Douglas (United States)

Douglas 1 City (1990 pop. 12,822), Cochise co., SE Ariz., at the Mexican border; inc. 1905. The mining and smelting of copper have been important since 1900; the city grew around a copper smelter, now abandoned and largely dismantled. Douglas is also a ranching center and a border station, with plants that make transformers, electronic components, and apparel. Gypsum and tungsten mines and limestone quarries are in the area. The city has an international airport. Its sister city is Agua Prieta, Mex. 2 City (1990 pop. 10,464), seat of Coffee co., S central Ga.; inc. 1895. Its manufactures include yarns, asphalt, aluminum doors, marble and dairy products, and jet engine parts. South Georgia College is in Douglas.

United States District Court, United States v., 407 U.S. 297 (1972), argued 24 Feb. 1972, decided 19 June 1972 by vote of 8 to 0; Powell for the Court, Burger, Douglas, and White concurring, Rehnquist not participating. In the early 1970s, the nation was in a state of civil unrest. Various groups were accused of bombing buildings and plotting against the government. In the name of national security, the administration of President Richard Nixon claimed authority to use electronic surveillance to monitor American citizens allegedly involved in subversive activities without, as customarily required by the Fourth Amendment, first obtaining a warrant from a magistrate on a showing of probable cause (see search warrant rule, exceptions to).

The government argued that the vesting of executive power in the president in Article II of the Constitution implied authority to use electronic surveillance to secure information necessary to protect the government from destruction. A judicial warrant requirement would interfere with the executive's responsibility by increasing the risk that sensitive information would be disclosed. Moreover, judges would not be able to evaluate domestic intelligence involving issues beyond judicial expertise.

A unanimous Court rejected the administration's claim. The Court emphasized that the case involved First Amendment as well as Fourth Amendment values because political organizations antagonistic to prevailing policies are the organizations most likely to be suspected by government of raising domestic national‐security dangers. In light of these First Amendment values and the vagueness of the concept of national security, the Court concluded that to permit official surveillance of domestic groups on the basis of a presidential decision without prior judicial warrant would create undue dangers of abuse.

Two days before this opinion was rendered, five men were arrested for attempting to plant electronic surveillance devices in the Democratic National Committee Headquarters in Washington, D.C., an event that initiated the Watergate affair.

See also Political Process; Presidential Emergency Powers.

Stanley Ingber

Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), argued 18 Nov. 1958, decided 8 June 1959 by vote of 5 to 4; Harlan for the Court, black, joined by Warren and Douglas, in dissent, Brennan also dissenting. This decision signaled a retreat from Watkins v. United States (1957), which had placed limits on the ability of congressional committees to inquire into political beliefs and associations. Watkins and similar decisions provoked concerted efforts in Congress to curb the Court's authority, which, although unsuccessful, nevertheless persuaded a majority to be more circumspect for a time in protecting the rights of alleged subversives. Barenblatt upheld the conviction for contempt of Congress of a witness who had refused to testify before the House Committee on Un‐American Activities about his beliefs and his membership in a communist club at the University of Michigan.

The Court dismissed Barenblatt's First Amendment claim through a “balancing of interests” (see First Amendment Balancing). It defined the government's interest as national self‐preservation despite the fact that the only evidence concerning the club was that its members held abstract intellectual discussions. At the same time, it treated the First Amendment interest as essentially irrelevant. The Court also found that the House committee had made clear the pertinency of its questions, contrary to Watkins, where the Court held that pertinency had not been made clear, even though the committee's explanation had been essentially the same in both cases. Although Barenblatt has never been explicitly overruled, the Court has since displayed far less reluctance to reverse convictions of uncooperative witnesses before such committees on constitutional grounds.

See also Assembly and Association, Citizenship, Freedom of; Communism and Cold War; Congressional Power of Investigation.

Bibliography

Dean Alfange, Jr. , Congressional Investigations and the Fickle Court, University of Cincinnati Law Review 30 (Spring 1961): 113–171.

Dean Alfange, Jr.