South Africa, Union of. In 1939 South Africa was a British dominion, comprising the provinces of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal, with the additional mandated territory of South West Africa. Rich in gold and diamonds, as well as coal and iron ore, and other strategic
raw materials, South Africa possessed an industrial base capable of ready expansion. Yet compared to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, its contribution was limited. ‘Viewed from outside’, concluded W. K. Hancock (
Smuts, The Fields of Force, Cambridge, 1968, p. 330), ‘the South African war effort was not massive’.
The reasons for this are not hard to find. South Africa entered the war against Germany deeply divided. As far as the overwhelming majority of black South Africans (Africans, Coloureds, and Indians in the tortured local lexicon) were concerned, the war was a matter of little concern. Unenfranchised Africans in particular saw no point in getting involved in a white man's war. ‘There is one thing certain’, noted one newspaper early in 1940, ‘there is no enthusiasm among them [Africans] for the war. The reason…is that they are not convinced of the truth of the causes and aims of this war and that they as an oppressed people do not figure anywhere in its aims’. Others were blunter. ‘Why should we fight for you? We fought for you in the Boer War and you betrayed us to the Dutch. We fought for you in last war. We died in France, in East Africa…and when it was over, did anyone care about us? What have we to fight for?’. Not surprisingly some Africans even ‘privately cheered the military advance of the Third Reich . . . because of an emotional alliance with the enemy of South Africa’. At the same time, a large section of the ruling white minority were strongly opposed to the war. Embittered by the British victory in the South African War (the ‘Anglo-Boer’ War of 1899–1902) and alienated by the subsequent policy of anglicization, most Afrikaners wanted nothing to do with what they saw as the UK's latest war. Only English-speaking whites, actually a minority of a minority; were unequivocally prepared to die for King and a far-away country.
As a result, when
General Smuts, a junior partner in the coalition United South African National Party government, narrowly defeated the prime minister on
General Hertzog's motion that South Africa should remain neutral, his mandate was considerably less than popular. On the 6 September 1939 the South African ‘herrenvolk democracy’ declared war on Nazi Germany. The irony was not lost on black political organizations. In December 1939 a resolution passed at the annual conference of the African National Congress (ANC) declared that ‘unless the government grants the Africans full democratic and citizenship rights, the ANC is not prepared to advise the Africans to participate in the present war, in any capacity’.
Although the ANC leadership later modified its position, in such circumstances the Smuts government had to move with great caution. Afrikaner hostility to the war found expression in two main channels. One of these was broadly constitutional; the other explicitly non-parliamentary. In parliament itself the combined Nationalists, including a faction of Hertzog's old National Party, the Purified National Party led by D. F. Malan, made up the Opposition. However, Malan, who later, as prime minister from 1948, was to secure Afrikaner domination of South African political life and to introduce apartheid, was pro-Nazi and the long-standing animosity between him and Hertzog made unity short-lived. Malan also fell out with a yet more extreme element of his own supporters, the
Ossewabrandwag who became committed to the violent overthrow of the government. Both movements found much to admire in Nazi racism and openly sought German victory. Nazi propaganda in Afrikaans beamed from the radio station at Zeesen near Berlin further inflamed this extremely vocal anti-war constituency.
The Smuts government made no attempt to introduce conscription and it shied away from banning extremist organizations.
internment for enemy aliens and those suspected of subversion (
c.2,000 and numbering amongst them another future prime minister, John Vorster) was eventually introduced, and to prevent the possibility of rebellion all private rifles were confiscated. But even so, dissent against the country's involvement in the war persisted. Early in 1941 the Ossewabrandwag provoked clashes between civilians and soldiers in Johannesburg; the following January saboteurs attacked power and telephone lines; and in June 1942 preliminary legal hearings revealed the presence of 8,000 extremists in the Transvaal, including members of the police, who were plotting to overthrow the government. From 1943, though, with hopes of German victory fading, the influence of the extra-parliamentary extremists fell sharply.
British reverses during the fighting which preceded the
fall of France in June 1940, and the entry of Italy into the war the same month, speeded South Africa's war preparations and threw it onto its own resources. These included vast amounts of iron ore, huge reserves of coal and electricity, and two of the world's largest explosives factories. In particular, railway and harbour workshops, and the gold mining industry provided important productive capacity and valuable engineering skills for the South African Engineer Corps which served with great distinction throughout the
Western Desert and
Italian campaigns, and elsewhere.
By 1945 South Africa's industrial output had nearly doubled, most growth occurring in mining, steel, and textiles. Factories turned out 12 million pairs of boots and shoes, 2 million steel helmets, and a mass of other war material which included armoured cars, tyres, howitzers, mortars, and ammunition. These were manufactured not only for South Africa's own armed forces, the Union Defence Force (UDF) but also for the UK and India. Food was exported in large quantities too. With the virtual closure of the Mediterranean and then the entry of Japan into the war, South Africa's ports and ship repair industry became a vital aspect of the Allied war effort, and both were expanded and improved. Four hundred
convoys carrying six million men used South African ports during the war, and 13,000 ships were repaired.
For many white South Africans, however, the war remained remote for the first two years, and though in May 1941 the government restricted the use of white flour and attempted to make voters live more frugally—whites were enjoined ‘not to keep more servants than you really need’, thereby freeing black labour for ‘more useful purposes’—it was not until the end of 1941, when Japan entered the war, that its effects began to be noticed. By then there were shortages as stocks ran low, shipping space contracted, and import sources dried up. Petrol rationing, and price and import controls were introduced, and a Food Controller was appointed.
