diplomacy. On the outbreak of hostilities, diplomatic missions in enemy countries close down and the diplomats depart. But diplomacy continues to flourish in wartime; diplomatic business becomes, if anything, more urgent. Foreign ministries continue sending out directives and receiving reports; traffic in coded messages becomes brisker; the couriers go on carrying diplomatic bags, if necessary by different routes.

In addition, as belligerent countries concentrate on the conduct of war, neutral states start to play a more significant role in diplomacy. Their missions are sometimes requested to represent the interests of the combatants, and strategically placed neutral countries become meeting-points as well as escape routes. Switzerland and Sweden provided the meeting-ground for diplomats as well as spies in the Second World War; while Portugal became the gate through which refugees streamed out of Europe.

The establishments of the foreign ministries in both Allied and Axis countries had grown everywhere before the war; the ministries became clearing houses for many different kinds of foreign business, propaganda, and economic warfare among them. The diplomats were often consulted on the consequences of military strategies, without having a decisive voice in such matters; they became so overburdened with paperwork that the clarity of their judgement sometimes suffered.

It may be that diplomacy played a less significant role than it had done in the First World War. From 1914 to 1918, war leaders relied on diplomats to make up for military weakness on crucial occasions. The most striking example was the belief, held in Berlin, that diplomacy would help reduce the war from two fronts—in the west and in the east—to a single-front engagement. In the Second World War diplomatic dilemmas tended to be resolved by military action. For example, Japan, an ally of Germany, was fighting China (see China incident), which was being aided by the USSR, when the Nazi–Soviet Pact of August 1939 was concluded; Japan's conundrum was resolved by the German attack on the USSR in June 1941 (see BARBAROSSA), just as the era of US isolationism was brought to an end by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Improved radio communications strengthened the growing preference of heads of government for keeping in touch directly with each other, and the position of diplomacy also changed for other reasons. The Germans under Hitler and, before them, the Soviets after the Bolshevik revolution, had begun using other means than diplomacy to keep in touch with the outside world. Lenin (1870–1924) and Stalin had the Comintern at their disposal, which gave Soviet foreign policy a second string. Equipped with a less appealing ideology than communism, Hitler learned how to use the Nazi Party, in conjunction with the Germans outside the Reich (see Volksdeutsche), as vigorous players in the international field.

The network of diplomatic agreements, with which Hitler entered the war, was both ideological and contradictory. Co-operation between Germany and Italy, the two leading fascist states in Europe, had been initiated as early as 1936. It was anchored in a loose accord, which became known as the Rome–Berlin Axis. The Anti-Comintern pact between Germany and Japan was concluded a few months later, towards the end of 1936: Italy acceded to the pact in November 1937. On 22 May 1939, Italy strengthened its understanding with Germany by a more formal alliance, which became known as the Pact of Steel, and on 27 September 1940 the Tripartite Pact, which was meant to lay down the foundations of the New Order both in Europe and in Asia, was signed in Berlin by Germany, Italy, and Japan; it was subsequently joined by the smaller states in eastern Europe which had come under the influence of the Reich.

Hitler's Polish campaign, and then the attack on the USSR, were launched without formal declarations of war. German diplomats had less opportunity than they had, say, in the First World War to be active in the search for potential allies. Hitler placed more reliance on military occupation, both in Scandinavia and in the Balkans, than on diplomatic persuasion.

Nor did the diplomacy of Hitler's foreign secretary Ribbentrop look coherent. Until the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Nazi–Soviet Pact had been in place, in stark contradiction to the Anti-Comintern Pact. The first signal was sent from Moscow in May 1939, when Molotov replaced Litvinov in the commissariat of foreign affairs, and the policy of collective security lost its main Soviet exponent. Hitler, on the other hand, wanted a guarantee of Soviet neutrality before he attacked Poland; a late approach from London to Stalin could no longer prevent his agreement with the Germans.

The New Order for Europe (see Germany, 4) had first begun to take shape when, during the years of the economic slump, Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler's minister of finance, created the dependence of the agrarian economies in the Balkans on the Reich. Other steps towards the New Order were taken by aggressive moves, both military and diplomatic, including the annexation of Austria and the Munich agreement. From Hitler's point of view, these were mere frontier rectifications, intended to correct some of the injustices of the old order in Europe, created by the peace treaties (see Versailles settlement). Others followed when the Vienna awards—a result of Hungarian diplomacy—ceded to Hungary certain Czechoslovak territories ( 1938) and then northern Transylvania which belonged to Romania ( 1940).

By the time of the second Vienna award, the spring and summer campaigns of 1940 had made Hitler the master of a great part of continental Europe. Stalin, alarmed by the speed of Hitler's advance in the west, intensified his effort to improve the position of the Soviet Union on its western border. The negotiations with Finland concerning a mutual assistance pact which included territorial and diplomatic concessions to the USSR, failed, and, in November 1939 the Finnish–Soviet war began. It cost the Soviet Union its seat on the League of Nations ( 14 December 1939) but helped it to gain about 12% of Finnish territory, by the Treaty of Moscow made on 12 March 1940. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were also absorbed by the USSR, after communist coups carried out between 15 June and 16 August. On 23 June, Stalin informed his German partners that he would like to have Bukovina in addition to Romania's Bessarabia, because it contained a Ukrainian population. This claim was too much for Hitler, who decided to block further Soviet advances. Nevertheless, the humiliation of Romania was not yet at an end. The Treaty of Craiova, on 23 August, handed over southern Dobruja to Bulgaria, a territory which it had lost in the second Balkan War in 1913. Hitler agreed to guarantee Romania's territory, which had been diminished by about a third within two months, only after the second Vienna award.

The New Order was created by diplomacy out of economic need, historical resentment, and military aggression. Propaganda put on it whatever gloss it possessed, while the requirements of the industries of the Third Reich at war helped to give the New Order some kind of cohesion. In the Auswärtiges Amt (foreign office) as well, the diplomats were distracted by an increased agenda, and by the new methods of dealing with the world outside the Reich.

Only a small part of the conquered territories suffered outright annexation. Several countries came under German military administration, including occupied France, Belgium, and, in 1941, Greece and Yugoslavia. Norway and the Netherlands, on the other hand, were placed in the care of civilian commissioners. Denmark enjoyed an exceptional status under the royal family, which decided to stay in Copenhagen after German occupation. The formula for the Nazi rule of Slav territories, through imperial pro-consuls, had first been tested in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia before the outbreak of war; it was then used in Poland and, finally, in the occupied territories of the USSR.

