Veto

Veto

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The veto is the power to block or reject a proposed decision. In Latin, the word veto literally means “I forbid.” The veto is generally an executive prerogative, as in the power of a chief executive to reject a bill or resolution that is proposed by the legislature. This power may also extend to an official authority or body, such as an international organization (e.g., the United Nations). While executive veto power is often discussed in conjunction with the authority granted to governors or presidents in the United States, it is a hallmark of a variety of separation-of-powers systems in other countries. The veto provides an important check on the power of the legislature in the lawmaking process.

In the United States, veto power is given to the chief executive by the U.S. Constitution. Even though this executive power has existed since America’s founding, its use was often construed narrowly. Prior to the administration of President Andrew Jackson (1829–1837), the veto was not used by presidents to object to legislation that was viewed as questionable on policy grounds. Rather, legitimate use of the executive veto involved objecting to legislation that was either poorly drafted or clearly unconstitutional. Following Jackson’s presidency, however, this practice changed, and modern U.S. presidents routinely veto legislation to which they object for political reasons. In contemporary American politics, the incidence of presidential vetoes is almost always greater under divided government, where the executive is controlled by one political party and (at least one chamber of) the legislature by the other.

Although vetoes occur relatively rarely in the legislative process, scholars are drawn to study them because vetoes carry clear policy implications. Indeed, the use of the veto by an executive is an ideal example of negative agenda control. The veto creates an opportunity to block legislative action, but it does not give the executive the power to alter proposed legislation after the fact. Nonetheless, Charles Cameron (2000) asserts that chief executives regularly engage in bargaining with legislators in an attempt to shape legislative outcomes at various stages of the process. In many respects, a credible veto threat may be sufficient to force compliance on the part of reluctant legislators who would prefer not to prolong a legislative battle over a controversial bill or resolution. To avoid “losing” to the president, one or both chambers of the legislature may be willing to make concessions if the price of passage necessitates it.

Although veto power is usually associated with the executive office, legislatures may hold veto power as well. In a bicameral legislature where both chambers must pass legislation in identical form before it is sent to the executive for approval, for instance, either chamber can block legislation, which is the equivalent of a veto. Moreover, a veto does not always require action on the part of an executive to effectively block legislation. If the U.S. Congress sends a bill to the president and adjourns prior to the ten days given to the president to sign or veto the measure, the bill essentially dies through what is known as a pocket veto. Conversely, the measure will automatically become law without the president’s signature if Congress remains in session past the ten-day limit. Thus, inaction on the part of the executive still can have tangible legislative consequences, contingent on the behavior of the legislature.

Veto power is by no means absolute. Consistent with the notion of both shared and separated powers, the legislature is typically given the opportunity to override an executive veto if members can garner the necessary votes. The override authority granted to legislatures provides an opportunity for offsetting an executive veto in an attempt to alter policy outcomes. In many cases, a legislative override requires a supermajority. In the U.S. Congress, for instance, two-thirds of both chambers must successfully vote to override an executive veto. While most override attempts fail as a result of the supermajority requirement, David Rohde and Dennis Simon (1985) maintain that the uncertainty associated with a potentially successful override provides an important check on unilateral power on the part of the executive.

SEE ALSO Constitution, U.S.; Monarchy, Constitutional; Power; Presidency, The; Separation of Powers; United Nations

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cameron, Charles M. 2000. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ingberman, Daniel E., and Dennis A. Yao. 1991. Presidential Commitment and the Veto. American Journal of Political Science 35: 357–389.

Rohde, David W., and Dennis M. Simon. 1985. Presidential Vetoes and Congressional Response: A Study of Institutional Conflict. American Journal of Political Science 29: 397–427.

Spitzer, Robert J. 1988. The Presidential Veto: Touchstone of the American Presidency. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Jamie L. Carson