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carriers
carriers.
1. Design and developmentBefore the Second World War, aircraft carrier design was driven by naval aircraft characteristics and by the constraints of the 1922 Treaty for the Limitation of Armament (known as the Washington Treaty). In the 1920s and 1930s, aircraft became faster, larger, and heavier, and their combat ranges and weapon loads increased. The treaty, however, set an upper limit of 121,500 metric displacement tons on the carrier tonnage allowed the US Navy (USN) and the Royal Navy (RN). The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was allowed 72,900 metric tons. These three were the only combatant powers to build and operate fleet carriers during the war, though the Canadian Navy provided the crew for two escort carriers. The French did have one under construction (Joffre) while Germany's ‘Z’ Plan of 1938 included the construction of four by 1948, and ultimately eight (see Germany, Table 11). But only one, Graf Zeppelin, was launched, in December 1938, but work on completing her stopped in 1943. A second, unnamed, was started, but was broken up in 1940. Inter-service rivalry was the principal reason for the demise of the German carriers for Göring never allowed the German Navy to have a separate air arm, nor did he encourage naval–air co-operation, and the Luftwaffe therefore never developed a suitable aircraft for carrier warfare. Italy's lack of carriers was also caused by inter-service rivalry; Mussolini's veto on his navy's having a separate air arm was only lifted after its defeat at the battle of Cape Matapan in March 1941. The transatlantic liner Roma was then converted into a carrier but she had only just been completed at the time of Italy's surrender in September 1943. Work on converting another liner, Augustus, remained unfinished.The Washington Treaty limited any individual carrier to 24,300 metric tons, but allowed the USA and Japan to convert two uncompleted battle-cruisers or battleships each to large carriers displacing no more than 29,700 metric tons. Improvements in aircraft, based on more powerful engines, made larger carriers more attractive. But the limits on overall carrier tonnage kept the three major navies from having many carriers at all, which increased the risk that, in wartime, the few available carriers would quickly be put out of action. There was a conflict between size and numbers. Advancing technology pushed up size, which reduced the numbers of carriers built. The desire to put more carriers to sea pushed the other way. In 1939 the RN, USN, and IJN had several basic kinds of carriers afloat or building (see Table 1). There were small, slow experimental types, such as HMS Argus, USS Langley, and the IJN's Hōshō; there were converted cruisers and battle-cruisers such as HMS Courageous, USS Lexington, and the IJN's Akagi; and there were also some effective carriers designed on the basis of experience with the older ships: HMS Ark Royal, USS Enterprise, and the IJN's Hiryu. All three navies also studied variations of the flying-deck cruiser (half-cruiser, half-carrier) and of merchant ship conversions (see CAM, fighter catapult, and MAC ships) as ways of increasing the numbers of aircraft which their fleets could take to sea. For the Allies there was also the need to give some kind of air cover to convoys during the battle of the Atlantic. In 1940 the RN completed the first of a series of heavily armoured carriers (Illustrious class), with reduced aircraft complements. The US and Japanese navies, on the other hand, continued to build lightly armoured vessels (Essex, Shokaku) with more than double the number of planes carried by ships such as Illustrious. War experience suggested to the British that they needed more aircraft, but the armoured decks of the British Pacific Fleet (see Task Force 57) did give some protection against Japanese kamikaze attacks. The Americans and Japanese, now freed from treaty restrictions, opted for more armour and size, producing Midway ( 1945: 42,650 metric tons) and Taiho ( 1944: 30,300 metric tons). All three navies also built many war emergency types: converted liners, light carriers based on cruiser hulls, and escort carriers based on merchant ship designs. The Imperial Navy converted three submarine tenders to produce Zuiho and Shoho (10,170 metric tons each) and Ryuho (12,060 metric tons). Two seaplane carriers (Chitose and Chiyoda, 10,080 metric tons each) and seven liners were also converted. The largest liner conversions were Junyō and Hiyo, each of 21,720 metric tons. In the mid-1930s, the USA had also planned passenger liner conversions, but these were never pursued because of their cost and the time it would have taken to make the conversions. Instead, the USN co-operated with the RN to produce ‘auxiliary aircraft carriers,’ or merchant ship conversions. Basic types were Casablanca (8,400 metric tons; 50 built) and Commencement Bay (17,000 metric tons; 19 built). Most RN escort carriers were obtained through Lend-Lease, such as the eleven Attacker type (10,360 metric tons), but there were also very austere additions of flight decks and three or four aircraft to each of nineteen grain and oil bulk carriers.