The New Order in Europe also contained Hitler's allies on approval: in addition to Italy, they were Finland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Albania, which had been annexed by Italy in March 1939. Italy entered the war on 10 June 1940: its place in the New Order was never secure. The theories of Hitler's philosophers of race allowed that fascist Italians might be sound ideologically, but they questioned their racial purity. The Germans had encouraged Mussolini's involvement in the Spanish Civil War so as to distract his attention from south-east Europe, where German diplomacy was becoming increasingly active. When the Italians received German military support for their failing ventures in the Balkans, it was clear that their role in the New Order could never be prominent. The day before the invasion of the USSR, Hitler dictated a long letter to Mussolini in which he said that he had never felt at ease in a partnership with Moscow. This was the first Mussolini knew of Hitler's intention and it is not known whether he felt relieved to hear that the great ideological rift in Nazi foreign policy was about to be mended at last.

On the Allied side, policy co-ordination was the key issue of British and French diplomacy: the Supreme War Council was created soon after the outbreak of the war; an agreement not to conclude a separate peace was signed in the spring of 1940. Otherwise, British and French interests were hard to reconcile. The British assumed that the war would last at least three years, and they put their faith in the effectiveness of a naval blockade. The French, on the other hand, intended to move the war as far away as possible from their border.

It was in Scandinavia that the French and the British interests promised to be reconciled and where successful diplomacy could have proved harmful to Germany's interests. Iron ore mined in northern Sweden was an important source of supply for German industries, and most of it passed through the Norwegian port of Narvik. On 16 September 1939, the British government declared that an attack on Norway would be regarded as equivalent to an attack on the UK. Various schemes for mining Norwegian territorial waters were considered in London. The context of Allied diplomacy in Scandinavia changed after the USSR started the Finnish–Soviet war on 30 November; the joint Franco-British plans to help Finland and to stop the traffic in Swedish ore came to almost nothing. The desire of the Swedish and Norwegian governments to maintain their neutrality, as well as their reluctance to provoke the Soviets, frustrated the plans of the Supreme War Council before Finnish resistance came to an end.

On 8 April 1940, the Admiralty in London announced that a minefield was being laid in Norwegian territorial waters; on 9 April, the Germans launched their Norwegian campaign, occupying Norway's principal ports, including Narvik and Oslo. The phoney war had drawn to a close: after the occupation of Norway and Denmark, the Wehrmacht turned against the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg (see FALL GELB). The French front was penetrated in the middle of May and, on 14 June, the Germans entered Paris.

British opinion did not consider the fall of France to have also been the defeat of the UK; for more than a year, however, the country would stand, with its empire, all but alone against an opponent in control of a large part of continental Europe. In the long term, the task of diplomacy was to help the UK survive the isolation; and, eventually, to break out of it. In the short term, the diplomats must try to limit the consequences of defeat.

When the Dutch C-in-C ordered his troops to resist the Germans, Lord Halifax asked the Dutch foreign minister to let the state of hostilities continue, without negotiating with the Germans. The Dutch royal family came to London, while Léopold III chose to stay in Belgium. The Belgian politicians, including Paul Henri Spaak (1899–1972), assured the foreign office on 28 May that they would also fight the war to the end. The continuity of the Dutch and Belgian governments-in-exile provided a spark of hope for the future.

About midnight on 21 June, the new French government under Pétain received the German terms. In a symbolic act, the armistice was signed in the same railway dining car, in the forest of Compiègne, in which the Germans had signed their capitulation in 1918. The threat that the UK would suffer the same fate as France came and went, as the Germans failed to invade; but after the entry of Italy into the war the policies of neutral Spain and Turkey became decisive for the British position in the Mediterranean. It was assumed in London that the Spanish leader, Franco, was looking forward to the defeat of the Allies: yet he did not want a clear-cut victory of the Axis either, because he feared that it would strengthen the position of Italy in the Mediterranean.

Late in September, it seemed that the Wehrmacht would move against Spain rather than the UK. On 23 October Hitler travelled to the Spanish border to meet Franco, who refused to make military concessions to Germany and succeeded in keeping Spain out of the war. In a conversation with Eden in May 1941, the Spanish ambassador said that, as long as the UK held Suez, Franco would resist the Germans and argue that there was little point in closing down one end of the Mediterranean while the other remained open.

The Turks, on the other hand, concluded a treaty with the UK and France on 28 September 1939. After the fall of France, they argued that they were no longer bound not to intervene in the case of aggression in the Mediterranean. They did, however, declare that they would remain non-belligerent. The British expected more of the Turks, especially after the Italian attack on Greece, launched on 28 October 1940, which began the Balkan campaign. The aim of the foreign office was to get Turkey to co-operate with Yugoslavia and go to war with Bulgaria if Bulgaria allowed the Germans to cross its territory. The British knew that the Germans would not allow the Italians to suffer defeat in Greece; and that, on 17 November, Bulgaria's King Boris (1894–1943) visited Hitler. But the Turks were not in a heroic mood, while the foreign office (though less than the prime minister) tended to understate the effect in the Balkans and the Near East of the appearance of British military weakness.

Until the end of 1941, the effort to assure the USA that the UK was worth backing in the war took the foremost place in London. Roosevelt, re-elected on 5 November 1940 for his third term as president, was resolved to keep the USA out of the war in Europe; but, equally, he did not want the UK to suffer defeat. In the UK's hour of greatest need, Churchill's relations with Roosevelt were conducted with tact and a great sureness of touch. In a letter to the president early in December 1940, the prime minister concluded that if the president was convinced ‘that the defeat of Nazi and fascist tyranny is a matter of high consequence to the people of the United States and the Western hemisphere, you will regard this letter not as an appeal for aid, but as a statement of the minimum action necessary to achieve our common purpose’. On 17 December, Roosevelt made a reference to the possibility of ‘leasing’ war material to the British. The question remained of how the UK would pay for such material: the answers were contained in the Lend-Lease Bill, introduced in the Congress on 10 January 1941. The Bill underwrote the US intention that the UK should not lose the war through the want of material means.

After Germany's entry into the Balkan campaign in April 1941, the second phase of hostilities was about to open. When the USSR and then the USA were drawn into the conflict by aggressive German and Japanese moves, the continuities between the First and the Second World Wars became clearer. The latter was, of course, concerned with the maintenance in Europe of the status quo established after the First, or with its reversal. After 22 June 1941, when the Germans invaded the USSR (see BARBAROSSA), the combination of the east and the west of Europe against its centre was renewed. There again arose the concern, in London, that the USSR might conclude a separate peace with Germany, and Stalin, after the Bolsheviks' experience of the civil war and the western powers' intervention in it, was deeply suspicious of his allies.

