PRIGG V. PENNSYLVANIA

A pre–Civil War case, Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 10 L. Ed. 1060 (1842), declared unconstitutional all fugitive slave laws enacted by the states on the ground that the federal law provided the exclusive remedy for the return of runaway slaves.

The national debate over slavery grew in intensity beginning in the 1840s. Many of the Northern states demonstrated their hostility to slavery by enacting laws that attempted to frustrate Southern slave owners who came North in search of runaway slaves. Slave owners were outraged at these laws, arguing that the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 gave them the right to reclaim their property without interference by state government. In 1842 the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the issue in Prigg v. Pennsylvania.

Edward Prigg, a professional slave catcher, seized Margaret Morgan, a runaway slave from Maryland living in Pennsylvania. Prigg applied to a state magistrate for certificates of removal under the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 and an 1826 Pennsylvania personal liberty law. Prigg needed the certificates to legally remove Morgan and her two children to Maryland. The Pennsylvania law had a higher standard of proof for demonstrating the slave owner applicant's title to the slaves. After the magistrate refused to issue the certificates, Prigg illegally returned the slaves to Maryland. Pennsylvania indicted Prigg for kidnapping under the 1826 law and extradited him from Maryland. Following his conviction, Prigg appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

By an 8–1 vote, the Court reversed his conviction. Writing for the Court, Justice joseph story concluded that the Pennsylvania law was unconstitutional because it conflicted with the federal act. He based his analysis on the Fugitive Slave Clause contained in Article IV, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution. The clause directs the return of runaway slaves to the state from where they came.

Story claimed that the clause was a "fundamental article, without the adoption of which the Union could not have been formed." His historical analysis, however, was questionable. The clause was added late in the Constitutional Convention and was not debated. Nevertheless, Story concluded that the clause was a "practical necessity." Without it, every non-slaveholding state would have been at liberty to free all runaway slaves coming within its limits. This would have "created the most bitter animosities, and engendered perpetual strife between the different states."

Having established that the Fugitive Slave Clause guaranteed the rights of slave owners to reclaim runaway slaves and to prevent nonslaveholders from interfering with such property rights, Story looked to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 for enforcement of these rights. Story held that the constitutional provision gave Congress the authority to pass the act, stating that "where the end is required, the means are given." Pennsylvania had argued that its law

was based on the police powers given to it by the Constitution. Story rejected this argument, holding that because the federal law was based on a specific constitutional provision that was national in scope, the federal power on this issue was exclusive.

As an extension of this conclusion, Story ruled that states were not compelled to enforce the federal fugitive slave provisions. It would be inconsistent and without legal basis, he reasoned, for the Court to declare the preeminence of federal law and then require state courts to help carry out the law. Therefore, the federal government was "bound, through its own proper departments, legislative, judicial, or executive, as the case may require, to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed upon it by the Constitution…." Though Story wished that state judges would execute the federal law, he understood that the federal government had no power to require them to do so.

Even if there had been no federal law on runaway slaves, Story, without "the slightest hesitation," found in the Fugitive Slave Clause an implied right for a slave owner or slave owner's agent to go into any state and recapture a slave. The owner of a slave "is clothed with entire authority, in every state in the Union, to seize and recapture his slave, whenever he can do it without any breach of the peace, or any illegal violence."

Story expressly recognized the police power of the states to arrest, detain, or exclude runaway slaves from their borders. States had as much right to protect themselves against the "depredations and evil example" of runaways as they did against "idlers, vagabonds, and paupers." These regulations, however, "can never be permitted to interfere with or to obstruct the just rights of the owner to reclaim his slave."

The Prigg decision angered slavery opponents. Some state judges took Story's opinion to heart and refused to participate in federal fugitive slave proceedings. In 1843 Massachusetts passed an act that forbade any state official from participating in the return of a fugitive slave under the 1793 federal law. Other Northern states passed similar acts.

Slave owners soon became aware that the withdrawal of state support curtailed their ability to return slaves to the South. There were not enough federal magistrates to process applications under the 1793 law. This led to the fugitive slave act of 1850, which authorized the appointment of a federal commissioner in every county in the United States who could issue certificates of removal for fugitive slaves. Persons who interfered in the process were subject to criminal penalties. The 1850 act caused many runaway slaves to move to Canada.