The main impact of the war in fact was felt elsewhere. It opened up a range of previously closed opportunities to white women and semi-skilled black factory operatives.
women worked in munitions factories and ultimately
c.65,000 served in the South African Women Auxiliary Services (SAWAS). As increased industrial output could only be sustained by employing more black workers, their numbers grew by three-quarters during the war. Grim living conditions exacerbated by overcrowding and inflation set off a wave of strikes in 1941–2, while in the countryside rumours of an imminent Japanese invasion in 1942 made it clear that many people would welcome Japanese soldiers as liberators. Desperate to bind black and white together in the face of danger, the Smuts government suspended influx control measures (so-called ‘pass laws’ which denied most black South Africans the right to dwell permanently in urban areas). But this relaxation of segregatory laws was short-lived. Once the Japanese threat receded, the old laws were reintroduced. This provoked an anti-pass campaign the following year, and accelerated the radicalization of black political movements. In 1943 the militant Congress Youth League was founded.
The Union Defence Force, which comprised the country's land, air, and sea forces, was commanded by Maj-General Pierre van Ryneveld, who acted as his own Chief of Staff. In September 1939 its regular component, the Permanent Force, totalled only 5,385 men. Coastal defences were antiquated, the land forces had no modern tanks or artillery, the South African Naval Service (SANS) had no warships, and the South African Air Force (SAAF) had only six modern aircraft. Part-time forces like the Active Citizen Force, the Defence Rifle Associations (Burger Commandos), and the South African section of the British Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve (RNVR)—which anyway came under the Royal Navy's C-in-C Africa Station at the British naval base at Simonstown—were equally unready and, with few exceptions, were neither properly trained nor armed for war.
During the
First World War, black South Africans saw active service in the Cape Corps, but in the Second, with very few exceptions, they only served as non-combatants, in the Non-European Army services (NEAS). This predominantly comprised the Cape Coloured Corps, which enrolled 45,000 men after it was reformed in May 1940, and the Native Military Corps (NMC) which enrolled 76,000 men. Recruitment for the Cape Corps was undertaken by the Director of Recruitment, but recruitment for the NMC was controlled by the Native Affairs Department. By far the majority of them came from rural areas devastated by drought. Destitute peasants joined up even though their basic pay was less than half that of white servicemen. The Cape Corps provided gunners for the Coast Garrison Force. Motor transport, and engineering works companies, and performed guard and security duties, while the Native Military Corps provided mess servants, hygiene personnel, and specially trained men for SAAF and Engineer units.
From March 1940 White volunteers joining the UDF had to take an oath, which obliged them to serve anywhere in Africa, but this remained optional for those already serving. Those taking the oath wore an orange strip, known as the ‘Red Tab’, on their shoulder straps. In January 1943 a new oath was introduced for those willing to serve anywhere. Some servicemen had refused to take the original oath and others refused to renew it when it changed; and throughout the war the government, while continuing to refuse black South Africans combatant roles, remained desperately short of white recruits for the ground forces.
The nucleus of these ground forces were three infantry divisions. The 7th Motorized Brigade Group of the 3rd SA Division took part in the capture of
Madagascar, but the balance of the division never saw action as it acted as a reserve for the other two divisions. The 1st SA Division, and armoured cars of the 2nd SA Tank Corps, fought in the
East African campaign before moving, with the SA Division, to the Middle East in 1941. By September 1941 there were nearly 60,000 South African troops in Egypt, including 15,000 blacks. This proved to be the peak of South Africa's war effort on the ground because the 1st SA Division lost one-third of its strength during the
Sidi Rezegh battles of November 1941 and the 2nd SA Division had 353 casualties while capturing
Bardia in January 1942, and a further 10,722 became prisoners of war when
Tobruk fell in June 1942. The 1st SA Division was withdrawn after taking part in both
El Alamein battles and its survivors then formed the nucleus of a new formation, the 6th Armoured Division, which fought in the Italian campaign from April 1944 until the end of the war.
The SAAF, however, remained in combat without a break and by the end of the war it totalled four SAAF wings and 28 squadrons, as well as supporting other units. It served under RAF command in East Africa and Madagascar, in the Western Desert—making almost one third of the striking power of the
Western Desert Air Force—and in the Central Mediterranean, where it was part of the
Balkan Air Force. Besides contributing significantly to victory in the battle for the Mediterranean, the SAAF played a vital role in training Allied air crew.
At sea the SANS, aided by the SAAF's Coastal Air Force, patrolled South Africa's coast line, and its minesweepers dealt with mines laid by German
auxiliary cruisers (see Map 97). In January 1940 it was absorbed into the newly-formed Seaward Defence Force (SDF) which also absorbed those members of the RNVR's South African section not already manning ships of the Royal Navy. By November 1940 the SDF had expanded enough to provide a flotilla of four modern Antarctic whalers, converted for minesweeping, for service in the Mediterranean. In August 1942 the SDF and RNVR (SA) officially amalgamated to become the South African Naval Force (SANF). By 1945 this totalled 78 vessels, including three new frigates, one of which sank a U-boat.
Altogether 334,224 South Africans volunteered for full-time service. Of this total, 132,194 whites, and most of the 123,131 Blacks who had volunteered, served in the ground forces, while 44,569 whites served in the SAAF and 9,455 in the SANF. A total of 21,265 white women served in various branches of the women's Auxiliary Defence Corps and 3,710 in the Military Nursing Service, Casualties amounted to nearly 9,000 dead, over 8,000 wounded and over 14,000 taken prisoner.
Ian Phimister
Bibliography
Davenport, T. , South Africa: A Modern History (4th edn., London, 1991).
South Africa at War Series, 8 vols. (Cape Town, 1968–79).