Though the emerging alliance against Hitler was less tied together by diplomatic conventions than had been the alliance against Germany in the First World War, much more time was spent on the design of the post-war world. One of the impulses for the special interest in the future was the presence of several governments-in-exile in London; as well as of communist émigrés in Moscow. But the main contrast between the two World Wars soon emerged. In the First, the Russian steamroller, after initial advances, was put into reverse; in the Second, the Red Army, after severe setbacks, advanced into the centre of Europe. This profoundly altered the strategic context of diplomacy in the Second World War and a new diplomatic agenda started to be drawn up.

However, the two wars remained linked, for the governments-in-exile as much as for the leaders of the Great Powers, by political memories as well as by personal connections. Ignacy Paderewski (1860–1941), who had delighted President Wilson with his accomplished interpretations of Chopin on the piano, and who became the first prime minister of Poland after the First World War, emerged again as the president of the Polish National Council in France. Władysław Sikorski, who had also taken part in the reunification of Poland, and who served a term as prime minister in 1922–3, became the head of the Polish government-in-exile in London. Edvard Beneš, who had helped Tomas Masaryk (1850–1937) achieve the recognition of Czechoslovakia by the Allies in 1918, was assisted by Masaryk's son, Jan, to overcome diplomatic hurdles during the war.

The west Europeans in London, including the Scandinavians, in the main shared in the British foreign office's assumption that the states of continental Europe would return to approximately the same position as they had occupied before the war. The east Europeans, on the other hand, believed that they must maintain strong links with the west after the end of the war. Before June 1941, General Sikorski had assumed that his country was at war with the two partitioning powers, Germany and the USSR. The Poles expected the situation of 1918 to be repeated. They believed that the USSR would have no say in the making of peace and that western influence would again prove decisive in the making of post-war order.

Whereas political refugees came to London as a result of the war in Europe, Moscow had become a centre of foreign communists between the two wars. The first wave arrived after the suppression of the regime of Béla Kun (1886–1939) in Hungary in 1919; and among the last arrivals were the leaders of the Communist Party banned in post-Munich Czechoslovakia. Though the ranks of the exiles had been depleted in Stalin's purges, those who survived played significant roles in the politics of their countries during and after the war.

The Bulgarians provided the Comintern with its secretary general, Georgi Dimitrov; among the Germans, Wilhelm Pieck came to Moscow from exile in Paris and Walter Ulbricht (1893–1973)—another member of the KPD Politburo—arrived from Prague. Ana Pauker (1893–1960), a Romanian communist, and Matyás Rákosi, a member of Béla Kun's short-lived Soviet government in Hungary, also sought asylum in Moscow. Bolesław Bierut (see Lublin Committee) came after he had been threatened with arrest in Poland; and Klement Gottwald (1896–1953) headed the last group of communist migrants, when the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was banned shortly after the Munich agreement.

In an unexpected move, on 15 May 1943, the Comintern asked its member countries to dissolve the organization. Stalin distrusted international socialism, especially when he was unable to manipulate it; and he had turned to other means of exerting Soviet influence abroad, more acceptable outside the USSR than the Comintern. A few weeks after the German invasion, a Panslav congress took place in Moscow. It aimed to unite the Slavs in resistance against Hitler, and call into play political forces outside the Comintern; three similar congresses followed in Moscow, as well as a conference of American Slavs in Detroit in April 1942.

Differences between the policies of exile communities in Moscow and those in London soon emerged. Moscow for instance advocated acts of sabotage and the organization of partisan warfare at a level of intensity and sacrifice which Beneš, for one, was unwilling to allow. It was nevertheless Beneš who regarded Stalin as a person with whom the Czechoslovaks—as well as the other Allies—could do business, while virtually the whole Polish emigration resisted such an idea. The British foreign office tried hard to help the Poles come to an agreement with the USSR: after great difficulties, a treaty was signed between them on 30 July 1941.

The Soviets renounced the Nazi–Soviet Pact and its associated treaties on the insistence of the Poles, who assumed that Moscow thereby acknowledged Poland's claim to its pre-war territories in the east. General Sikorski put the matter bluntly to Maisky, the Soviet ambassador in London: he said that he would not consider returning to a territorially diminished Poland after the war. In December 1941 Sikorski travelled to Moscow, for an extraordinary meeting with Stalin. At a time when the Wehrmacht had a spearhead within sight of Moscow, Stalin told the Poles, in a tense moment, ‘We will conquer Poland and we will give it back to you.’ Sikorski and Stalin signed a declaration of friendship, but Soviet–Polish relations did not prosper (see Poland, 2(e)). The policies of exiled governments, of the Poles especially, gave the British foreign office an unusual, close-up view of Soviet diplomacy. A new field of foreign relations was opened up, which became the matrix of the post-war division of Europe. Before BARBAROSSA, the foreign office had disagreed with the views of Stafford Cripps, its ambassador in Moscow. Cripps argued that the Soviets were more concerned with the possibility of the UK's constructing an anti-Soviet combination after the war than with the policies of a victorious Germany. At that time, the foreign office wanted the Soviets to remain at least neutral in Europe—as neutral to the UK, that is, as they were to Germany—and, in Asia, to renew, or continue, their assistance to China against Japanese aggression. In return, the British were prepared to recognize Soviet acquisitions in the Baltic and in other parts of Eastern Europe, and they were ready to make an offer of commodities required for the USSR's defence.

The foreign office persisted in this policy of helping the Soviets, especially after Eden succeeded Halifax as foreign secretary, and on the day BARBAROSSA was launched Churchill broadcast an offer of assistance to the Soviet Union. An agreement between the two countries was signed on 12 July 1941, and concerned the two points suggested by Stalin. It was an undertaking by the UK not to conclude an armistice except by mutual consent; and a promise to offer the USSR material support.

Early in the autumn a British delegation, headed by Lord Beaverbrook travelled to Moscow together with the Americans, led by Averell Harriman (see Three-Power conference). It did not provide Stalin with the assurance, especially in the matter of military assistance, he had expected. An unfriendly message from Stalin reached London on 11 November; it elicited the promise from the prime minister that he would travel to Moscow with military experts soon, and that the UK would declare war on Finland, Hungary, and Romania.

As far as the future of Europe was concerned, the return to the status quo in the area west of the River Rhine was never questioned in the British foreign office; it was the future of Germany, and of the territory lying between Germany and the USSR, that came under review. As early as November 1940, a ‘confederation’ between Poland and Czechoslovakia was declared under the sponsorship of the foreign office; it was further explained in January 1942. In July 1941, Sikorski told Eden that the Yugoslav leaders favoured the creation of two federal blocks; one was to be grouped around Poland, the other around Yugoslavia. The Greeks in London were also in touch with the Yugoslavs on the possibility of forming a union in the Balkans.