2. WarfareCarrier forces revolutionized war at sea. In the Pacific war they were the principal maritime offensive weapon; in the battle of the Atlantic, where escort carriers eventually helped tip the scales against the U-boat, and in the battle for the Mediterranean, where they fought Axis air power to break the siege of Malta, their presence was vital. Before the war, the three major navies (the Royal Navy (RN), the United States Navy (USN), and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN)) foresaw the carrier's major roles: (1)strikes against other carriers to gain air superiority over the battle area,(2)reconnaissance,(3)attacks against warships and shipping,(4)fixing the enemy's battle line so that friendly battleships could engage it,(5)attacking targets ashore, and(6)convoy escort. It was not clear, however, just which role or roles would matter the most. British pre-war experiments and exercises suggested to the RN that carrier bombers and torpedo planes could not by themselves eliminate battleships. American and Japanese trials, on the other hand, indicated that, suitably armed, carrier aircraft could be the decisive weapon. Those uncertainties, and the fact that the Washington Treaty of 1922 restricted the number of carriers (and hence also the number of carrier aircraft) which navies could field, made war experience the final arbiter of the carrier's status.
The three major navies designed and built carrier forces to deal with what they thought would be their primary tactical problems. For Japan and the USA, the challenge was to mass as many strike aircraft as possible so as to overwhelm the opposing side's defensive fighters and wipe out their aircraft carriers early in an engagement. Consequently, their carriers sacrificed armour protection for large, strike-heavy air groups. The British worried about endurance in the face of damage. The RN wanted damage-resistant carriers that could stay with its battle line and aircraft that could scout, attack, and spot shellfire for its surface formations. As a result, British carriers designed immediately after Ark Royal, completed in 1938, had armoured flight decks and reduced air complements (33 planes for Illustrious, 60 for Ark Royal, and 96 for the USN's contemporary, Hornet). Different fleet doctrines led to different types of aircraft as well as different carrier designs. As Table 2 shows, the RN, constrained by limited hangar capacities and committed to the role of supporting its battle line, procured multi-purpose aircraft. The USN and IJN, on the other hand, developed highly specialized fighters, scout bombers, and torpedo planes. Japanese carrier aircraft, such as the Zero, were designed with very great ranges, and this gave the IJN not only a tactical advantage in carrier-versus-carrier clashes, but also a strategic edge as Japanese naval formations accompanied by carriers had the advantage of finding Allied ships before they themselves were found. Zeros could also keep Allied reconnaissance planes at a distance, so that Japanese commanders usually knew more about Allied movements than the Allies knew about theirs. This strategic advantage was the key to the great success of Japanese naval forces in the first six months of the Pacific war. Even in 1944, most Japanese carrier aircraft outranged their US opponents. The pre-war plan of the IJN was to combine carrier strikes with attacks by long-range, land-based bombers. The carrier planes would strike by day, the bombers by night. Japanese tactics were foiled through the USN's effective application of radar to tactical fighter control and by the growing power of its fighters. Just before the war, the USN sponsored the development of large, powerful radial aircraft engines. The fighters built with these engines, such as the famous F4U Corsair, outmatched their Japanese contemporaries and gave the USN the ability to eliminate Japan's naval pilots even if its bombers and torpedo planes could not find and sink all Japan's carriers. War experience demonstrated how important and how vulnerable carriers were. Of the seven carriers which the RN had on hand in September 1939, two (Courageous and Glorious) were lost in less than a year, Ark Royal was sunk in 1941, and two more of the remaining five (Eagle and Hermes) were sunk in 1942. The USN also started its war with seven carriers. After one year of operations, only three of the seven (Enterprise, Saratoga, and Ranger) were still afloat. The IJN suffered even more. Four of its six large carriers were lost at the battle of Midway in June 1942. Carrier warfare varied with the theatre. In the Atlantic and Mediterranean, RN carriers fought submarines and land-based aircraft. In the Pacific, US and Japanese carriers first fought each other; then, when US carriers had virtually wiped out Japan's carrier pilots (at the battle of the Philippine Sea), US carrier forces went after Japanese naval and merchant ships and also