Anzio. After the
Salerno landings had been mounted in September 1943, the Allies planned a second landing on the west coast of Italy during the
battle for the Mediterranean to try to break the deadlock in the
Italian campaign, by breaching the
Winter Line and hastening the capture of Rome. One plan was cancelled but the second (SHINGLE), decided upon at the
Marrakesh conference with Churchill in the chair, was mounted on 22 January 1944 by Maj-General John Lucas's 6th US Corps of
Mark Clark's Fifth US Army. Churchill later wrote he had hoped that the Allies were hurling a wild cat on to the shore but all they got was a stranded whale. The reality did, indeed, turn out to be very different from Churchill's hopes and it was the opinion of the US Navy's official historian that putting such a modest force ashore was akin to sending a boy on a man's errand.
Lucas's corps comprised the 1st British Infantry Division and a British Commando Brigade, which landed north of Anzio; and 3rd US Infantry Division, reinforced with tanks and Ranger battalions (see
USA, 5(f)), which landed in or south of the port. In all, 378 ships took part and air support was drawn from Maj-General John Cannon's immensely strong Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force. By contrast, German naval and air forces were weak. Their
explosive motor boats and
human torpedoes did attack Allied shipping off the beachhead but they were largely ineffectual.
The landings, as indicated by
ULTRA intelligence, achieved total tactical surprise and were virtually unopposed. However, the operation had been hastily mounted and Lucas's orders made its immediate objectives far from clear. Moreover, contrary to the expectations of the Marrakesh Conference, Lucas decided against exploiting the surprise he had achieved. Instead, he consolidated his position.
In the days that followed German bombers caused some damage to the naval forces and bad weather hindered the Allied build-up, and it was not until he knew reinforcements were arriving that Lucas agreed to advance. But by then it was too late, for the German commander in Italy,
Field Marshal Kesselring, reacted with brilliant improvisation, and by 26 January he had the core of no less than six divisions of a hastily improvised Fourteenth Army, commanded by General Eberhard von Mackensen, surrounding the Allied perimeter. This cordon proved highly effective: when Lucas advanced, two battalions of Rangers near Cisterna were wiped out in an ambush; by 30 January the 3rd US Division had 3,000 casualties; the British who, with American armoured help, had created a salient towards Osteriaccia, had 2,100. These losses forced Lucas on to the defensive again.
However, during the last days of January ULTRA intelligence provided details of German plans and tank strengths—a senior intelligence officer on General Alexander's staff considered it ‘one of Ultra's most important triumphs’ (quoted in R. Bennett,
Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, London, 1989, p. 269)—and it enabled the Allied commanders to defend the perimeter with maximum effectiveness. The elimination of the Osteriaccia salient could not be prevented, but heavy losses were inflicted on the Germans; and when a few days later German forces began moving into the area around Aprilia it was known that it was a build-up to a counter-offensive. This was launched on 16 February but, aided by foreknowledge, powerful air support, heavy artillery concentrations, and sturdy defence, the Allies halted it after four days with little territorial loss and 5,389 German casualties. On 22 February Lucas was replaced by his deputy,
Maj-General Truscott, who drove off a second German attack on 29 February. When the attack failed, Kesselring abandoned any hope of eliminating the landings, although he continued to attack the perimeter to keep the Allied landing beaches under fire. It was not until the spring that 6th Corps, now heavily reinforced, broke out and linked up with Fifth Army's 2nd Corps on 25 May and began the triumphant advance on Rome.
The cost of Anzio was heavy for the Allies: some 7,000 killed and 36,000 wounded or missing in action; 44,000 were disabled with injuries or sickness. German losses were estimated by Kesselring to have been 40,000 including 5,000 killed and 4,500 captured.
Bibliography
D'Este, C. , Fatal Decision (London, 1991).