As the alliance against Hitler broadened, the scope for diplomatic activity became less. In the Far East, as China began to drift into civil war, the Americans went on the offensive against the Japanese in the Pacific; the British and the Americans—with French and Polish assistance—fought the North African and Italian campaigns but all the Allies (except China) became equally engaged only in Europe north of the Alps. It was there that the Big Three showed they had more power at their disposal than any combination in history. Confronted with this Grand Alliance, Goebbels's propaganda transformed the idea of the New Order in Europe into the concept of Festung Europa.

While the future of Europe moved to the top of Allied diplomatic agenda, the strategic context of the main agenda item changed. Beneš, sensitive as ever to the underlying shifts of diplomacy, visited Washington in May 1943, so as to secure Roosevelt's support for a new and comprehensive treaty between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. Beneš described Stalin as a benign leader, anxious to reform his country; the president thought the view novel and acceptable, and hinted that the treaty could be a model for similar treaties for countries bordering the Soviet Union. The British foreign office was more reserved about the idea: Eden suggested that the Czechoslovak treaty would put the Poles at a disadvantage in their relations with Moscow.

Late in the autumn of 1943, Beneš travelled to Moscow. He was open with the Soviets, and gave Stalin a valuable second opinion on the intentions of the Allied leaders. He assured Molotov that the British government had agreed to the expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia, and that all German property there would be confiscated and nationalized. He opened up the perspective before Stalin of an alignment between social and national revolution, not only in Czechoslovakia but in other countries of eastern Europe as well. He suggested that the new Polish prime minister, Stanisław Mikołajczyk, was the Polish leader most likely to come to terms with the Soviets and told Stalin how important it was that the USSR should share in the occupation of Hungary.

Meanwhile, in London, the concern, with the changing balance of power in Europe grew. On 9 September 1944, five days after the landing of the British expedition to Greece, Churchill arrived in Moscow for the TOLSTOY conference to discover Stalin's plans for eastern Europe. He offered to bring Mikołajczyk and his foreign minister, Tadeusz Romer, to Moscow at short notice. They landed at Moscow airport in the evening of 12 October, Mikołajczyk making the long trip for the second time in ten weeks. He still feared the incorporation of Poland into the USSR, and was uncertain about Polish frontiers. The need to resist Hitler had united the Poles; now, the emergence of a powerful USSR started cruelly to divide them.

Stalin helped to advance the interests of the Poles in Moscow, though he neither liked nor trusted them; and most of them were survivors of a party decimated in his purges. The defeat of the Warsaw rising had put the London Poles into a weak position, though Mikołajczk kept on refusing to give up the eastern territories of Poland, beyond the Curzon Line (see Polish–Soviet frontier). After Churchill and the Polish delegation left in October 1944, Stalin was compelled to rely on the Polish team in Moscow.

Stalin regarded the British plans, outside the unresolved Polish question, as being out of touch with reality. As far as he was concerned, Churchill's plan for a Danubian federation, or for a second German state based on Vienna, belonged to the same category of vague aspirations as did the earlier federal plans considered by the Polish, Yugoslav, Greek, and Czechoslovak politicians in London. Churchill had suggested that Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary should form a group which would become a customs union. Stalin replied that the eastern peoples would first want to build up their national life, without restricting their rights by combining with others.

In the concluding phase of the war, diplomacy tended to be transacted at the very top of the Allied hierarchy. Meetings of the Big Three in particular exercised magnetic power over diplomatic business. Items such as the definition of war aims, proposals for the organization of post-war security in Europe, the design for an international organization (see San Francisco conference), were often handed down to specialized committees and came to occupy most of the time of the diplomats. Chance remarks of the Allied leaders sometimes tended to assume the quality of self-fulfilling prophecies. At the Yalta conference in February 1945 (see ARGONAUT), Roosevelt suggested that the military zones of occupation might be the first step to the dismemberment of Germany: as they indeed proved to be.

In any case, Europe was being divided in other ways. The Allied Control Commissions in the liberated areas of Europe caused new disputes, in which military and diplomatic concerns overlapped. In Italy, Soviet delegates on the commission complained of being downgraded to the status of observers. In Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, on the other hand, western missions came to occupy similar positions. Nevertheless, when on 19 January 1945 the head of the US mission to Bulgaria learned, in a roundabout way, of the agreement between Churchill and Stalin on the division of influence on Bulgaria, he was convinced that the Soviets were in fact being more generous to his mission than they were obliged to be.

Moscow's aim was to break the power of the conservative military and bureaucratic élites in the defeated countries of south-eastern Europe; the power, that is, of the men who had brought those countries to side with Germany in the war. Western officers on the Allied Control Commissions found it hard to understand the extent of the upheaval brought to the region by German ascendancy. In opposition to the growing Soviet influence, they found their friends and informants among the people who were committed to the anti-communist cause. As early as the summer of 1944, the US state department was in possession of a great deal of information, from local sources in south-eastern Europe, concerning the Soviet threat to the region. It seems that the last great campaign by Goebbels's propaganda machine, which focused on the growing rift between the western Allies and the Soviet Union, made its mark.

At the time of the meeting of the Big Three at Yalta, the western partners held different views on the future uses of Soviet military power. Roosevelt assumed that the USSR had no imperial ambitions, while Churchill's view was less sanguine. He believed that Stalin not only planned expansion: he had opted for the tsarist form of imperialism. The terms of Soviet entry into the war against Japan were settled by Roosevelt alone with the Soviets; and, indeed, one of the conditions concerned the restoration of the rights lost by Russia at the Treaty of Portsmouth, on the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese war in 1905. Roosevelt's other omphalic concern was the establishment of a world security organization, and it helped to explain why he was less concerned than Churchill about the extension of the Soviet influence to the small states of eastern Europe. Roosevelt believed that they would find safety inside the new organization; just as the peacemakers after the First World War had assumed that the minorities in central and east Europe would be safe in the care of the League of Nations.

It was easier to make a general agreement on reparations at Yalta—awarding the USSR half of the German liability—than it was to come to specific terms on Poland. An accord was reached on the Provisional Government of National Unity, committed to hold general elections soon. The eastern frontier of the new Poland was fixed to run along the Curzon Line, while the question of the western border was left open, with a reference to ‘substantial accessions of territory in the north and west’ (see Oder–Neisse Line). The Polish government in London, on learning of the terms, described them as the fifth partition of Poland.

Late in June 1945, the Moscow commission succeeded in cobbling together a compromise cabinet, with Bierut at its head, to rule the new Poland. This was long after Stalin's suggestion that the model of Yugoslavia could be used for Poland had ignited Churchill's anger. Tito had marginalized the six members of the Yugoslav government who had come from London, including Ivan Subaš, the leader of the Croat Peasant Party. Churchill believed that Stalin had disregarded the fifty–fifty agreement on Yugoslavia that they had made at the TOLSTOY conference and that Tito was well on the way to a dictatorship.

