Sicilian campaign. The decision to invade Sicily as part of the Allies' strategy to win the battle for the Mediterranean, was made at the Casablanca conference in January 1943 (see SYMBOL). The operation (HUSKY) was given to General Alexander's newly formed Fifteenth Army Group. It comprised Montgomery's British and Commonwealth Eighth Army and Patton's 1st US Armored Corps, which became Seventh US Army on invasion day, a total of eight divisions including airborne, commando, and Ranger units. The supporting sea and air commanders, Cunningham and Tedder respectively, worked with Alexander under Eisenhower and Allied Forces HQ, a command system which, by allowing the Axis forces to evacuate Sicily almost unscathed, proved to be less than satisfactory.

The planning stage was confused and protracted, the operational one hardly less so. Anglo-American, and inter-service, co-operation was dogged by disagreement and acrimony, which were the foundation of high-level disputes later in the war (see also rivalries). Montgomery's most noteworthy contribution was to improve the invasion plan, for once ashore he acted almost independently of Patton and signally failed to achieve the quick breakthrough he sought. The Americans, on the other hand, highly mobile and aggressive, came of age as a fighting force.

The landings, launched before dawn on 10 July 1943, were the second largest undertaken in Europe during the war after OVERLORD and involved 180,000 Allied troops and 2,590 ships (see Map 96). The operation succeeded, but with not much margin to spare. Axis airfields had been neutralized, but the air support plan was inadequate and strong winds made the first large Allied airborne operation a disaster, with many of the gliders landing in the sea. However, ULTRA intelligence had already revealed the success of the MINCEMEAT deception plan, which had focused German attention elsewhere, and that the morale of the defending forces was low.

The only two German divisions available to oppose the landings, the reconstituted Hermann Göring and the newly formed 15th Panzer Grenadier, proved formidable opponents. Both these were part of General Hans Hube's 14th Panzer Corps which was later reinforced by 1st Parachute Division and most of 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. An Italian, General Alfredo Guzzoni, one of Mussolini's most competent generals, was in overall command though he soon relinquished operational control to Hube.

Despite the adverse weather conditions the landings which followed the airborne drops went fairly smoothly. Montgomery's two corps (10th and 13th) landed between Pozallo and Syracuse on the east coast where there was only isolated opposition, and Syracuse was taken, as planned, by 13th Corps on the day of the landings. The Americans, landing between Cape Scaramia and Licata on the south-west coast, were more exposed to the weather and had some difficulties. Initial opposition was also stronger there but by the end of the day all three divisions were ashore. Fierce fighting on 11 July drove off armoured counter-attacks around Gela, US warships providing much needed support.

Once the Allied forces were firmly ashore Alexander ordered Patton to shield Montgomery's left flank as the Eighth Army advanced on two axes: 13th Corps towards Catania and 30th Corps towards the network of roads around Leonforte and Enna. By doing so he missed the opportunity of allowing Bradley's 2nd US Corps to cut the island in half quickly and trap 15th Panzer Grenadier escaping from the west.

On 15 July 1943 Patton regrouped his forces to form a Provisional Corps under his deputy, Lt-General Geoffrey Keyes, ready to advance on Palermo. When, the next day, Alexander ordered him to continue protecting Montgomery's flank, Patton flew to see him to protest. New instructions allowed the Provisional Corps to reach Palermo on 22 July after a whirlwind advance in which many Italian prisoners-of-war were taken, but which was of doubtful value otherwise. By 17 July Hube had established the first of three lines of defence, stretching from south of Catania across to San Stefano on the north coast. The rugged Sicilian landscape confined any armoured advance to the narrow, winding roads, making the terrain ideal for defensive purposes. The defenders made the most of it and Montgomery's forces, now organized into a four-pronged attack, made slow progress. But on 22 July 1943 (three days later than Montgomery had predicted) 1st Canadian Division took Leonforte, while on its left Bradley's 2nd Corps made, too late, the bisection of the island Alexander had originally envisaged Montgomery would achieve. Montgomery's attack towards Catania was even slower and the port did not fall until 5 August.

