Harry S Truman

Harry S. Truman 1884-1972, 33d President of the United States, b. Lamar, Mo.

Early Life and Political Career

He grew up on a farm near Independence, Mo., worked at various jobs, and tended the family farm. He served as a captain of field artillery in France in World War I. On his return from the war he married (1919) Elizabeth (Bess) Virginia Wallace; they had one daughter, Mary Margaret. After a brief partnership in a haberdashery store, Truman turned to politics and, with support from the Democratic machine of Thomas J. Pendergast , was elected judge (1922-24) and president judge (1926-34) of Jackson co., Mo. He attended (1923-25) the Kansas City school of law.

In 1934 he was elected a U.S. Senator. In the Senate he was a firm supporter of the New Deal policies of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, but the administration was cool toward Truman because of his connection with Pendergast. By 1940 the Pendergast machine had been broken, and Truman had a hard fight for reelection. In his second term he achieved national prominence as chairman of a Senate committee to investigate government expenditures in World War II. His vigorous investigations revealed startling inefficiency and bungling on war contracts. Because he was acceptable both to the conservative Democrats and the New Dealers as well as to powerful labor leaders, Truman was nominated for Vice President in 1944 and was elected to office along with President Roosevelt.

Presidency

On the death (Apr. 12, 1945) of Roosevelt, Truman succeeded to the presidency. He assumed power at a very critical time. He was immediately confronted with the problems of concluding the war and preparing for the difficulties of international postwar readjustment. The war in Europe ended with Germany's unconditional surrender on May 8, 1945, and in July Truman attended the Potsdam Conference to discuss the postwar European settlement. To end the conflict with Japan, he authorized the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. That action did bring the war to an immediate end, but the morality of it continues to be debated.

First Term

At home, inflation and demobilization were the chief worries of reconversion to a peacetime economy. Although Truman began quietly to eliminate the old New Dealers from the administration, his domestic policies were essentially a continuation of those of the New Deal. His program (later labeled the Fair Deal) called for guaranteed full employment, a permanent Fair Employment Practices Committee to end racial discrimination, an increased minimum wage and extended social security benefits, price and rent controls, public housing projects, and public health insurance. However, Congress, which was controlled by the Republicans after the 1946 elections, blocked most of these projects, while passing other legislation—notably the Taft-Hartley Labor Act (1947)—over Truman's veto.

In foreign affairs his chief adversary was the USSR. Relations with that country deteriorated rapidly after Potsdam. The two powers were unable to agree to feasible plans for the unification of Germany, general disarmament, or the establishment of a United Nations armed force. Truman took an increasingly tough stand against what he considered to be the threat of Communist expansion in S and W Europe. In 1947 he proposed a program of economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey, stating that it should be a principle of U.S. policy "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Enunciation of the so-called Truman Doctrine signaled the beginning of the policy of "containment" of Communism. It was implemented by the adoption of the Marshall Plan (1947), designed to effect the economic reconstruction of Europe, by the Point Four program (1949) of technical aid to underdeveloped countries, and, above all, by the creation (1949) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization .

In 1948, Truman ordered the desegregation of the armed forces. As a result, a bloc of southern Democrats bolted the party and sponsored J. Strom Thurmond for President in the election of that year. Truman was also challenged on the left by Henry A. Wallace of the Progressive party, who opposed Truman's policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Although he won renomination, the President was thought to have little chance of reelection. But Truman embarked on a vigorous whistle-stop campaign across the country, blaming the Republican Congress for most of the nation's ills and highlighting its inactivity by calling a special session of Congress, at which he urged the Republicans to enact into law their own moderately liberal party platform. The campaign was a resounding success. Contrary to all the predictions, Truman defeated his Republican opponent, Thomas E. Dewey , and Democratic majorities swept into the House and Senate.

Second Term

In his second administration Truman made little progress with his Fair Deal programs, although he did secure passage of a housing act (1949). Domestic affairs were increasingly dominated by the fear of Communist subversion. Truman had instituted (1947) a loyalty program for civil servants, but the government came under increasing attack for loose security, particularly after the conviction of Alger Hiss . Truman dismissed the charges of internal subversion as a "red herring" ; in 1950 the McCarran Internal Security Act, which provided for the registration of Communist and Communist-front organizations, was passsed over Truman's veto.

Overseas developments contributed considerably to the tide of fear within the United States. Truman's administration was blamed by many for the collapse of the regime of Chiang Kai-shek (toward which the administration had been cool) and the victory of the Communists in China (1949). The success of the Chinese Revolution was followed by the outbreak (1950) of the Korean War . Truman immediately sent U.S. troops to Korea under the aegis of the United Nations. In 1951 he raised the controversy that had been building up around American foreign policy to a new pitch of intensity when he dismissed Gen. Douglas MacArthur from his East Asian command for insubordination for attempting to involve the Chinese in the war and for publicly advocating an attack on China.