After Roosevelt's death on 12 April and Churchill's electoral defeat in the summer, Stalin was the last survivor of the Big Three at the Potsdam conference in July 1945 (see TERMINAL). President Truman had initially thought that he could come to terms with Stalin, and that he should not side with the UK against the Soviets, before other voices from the state department started reaching him. The agreement at Potsdam recommended the application of the principles of the UN Charter to post-war problems, and attempted to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to world peace. The Oder–Neisse line became the western border of Poland; and provisions were made for the creation of the Council of Foreign Ministers and for the conclusion of peace treaties with the former enemy states, Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, and Romania. Finally, Article XIII recognized that the transfer of German minorities from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary would have to be carried out. By then, many of the Volksdeutsche from eastern Europe had been on the move for a long time (see demography and deportations).

Clement Attlee knew even less about the development of the atomic bomb than did Stalin: it had been first tested successfully before the Potsdam meeting, and exploded over Hiroshima a week after its conclusion. Truman casually mentioned to Stalin at Potsdam that a weapon of unusual force had been developed: Churchill was certain that Stalin had no idea of the significance of the president's remark. At Potsdam, a new era of diplomacy opened.

Z. A. B. Zeman

Bibliography

Shlaim, A. , Britain and the Origins of European Unity, 1940–1951 (Reading, 1978).
Woodward, E. L. , British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, 5 vols. (London, 1962).
Zeman, Z. A. B. , The Making and Breaking of Communist Europe (Oxford, 1991).

Diplomacy

BIBLIOGRAPHY

There are at least two senses in which the term “diplomacy” is used: the first and more narrowly defined refers to the process by which governments, acting through official agents, communicate with one another; the second, of broader scope, refers to modes or techniques of foreign policy affecting the international system (Nicolson [1939] 1964, pp. 13–14).

In the past it was believed that the narrower notion of diplomacy embraced all official contacts and connections of a peaceful nature between state units (Satow [1917] 1962, p. 1). It is now clear that it does not do so: governments have means of communicating officially that could scarcely be called diplomatic. In 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, official messages were broadcast to save time and the protagonists negotiated in a number of other unorthodox ways (Schlesinger 1965). More generally, public statements of policy, speeches by influential leaders, and revelations to the press have served as means of direct contact with foreign states. In its restricted definition, then, diplomacy refers specifically to the use of accredited officials for intergovernmental communication, not simply to communications links between states.

Origin and development of diplomacy. Employment of diplomatic envoys is as ancient as polities themselves (C. D. Burns 1931), but not until the fifteenth century were the first permanent legations established. The Italian states inaugurated the ambassadorial system, which rapidly spread to the rest of Europe. Until the beginning of the nineteenth century two classes of diplomatic representatives were utilized: ambassadors, who were obliged to vie for precedence in the capital to which they were assigned; and semiofficial agents, who, though less involved in court functions, did not have access to fully authoritative sources of information, At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, four categories of representatives were established: (1) ambassadors, papal legates, and nuncios; (2) envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary; (3) ministers resident; and (4) chargés d’affaires. Precedence was to be based on the rank of the appointment conferred by the home government and on seniority of service in the particular capital. Thus were enunciated the basic diplomatic conventions as we know them today (Nicolson [1939] 1964, pp. 28, 31–33).

Until the twentieth century, members of the diplomatic corps were recruited from the wealthy classes (C. D. Burns 1931). Those selected were generally amateurs, whose rank and social position entitled them to consideration for diplomatic appointment. Examinations, when required, placed inordinate emphasis upon linguistic competence, and a degree of financial independence was a pre-requisite. By World War ii an appreciable democratization and professionalization of foreign services had occurred (Ilchman 1961). Competitive substantive examinations requiring high educational attainment had been instituted in most major coun-tries (Nicolson [1939] 1964, pp. 208–218). Independent means was no longer a requirement for entry into the diplomatic corps, and women became eligible for appointment.

Impact of technology on diplomacy. With the technological revolution of the twentieth century, the role of the diplomatist has changed appreciably. In the 1920s diplomatic officials were still given a certain latitude by their controlling agencies on questions of secondary importance; only in a crisis did they act merely as messengers (C. D. Burns 1931). Today the reporting function has become virtually all-encompassing; negotiations are largely conducted by foreign offices, and diplomatic representatives are utilized only for transmission of requests and responses. The daily traffic of United States messages alone totals more than 400,000 words (U.S. Congress … [1964] 1965, p. 584). Rewards in the American Foreign Service are distributed partly on the basis of the variety and quality of cables sent to Washington. We are now far removed from Jefferson’s complaint in 1791 to William Carmichael, American chargé in Spain, that he had received only one dispatch from him in 21/2 years (ibid., p. 584). This is not to say that ambassadors exercising their independent judgment do not occasionally make determinations of very great importance (Rusk [1964] 1965, p. 582; Merchant 1964, pp. 123–124). At the time of the Dominican crisis in 1965, Ambassador Bennett made assessments of crucial significance concerning the need for United States military intervention; these were heeded and acted upon in Washington. Once information and interpretation have been provided, however, decisions are taken in national capitals. Even on fairly minor matters the local ambassador possesses little power (Kennan [1964] 1965, pp. 589–590).

Diplomatic proliferation. The decline in decision-making authority of the individual diplomatist is partly correlated with the vast expansion of diplomatic missions since World War ii. In 1930 the London diplomatic corps totalled 56 embassies and legations, the largest including only 17 staff members (C. D. Burns 1931). In 1964 London had 96 foreign missions, with an average of 13.6 diplomats each. The United States housed diplomatic establishments from 107 countries. If each of the almost three thousand American diplomats abroad in 1964 had been allotted independent negotiating tasks, the foreign relations of the United States would soon have been in disorder (Brams 1966, pp. 39, 42). Even communications with overseas missions posed great difficulties. Of the 1,300 in-coming daily cables, the secretary of state saw only twenty to thirty; of the one thousand out going cables, he read about six. Increasingly, lesser officials and desk officers have become responsible for the information on which policy determinations are made (Rusk [1964] 1965, p. 578).

Another important feature of present-day diplomacy is its multilateral character. In 1963 the United States belonged to intergovernmental organizations having a gross membership of 1,141; 103 states were represented in this total. France held an even larger number of common memberships (Brams 1966, p. 49). In the same year the United States attended over 400 international conferences and participated in more than 10,000 votes (Merchant 1964, p. 128). As a consequence, much of the organization of foreign ministries has been determined by the need to prepare for and develop positions in multilateral bodies (Beloff 1961). The result has probably been to influence in some measure the content of foreign policy (E. Haas 1958; 1964).

