Aleutian Islands campaigns. Kiska and Attu, two of the most westerly of these US-owned islands, which stretch across the north Pacific between Alaska and Japan, were occupied by Japanese forces in June 1942 (see Map 3). Though the Japanese feared the islands might be used as American bases to bomb, or even invade, Japan, they were principally occupied to help draw part of the US Pacific Fleet north before it was brought to battle off
Midway in the central Pacific by
Admiral Yamamoto's Combined Fleet. But
Admiral Nimitz, C-in-C US Pacific Fleet, forewarned of Japanese intentions by
ULTRA intelligence, sent his most powerful units to ambush Yamamoto off Midway and formed Task Force 8 (later known as North Pacific Force) to defend the Aleutians. Commanded by Rear-Admiral Robert Theobald, the force included 5 cruisers, 14 destroyers, 6 submarines, and 85 Army Air Forces aircraft.
From the start neither, side knew much about the other's dispositions or intentions and both forces were frequently shrouded in the fog and rain squalls that often prevailed. The Americans also feared the islands could be used as an invasion route and Theobald decided, quite contrary to the intelligence estimates that had been given him, that the Japanese invasion transports were heading for Alaska, an error which placed his forces in the wrong area.
Opposing Theobald's force were the offensive components of the Japanese Fifth Fleet, commanded by Vice-Admiral Hosogaya Boshiro, which was divided into four groups. Rear-Admiral Kakuta Kakuji's Mobile Force, built around two light carriers and a seaplane carrier; the Kiska Occupation Force; the Adak-Attu Occupation Force; and the supply ships which were escorted by Hosogaya's flagship, the heavy cruiser
Nachi, and two destroyers. Yamamoto's Midway Force had also detached a powerful Aleutian Screening Force to act as distant cover for Kakuta but this was withdrawn when the battle off Midway failed to go Yamamoto's way. As part of the plan to induce Nimitz to divide his fleet, Kakuta twice raided a new US base at Dutch Harbor on Unalaska in the eastern Aleutians. This caused considerable damage, but a second raid, on US destroyers in Makushin Bay, failed.
Theobald's error in supposing Alaska was Hosogaya's objective meant that the Japanese landings on Attu on 5 June 1942, and on Kiska two days later, were unopposed, and they remained unknown to the Americans until 10 June. Kiska was then raided by American bombers—Attu was beyond their range—but they did little damage, and a naval bombardment was hardly more effective. On 27 August the Japanese began transferring the Attu garrison to Kiska, but in October Attu was reoccupied and then reinforced.
For the next nine months the Japanese were harassed from the sea, and from the air by USAAF bombers operating from air strips specially built on two other islands, Adak and Amchitka, just 145 km. (90 mi.) and 95 km. (60 mi.) respectively from Kiska. But adverse weather conditions hindered any real attrition of the occupying Japanese and it was not until March 1943 that sufficient Allied forces became available to drive them from American soil.
The weather also made American air support unreliable as Rear-Admiral Charles McMorris discovered when it failed to arrive after he encountered Hosogaya's more powerful force on 26 March 1943. However, the
battle of the Komandorski Islands which followed prevented the 2,630-strong Japanese garrison on Attu from receiving any further infantry reinforcements before 11,000 men of the 7th US Infantry Division landed there on 11 May 1943 with the support of a battleship bombardment and, for the first time in the
Pacific war, with air support supplied by an escort carrier. The Japanese, commanded by Colonel Yamazaki Yasuyo, resisted stubbornly and on 16 May the commanding US general was dismissed when he remarked that it would need six months to conquer the island. But Yamazaki and his men, outnumbered and poorly supported from the air and sea, were gradually pushed into the last high ground. Then, before dawn on 29 May, they launched one of the biggest
banzai charges of the war which overran two command posts and a medical station before being halted. The battle went on all day and the next morning the surviving Japanese made a final attack before most of the survivors committed suicide. Only 28 prisoners were taken and 2,351 bodies were counted. The Americans lost 600 killed and 1,200 wounded.
Vice-Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, who had succeeded Theobald in January 1943, now turned his attention to Kiska. He imposed a destroyer blockade and ordered intensified air and sea attacks on the garrison. However, by then the Japanese had decided to evacuate the island and on the night of 28/29 July, while US naval patrol ships were refuelling after the
‘Battle of the Pips’, the Japanese Navy expertly evacuated 5,183 troops and civilians under cover of fog. Air reconnaissance failed to establish that Kiska was no longer occupied and as ground fire was reported on several occasions it was suspected that the Japanese might be hiding. So on 15 August 1943 a force of 34,000 US and Canadian troops landed, but it took them some days to discover the Japanese had departed. In doing so 56 men were killed or wounded when friendly patrols fired on one another.
If nothing else, the campaign taught the Americans some useful lessons in
amphibious warfare which were soon put to good use elsewhere in the Pacific war. For the Japanese the whole diversionary effort was a disaster and a waste of valuable men and
matériel.