At home Truman became involved in further controversy when he seized (1952) the steel industry in order to prevent a strike. He claimed that the action was justified by the President's inherent powers in time of emergency, but the Supreme Court overruled him. Disclosures of corruption among federal officials were also politically damaging during this period. Truman declined renomination in 1952 and pressed the presidential candidacy of Adlai Stevenson, who was, however, overwhelmingly defeated by the Republican candidate, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Later Life and Legacy

Truman remained active in politics for many years after his retirement, campaigning around the country for Democratic candidates and commenting on national issues. He also contributed much time to the Harry S. Truman Library, which opened in 1957 in Independence, Mo. Truman died on Dec. 26, 1972.

Although Truman did not have great success with his domestic programs, many of his reform proposals were later enacted into law. Thrust into office largely ignorant of foreign affairs, he acted decisively in erecting the machinery of "containment" against the threat of Communist expansion and committing the United States to a new internationalism. Some historians, however, have challenged the assumption of a Communist threat on which Truman's action were based. They argue that the cold war confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union could have been averted by a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Truman administration. Although Truman's policies remain a subject of controversy, he has become a popular figure largely because of his feisty personality and his come-from-behind victory in 1948.

Bibliography

See his Year of Decisions (1955), Years of Trial and Hope (1956), and Mr. Citizen (1960). See also S. Neal, ed., Eleanor and Harry: The Corresondence of Eleanor Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman (2002); biographies by M. Truman (1972), D. McCullough (1992), and A. L. Hamby (1995); R. Donovan, The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (2 vol., 1979-84); R. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency (1983); R. S. Kirkendall, ed., Harry S. Truman Encyclopedia (1989); Z. Karabell, The Last Campaign: How Harry Truman Won the 1948 Election (2000).

Truman, Harry S (1884–1972) US Democratic statesman, 33rd President of the USA (1945–53). As Vice—President, he automatically took office on Franklin Roosevelt's death in 1945. One of his first actions was to authorize the use of the atom bomb against Hiroshima and NAGASAKI in 1945 to end the war with Japan. At home Truman put forward an extensive social programme, which was largely blocked by Congress, although racial segregation in the armed forces and in federally funded schools was ended. His expression in 1947 of what became known as the Truman Doctrine (the principle that the USA should give support to countries or peoples threatened by Soviet forces or Communist insurrection) was seen by the Communists as an open declaration of the cold war. In 1948 his administration introduced the Marshall Plan of emergency aid to war-shattered European countries and helped to establish NATO the following year. He later involved the USA in the Korean War.

Truman, Harry S (1884–1972)was president of the USA, 1945–52.On 12 April 1945, Roosevelt's death catapulted Truman, as incumbent vice-president, into the American presidency. Millions in the country worried that ‘the little man from Missouri’, as he was initially described, would not be an effective replacement for Roosevelt, one of the greatest presidents in US history. Truman, however, had attributes that would allow him to rise to the challenge. A captain of artillery in the First World War, a Missouri county judge, and, from 1935, a senator, he had almost ten years of experience in the Senate when Roosevelt selected him as his vice-presidential running mate in 1944. Despite ties to the corrupt Democratic machine in Kansas City, Missouri, Truman had a reputation as an honest, hard-working, loyal Democrat. He gained national prominence during the Second World War as chairman of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program. Credited with saving the government billions of dollars and protecting the Roosevelt administration from criticism over war production, the Truman Committee, as it was called, gave him standing with Roosevelt. More important, a split in the Democratic Party, between southern conservatives opposed to the incumbent liberal vice-president, Henry Wallace, and liberal labour leaders opposed to the leading conservative candidate, James Byrnes of South Carolina, made Truman, a border state Democrat and moderate, the compromise choice for the job.

During his 83 days as vice-president, the 60-year-old Truman had little contact with Roosevelt and no clear idea of what his chief intended in foreign affairs. The president, for example, had never informed him of the programme to build an atomic bomb nor taken him into his confidence on any of the great post-war issues the country would shortly confront. On assuming the presidency, Truman relied on Roosevelt's advisers and his own instincts to fashion a response to events in Europe, where the war ended on 8 May. To reassure Americans and the country's allies that there would be no break with Roosevelt's policies, Truman announced in his first speech on 16 April that he would insist on unconditional surrender by Germany and Japan.

By the time Truman had become president, Germany's defeat was assured and the emerging problem in Europe was Soviet expansionism. Aggressively asserting their self-interest in eastern Europe generally and in Poland in particular, the Soviets angered Truman, who accused them of breaking the Yalta agreements made with Roosevelt in February 1945 (see ARGONAUT). Truman believed that Soviet treatment of Poland signalled whether the world would enter a new era of collective security in international relations or a return to traditional Great Power politics. In meetings with the Soviet foreign minister, Molotov, on 22– 23 April, the president, believing it would save American lives, echoed Roosevelt's hopes for Soviet participation in the war against Japan while emphasizing that good relations with the USA depended on Moscow's fulfilment of the Yalta accords.

Truman took some hope for continued co-operation with the Soviets from the successful San Francisco conference in April and May, which established the United Nations. He took particular satisfaction from Stalin's acceptance of American insistence on limiting vetoes in the Security Council to matters of substance. No nation would have a veto over agenda items for debate, assuring freedom of discussion on all international questions. He also took comfort from the thought that the likely development of an atomic bomb would give the USA the power to shape the course of post-war affairs. His decision to go ahead with the production of the bomb, however, rested principally on the expectation that it would serve to end the war more quickly against Japan (but see atomic bomb, 2).

