Suez Crisis (1956–1957)

SUEZ CRISIS (1956–1957)

The British and French challenging of Egyptian President Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, also involving Israel, and ending in the achievement of control of the Canal by Egypt.

On 26 July 1956, before 100,000 Egyptians in the main square of Alexandria, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser announced his decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company. This came as a rebuff to the recent withdrawal of the United States and Great Britain from their pledge to finance the construction of a high dam across the Nile River near Aswan. The Suez Canal lay formally under Egyptian sovereignty, but the implementation of these sovereign rights was regulated by an international convention agreed upon by Egypt and several maritime powers in 1888 in Constantinople. The revenue and daily administration of navigation through the canal were handled by an international company based in Paris and owned mainly by British and French shareholders. There was nothing illegal in the act of nationalization, since Nasser promised to compensate the shareholders faithfully and ensure there was no disruption of navigation. But Great Britain and France saw in Nasser's act a defiant blow to their prestige and political standing in the Middle East and North Africa.

Within hours the British and French decided jointly to make every effort, including the use of military action if necessary, to regain control of the Canal. They ordered their chiefs of staff to plan an invasion of Egypt. Under the command of British general Sir Charles Keightley and French admiral Pierre Barjot, a large force assembled in several Mediterranean ports and operative plans were laid out for an operation code-named "Musketeer." The U.S. administration, while in agreement on the need to ensure the international nature of the Canal, made clear from the outset its strong objection to the use of force for this purpose. Also, considering the support Nasser was allegedly giving to Arab rebels in Algeria, French public opinion supported its government's hard-lined intention. Public opinion in Britain, even within the ruling Conservative Party, was, however, divided.

In order to overcome these difficulties and save the time needed for the preparation of the military operation, some preliminary diplomatic measures had to be taken. While British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden and French Prime Minister Guy Mollet interpreted these measures as preparation of the military operation, American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles took them as an opportunity to calm his allies and forestall any resort to force. As expected, the Soviet Union and several "neutral" states led by India unequivocally supported Egypt's position. A conference was held between 18 and 23 August in London, at the end of which a resolution signed by eighteen of the participating maritime states was presented to President Nasser by Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies. The resolution demanded that Egypt agree to the empowerment of a new international agency that represented the interests of the canal users and took over the administration of canal affairs.

The French and British, having almost completed their military preparations, were ready to take the next diplomatic step of bringing the issue before the United Nations (UN) Security Council. But Dulles feared that such a move would lead to an impasse and precipitate the use of force. He persuaded his allies and several other maritime states to convene once more on 19 September for a second conference in London. On 21 September the group announced the formation of a Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA), which was supposed to deal with matters of finance and administration of the canal on a practical level and uphold the users' rights. But SCUA was stillborn, since in the meantime Nasser had replaced all the old company's navigators and arranged for uninterrupted operation of the canal under Egyptian management. Prudently, Nasser decided at this stage not to force the issue of payments for the passage in the canal, rendering SCUA nothing more than a paper declaration.

At the end of September Britain and France, becoming restless as their assembled invasion force began to exact a heavy burden, filed a formal complaint in the Security Council. Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN secretary-general, tried to mediate a compromise in private meetings with foreign secretaries Selwyn Lloyd (Great Britain), Christian Pineau (France), and Mahmud Fawzi (Egypt), and formulated a six-point draft proposal to be elaborated at a later stage. But France and Great Britain were not looking for a compromise in defeating Nasser. Despite the fact that the Security Council voted favorably on Hammarskjöld's "Six Points," Lloyd and Pineau insisted on another formal Security Council resolution that would condemn and nullify the nationalization act. This proposal was defeated by a Soviet veto and the council disbanded without a practical solution to the crisis.

From the British and French standpoint, by the middle of October 1956 all diplomatic measures were exhausted and the time was ripe for the "Musketeer" operation. But in view of the smooth operation of the canal, mounting opposition inside Britain, and repeated warnings of the American administration against the use of force, Eden procrastinated. It seemed that he had lost a clear and compelling casus belli.

From the beginning of the crisis the British, knowing of the warm relations developing between France and Israel over recent months, had insisted on a strict separation between their quarrel with Nasser and the Arab–Israeli conflict. Israel, Britain maintained, should be left outside the imbroglio. Despite having many grievances against Egypt and despite the disruption of the balance of power introduced in September 1955 by a huge Soviet-Egyptian arms deal, Israel preferred to concentrate all its energies on absorbing the large quantities of armaments acquired from France since the end of June. The French, on the other hand, whose part in "Musketeer" was to operate on the east bank the Canal, sought to examine the possibility of getting tactical assistance from Israeli forces, if they could press the Egyptians in the Sinai Peninsula from the east. By the end of September, recognizing Eden's hesitations, the French had begun to consider triggering the entire situation by inducing Israel to take the initiative and attack Nasser first.

Invited by the French, Golda Meir, Israel's minister of foreign affairs, together with General Moshe Dayan, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) chief of staff, and Shimon Peres, the director-general of the Ministry of Defense, arrived in Paris on 30 September for exploratory talks. The St. Germain Conference did not yield any definitive military plans, however, since the situation at the UN was not resolved and Britain's position remained unclear. Under the assumption that Israel might be invited at some point to participate in the war, further French armaments were rapidly shipped to Israel and a group of high-ranking French officers, headed by Major General Maurice Challe, proceeded to Tel Aviv to explore operations possibilities. Having become better acquainted with Israel's capabilities, Challe conceived a new plan: Israel would initiate an assault on the Sinai, and the French and British would issue an ultimatum to Israel and Egypt to withdraw so that French and British forces could occupy the canal and assure free and secure navigation. Assuming that Nasser would reject the demand, the road for "Musketeer" was open.

