Korean War, U.S. Air Operations in the

Korean War, U.S. Air Operations in the. Aerial operations controlled and conducted by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) played a major part in the prosecution of the Korean War by the United Nations Command. These operations fell into several categories: the campaign to gain and retain aerial superiority over the North Korean and later the Chinese Communist air forces; the bombing campaign against military and industrial targets in North Korea; close air support to the ground forces of the United Nations; airlift operations, both intratheater and intertheater; coordination of air assets provided not only by the USAF but the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and a half dozen other UN air forces. In addition, there were many other duties, such as search and rescue operations, aeromedical evacuation, aerial reconnaissance, and air defense operations over the Korean peninsula and Japan.

The Far East Air Force (FEAF) controlled and coordinated all operations from its headquarters in Japan through four subordinate commands: the Fifth Air Force (responsible for close air support, interdiction, and reconnaissance); Bomber Command (responsible for strategic bombing); Combat Cargo Command; and the Japan Air Defense Force. In practice, however, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps were semi‐autonomous in their air operations.

During the opening weeks of the war in July and August 1950, the close air support provided by the FEAF was often responsible for the survival of the ground forces, and throughout the war, it was often the decisive factor in ground combat. This critical support came at a price, however. The USAF had considered close air support obsolescent after World War II and had virtually abandoned it, closing down the Tactical Air Command responsible for the mission. As a result, the FEAF had neither equipment nor trained personnel, and had to resort to inappropriate aircraft, including strategic bombers and high‐speed jet aircraft, for bombing missions supporting ground forces. Friendly fire casualties were common among ground troops. The Marine Corps, by contrast, had emphasized close air support in the postwar years, and its pilots were trained and had the planes to deliver accurate ordnance in support of ground troops. Throughout the war, Marine aircraft were the supporting weapon of choice among ground troops of all services.

The Korean War occurred as all air forces were making the transition from propeller‐driven craft to jets. The Chinese forces had the best jet fighter early in the war in the Soviet‐supplied MiG‐15, until the USAF F‐86 Sabrejet arrived, late in 1950. The Sabrejets quickly became the “MiG killers”; by the end of the war, FEAF had downed more than 950 enemy aircraft, while losing only 147 in air‐to‐air combat.

The Strategic Bombing Survey ordered after World War II had convinced aerial planners that it was critical to concentrate on one key component of an opponent's assets for victory in a bombing campaign. In the little‐industrialized country of North Korea, such strategic targets were sparse; FEAF settled on the electrical power grid—particularly the large dams that generated hydroelectric power near the Chinese border—and in the waning months of the war on agricultural irrigation dams. Both campaigns were largely successful in achieving their goals of destruction, but their effect on shortening the war is debatable.

The political aim of avoiding a wider war prohibited bombing outside North Korea's borders. This provided a sanctuary for enemy aircraft in Manchuria, a bitter frustration for U.S. airmen throughout the war. Often forgotten, however, is that by tacit agreement Chinese aircraft did not bomb FEAF bases in Japan or South Korea, providing the United Nations a sanctuary as well.

Airpower achieved several important innovations during the Korean War. Delivery of personnel and supplies was much improved, particularly using the C‐119 “Flying Boxcar.” Given the primitive road network on the Korean peninsula, delivery by parachute was often the only way of getting supplies to isolated areas. Parachute delivery of bombs allowed bombers to fly much lower and to drop with far greater accuracy on such targets as bridges.

Helicopter operations became routine, foreshadowing their role in the Vietnam War. Helicopters were used for search and rescue of downed aviators on land and sea; for medical evacuation from the battlefield; for tactical reconnaissance and staff transport; and, to a limited degree, for moving troops on the battlefield.

In the aftermath of the war, advocates of airpower maintained an exaggerated primacy for aerial weapons in bringing it to a close, not unlike the arguments that would be used after the Persian Gulf War.
[See also Bomber Aircraft; Bombs; Fighter Aircraft; Korean War; Korean War: U.S. Air Operations in the; Strategy: Air Warfare Strategy; Tactics: Air Warfare Tactics.]

Bibliography

Robert F. Futrell , The United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953, 1983.
Richard P. Hallion , The Naval Air War in Korea, 1986.

Kenneth E. Hamburger