Soviet reaffirmation in June of a readiness to fight Japan and acceptance of Truman's suggestion that there be a Big Three meeting (see also Grand Alliance) in July further encouraged the president's hopes for post-war co-operation with Moscow. As a consequence, Truman rejected suggestions from Churchill that US troops, who ended the war deep inside the previously determined Soviet zone of occupation, be left there as a way to put pressure on Moscow regarding eastern Europe. Truman believed that this would do more to undermine than advance Soviet–American relations and might delay the movement of US forces from Europe to the Far East.

Truman's conference with Churchill and Stalin at Potsdam from 17 July to 3 August (see TERMINAL) jolted the president's hopes for sustained Allied co-operation. Towards the end of July, elections in the UK replaced Churchill with Attlee, leader of the Labour Party, and raised questions in Truman's mind about continuities in British foreign policy. More important, the conference produced sharp quarrels with Stalin over a number of issues, including western recognition of Moscow's East European satellites, Poland's western boundary with Germany (see Oder–Neisse Line), and German reparation payments. Although agreements were hammered out on some of these issues, and Truman put the best possible face on the discussions in a report to the American people, he had few illusions about the results of the meetings. Agreements with Moscow were more the exception than the rule, and the Big Three papered over their differences by referring them to a council of foreign ministers for further discussion.

Truman's face-to-face encounter with Stalin and the Soviets convinced him that the essential ingredient of relations with them must be toughness. News of the successful test of an atomic bomb in the New Mexico desert on 16 July stiffened his resolve to follow a hard line. When he received a cable about the test, Secretary of War Henry Stimson remembered that ‘the president was tremendously pepped up by it.’ Churchill saw Truman as ‘emphatic and decisive…telling [the Soviets] as to certain demands that they absolutely could not have.’ Partly out of a desire to avoid future recriminations with the Soviets over hiding the development of the bomb, Truman now decided to inform them of its existence. At the close of the day's proceedings on 24 July, he casually told Stalin that the USA had a weapon of unusually destructive force that it planned to use against the Japanese to end the war. Stalin, who already had knowledge of America's atomic project from spies, coolly expressed pleasure at the news and the hope that the Americans would make good use of the weapon against Japan. Three days before the end of the conference Truman wrote to his mother, ‘You never saw such pig-headed people as are the Russians. I hope I never have to hold another conference with them—but, of course, I will.’ In fact, he never did.

A constant concern Truman faced during and after Potsdam was how to end the war against Japan quickly but without sacrificing American determination for an unconditional surrender. Suggestions to Truman and his secretary of state James Byrnes that they issue a call for Japan's surrender while promising not to abolish the monarchy were rejected. The president believed that Japan might take such a statement as a sign of weakness and might lead to terrible repercussions in the USA. Although the Japanese asked the Soviets to explore the possibility of mediation, and Stalin passed the request to Truman at Potsdam, the president was unresponsive. He believed it was a ploy to divide the Allies and weaken their will to fight. Moreover, deciphered cables (see MAGIC) from Tokyo to the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, saying that Japan would not accept unconditional surrender, persuaded the president that Japan intended to hold on to some conquered territory. On 27 July, the UK, USA, and China issued an ultimatum to Japan to proclaim unconditional surrender or face ‘prompt and utter destruction’. Nothing was said about the future of the monarchy. Tokyo dismissed the ultimatum as a rehash of past declarations.

The Japanese response triggered final preparations for using atomic bombs against Japan at Hiroshima on 6 August and Nagasaki on 9 August. Much has been written about Truman's fateful decision to drop the bomb. In a sense there never was a decision. As General Leslie R. Groves, the army officer in charge of the bomb's development, said, Truman's ‘decision was one of noninterference—basically a decision not to upset the existing plan.’ All the momentum was in the direction of using the bomb. Having invested $2 billion in its development, fearful that the alternative was a longer war with hundreds of thousands of additional Allied casualties, and hardened by repeated Axis and Allied air raids, which had already taken hundreds of thousands of civilian lives, Truman and his military chiefs saw no compelling reason against the earliest possible use of the bomb. Considerations of power politics—the extent to which use of the ‘winning weapon’, as some called it, would increase the USA's ability to compel Soviet compliance with post-war peace arrangements—were distinctly secondary; but they were not entirely absent from Truman's mind.

Soviet entry into the war against Japan on 8 August and Japanese acceptance of US surrender terms, which Tokyo interpreted as not eliminating the emperor's rule, brought an end to the war on 14 August. Although Truman understood that the future peace might hold difficulties as great as any he had faced in ending the war, he took satisfaction from having presided over a rapid conclusion to the most terrible war in human history.

Robert Dallek

Bibliography

Donovan, R. J. , Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945–1948 (New York, 1977).
Gaddis, J. L. , The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (New York, 1972).
Sherwin, M. J. , A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb in the Grand Alliance, 1941–1945 (New York, 1975).