Suez Crisis

Suez Crisis

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Suez Crisis of October 1956, which involved a coordinated attack by British, French, and Israeli forces on Egyptian positions in the Sinai Peninsula and along the Suez Canal, was a pivotal moment not only for interstate relations within the region, but also for interactions between the superpowers within the larger context of the cold war. Triggered by numerous factors and settled by an uneasy cease-fire, the Suez Crisis left a great deal of “unfinished business” on the table between Israel and the Arab States. It also saw the first full engagement of the United States into the region.

The political environment in the region had been deteriorating for an extended period prior to the actual invasion. Among the elements that contributed to this situation were: (1) the 1955 establishment of the Baghdad Pact between Turkey and Iraq; (2) the completion of an extensive arms deal between Czechoslovakia and Egypt; (3) the prospect of the sale of modern weaponry to Iraq and possibly to other future Baghdad Pact members; (4) the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt in June 1956, which included provisions that excluded Israeli shipping from passing through the canal and a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and Straits of Tiran (which cut off all shipping into Israel’s southern port city of Eilat); (5) increased incursions into Israel by Palestinian guerillas known as the fedayeen (whom Israel labeled as terrorists); and (6) the October 1956 expansion of the Syrian-Egyptian joint military command to include Jordan. As a result of these events, the Israelis believed that they were “under siege” and that action was needed.

For the Israelis, there were three main goals behind any action undertaken in late 1956: (1) the restoration of freedom of navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba and Straits of Tiran, (2) cessation of fedayeen raids, and (3) the elimination or reduction of the threat posed by the Egyptian army deployed in Sinai. The British and French were not happy with the situation either, but they were focused on the implications of Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal and Nasser’s support for Algerian nationalists fighting against the French.

Although their motives were different, the three sides agreed that the situation was intolerable and action needed to be taken. In fact, the Israelis had considered taking unilateral preemptive action, but they were instead “invited” to participate in the action already being planned by the British and French. The timing of the operation was also influenced by perceptions that both the United States and the Soviet Union were distracted or involved with other things at the time, and that they would therefore not “interfere” with the operation. For the United States, 1956 was a presidential election year, and the British, French, and Israelis believed that the Americans would be wrapped up in their own electoral cycle, and that President Eisenhower would not risk his chances of winning re-election by getting involved in an international conflict. It was also believed that the Soviets had their hands full dealing with rising national sentiments in both Poland and Hungary.

The actual invasion of Egyptian territory by Israeli forces began on October 29, 1956. By November 7, a cease-fire was brokered. Part of the cease-fire agreement included the establishment of a peacekeeping force under the auspices of the United Nations. Known as the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), these troops were intended to serve as a buffer between Egypt and Israel. They were charged with ensuring that freedom of navigation throughout the Straits of Tiran was maintained, and that there would be no cross-border raids by guerrilla forces. These were two of the primary Israeli concerns that led to the outbreak of armed hostilities. UNEF also supervised the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory, a process that was completed by March 1957. UNEF remained deployed in the area until May 1967, when President Gamal Abdel Nasser expelled the force from Egyptian territory.

The Suez Crisis also had larger implications for the region and for the international system as a whole. For the first time, the United States was brought into the Arab-Israeli conflict, although the Americans tended to view the situation in terms of the larger cold war context. In early 1957, concerns about Nasser and Soviet influence in the region led the Eisenhower administration to formulate what would become known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. According to this policy, the United States would provide assistance, when requested, to any country in the Middle East threatened by international Communism. In this respect, the Eisenhower Doctrine set the stage for active U.S. involvement in the region.

SEE ALSO Arabs; Eisenhower, Dwight D.; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; War

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kyle, Keith. 1991. Suez. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Troen, Selwyn Ilan, and Moshe Shemesh, eds. 1990. The SuezSinai Crisis, 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal . London: Frank Cass.

Rachel Bzostek