Eden was persuaded to join in this collusion, under the strict condition that it not look as if Great Britain had invited Israel's attack, and that Great Britain appeared to be reacting to a new situation provoked by Israel. Prime Minister of Israel David Ben-Gurion considered the proposal humiliating; he also did not trust the British intention to fulfill their share of the "scenario." To unravel the complex situation, a highly confidential meeting took place between 20 and 23 October at a small private villa in Sèvres, outside Paris. A series of meetings involving Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan, and Shimon Peres from Israel; Guy Mollet, Christian Pineau, and Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, the French minister of defense, and briefly also involving Selwyn Lloyd of Great Britain, took place. After the group reached agreement on slight changes in the Challe scenario, and the French assured Israel of military reinforcement, the Sèvres Protocol was signed by Ben-Gurion, Pineau, and Patrick Dean, a senior British official.

On 29 October, an Israeli parachute battalion was dropped east of the Mitla Pass, about forty miles east of Port Suez, and Israeli armor and infantry began to push west into the heart of Sinai. In accordance with the Sèvres Protocol, the next day an appeal was made jointly by the French and British governments demanding that the belligerent parties clear the canal zone. Israel, not intending to reach the banks of the canal anyway, acceded to the request. Nasser, as expected, declined. Thirty-six hours later, on the evening of 31 October, the British and French launched heavy air attacks on Egyptian airports and other military and supply installations, operating from their bases in Cyprus and from aircraft carriers off the shore of Egypt, and started the six-day naval voyage of their invasion forces from Malta, Toulon, and Algiers.

The thinly disguised deception and the unwar-ranted attack on Egypt incensed President Eisenhower who started, in concert with the Soviet Union and almost the entire international community, to put pressure on the colluding parties. Because British and French vetoes would be used to stymie the Security Council, a special emergency session of the General Assembly convened under the "Uniting for Peace" formula (which had been used during the Korean crisis in 1950). On 5 November French and British paratroopers dropped near the towns of Port Said and Port Tawfiq at the northern edge of the canal, while Israel had by this point already completed the conquest of the entire Sinai Peninsula. The landing from the sea of further troops the next day completed the capture of Port Saʿid, but their advance was arrested about thirty miles to the south. The mounting pressure of the UN, threats of the Soviet Union, and heavy pressure of public opinion in Great Britain opposing the war, were all factors that moved Eden to order a cease-fire.

Following a proposal devised by Lester Pearson, the Canadian minister of foreign affairs, the UN established a special Emergency Force (UNEF) under the command of Canadian general E. L. M Burns. The invading parties now succumbed to international pressure and withdrew their forces from the Canal on 22 December, assuming that UNEF would take responsibility for the management of the areas they evacuated. But, acting on their sovereign prerogatives, the Egyptians immediately took over those territories and UNEF moved eastward into Sinai to shadow the gradually retreating Israeli forces. By the middle of February 1957, after the IDF completed the evacuation of almost the entire peninsula, a crisis developed because Israel had hoped to hold on to the Gaza Strip and to the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba (Elat) at Sharm al-Shaykh. Heavy American pressure and the threat of UN sanctions moved Ben-Gurion to withdraw Israeli forces to the old armistice demarcation lines by 6 March 1957. The UN force was newly deployed along the Egyptian side of the Egyptian-Israeli frontier, but the Egyptians refrained from returning to the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip with more than token forces. Both these measures put an end, at least for the following ten years, to the many frictions that had inflamed relations along those frontiers before the war, and left the Straits of Tiran open to Israeli navigation.

The 1956 Suez War is commonly considered a major blunder in modern international relations and a watershed leading to the final demise of British and French colonialism. Within a few years both Great Britain and France lost their positions in the Middle East and North Africa, and their status as first-rate powers waned while dependence on U.S. power grew. The Eisenhower Doctrine of January 1957 gave a symbolic imprimatur to the evolving new situation in the Middle East. The main winner of the entire affair was President Nasser, who not only achieved nationalization of the Suez Company and expelled the last vestiges of British presence along the canal, but also emerged as the uncontested leader of the Arab people and became, along with India's Jawaharlal Nehru and Yugoslavia's Josef Broz Tito, one of the outstanding leaders of the neutralist bloc of nations.

see also arab–israel war (1956); london conference (1956); sÈvres protocol.

Bibliography

Bar-On, Mordechai. The Gates of Gaza: Israel's Road to Suez and Back, 1955–1957. New York: St. Martin's, 1994.

Burns, E. L. M. Between Arab and Israeli. London: G. G. Harrap, 1962.

Fawzi, Mahmoud. Suez 1956, an Egyptian Perspective. London: Shorouk International, 1986.

Golani, Motti. Israel in Search of a War: The Sinai Campaign, 1955–1956. Brighton and Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 1998.

Kyle, Keith. Suez. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1991.

Love, Kennett. Suez—The Twice-Fought War: A History. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969.

Lucas, W. Scott. Divided We Stand: Britain, the US, and the Suez Crisis. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991.

Nutting, Anthony. No End of a Lesson: The Story of Suez. London: Constable, 1967.

Pineau, Christian. 1956 Suez. Paris: R. Laffont, 1976.

mordechai bar-on