Palestinian Authority

Palestinian Authority

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

1996 ELECTIONS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE PA

THE SECOND INTIFADA AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE OSLO PROCESS

THE ROAD MAP AND TRANSITION OF POWER IN THE PA

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994 was a culmination of a process dating back to the Madrid Conference of October 1991 when Israelis and Palestinians engaged in official direct negotiations for the first time. The Declaration of Principles (DOP), which was officially signed by Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in September 1993 in Washington, D.C., gradually led to Palestinian self-government in about 42 percent of the West Bank and the whole Gaza Strip.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

The DOP, also known as the Oslo Accords, are the first sustained effort sponsored by the international community led by the United States and Russia to find a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of United Nations resolutions 242 and 338. The marginalization of the PLO after the first Gulf War and the impacts of the first intifada (a Palestinian uprising directed against Israel) on Israeli perceptions of the Palestinians made both sides more willing than ever to directly negotiate with each other. The DOP was based on the Israeli recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in exchange for the PLO’s recognition of the State of Israel.

The DOP envisioned the creation of Palestinian autonomous government in Gaza and the West Bank as a three-stage process in five years. The Cairo agreement between Israel and the PLO in 1994 established Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and the West Bank city of Jericho. The second stage was initiated with the signing of the “Oslo 2 Accord” in September 1995 when Palestinian self-rule was extended to the West Bank, which was divided into three zones. PA would control all civilian and security affairs in Zone A, which would cover cities populated by the Palestinians. Zone B would consist of Palestinian villages, and Israel would have final authority in external security in this zone. Zone C would include Jewish settlements, strategic roads, and sparsely populated areas (which made up 70 percent of the West Bank) and would remain under Israeli control. There were no restrictions on the further expansion of Jewish settlements in this zone. While the PA gained control of about 30 percent of the West Bank, only 3 percent of this area was in Zone A.

The Oslo Process continued with additional agreements in the 1990s. The Hebron Agreement in January 1997 divided the city of Hebron into two and resulted in the redeployment of Israeli soldiers to a smaller section of the city. In October 1998 Israel and the Palestinians signed the Wye Memorandum that called for further redeployment of the Israeli military in the West Bank and the PA to fight against terrorism against Israel. The third and final stage was originally scheduled to take place in 1999 and would have led to a peace treaty solving all core issues, such as the status of East Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, refugees, security arrangements, and water rights. While Palestinians consider East Jerusalem as the capital of their future state, Israel, which annexed East Jerusalem, refused to relinquish its sovereignty over the city. Israel and the Palestinians reasserted their commitment to the resumption of permanent status negotiations by signing the Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum in September 1999. However the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000 ultimately derailed the process.

The creation of the PA was a major step toward the fulfillment of Palestinian national aspirations. However the PLO’s recognition of Israel and the Oslo Process did not enjoy universal approval among Palestinians. A rejectionist front that included Hamas and Islamic Jihad denounced the Oslo Process. Terrorist attacks by militant Palestinian groups and Israeli retaliations undermined the process and fueled the mutual suspicions between Israel and the Palestinians. Furthermore, the Palestinian support of diplomatic negotiations with Israel was not sustainable. The partial Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the West Bank did not necessarily translate into independence, security, freedom of action, and economic well-being for the Palestinians. The PA was not sovereign and was highly dependent on Israeli cooperation for its survival. It had no control over its external borders, customs, airspace, water, and minerals. Israel collected the PA’s custom duties, taxed Palestinian citizens working in Israel on behalf of the PA, and remained the market for its export and the source of its imports. Foreign assistance made a substantial portion of the PA’s budget. From the Israeli perspective, the main task of the PA was the establishment of order and security in the Palestinian territories and the end of attacks against Israeli military and citizens. From the Palestinian perspective, the Oslo Process would ultimately result in the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank. By 2000 neither side achieved its goals.

1996 ELECTIONS AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE PA

The DOP specified that free and general elections should be organized in the West Bank and Gaza to enable the Palestinians to govern themselves according to democratic principles. The elections for the Palestinian legislative council (PLC) and the presidency took place in January 1996 after Israeli military withdrew from Zones A and B in December 1995. Yasser Arafat (1929–2004), who was the leader of both Fatah (the Palestinian National Liberation Movement, a branch of the PLO) and the PLO, was elected president by capturing around 88 percent of the vote. Fatah dominated the legislative council elections, which was boycotted by Hamas, by capturing a majority of the seats.

Despite having popular legitimacy, the PA was characterized by authoritarian practices. Power was personalized in the hands of Arafat who thwarted the PLC’s attempts to make him more accountable and to end his ruling by decree. While the PLC ratified the Basic Law in 1997, which was intended as an interim constitution, Arafat did not ratify it for five years. He populated senior positions mostly with comrades from Fatah who had been in exile for decades at the expense of local leaders and grassroots organizations. The tension between “outsiders,” who did not participate in the intifada, and “insiders,” who had public support, fostered discontent with the PA. Public positions were distributed according to personal connections, histories, family relations, and patronage considerations. Distinction between personal and public budget blurred and the administration was beset by widespread corruption and incompetent management. The establishment of multiple layers of security forces facilitated the suppression of dissent. The PA’s intimidation of the Palestinian press contributed to the rise of self-censorship. The PA entered into strategic alliances with local notables by co-opting and assigning them positions in the administration. All these practices diminished the prospects for a vibrant civil society and eroded the rule of law.

The PA’s obligations to Israel and the Palestinian people were hardly compatible. On the one hand, Israel demanded the PA to prevent security threats to Israeli civilians and military from the areas it controlled. On the other, Palestinians expected that the establishment of the PA would stop Israeli incursions, blockades, and expansion of settlements. The PA’s performance in combating attacks against Israeli targets was not satisfactory for Israel and the latter continued its policies of retaliation and intimidation against the Palestinians. As a result both Palestinian and Israeli support for the PA diminished.

