7,213 sq km), one of the Visayan Islands , the Philippines, between Luzon and Mindanao . A fertile agricultural land, it is the nation's leading producer of sweet potatoes and bananas and a major producer of corn and peanuts. It has commercial coconut plantations and extensive forest reserves; lumbering is an important industry. In World War II, Leyte was occupied by the Japanese in early 1942. It was the scene of the first main American landing (Oct. 20, 1944) in the campaign to recover the Philippines. That landing was followed by the battle of Leyte Gulf (Oct. 23–26, 1944), widely considered one of the greatest naval engagements of all time, in which American naval forces destroyed the Japanese fleet.

Bibliography: See T. J. Cutler, The Battle of Leyte Gulf (1994) and E. Thomas, Sea of Thunder (2006).

Leyte Gulf, Battle of (World War II) (Oct.1944) In the campaign to recover the Philippines from Japanese occupation, US forces under General MacArthur landed on the island of Leyte on 20 October 1944. On 23 October Japanese naval forces converged, to attack US transports. In a series of scattered engagements forty Japanese ships were sunk, forty-six were damaged, and 405 planes destroyed. US losses were one light carrier, two escort carriers, and three destroyers. Following this major US victory, the Japanese fleet withdrew from Philippine waters.

Leyte Gulf, Battle of (October 1944) A naval battle off the Philippines. In the campaign to recover the Philippines, US forces landed on the island of Leyte. Four Japanese naval forces converged to attack US transports, but in a series of scattered engagements 40 Japanese ships were sunk, 46 were damaged, and 405 planes destroyed. The Japanese fleet, having failed to halt the invasion, withdrew from Philippine waters.

Leyte •Albacete, eighty, Haiti, Katy, Kuwaiti, Leyte, matey, pratie, slaty, weighty •safety • frailty •dainty, painty •hasty, pastie, pasty, tasty •suzerainty •Beatty, entreaty, graffiti, meaty, Nefertiti, peaty, sleety, sweetie, Tahiti, titi, treaty •beastie, yeasty