World War II, U.S. Air Operations in: The Air War in Europe

World War II, U.S. Air Operations in: The Air War in Europe. U.S. air operations in the Mediterranean and Europe evolved into two distinct fields of effort: the strategic air campaign against the German war economy and the tactical air support of American ground forces. In both arenas the U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) began hostilities with untested doctrine. In the strategic sphere, the AAF believed that it could attack and destroy German war industries, with accuracy and in daylight, without the benefit of friendly fighter escort, while suffering acceptable losses. In the tactical sphere, using methods based on British combat experience in 1940–41, Field Manual 35‐31 laid out a scheme for the command and control of tactical air power that usually placed airmen in control of their own forces.

U.S. Tactical Air Operations in Europe.

Tactical air power requires the cooperation and understanding of two combat arms, each with a unique perspective on ground operations. The United States' initial ground campaign in Tunisia demonstrated the difficulties inherent in orchestrating ground and air efforts. At the outset neither ground nor air understood the U.S. Army's air support doctrine, but both were forced, unprepared, into combat. As a result, “teething” problems, such as lack of radar for early warning and excessive fear by ground units of air attack, hampered cooperation. In mid‐February 1943, the placement of all Anglo‐American tactical air power under the command of an experienced air officer, Air Marshal Arthur T. Connignham of the British Royal Air Force (RAF), coincided with air reinforcements and the solution of air logistics problems. By the campaign's end, tactical air power had contributed greatly to the Axis defeat on the ground. Likewise, tactical air power assisted in repelling Axis counterattacks on the beachheads of Sicily and Salerno in Italy. In the winter of 1943–44, tactical air aided the fruitless Allied assaults on the Cassino Line and the defense of the Anzio Beachhead. In the spring of 1944, the U.S. Twelfth Air Force and British First Tactical Air Force began Operation STRANGLE, a campaign designed to interdict German supplies, and in the winter of 1944–45, tactical air operations in Italy followed much the same pattern.

In the European theater, the AAF established the Ninth (Tactical) Air Force in October 1943 in Great Britain under the command of Lieut. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton. By June 1944, it had become the most powerful tactical air force in World War II. Initially, Ninth Air Force fighters flew escort for strategic bomber aircraft attacking into Germany. As the needs of the Anglo‐American invasion forces increased the Ninth gradually switched its emphasis to air/ground training and to an attritional air attack on the Belgian and French transportation systems. The Allied high command expected the transportation plan to hinder the post‐invasion movement of German reinforcements and logistics to oppose the beachhead. On the day of the landings in Normandy on 6 June 1944, the Ninths' medium bombers struck invasion beaches, its fighters supplied air cover, and its troop transports delivered the bulk of the Allied parachute forces. Allied fighter bombers made daylight movement by German ground forces almost impossible and entirely thwarted German air force tactical operations. After assisting in the breakout at St. Lô on 25 June 1944, the Ninth worked closely with the U.S. Twelfth Army Group assigning a Tactical Air Command to each of its armies; AAF pilots literally rode in the turrets of the most advanced American armored spearheads in order to call upon tactical air power when needed. With the invasion of southern France on 25 August 1944, the AAF established the First Provisional Air Force to assist the Sixth Army Group. In the winter of 1944–45, Germany purposely launched their Ardennes counteroffensive in poor flying weather in hopes of negating Allied air power. This ploy ultimately failed and tactical air pushed back the Germans and then assisted the Allied drive into Germany in the spring.

U.S. Strategic Air Operations in Europe.

On and increasing scale from mid‐1942 through May 1945, U.S. strategic air contributed to the defeat of Germany. Along with the British strategic effort, U.S. bombing constituted a second or third front against the enemy. In a significant diversion of strength and resources, Germany was forced to disperse its aircraft and ball bearing industries, devote two million troops to air defenses, skew aircraft production toward interceptors, and divert high velocity artillery and vital communications equipment to home defense. This drain increased throughout the conflict, constituting a significant, if somewhat intangible, achievement of strategic bombing.