fought successfully against Japanese land-based air forces. In the Okinawa campaign ( April– June 1945), USN carriers (supported by an RN carrier task force) were primarily fighting land-based Japanese kamikaze aircraft. By the end of the war, US carrier aircraft were ranging over Japan's home islands. In the summer of 1940, with France in German hands and Italy a declared enemy, the RN's fleet carriers acted with other ships to protect the UK from surface blockade and to contest control of the Mediterranean with Italian forces (see Taranto, and Cape Matapan). In such actions, British carrier aircraft, acting in support of RN forces, successfully attacked ships which lacked effective air cover at sea. Around Malta, however, in support of the struggle to resupply British forces there, in which the US carrier Wasp also took part on two occasions, RN carriers fought sustained battles against land-based air units. The cost was high. Apart from the loss of Ark Royal, Illustrious was severely battered by German dive-bombers in January 1941; Formidable was similarly damaged in May 1941; and Victorious and Indomitable were also hit during a resupply effort in August 1942. The fact that their armoured deck carriers could not carry many aircraft at all, let alone many high performance fighters, placed British carriers at a grave disadvantage when assaulted by repeated waves of experienced German land-based dive-bomber squadrons. There were just not enough effective fighters to defend against German attacks or to escort British strike aircraft on raids against Axis airfields. Escort carriers, designed to provide air cover for convoys and for amphibious landings, lacked the speed to stay with the larger fleet carriers, but they performed invaluable service for the Allies in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. Poorly protected internally, they were suited to combat in areas where the enemy air threat was weak or non-existent. In the Atlantic their aircraft hounded German submarines in areas beyond the reach of land-based patrol bombers, and one was instrumental in the capture of U-505 in June 1944. In October of that year, sixteen escort carriers (designated CVEs in the US Navy) and their destroyer guard were caught in a surprise daylight surface engagement with a force of four Japanese battleships, six cruisers, and many destroyers in the battle of Leyte Gulf. One CVE was lost, and others were damaged (several by kamikaze aircraft), but the Japanese force was driven off with the loss of three cruisers. Such ship-to-ship combat was the exception for escort carriers. Most provided air cover for units fighting ashore or defending themselves against submarines. In the Pacific war, carrier warfare began with a massed carrier raid by Japan on Pearl Harbor (which caught none of the US carriers in port) and the retaliatory Doolittle raid, then progressed to violent carrier-against-carrier duels—one of them, the battle of the Coral Sea, was the first-ever naval encounter in which neither side's warships were visible to the other's—and finally circled back to massed raids by US carriers against Japan. When the Pacific war began, both USN and IJN carrier aircraft complements were heavily weighted towards bombers and torpedo planes. Both sides understood the need to attack first, with overwhelming power, and at the longest possible range. In pursuing this doctrine, the IJN went so far as to deprive its pilots of adequately armoured planes. In addition, US carriers faced a special dilemma once US forces began to invade Japanese-held islands: whether to establish and maintain air supremacy during an amphibious assault (see amphibious warfare) or to hunt Japanese carriers, and by failing to solve it Vice-Admiral Fletcher very nearly turned initial success into disaster, at Guadalcanal. The 1942 carrier battles were decided by which side found the other first, and by the striking power each side could deliver before suffering its own losses. By 1944, however, things had changed. Radar-directed air patrols and radar-directed ships' anti-aircraft guns downed Japanese pilots faster than the IJN could train them, allowing the USN simultaneously to cover amphibious landings and defeat Japanese carrier attacks. US carriers survived massed kamikaze attacks at Okinawa because, unlike the RN at Malta, their fighter complements were large and their fighter-control system based on improved radars. Despite these advances, however, eight large, one light, and three escort carriers were seriously damaged by suicide aircraft. Massed kamikaze raids were such a threat to the carriers and the amphibious forces that B29 bombers were ordered to crater the airfields where the Japanese aircraft were organized for their assaults. However, despite the damage they sustained at Okinawa, US carriers demonstrated that carrier aviation could wage sustained campaigns against land targets. That understanding formed the basis for the development of modern carrier battle groups armed with nuclear weapons. See also sea power. Tom Hone Bibliography Friedman, N. , British Carrier Aviation (London, 1988). |