Prigg was a crucial case because it announced that slavery was a national issue that could not be disturbed by state action. It also disclosed that the institution of slavery was woven into the Constitution.

further readings

Finkelman, Paul. 1993. "Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania." Rutgers Law Journal 24 (spring).

Maltz, Earl M. 2000. "Majority, Concurrence, and Dissent: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and the Structure of Supreme Court Decisionmaking." Rutgers Law Journal 31 (winter).

Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 539 (1842), argued and decided Jan. 1842 by vote of 8 to 1; Story for the Court, Taney, Thompson, Baldwin, Wayne, and Daniel concurring, McLean in dissent. In 1837, Edward Prigg and three other Maryland men seized Margaret Morgan, a runaway slave living in Pennsylvania. Prigg applied to a justice of the peace for certificates of removal under the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 and Pennsylvania's 1826 personal liberty law. The federal law authorized state magistrates to hear cases involving fugitive slaves. The justice of the peace refused Prigg's request for a certificate of removal. Without any legal authority, Prigg then removed to Maryland Morgan and her children, including one conceived and born in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania then indicted all four men for kidnapping under the 1826 state law. Morgan and her children were subsequently sold to slave traders and disappeared from the historical record.

After protracted negotiations, Maryland agreed to extradite only Prigg for trial, and Pennsylvania agreed to expedite proceedings so that the case could quickly go to the U.S. Supreme Court so that it might define the power of the states to legislate on the rendition of fugitive slaves.

Speaking for the Court, Justice Joseph Story held (1) that the federal Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 was constitutional; (2) that Pennsylvania's personal liberty law of 1826 (and by extension all similar laws) unconstitutionally added new requirements to the rendition process; (3) that the Constitution's Fugitive Slave Clause (Art. IV, sec. 2, cl. 3) implied a right of recaption, so that under the clause any slave owner or his agent could capture a fugitive slave without complying with the federal law of 1793 if such a capture could be done without a breach of the peace; and (4) that all state judges and other officials ought to enforce the federal law but that the national government could not force them to do so because the federal government had no power to require state officials to act.

Story held that all state laws that interfered with the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act were unconstitutional. Story based much of his decision on an inaccurate analysis of the intentions of the Philadelphia framers, asserting “that it cannot be doubted that it [the Constitution's Fugitive Slave Clause] constituted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which the Union could not have been formed” (p. 611). In fact, the clause was added quite late in the Constitutional Convention, with almost no debate and little thought.

Chief Justice Roger B. Taney concurred in the result in Prigg, but objected to Story's conclusion that state judges did not have to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act. In his concurrence (which read more like a dissent), Taney misrepresented Story's opinion by claiming that it prohibited state officials from enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act, when in fact Story actually urged state officials to enforce the law but conceded that the federal government had no power to require them to do so. Taney also complained, again erroneously, that Story's opinion prohibited all supplemental legislation on the rendition of fugitive slaves. Story's opinion actually allowed states to enact legislation aiding the rendition process as long as they did not add requirements beyond what the federal law mandated. Taney complained that under Story's opinion fugitive slave rendition would be virtually impossible, because at the time there were so few federal judges to enforce the federal statute. Taney's complaint became a self‐fulfilling prophecy, as some Northern judges used his characterization of Story's opinion as a justification for not hearing fugitive slave cases, and some state legislatures also prohibited the use of state facilities for fugitive slave rendition.

Story's son claimed that his father's opinion was an antislavery decision because it allowed the free states to withdraw their support for fugitive rendition. In private correspondence, however, Story urged Congress to create federal commissioners to enforce various federal laws, including the 1793 act. In the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 Congress adopted Story's recommendation. Rather than being an antislavery opinion, Story's effort was actually an attempt to nationalize law, consistent with his opinion from the same term in Swift v. Tyson (1842).

See also Comity; Federalism; Slavery.

Bibliography

Paul Finkelman , Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts: Anti‐Slavery Use of a Pro‐Slavery Decision, Civil War History 25 (March 1979): 5–35.

Paul Finkelman