Hungarian Revolution

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The events in Hungary in October to November 1956 have been characterized both as an uprising and a revolution. The revolt was spontaneous, and its adherents came from diverse political and social backgrounds with disparate motivations. However, the speed with which the unrest spread across the country evidenced a commonly held and deep-seated bitterness over the nation’s political and economic plight. Moreover, most of those involved blamed the crisis squarely on the Soviet-dominated regime that had been in place since 1949, and demanded the removal of Soviet forces from Hungary as well as the reintroduction of a multiparty political structure. The magnitude of popular opposition and the general objective of abolishing the existing system merit classifying the events of 1956 as a revolution.

Despite its failure, the revolution had significant effects. In the short term, it did result in greater consolidation of Soviet control over both Hungary and the region. With Moscow’s backing, the newly installed leadership under János Kádár (1912–1989) violently quashed the rebellion, executing hundreds, including the reformist prime minister Imre Nagy (1896–1958), and imprisoning thousands, thus eliminating all overt political dissent. Regionally, the revolution forced Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to be more cautious in encouraging East European Communist rulers to pursue reforms. However, the long-term effects of the revolt were more significant. The crisis exposed the ideological bankruptcy of Sovietled communism and the brutality of Moscow’s methods, and served as a permanent symbol for the causes of self-determination and independence in the region.

Half a century later, scholarly debates persist about many aspects of the revolution, although the opening of archival records in recent years has helped to resolve important issues. In Hungary the scale of the revolt, the manner in which it unfolded, the behavior of various groups in different parts of the country, and the methods employed to fight the Soviets are all well known. Of particular interest among the new findings are records describing the actions of Nagy and his colleagues in the temporary government. Nagy emerges as a figure both complex and courageous, if ultimately inadequate to the task, who was thoroughly underestimated by both Moscow and Washington. The circumstances surrounding his fate are more fully understood as well: Kádár, not the Soviets, pressed for his execution, which finally took place in 1958.

The archives further explain a great deal about decision making in Moscow. Handwritten notes of Soviet Presidium meetings by Vladimir Malin, head of the General Department of the party, record key debates over whether to acquiesce to the changes in Hungary or to suppress the revolt. Khrushchev and his more moderate allies clearly hoped to avoid a major intervention, and the Kremlin appeared to be on the verge of ordering a troop withdrawal from Hungary (a public declaration to that effect appeared on October 30) when he suddenly reversed course a day later.

The U.S. role is also clearer. The revolution caught the White House by surprise, and the Eisenhower administration came under criticism from certain quarters for its passive reaction. Yet suspicions have lingered that the United States quietly undertook certain covert operations such as unleashing trained émigré units and providing weapons to the rebels. Recently declassified internal records from the Central Intelligence Agency make clear, however, that no such activities took place, nor did senior White House officials contemplate them. Furthermore, it is well established that President Eisenhower opposed any actions that might provoke a direct conflict with the Soviet Union.

Yet, a number of questions remain unanswered. Kádár is still a controversial figure in Hungary, and his exact motivations in accepting the role of the Kremlin’s agent of repression are still in dispute. Scholars also continue to discuss the most contentious aspect of U.S. involvement––Radio Free Europe (RFE). RFE tapes from the period confirm that the organization broadcast statements that at the very least encouraged insurgents to take action. Although recent analyses downplay the impact of those broadcasts, there is some disagreement over whether U.S. officials authorized them and to what degree they were responsible for inciting Hungarians to risk their lives in the revolution.

Regarding the Soviet response, although we now know better which issues concerned Khrushchev—the descent into chaos inside Hungary, the Suez crisis, domestic political considerations and possibly China’s views—it remains unclear exactly which of these, or what combination of these, ultimately changed his views. A related difference of opinion exists over whether and how the Suez crisis affected events in Hungary beyond influencing Khrushchev’s thinking. Underlying these questions is the fascinating debate over whether the crushing of the revolt was inevitable or whether different choices by the rebels, Nagy, members of the Soviet leadership, or even the Americans might have averted the tragedy.