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Cite this article
I. C. B. DEAR and M. R. D. FOOT. "carriers." The Oxford Companion to World War II. 2001. Encyclopedia.com. 1 Jun. 2012 <http://www.encyclopedia.com>. I. C. B. DEAR and M. R. D. FOOT. "carriers." The Oxford Companion to World War II. 2001. Encyclopedia.com. (June 1, 2012). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O129-carriers.html I. C. B. DEAR and M. R. D. FOOT. "carriers." The Oxford Companion to World War II. 2001. Retrieved June 01, 2012 from Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O129-carriers.html |
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Carriers
CARRIERSIndividuals or businesses that are employed to deliver people or property to an agreed destination. The two main types of carriers are common carriers and private carriers. A common carrier, such as a railroad, airline, or business that offers public transportation, customarily transports property and individuals from one location to another, thus offering its services for the hire of the general population. A private carrier is employed by special agreement only and reserves the right to accept or reject employment as a carrier. Private carriers include chartered cargo planes, ships, and buses and are generally not subject to the same regulatory restrictions as common carriers. Common carriers engaged in interstate transportation are regulated on the federal level pursuant to the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power … [t]o regulate Commerce … among the several States" (art. I, § 8, cl. 3). The government, through the interstate commerce act (49 U.S.C.A. § 10101 et seq.), traditionally regulated charges for interstate transportation by common carriers. Beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, deregulation of the trucking industry reduced government involvement in establishing rates. Unless a statute states otherwise, a common carrier has broad authority to fix transportation rates so long as the rates are reasonable. In determining whether a rate is reasonable, a number of elements are considered. The most essential is the cost of transportation to the carrier, and others include the character and value of the items to be shipped; their weight, bulk, and ability to be handled; and the mileage to be covered. Though common carriers have a great deal of freedom to set interstate rates, they must follow procedures set forth by the interstate commerce commission, including filing rates with the commission and publishing them. A state possesses the authority to monitor and control the management and functions of common carriers operating within its borders and may set the prices charged by carriers doing business within the state. Most state laws require common carriers to file rate schedules with a state regulatory commission. A common carrier is obligated to provide the necessary facilities to transport the volume of goods expected and to exercise the reasonable care needed to transport the goods safely. In the case of perishable goods, such as frozen or fresh foods, the common carrier must provide refrigerated or ventilated cars to ensure their safe transportation. Likewise, when transporting livestock, a common carrier is required to provide adequate ventilation, bedding, and partitions. The common carrier may be liable for loss or injury to the livestock resulting from defects in the cars it uses to transport the animals. The carrier must follow any specific shipping directives provided by the shipper and if any instructions are ambiguous, the carrier must hold the goods until the shipper provides clarification. The shipper can select the route and manner by which the goods can be transported, but if no route is specified, the carrier is free to choose any convenient route that does not result in delay to the shipper. Subject to some exceptions, a common carrier is absolutely liable for loss or damage to the goods it receives for shipment. A common carrier is not liable for loss or injury to goods brought about by an act of God, an event such as an unforeseeable flood that could be neither caused nor prevented through the exercise of proper care on the part of the carrier. A carrier could, however, be liable for an act of God if it is guilty of negligence after the discovery of an accident. For example, a fire started by lightning would ordinarily be considered an act of God, but if the carrier discovered it early and did nothing to abate it, the carrier could still be liable for failing to exercise due diligence. In addition, a common carrier is not liable for a loss of goods when the loss is caused by the destruction or appropriation of the goods by the military forces of a "public enemy" at