TANNENBERG, BATTLE OF

The Battle of Tannenberg, in August 1914, was the consequence of Russia's commitment to an immediate offensive during World War I. On the grand strategic level, the tsarist empire's major problem involved making sure its major continental ally, France, was not forced out of the war before Russia could bring its full strength to bear. That in turn justified taking strategic risks. The principal question was whether the attack should concentrate on Germany or Austria, and the Russian army seemed to have ample strength to pursue both options.

Russia's war plan against Germany involved sending two armies against the exposed province of East Prussia, defended by what seemed little more than a token force. The First Army, under General Pavel Rennenkampf, advanced west across the Niemen River; the Second Army, under General Alexander Samsonov, moved northwest from Russian Poland. Both initially achieved local successes against indecisive opposition. The Russian commanders, however, failed to coordinate their movements and to press their advantage. Poor logistics and intelligence further slowed the advance, particularly in the Second Army's sector. That gave a new German command team of Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff time to develop plans already outlined by staff officers on the ground— to concentrate their entire force against the Second Army.

After five days of hard fighting, between August 26 and August 30, there were 50,000 Russian casualties, and 90,000 prisoners. Samsonov committed suicide and the Germans turned on Rennenkampf, driving the First Army back over the frontier between September 7 and 14, in the Battle of the Masurian Lakes.

The Russians came closer to victory in East Prussia than is generally realized. Their failure was primarily a consequence of attempting a campaign of maneuver arguably beyond the capacity of any army under the tactical conditions of 1914. But while the losses in men and material were replaced, the blow Tannenberg inflicted on Russian national morale was never restored throughout the war.

See also: world war i

bibliography

Golovine, N. N. (1934). The Russian Campaign of 1914, tr. A. G. S. Muntz. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: The Command and General Staff School Press.

Showalter, Dennis. (1991). Tannenberg: Clash of Empires. Hamden, CT: Archon.

Dennis Showalter

Tannenberg, Battle of (World War I) (23–31 Aug. 1914) According to the Schlieffen Plan, Germans were concentrating their military efforts on the Western Front. When the 1st and 2nd Russian Armies, under Generals Rennenkampf and Samsonov respectively, attacked sooner than expected in the east, the inferior German forces initially had to withdraw. According to a plan drawn up by Colonel Max Hoffmann and executed by Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the Germans first encircled the 2nd Army near Tannenberg, aided by the interception of wireless signals and trusting that Rennenkampf would do little to relieve his arch-rival Samsonov. A few days later, the German army also fought successfully against the 1st Army near the Masurian lakes. Despite their numerical inferiority, the Germans had relatively few casualties and took 137,000 prisoners of war. The battle ended the threat of a Russian invasion, but at a time when German advances to the west were disappointing, its psychological effects were even more important. It transformed Ludendorff and especially Hindenburg into mythical figures, and their position was so strong that they became virtual dictators of Germany 1916–18. Especially in the late stages of World War II, the image of Tannenberg was often invoked in Nazi propaganda to encourage a belief in ultimate victory even if the enemy was already on German soil.