Changing diplomatic techniques. The second and more broadly defined meaning of “diplomacy” applies to modes or techniques of foreign policy affecting the international system. In this extended sense diplomatic techniques have undergone a considerable metamorphosis since the eighteenth century (Rosecrance 1963). The extensive use of propaganda, subversion on a wide scale, and the manipulation of national economic instruments for foreign policy purposes have greatly enlarged the range of multilateral dealings on the world scene. Now even cultural and educational exchange may be seen as a tool in the cold war (Coombs 1964). To be sure, a plentiful armory of diplomatic weapons has been the stock in trade of state action since the time of Machiavelli. The most vigorous use of these implements, however, awaited the French Revolution and the fruition of nationalism (Rosecrance 1963). And it was not until the 1930s and World War ii that the “old diplomacy” was transformed (Craig 1961, pp. 23–25).

The evolution of techniques was, at the same time, an alteration of the boundary between domestic and external politics. While domestic affairs during the eighteenth century had remained largely unaffected by wars, in the twentieth violence came to be expressed internally, as well as externally (Scott 1964). Subversion, propaganda manipulation, and economic pressure combined to sap the sinews of domestic strength.

Of equivalent importance, new systems of action appeared in international diplomacy. The totalitarians inaugurated a new form of diplomacy, consisting of bluff, bluster, and intemperate attack. They did not hesitate to sign agreements with democratic powers, knowing that they could violate them later with impunity.

After World War ii the emergence of a large number of new nations added a new dimension to the practice of diplomacy. In 1914 approximately twenty states had abiding interests in foreign relations, and of these all but two or three were European (Craig 1961). A generation after World War ii there were more than 115 states engaged in world politics and more than half were Afro—Asian. These new nations operated on behalf of divergent objectives, and the techniques they employed were often distinct (Binder 1958). The hypothesis could be entertained that the new nations represented a separate subsystem of international relations. In the twenty years following World War ii an essentially European system of international relations had been transformed into a world system. The world system was not fundamentally European: it consisted of a congeries of separate regional subsystems, unified only at the topmost level of inter-action. Under the circumstances it was not surprising that nations should follow different “rules of the game.” Perhaps the most characteristic difference between European and Afro-Asian systems was illustrated in attitudes toward the balance of power. Even minor shifts in Europe brought forth a countervailing powerful coalition to prevent further imbalance; in Asia even fundamental alterations in the power balance did not stimulate formation of an opposing bloc (Rosecrance 1956).

Diplomatic patterns. Diplomatic techniques are, of course, related to diplomatic patterns. Twenty years after the close of World War ii it was still difficult to discern the direction in which international constellations were moving. In the immediate postwar era, bipolarity was an accepted general description of the state of the international system. As a range of new nations attained independence and refused to align with either of the two major blocs, however, multipolarity was hailed as the emergent system of the future (Rostow 1960). Some authors found a mixed system most realistic, with bipolarity characteristic of military matters and multipolarity of political matters (Liska 1963). Still others declared the two major alliance systems to be incidents of the balance of power process; alliance patterns would be reshaped as new threats emerged, and the world would revert to the combinations and procedures of the nineteenth century (Bull 1964).

Part of the debate revolved around the nature of dynamic processes: international politics could be seen as a sociological process, with political outcomes dependent upon the balance and intensity of communications flows (Deutsch 1953); it could be seen as a power process, with political outcomes dependent upon the external impact of other actors (Hinsley 1963). If diplomacy depended partly upon cultural communications and political, economic, and historical ties, some degree of North Atlantic cohesion might survive after cooperation was no longer strictly necessary on grounds of threats to the peace. If diplomacy was a product of military-political factors only, the quiescence of Russia and the resurgence of China should produce entirely new constellations of force.

Material considerations were also relevant. In economic and technological terms the Soviet Union and the United States were likely to remain the dominant international powers until at least the beginning of the 21st century (Waltz 1964). Their rate of industrial development, as compared to that of the new nations, was likely to increase their preeminence. The challenges to technological bipolarity were to be found within or on the fringes of major-power alliance systems. Japan, western Europe, and China would be independent power centers, in economic-technological terms, at some point in the future. These powers, if they pursued separate international courses, could create an oligopolistic international order, partially akin to the five-power confraternity of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For a considerable period of time, however, western Europe seemed destined to remain disunited: the relaxation of cold war hostilities, if it diminished the need for Atlantic cohesion, also reduced the momentum behind European integration. And as long as western Europe was divided, it would remain a tempting prize in the cold war and a reason for continued, if limited, hostility between the Western and the Soviet camps. In the circumstances, it was interesting that the divergence of interests between the haves and havenots led to so little conflict along North-South lines. East-West disputes continued to be controlling (Russett 1965; Alker 1964). Such patterns, if perpetuated, suggested the projection of a modified bipolarity well into the future.

Determinants of diplomacy. Future patterns of diplomatic action depend, of course, on the same basic factors that underlie international order. Some writers have viewed these as primarily domestic and sociopsychological, arguing that wars are caused by internal tensions and that domestic conflicts, explicit or latent, spill over into the international arena (Freud 1930; M. Haas 1964; and Rosecrance 1963). There has been some historical evidence for this proposition in the period since the French Revolution: the working out of domestic revolutionary issues often had consequences for the international system; patterns of external peace often were correlated with periods of internal stability (Rosecrance 1963). And yet this was not always the case: military power could be either a facilitative or a restraining influence (Hinsley 1963).

It was possible even to advance contrary hypotheses: that domestic change might be caused by international factors (Liska 1963) or, at the least, that domestic conflict was not clearly related to foreign conflict in certain recent periods (Rummel 1963). Such approaches led directly to claims that the form of the international system—specifically the lack of a strong supranational framework, capable of regulating international conflict—ensured the continuance of war (Waltz 1959). Whatever the validity of such contentions (and some evidence pointed in another direction: Deutsch et al. 1957), they could not be fully tested in the absence of international government. World government, moreover, was, as nearly everyone admitted, unobtainable, and theorists of diplomacy were forced back on less funda-mental remedies for international strife. At this level no particular relationship was found between specific alliance patterns and the existence of war (Singer & Small 1965a, p. 35).

Some writers, however, observed a connection between the levels of international threat and a conflict spiral ending in war. The argument was that if threats (or the perception of injury) reach a certain magnitude, a state is tempted to go to war regardless of the military consequences. This theory was intended as an explicit refutation of the deterrent hypothesis, i.e., that states never attack when they believe their opponent is stronger at the time they must make the decision. Its advocates claimed that political threats overbore military threats (Zinnes et al. 1961).