war with the domestic government. However, merely a declaration of martial law will not relieve the common carrier of liability, and groups who are not functioning as military forces against the government are not considered public enemies. Thus, a common carrier remains liable for a loss of goods resulting from the acts of a mob, rioters, and strikers, even if the carrier was not negligent and took all possible precautions to prevent the loss. A carrier will not be held liable for injuries to goods that occur as a result of the shipper's negligence or misconduct. Furthermore, when the nature or value of the goods to be shipped is fraudulently concealed or misrepresented by the shipper, whether to obtain a lower shipping rate or for any other purpose, the carrier is not liable for any losses incurred. fraud can be established by the shipper's silence regarding the value of the goods or by untruthful statements made by the shipper. If the shipper failed to notify the carrier about the nature of the contents of a particular shipment, the carrier is ordinarily exempt from liability if a loss occurs, even if the loss is due to negligence on the part of the carrier. A common carrier can restrict its liability for damages by clear and unambiguous terms contained in its contract with the shipper. Questions concerning the validity of such agreements are resolved by state law when shipments within a state are involved and federal law is applied to contractual disputes concerning interstate shipments. A contractual provision releasing the carrier from liability must not contravene public policy and a carrier that departs from the usual method or route for shipment may not rely upon any limitations on liability contained in the contract. Some common carriers, like public buses and taxis, transport people from one place to another. A common carrier of passengers, also known as a public carrier, transports for hire all persons (within certain limitations) as a regular business and represents itself as being engaged in such a business. A public carrier can deny carriage to people who refuse to comply with its reasonable regulations, who are likely to present danger to other passengers, or who in some way interfere with the safe carriage of passengers. Common carriers of passengers are subject to extensive regulation by state and federal governments. Many states, for example, require by law that common carriers be inspected annually in order to protect people from the hazards of riding in vehicles that are poorly maintained. A common carrier that transports passengers may also make its own rules and regulations provided they are reasonable and will protect the interests of both the carrier and the passengers. A carrier of passengers is liable for injuries suffered by passengers as a result of its negligence but is not an insurer of its passengers' safety. Instead, a common carrier is required to act with the utmost care, skill, and diligence to protect the safety of its passengers as may be mandated by the type of transportation provided and the risk of danger inherent in it. Conversely, a private carrier of passengers must act with only reasonable care and diligence unless the contract for carriage provides otherwise, though some jurisdictions hold a private carrier to the same duty as that applied to common carriers. Determining whether a carrier is a common carrier, and thus subject to a higher standard of care, was the subject of some litigation in the late 1990s. For example, a California federal district court held in early 1995 that Disneyland, as the operator of an amusement park ride, qualified as a common carrier and thus should be held to a duty of utmost care and diligence for the safety of its passengers even though the chief purpose of the ride was to entertain and not transport travelers (Neubauer v. Disneyland, 875 F. Supp. 672 [C.D. Cal. 1995]). As a result, Disneyland was held liable for injuries the plaintiffs suffered when their boat on an amusement ride was rammed from behind by another boat. The court looked to the broad definition of a common carrier contained in state law and held that any narrowing of the term carrier should take place in the legislature and not in the court. Some courts have considered whether the age of the passenger affects the duty owed by a common carrier. The Iowa Supreme Court, for example, in 1995 considered whether a school bus owed an additional duty to a child injured as he was struck by a car after safely alighting the bus (Burton ex rel. Hawkeye Bank of Des Moines v. Des Moines Metropolitan Transit, 530 N.W.2d 696 [Iowa]). The court declined to extend the duty owed by drivers of school buses to ensure the safety of children alighting the vehicles, holding that the bus company had no duty beyond that owed by a common carrier to protect child passengers from dangers that may reasonably and naturally be anticipated. According to the court, once