THE SECOND INTIFADA AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE OSLO PROCESS

The official deadline for conclusion of Israeli-Palestinian formal settlement negotiations passed on May 4, 1999. It appeared to all parties that the Oslo Process was reaching a dead end. In July 2000 U.S. president Bill Clinton invited Arafat and Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak to a summit at Camp David to achieve a breakthrough. However, the summit was terminated without an agreement. After the Israeli Likud leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, sacred for both Muslims and Jews, in September 2000, Israeli Arabs and Palestinians in the West Bank rioted. Younger generation Fatah members created Tanzim, an armed wing of Fatah, and confronted the Israeli military. The Oslo Process was in shambles. The conflict escalated to a new level in April 2002 when Israel conducted “Operation Defensive Shield” and reoccupied the parts of the West Bank and Gaza it had previously withdrawn from. Arafat was surrounded in his compound in Ramallah, in the West Bank. Israel accused Arafat of igniting the intifada and sponsoring terrorism and demanded his dismissal. In the same year, Sharon who won the Israeli elections in 2001, began constructing a barrier intended to separate the Palestinian West Bank from Israel and stop suicide terrorism employed by the militant Palestinian groups. As a result of Israeli operations and blockades the PA was in crisis. Unemployment skyrocketed among the Palestinians and the economy collapsed. Meanwhile, U.S. president George W. Bush declared that he would conditionally support the establishment of a Palestinian state in June 2002. His conditions included a comprehensive reform of the PA, the replacement of Arafat, and Palestinian agreement to a ceasefire. In 2003 the PLC amended the Basic Law as part of the reform initiative. A post of prime minister was created and the number of seats in the PLC was increased from 88 to 132. Arafat appointed Mahmoud Abbas as prime minister and gave away some of his extensive powers to him in March 2003. However, Abbas resigned in October complaining about his lack of power.

THE ROAD MAP AND TRANSITION OF POWER IN THE PA

Bush’s declaration ultimately resulted in the Road Map for Peace, which was released in April 2003. The Road Map was issued by the Quartet—the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations—and was intended to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 2005. It required the PA to make democratic reforms and end its support of terrorism. The conditions seemed positive for progress toward peace negotiations as two developments in 2004 abated the level of violence. In February 2004 Sharon announced that Israel would unilaterally withdraw from Gaza, and in November 2004 Arafat died. Following Arafat’s death, presidential elections were held in January 2005. Hamas boycotted the elections and Marwan Barghouti, who was a popular leader of Tanzim, retired from the race several weeks before voting was to occur. Consequently, the Fatah candidate Abbas easily won the elections with 62 percent of the votes cast. Abbas’s election to the presidency led to a thaw in relations with the United States and Israel. A month after his election, he met with Sharon and they both declared their commitment to work together to end the violence. In May Abbas visited the White House and received Bush’s support for an independent Palestine and promise of direct aid in exchange for the PA’s crackdown on terrorism. In August Israel dismantled the Jewish settlements and disengaged from Gaza.

The second Palestinian presidential and parliamentary elections were originally scheduled for 2001; however, the elections were indefinitely delayed after the outbreak of violence. After the death of Arafat in November 2004, Palestinian factions met in Cairo, Egypt, in March 2005 to discuss how to replace him. Fatah consented to have elections, and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire with Israel. After the adoption of a new electoral system the same month, the parliamentary elections eventually took place in January 2006. This time Hamas did not boycott the elections and defeated Fatah by capitalizing on public discontent with the PA’s past ten-year performance. Hamas captured 74 of the 132 seats to Fatah’s 45 seats in the PLC. Hamas formed a new cabinet in March and Ismail Haniya became the prime minister. The relationship between Hamas and Fatah remained tense and skirmishes took place between militants in October 2006.

Hamas, which does not officially recognize Israel, isolated the PA in the international arena and ended the thaw between the PA and Israel. The U.S. administration refused to deal with Hamas until it renounced its terrorist tactics and recognized Israel’s right to existence. Both the United States and the European Union cut all aid to the PA, and Israel declined to hand over tax receipts it had collected on behalf of the PA. As a result the PA was unable to pay the salaries of its civil servants, which had disastrous consequences for Palestinian society. In June 2006 Israeli military reentered Gaza following an attack that killed two Israeli soldiers and abducted one. Israel detained Hamas members including ministers and PLC representatives. This most recent conflict further undermined the prospects for diplomatic negotiations between the PA and Israel.

SEE ALSO Arab-Israeli War of 1967; Arabs; Arafat, Yasir; Bush, George W.; Colonialism; Jews; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Palestinians; Peace Process; Sharon, Ariel

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brown, Nathan J. 2003. Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Khalidi, Rashid. 2006. The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Boston: Beacon.

Khan, Mushtaq Husain, ed., with George Giacaman, and Inge Amundsen. 2004. State Formation in Palestine: Viability and Governance during a Social74 Transformation. New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

Klein, Menachem. 2003. By Conviction, Not by Infliction: The Internal Debate Over Reforming the Palestinian Authority. Middle East Journal 57 (2): 194–212.

Parsons, Nigel. 2004. The Politics of the Palestinian Authority: From Oslo to al-Aqsa. New York: Routledge.

Robinson, Glenn E. 1997. Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Rubin, Barry. 1999. The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State-Building. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Shikaki, Khalil. 2006. Sweeping Victory: Uncertain Mandate. Journal of Democracy 17 (3): 116–130.

Gunes Murat Tezcur