This argument is based upon a partial misunderstanding of deterrent mechanisms that was developed by military writers (Ellsberg 1960). Deterrence is not simply a matter of respective military proportions; it is inextricably connected with the probability that military forces might be used. If a state was sure that its opponent was going to attack it anyway, that state might decide to attack first, despite an unfavorable balance of military force, in order to reap the advantages of the initiative. If the status quo had worsened decisively from the point of view of one state, it might wish to attack (even though the probability of its winning was very small) in order to avoid the disastrous consequences of the situation. In the theory of deterrence, the risks of not striking had to be assessed alongside the risks that striking entailed (Wohlstetter 1959). Deterrence calculations, then, did not rest solely or even primarily on the balance of military postures. Nor did it follow that military deterrence analyses prescribed in crisis situations an increased military threat against an opponent in order to forestall his possible decision for war.

Because of the threat posed by nuclear weapons, it was generally believed that their acquisition by additional countries would raise the risks of war. Such an impact could not be discounted (Beaton & Maddox 1962); neither, however, on the basis of available evidence, could it be confirmed. There remained the possibility that nuclear weapons might turn out to be an expensive detour, useful for prestige purposes but irrelevant for war. As smaller states opted for nuclear capabilities, larger ones were concentrating on conventional and counter-insurgency postures. The very success of deterrence in preventing nuclear war raised the stakes and possible rewards of internal violence and warfare (Huntington 1962). In the longer run deterrent stability seemed likely to focus attention on conventional arenas, in which middle powers might contend much more equally with the great states for position and influence than they would be able to do in a nuclear arms race. Under such conditions the spread of nuclear weapons would merely divert resources from those types of conflicts in which major political and military gains would be likely and enhanced bipolarity could actually result [seeDeterrence].

The prospects for diplomacy. Different international constellations would require different diplomatic methods to attain desired outcomes. A bipolar order places major emphasis upon military competition between two great blocs. Intrabloc diplomacy becomes coalition management, in the face of exterior threat. As long as the danger of war between blocs is not negligible, individual interests are sub-merged in a common opposition to the external foe. In such circumstances diplomacy proceeds by military reassurance of allies and military deterrence of enemies. Integrated or quasi-supranational military-political mechanisms may be set up within blocs. Between blocs only the most tenuous diplomatic connections need be maintained. In other words, a bipolar world largely substitutes military for diplomatic skills and operates within clearly distinguished arenas of common and opposed objectives.

In a multipolar order, on the other hand, enemies and allies are no longer clearly differentiated and different standards of diplomatic competence and practice are therefore required. International outcomes will be determined as much by diplomatic skill as by military force. As long as no single, salient threat to the international system emerges, alliances and antagonisms will be tentative and short-lived. Since the major powers will by and large be able to fend for themselves, military arrangements with other states will be less necessary. Increments to national position will accrue more from diplomatic than from military feats. A truly multipolar order will require a vastly increased diplomatic corps and enhanced diplomatic prescience. Since political combinations will be hard to predict and the number of significant actors very large, diplomatic intelligence and research will be all-important.

In the intermediate case, that of an oligopolar order, military arts would continue to exert an important influence, while the number of crucial national actors would rise to five or six. Major military capacities would be confined to the international oligopoly; other states would not play a significant military role. Relations between the large powers would require a delicate balancing of military and diplomatic techniques. Changes in combinations among the ruling powers might have a decisive impact upon the security of one of their number. Diplomatic virtuosity akin to that practiced in the eighteenth century would be a necessary supplement to nuclear deterrence. A united oligarchy would have theoretical supremacy over the rest of the world; its internal divisions, however, would be likely to sanction diplomatic contests for the allegiance of smaller states. Again military and diplomatic variables would contend for influence.

A tentative assessment of these possibilities would stress the growing influence of diplomacy. If hostilities are focused and raised to peak intensity, military factors are dominant; if they are diffused and lessened, diplomacy becomes preeminent. Even in a bipolar order, diplomacy has played an important part: nations might have wished for war or an overturn of past patterns of international outcomes; if they used coercion to achieve their objectives, however, its expression had to be disciplined and restrained. Negotiation was as essential an ingredient as proportionate force. In the 1960s it remains possible that there will be in the future a revival of historic diplomacy: if unlimited violence cannot be tolerated, diplomacy may flourish anew.

R. N. Rosecrance

[See alsoAlliances; Communism, article onthe international system; Foreign policy; International politics; Negotiation; Systems Analysis, article oninternational systems. Guides to other relevant material may be found underInternational relationsandWar.]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alker, Hayward R. JR. 1964 Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly. American Political Science Review 58:642–657.

Beaton, Leonard; and Maddox, John R. 1962 The Spread of Nuclear Weapons. New York: Praeger.

Beloff, Max 1961 New Dimensions in Foreign Policy: A Study in British Administrative Experience, 1947–1959. New York: Macmillan.

Binder, Leonard 1958 The Middle East as a Subordinate International System. World Politics 10:408–429.

Brams, Steven J. 1966 Flow and Form in the International System. Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern Univ.

Bull, Hedley 1964 Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance: A Critique of United States Doctrine. Policy Memorandum No. 29. Princeton Univ., Center of International Studies.

Burns, Arthur L. 1957 From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis. World Politics 9:494–529.

Burns, C. Delisle 1931 Diplomacy. Volume 5, pages 147–153 in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Macmillan.

Coombs, Philip 1964 The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs. New York: Harper.

Craig, Gordon 1961 On the Diplomatic Revolution of Our Times. Haynes Foundation Lectures, 1961. Riverside: Univ. of California Press.

Deutsch, Karl W. 1953 Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry Into the Foundations of Nationality.Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press; New York: Wiley.

Deutsch, Karl W. et al. 1957 Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton Univ. Press.

Ellsberg, Daniel 1960 The Crude Analysis of Strategic Choices. RAND Corporation Paper 2183. Santa Monica, Calif.: The Corporation.

Freud, Sigmund (1930) 1958 Civilization and Its Discontents. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. → First published as Das Unbehagen in der Kultur.

Haas, Ernst B. 1958 The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950–1957. Stanford Univ. Press.

Haas, Ernst B. 1964 Beyond the Nation-state: Functionism and International Organization. Stanford Univ. Press.

Haas, Michael 1964 Some Societal Correlates of Inter-national Political Behavior. Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford Univ.

Hinsley, Francis H. 1963 Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations Between States. Cambridge Univ. Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1962 Patterns of Violence in World Politics. Pages 17–50 in Samuel P. Huntington (editor), Changing Patterns of Military Politics. New York: Free Press.

Ilchman, Warren F. 1961 Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1779–1939: A Study in Administrative History. Univ. of Chicago Press.

Kennan, George F. (1964) 1965 Impressions of a Recent Ambassadorial Experience. Pages 587–594 in Harry Howe Ransom (editor), An American Foreign Policy Reader. New York: Crowell.