Responding to a promise to British prime Minister Winston Churchill, U.S. strategic air operations began on 4 July 1942, with a raid of six U.S. Eighth Air Force light bombers on Dutch airfields. The Eighth's first heavy bomber raid of twelve B‐17s hit marshalling yards at Rouen, France on 17 August 1942. The raid came after pressure from AAF headquarters in Washington and criticism of American methods in the British press. On 27 January 1943, fifty‐five aircraft made the first American air attack on Germany—the naval base at Wilhelmshaven. Once again, the attack followed promises made to Churchill and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Throughout the war, U.S. strategic air power would be the focus of intense political, diplomatic, military, and bureaucratic pressures.

Pre‐war plans specified that the U.S. air force in Britain would be the AAF's largest overseas contingent and gave it the task of conducting an offensive against the German war economy. However, shifting priorities (such as the invasion of North Africa) slowed the rate of the Eighth's growth. By the second Schweinfurt Raid of 14 October 1943, the Eighth had failed to gain air superiority over Germany. Its short‐ranged fighters could not accompany the bombers deep into Germany, where the bombers suffered crushing losses, while the European weather allowed only a slow rate of operations. Wartime crew training could not produce sufficient personnel capable of duplicating pre‐war bombing accuracies. The Eighth had inflicted no permanent damage to the German war effort.

By the end of February 1944, however, the Eighth's fortunes reversed. In November 1943, the Eighth introduced the H2X radar bombing device, which permitted the bombing of large targets through clouds and, consequently, allowed an increase in attacks. Long‐range escort fighters, P‐51s, P‐38s, and P‐47s with drop tanks arrived in large numbers, while a change in tactics, instigated by the Eighth's new commander. Lieut. Gen. James H. Doolittle, required American fighters to attack German aircraft rather than passively protect bombers. Constant combat increased the attrition of German pilots to catastrophic levels. In addition, an influx of new bomb groups almost doubled the Eighth's bomblift, and the creation in Italy of a new U.S. strategic air force, the Fifteenth, opened new areas to attack and spread German air defenses.

Just as the Eighth gained air superiority over Germany, a dispute arose in London as to how strategic air could best aid the coming invasion of France. Lieut. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, commander of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces, wished to attack the German synthetic oil industry, while Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's air commanders favored an attritional attack on the French and Belgian rail systems. Eisenhower chose transportation bombing, but allowed two oil attacks in May 1944. The success of those attacks, confirmed by Allied code breakers, made oil the first priority air target in the month before the invasion. Both tactical and strategic air power mangled the French railways, but strategic air power's chief contribution to the Normandy landings was the elimination of the German day fighter force. From landing to breakout, the invasion never encountered significant air opposition.

For the remainder of the war, synthetic oil was the primary U.S. strategic target. By September 1944, bombing temporarily halted production entirely. The oil campaign, which deprived the German air force of flight and training time, severely hampered the mobility of ground forces, and even limited fuel to the U‐boats, was the finest achievement of U.S. strategic bombardment. It destroyed a vital, compact, target system with minimal damage to the civilian population. However, the harsh weather of the winter of 1944–45 rendered the refineries safe even to the H2X. Consequently, the Eighth devoted the majority of its effort to hitting the German rail system, especially after the German Ardennes counteroffensive. The key components of the rail system, marshalling yards, were physically located in the midst of German urban areas. Given the inaccuracy of bombing in severely overcast conditions, rail yard bombing meant that many bombs would fall among the civilian population. The Eighth further increased destruction by employing large numbers of incendiary bombs in rail yard raids. At the end of January 1945, at Churchill's urging, the Allied strategic bombing effort began an offensive against eastern Germany to aid Soviet ground forces and demonstrate Allied solidarity. Strategic raids on Berlin and other cities followed, including the RAF's controversial attack on Dresden on 13 and 14 February. The Eighth bombed the center of the city on 15 February. Ironically, the transportation bombing achieved its aim. By the end of February 1945, it had ruined the rail system, shattering Germany's ability to sustain its war economy.
[See also Air Force, U.S.: Predecessors of, 1907 to 1946; Air Warfare Strategy; World War II: Military and Diplomatic Course.]

Bibliography

Stephen McFarland and and Wesley Newton . To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority over Germany, 1942–1944, 1991.
Conrad Crane , Bombs, Cities, and Civilians: American Airpower Strategy in World War II, 1993.
Thomas A. Hughes , Overlord: General Pete Quesada and the Tactical Air Power in World War II, 1995.

Richard G. Davis