peace process

peace process (1993– ), the agreed label, partly designed to mask very differing interpretations of what is involved, for the political arrangements that brought an apparent end to the Northern Ireland conflict. On 24 April 1993 negotiations between Social Democratic and Labour Party leader John Hume and Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin, intended to draw the republican movement into the political process, culminated in a joint statement of nationalist principle. On 15 December the Downing Street Declaration, issued by the British and Irish prime ministers John Major and Albert Reynolds, outlined a way forward based on three proposed strands. Once the IRA had responded by declaring a ceasefire in August 1994 (quickly followed by Ulster Defence Association and Ulster Volunteer Force ceasefires), the way was clear for further progress, and in February 1995 the two sovereign governments published a detailed scheme, Frameworks for the Future. As in 1973 the proposal was for power‐sharing between major political parties representing the two traditions within Northern Ireland (Strand One), accompanied by an ‘Irish dimension’ of cross‐border collaboration, sufficient to give full recognition to the sense of Irish identity felt by most Northern Catholics while retaining the United Kingdom membership valued by Ulster Protestants (Strand Two). Strand One was of more substance than Strand Two, and there was some truth in the wry nationalist characterization of the scheme as ‘Sunningdale for slow learners’. Where the new proposals differed from those of the 1970s was in the addition of Strand Three, which built on the 1985 Anglo‐Irish agreement to put the Dublin‐London axis firmly in charge of the process. A further difference was in the intention of ending violence by involving Sinn Féin in the political process, rather than by using that process to isolate them.

Various developments made this possible. Twenty years of European collaboration had created a new context for Anglo‐Irish relations; militant nationalist rhetoric had less resonance than previously in the Irish Republic; the republican movement was in the hands of veterans from 1969 who wished to escape from the stalemate of ‘the long war’. The new American president, Bill Clinton, helped to bring Sinn Féin into the political process. There was also the new global context created by the end of the Cold War and the apparently successful peace initiatives in South Africa and in Israel.

The Ulster Unionist Party, led after 1995 by David Trimble was, as ever, divided in its response to reformist pressures, not least because it feared a challenge from the uncompromising Democratic Unionist Party. The Unionists pressed for ‘decommissioning’ of IRA weapons before they would begin talks with Sinn Féin. Meanwhile the Conservative government had become dependent on Unionist MPs at Westminster to keep them in office. A tacit agreement emerged among constitutional politicians that further progress could not be made prior to a UK general election. The Republicans were less patient, and on 9 February 1996 the IRA ceasefire ended with a devastating bomb at Canary Wharf in London. Further incidents followed, although violence still remained considerably below its pre‐ceasefire level, and did not return in any significant way to Northern Ireland itself.

The election of a Labour government with a strong parliamentary majority changed the context once again, so that when a new IRA ceasefire began on 20 July 1997 the Ulster Unionists reluctantly took the risk of going into all‐party talks with Sinn Féin prior to any ‘decommissioning’ of weapons. The ‘Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement’ of 10 April 1998 accepted the three‐strand approach. It confirmed that Northern Ireland would remain within the United Kingdom unless and until a majority of its voters determined otherwise; the Irish government agreed to revise the territorial claim in clause 2 of the constitution of 1937 to reflect this new understanding. Important powers would be devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly and a power‐sharing executive of ministers, led by a ‘first minister’. The fact that the Labour government was at the same time implementing devolution schemes in Scotland and Wales provided a context of ‘normality’ in which this part of the scheme could be set. Strand Two of the Agreement provided for the establishment of a North‐South ministerial council in Ireland, which nationalists could read as a first step towards ending partition, and unionists could characterize as merely practical co‐operation with a neighbouring state. Strand Three provided for a British‐Irish Council, or ‘Council of the Isles’, drawing in the two sovereign governments and the three devolved ones.

Although there was fierce debate over Strands Two and Three, the most important practical outcome was the evolution of measures which might transform Northern Ireland itself into a polity which would be de facto acceptable to Catholics as well as Protestants. By summer 2001, the Unionist Party had survived the spectre of ‘Republicans in government’, the devastating bomb in Omagh planted by a Republican splinter group on 15 August 1998, the release of virtually all IRA (and UDA and UVF) prisoners, repeated challenges to Trimble's leadership from within the Unionist Party, and the continued refusal of the IRA to ‘decommission’ its weapons. The future character of the police service in Northern Ireland was a substantive issue which remained unresolved (see royal ulster constabulary), and support for anti‐Agreement Unionists within the party showed no sign of abating. The rerouting of Orange Order parades away from nationalist areas and the lack of progress on IRA decommissioning were also recurring threats to stability. In October 2002 the discovery of an alleged IRA spy ring within Stormont led to the collapse of the power‐sharing executive. Over the next five years the DUP and Sinn Féin steadily gained electoral ground. New elections in March 2007 confirmed that they had decisively overtaken the UUP and SDLP but seemed to open the way to a new executive in which they would predominate. How far this outcome will bring an end to the earlier pattern of walkouts, suspension of devolution, and paramilitary brinkmanship remains to be seen.

Bibliography

Darby, J., and MacGinty, R. (eds.), The Management of Peace Processes (2000)

A. C. Hepburn