Liska, George 1963 Continuity and Change in International Systems. World Politics 16:118–136.

Merchant, Livingston 1964 New Techniques in Diplomacy. Pages 117–135 in Edgar A. J. Johnson (editor), The Dimensions of Diplomacy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Nicolson, Harold (1939) 1964 Diplomacy. 3d ed. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

Rosecrance, Richard N. 1956 The Aims and Methods of American Policy in Asia. Public Policy: A Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration (Harvard University) 7:3–24.

Rosecrance, Richard N. 1963 Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective. Boston: Little.

Rostow, Walt W. 1960 U.S. in the World Arena: An Essay in Recent History. New York: Harper.

Rummel, Rudolph J. 1963 Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations. General Systems 8:1–50.

Rusk, Dean (1964) 1965 Diplomacy as an Instrument. Pages 576–583 in Harry Howe Ransom (editor), An American Foreign Policy Reader. New York: Crowell.

Russett, Bruce M. 1965 Trends in World Politics. New York: Macmillan.

Satow, Ernest M. (1917) 1962 A Guide to Diplomatic Practice. 4th ed. Edited by Nevile Bland. London: Longmans.

Schlesinger, Arthur M. JR. 1965 A Thousand Days. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Scott, Andrew M. 1964 International Violence as an Instrument of Cold Warfare. Pages 154–169 in James N. Rosenau (editor), International Aspects of Civil Strife. Princeton Univ. Press.

Singer, J. David; and Small, Melvin 1965a Formal Alliances, 1915–1939: Quantitative Description. Unpublished manuscript, Univ. of Michigan, Mental Health Research Institute.

Singer, J. David; and Small, Melvin 1965b The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System: 1815–1940. Unpublished manuscript, Univ. of Michigan, Mental Health Research Institute.

U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations (1964)1965 The American Ambassador. Pages 584–587 in Harry Howe Ransom (editor), An American Foreign Policy Reader. New York: Crowell.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1959 Man, the State and War. New York: Columbia Univ. Press.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1964 The Stability of a Bipolar World. Dædalus 93:881–909.

Wohlstetter, Albert 1959 The Delicate Balance of Terror. Foreign Affairs 37:211–234.

Zinnes, Dina A.; North, Robert C.; and Koch, Howard E. 1961 Capability, Threat and the Outbreak of War. Pages 469–482 in James N. Rosenau (editor), International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory. New York: Free Press.

Diplomacy (1878). The Victorien Sardou drama was first offered in America by Lester Wallack in an adaptation by Saville and Bolton Rowe. Its story centers on Dora, a poor girl who is married to Julian Beauclere after he had spurned the Countess Zicka. The countess steals an important document and implicates Dora in the theft. The play, which proved one of Wallack's greatest successes, featured H. J. Montague as Julian, Maude Granger as Dora, and Rose Coghlan as the Countess. It remained a favorite for fifty years, its last important revival coming in an all‐star production in 1928 with a cast that included Margaret Anglin, Jacob Ben‐Ami, Charles Coburn, William Faversham, Helen Gahagan, Rollo Peters, and Tyrone Power.

diplomacy XVIII. — F. diplomatie, f. diplomatique. diplomatic pert. to original official documents; concerned with diplomacy. XVIII. In the former sense — modL. diplōmaticus, f. L. diplōmat- DIPLOMA; in the latter sense — F. diplomatique. As sb. diplomatic
A. †diplomatist; diplomacy XVIII;

B. (also -ics) study of original documents XIX. A. sb. uses of the adj.; B — F. diplomatique.

So diplomat XIX. — F. diplomate, back-formation from diplomatique. diplomatist XIX. f. F. diplomate or L. stem diplōmat-.

di·plo·ma·cy / diˈplōməsē/ • n. the profession, activity, or skill of managing international relations, typically by a country's representatives abroad: an extensive round of diplomacy in the Middle East. ∎  the art of dealing with people in a sensitive and effective way: his genius for tact and diplomacy.

diplomacy n.the profession, activity, or skill of managing international relations, typically by a country's representatives abroad: an extensive round of diplomacy in the Middle East.

DIPLOMACY

DIPLOMACY. SeeForeign Policy ; Foreign Service andindividual nations and treaties.

diplomacy •radiancy •immediacy, intermediacy •expediency • idiocy • saliency •resiliency • leniency •incipiency, recipiency •recreancy • pruriency • deviancy •subserviency • transiency • pliancy •buoyancy, flamboyancy •fluency, truancy •constituency • abbacy • embassy •celibacy • absorbency •incumbency, recumbency •ascendancy, intendancy, interdependency, pendency, resplendency, superintendency, tendency, transcendency •candidacy •presidency, residency •despondency • redundancy • infancy •sycophancy • argosy • legacy •profligacy • surrogacy •extravagancy • plangency • agency •regency •astringency, contingency, stringency •intransigency • exigency • cogency •pungency •convergency, emergency, insurgency, urgency •vacancy • piquancy • fricassee •mendicancy • efficacy • prolificacy •insignificancy • delicacy • intricacy •advocacy • fallacy • galaxy •jealousy, prelacy •repellency • valency • Wallasey •articulacy • corpulency • inviolacy •excellency • equivalency • pharmacy •supremacy • clemency • Christmassy •illegitimacy, legitimacy •intimacy • ultimacy • primacy •dormancy • diplomacy • contumacy •stagnancy •lieutenancy, subtenancy, tenancy •pregnancy •benignancy, malignancy •effeminacy • prominency •obstinacy • pertinency • lunacy •immanency •impermanency, permanency •rampancy • papacy • flippancy •occupancy •archiepiscopacy, episcopacy •transparency • leprosy • inerrancy •flagrancy, fragrancy, vagrancy •conspiracy • idiosyncrasy •minstrelsy • magistracy • piracy •vibrancy •adhocracy, aristocracy, autocracy, bureaucracy, democracy, gerontocracy, gynaecocracy (US gynecocracy), hierocracy, hypocrisy, meritocracy, mobocracy, monocracy, plutocracy, technocracy, theocracy •accuracy • obduracy • currency •curacy, pleurisy •confederacy • numeracy •degeneracy • itinerancy • inveteracy •illiteracy, literacy •innocency • trenchancy • deficiency •fantasy, phantasy •intestacy • ecstasy • expectancy •latency • chieftaincy • intermittency •consistency, insistency, persistency •instancy • militancy • impenitency •precipitancy • competency •hesitancy • apostasy • constancy •accountancy • adjutancy •consultancy, exultancy •impotency • discourtesy •inadvertency • privacy •irrelevancy, relevancy •solvency • frequency • delinquency •adequacy • poignancy