SEE ALSO Berlin Wall; Cold War; Glasnost; Khrushchev, Nikita; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Warsaw Pact

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Békés, Csaba. 1996. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics. Cold War International History Project Working Paper no. 16. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Békés, Csaba, Malcolm Byrne, and János Rainer. 2002. The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents. Budapest: Central European University Press.

Borhi, László. 2004. Hungary in the Cold War, 1945–1956: Between the United States and the Soviet Union. Budapest: Central European University Press.

Gati, Charles. 2006. Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Kovrig, Bennett. 1973. The Myth of Liberation: East Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics Since 1941. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Kovrig, Bennett. 1991. Of Walls and Bridges: The United States and Eastern Europe. New York: New York University Press.

Kramer, Mark. 1996. The “Malin Notes” on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956. Cold War International History Project Bulletin 8/9 (Winter): 385–410.

Litván, György, János M. Bak, and Lyman H. Legters, eds. 1996. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt, and Repression, 1953–1963. New York: Longman.

Orekhova, Elena D., Viacheslav T. Sereda, and Aleksandr S. Stykalin, eds. 1998. Sovietskii Soiuz i Vengerskii Krizis 1956 Goda: Dokumenty [The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis in 1956: Documents]. Moscow: Rossiiskaya Politicheskaya Enciklopedia.

Rainer, János. 1996–1999. Nagy Imre: Politikai életrajz [Imre Nagy: A Political Biography]. 2 vols. Budapest: 1956-os Intézet.

Malcolm Byrne

Hungarian Revolution (23 Oct.-4 Nov. 1956) The process of de-Stalinization which was begun in February 1956 at the XXth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party created an atmosphere of hope and patriotism in Hungary, a country that had been plagued by violent repression and arbitrary purges since the trial of Rajk in 1949. Khrushchev forced the hated Stalinist party leader Rákosi to resign in July, but the appointment of the almost as repressive Ernó Geró proved to be an own goal, as it fuelled popular protest against the leadership. On 23 October 1956, the confused secret police answered a demonstration by university students for democratization and the return of Nagy as Communist Party leader by opening fire on the crowd. However, the incident became a victory for the students, as the panicking guards then surrendered their arms. Geró declared martial law, and requested the installation of Soviet tanks in the streets of Budapest. On 25 October, Hungarian policemen fired on a crowd of demonstrators and killed 300 people. An enraged population stampeded into the Communist headquarters. On 28 October, a cease-fire was established, Soviet tanks were withdrawn, and a new government under Nagy was formed. Political prisoners such as Mindszenty were released, and political parties were legalized. Nagy announced his country's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. He was betrayed, however, by his Minister of State, Kádár, who fled towards the advancing Soviet troops and officially requested their intervention on 3 November 1956. The next day, Nagy was overthrown by an invading army of over 150,000 Warsaw Pact troops and 2,000 tanks. He was imprisoned and executed in secret, while Kádár created a regime that lasted for more than thirty years.

Hungarian Revolution (23 October– 4 November 1956) A revolt in Hungary. It was provoked by the presence in the country of Soviet troops, the repressive nature of the government led by Erno Gerö, and the general atmosphere of de-Stalinization created in February at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. Initial demonstrations in Budapest led to the arrival of Soviet tanks in the city, which served only to exacerbate discontent, Hungarian soldiers joining the uprising. Soviet forces were then withdrawn. Imre NAGY became Prime Minister, appointed non-communists to his coalition, announced Hungary's withdrawal from the WARSAW PACT, and sought a neutral status for the country. This was unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Powerful, mainly Soviet but some Hungarian, forces attacked Budapest. Resistance in the capital was soon overcome. Nagy was replaced by János KÁDÁR, while 190,000 Hungarians fled into exile. The Soviet Union reneged on its pledge of safe conduct, handing Nagy and other prominent figures over to the new Hungarian regime, which executed them in secret.