a passenger alights safely, the passenger (even when he or she is a child) is better able to guard against the danger of moving vehicles; thus, public policy did not support extending a carrier's duty of care to include ensuring that the passenger safely crosses the street. Unless the carrier is negligent, it is not responsible to a passenger for injuries due to natural causes and due to causes beyond the carrier's control. A common carrier of passengers cannot ordinarily release itself from liability for injuries to a passenger caused by either willful, wrongful conduct or negligence on the part of the carrier. In some jurisdictions, though, a carrier can limit its liability for negligence in exchange for providing a reduced fare or free pass. However, such limitations on liability may be invalid if the reduced fare is not made optional and if passengers are not permitted to buy tickets that provide that the carrier's liability is not limited. Like common carriers that transport goods, carriers of passengers have also been subject to deregulation by the federal government. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (49 U.S.C.A. § 334, 1301 et seq.) gave airlines almost complete discretion over rates, routes, and services offered. Prior to passage of the act, the Civil aeronautics Board, a federal agency, exercised exclusive control over pricing in the airline industry. Subsequent federal legislation also affected the responsibilities of carriers to their employees and passengers. In 1990 Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C.A. § 12201 et seq.), which prohibits employment discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability. The ADA further prohibits a carrier covered by the act from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability because of that disability in regard to job application procedures, hiring, advancement, discharge, compensation, training, and other terms and conditions of employment. The ADA then sets forth in some detail the procedures that the carrier must follow in screening, interviewing, and hiring employees to ensure that individuals with disabilities are not subject to discrimination. In particular, the ADA requires that a carrier provide "reasonable accommodation" for the physical or mental limitations of a qualified applicant or employee with a disability unless the carrier can show that the accommodation would impose an "undue hardship" on business. According to the equal employment opportunity commission, a reasonable accommodation is a modification or adjustment to a job, practice, or work environment that makes it possible for an individual with a disability to enjoy an equal employment opportunity. An undue hardship has been defined as an action that is unduly costly, extensive, substantial, or disruptive or that would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the carrier's business. The ADA has also affected the scope of a carrier's responsibility to its passengers. Under the ADA, carriers of passengers such as buses and rail systems must ensure that their facilities are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities by providing lifts, ramps, or other mechanisms. Airlines, which are not specifically covered by the ADA, are prohibited from discriminating against disabled individuals under the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301 note, 1374, 1374 note, which was enacted in 1986. The ACAA provides that "[n]o air carrier may discriminate against any … handicapped individual, by reason of such handicap, in the provision of air transportation" (42 U.S.C.A. § 1374). Like the ADA, it further provides that air carriers must make "reasonable accommodations" for disabled individuals traveling by air. further readingsAstle, W. E. 1980. Shipping and the Law. London: Fairplay Publications. Lebedoff, David. 1997. Cleaning Up: The Story behind the Biggest Legal Bonanza of Our Time. New York: Free Press. Hegedus, L.E. 1992. "Shinault v. American Airlines, Inc.: Compensatory and Emotional Distress Damages under the Air Carrier Access Act." Tulane Law Review 66. Murphy, Betty Southard. 1993. "The Americans with Disabilities Act: How It Affects the Airline and Railroad Industries." American Law Institute (April). cross-referencesAirlines; Diligence; Disability Discrimination; Negligence; Railroad; Shipping Law. |
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Cite this article
"Carriers." West's Encyclopedia of American Law. 2005. Encyclopedia.com. 1 Jun. 2012 <http://www.encyclopedia.com>. "Carriers." West's Encyclopedia of American Law. 2005. Encyclopedia.com. (June 1, 2012). http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3437700721.html "Carriers." West's Encyclopedia of American Law. 2005. Retrieved June 01, 2012 from Encyclopedia.com: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3437700721.html |
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