Hitler was implacably opposed to any withdrawal but when Mussolini fell from power on 25 July he ordered plans for a possible evacuation to be drawn up, and two days later the Germans started withdrawing from the first defensive line. However, they continued to resist stoutly in ideal defensive country, though the Italians had virtually given up. The 1st US Division (see Big Red One) was involved in a fierce five-day battle at Troina while the British launched a powerful attack towards Adrano, both places being key positions in Hube's next line of defence. Their fall prompted Kesselring, the German C-in-C South-West, to start a total evacuation which began on the night of 11/12 August 1943, a brilliantly planned and executed operation. It has been estimated that as many as 40,000 German and 62,000 Italian troops—and most of their equipment and supplies—escaped almost unhindered. The Allies' use of intelligence at the highest level, including ULTRA which gave a clear warning of the Germans' intentions ten days in advance, was poor and the Allied commanders, without a co-ordinated plan to stop the exodus, made little concerted effort to intervene.

However, both the Americans on the north coast, who fought their last fierce engagements between San Fratello and Sant' Agata, and the British, who were advancing north-eastwards on either side of Mount Etna, launched fruitless amphibious warfare operations to cut off their retreating opponents. A final dash by the two allies to reach Messina first was won by the Americans. One of their patrols entered the port on the evening of 16 August; by early next morning the last of Hube's men had been evacuated. Once the island had been liberated the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories established a civilian administration which was deeply penetrated by the Mafia.

Bibliography

D'Este, C. , Bitter Victory (London, 1988).

SICILIAN CAMPAIGN

SICILIAN CAMPAIGN. In accordance with a decision made at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, combined British and American ground, naval, and air forces under Lt. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower invaded Sicily on 10 July 1943 and conquered the island in thirty-eight days. Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery's British Eighth Army landed on the eastern coast; Lt. Gen. George S. Patton's Seventh U.S. Army came ashore on the southern coast. They were opposed by Gen. Alfredo

Guzzoni's Sixth Army of 200,000 Italians plus 30,000 Germans. A counterattack at Gela was quickly contained, and the beachheads were secured.

Montgomery advanced through Syracuse and Augusta to Catania in order to seize Messina. Patton was to protect his flank, but he obtained permission from Gen. Harold Alexander, the Allied ground commander, to extend westward toward Palermo. On 22 July he took the city. Montgomery was halted by strong defenses before Catania.

On 25 July in Rome, Benito Mussolini was deposed and imprisoned. Marshal Pietro Badoglio, the new Italian leader, soon sought terms of surrender. The Germans assumed control of Guzzoni's defense force, and by August the Axis effort in Sicily became a delaying action to cover an orderly withdrawal to the mainland. Axis troop withdrawal from Sicily started 11 August. Meticulously planned, the operation successfully transported about 125,000 men to the mainland.

With Patton already in Palermo, Alexander gave him permission, on 25 July, to advance on Messina. Thus began a contest between Montgomery and Patton to reach Messina. Launching three amphibious end runs to help his forces forward, Patton entered Messina first on 17 August. However, it was soon revealed that he had slapped two soldiers hospitalized for combat exhaustion. The unfavorable publicity marred his Sicily triumph and almost ended his military career.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

D'Este, Carlo. Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, July–August 1943. London: Collins, 1988.

Garland, Albert N., Howard M. Smyth, and Martin Blumenson. Sicily and the Surrender of Italy. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1965.

Mitcham, Samuel W., and Friedrich von Stauffenberg. Battle of Sicily. New York: Orion Books, 1991.

MartinBlumenson/a. r.

See alsoAnzio ; North African Campaign ; World War II .

Adrano , town (1991 pop. 32,717), E Sicily, Italy, at the foot of Mt. Etna, near the confluence of the Simeto and Salso rivers. It is the commercial center for a region where olives and citrus fruit are grown. Adrano was founded c.400 by Dionysius the Elder near a temple of the god Hadranus. Fierce fighting took place in Adrano during World War II. Of note are the ruins of the town's ancient walls and an imposing 11th-century Norman castle. The town was known as Adernò until 1929.

Adrano, Sicily/Italy Hadranon, Adranum, Adernò Founded in about 400 bc near a temple dedicated to the god Hadranus after whom the town is named. It was Latinized to Adranum in 260 bc by the Romans and this name evolved into Adernò. It assumed its present name in 1929.