Sinn Féin

Sinn Féin, a radical nationalist party founded by Arthur Griffith and Bulmer Hobson in 1905. Its name roughly translates as ‘ourselves’, indicating its emphasis on cultural and economic independence. The party was formed in the aftermath of the enthusiasm for radical organizations generated by the Boer War. It attracted a disparate group of Fenians, dissatisfied Nationalist Party members, feminists, and pacifists, and absorbed a number of existing radical groups, including the Dungannon clubs, the National Council, and Inghinidhe na hÉireann, as well as an earlier nationalist movement, Cumann na nGaedheal, founded by Griffith in 1900.

Sinn Féin's programme was broadly based on Griffith's ideas. Ireland was to become an equal partner in a dual monarchy under the English crown. The party's economic policy emphasized the development of Ireland's own resources and a reliance on the domestic market. In this way an independent Irish industry could be built up behind high protective tariffs, allowing Ireland to support itself economically and end emigration. To achieve these goals, Sinn Féin advocated passive resistance. Irish MPs should withdraw from parliament and form a national assembly in Ireland, while citizens should withdraw their co‐operation from government institutions in favour of Irish ones, starting with the courts.

Sinn Féin was not successful in political terms in this period. On the one occasion it challenged the Nationalist Party in a parliamentary election, the North Leitrim by‐election of February 1908, its candidate was defeated by a margin of three to one. However, it provided a focal point for fringe movements, and had a disproportionate influence on political thinking, particularly through the writings of Griffith. As such it obtained a certain notoriety as anti‐British, particularly during the First World War, when it opposed recruitment. As a result it was widely held responsible for the rising of 1916, although Sinn Féin as an organization had not in fact taken part.

This association with the rising explains why Sinn Féin became the name of the new militant nationalist movement that took shape during 1917 and began to supplant the Nationalist Party. The new party, however, was a coalition of radical republicans, who had participated in the Easter rising, and more moderate nationalists from the original Sinn Féin. The strains inherent in this coalition became clear in the compromise wording of its objectives agreed at its first convention in October 1917: ‘Sinn Féin aims at securing the international recognition of Ireland as an independent Irish Republic. Having achieved that status the Irish people may by referendum freely choose their own form of government’. At this convention Arthur Griffith stood down as president in favour of Eamon de Valera, the only surviving commandant of the rising.

Although there was a great deal of overlap with the leadership of the IRA, Sinn Féin was an independent and different organization. Apart from a large number of old Sinn Féin members, its success also attracted a radical element from the old home rule party into its ranks. An analysis of its leadership shows that Sinn Féin was heavily dominated by young Catholics from lower middle‐class backgrounds. Its association with the rising and its opposition to conscription ensured that the organization became very popular. By December 1918 it had attracted 112,080 members. Its new‐found support became apparent in the 1918 general election, when it won 73 out of 105 seats in Ireland. Republicans have always appealed to this result, representing the last time that all Irishmen voted in a free and undivided way, to legitimize their continued fight for independence. Although republicans actually took less than 48 per cent of the vote, the fact that constituencies in which there was no opposing candidate have been excluded from this count, and that northern constituencies were divided between Sinn Féin and the Irish Party, indicates that a majority of voters probably did support Sinn Féin. However, this did not necessarily constitute agreement with the means used by republicans later on. The 1918 Sinn Féin manifesto was very vague on the use of physical force and relied heavily on passive resistance and an appeal to the Versailles Peace Conference.

The image of majority support for Sinn Féin in this period is further undercut by the results of the local elections in 1920. It did particularly poorly in the urban elections of January 1920, when it received only 30 per cent of the vote. It was better organized for the rural election the following June and managed to acquire 72 per cent of votes cast. In general the Sinn Féin vote was stronger the more Catholic, rural, western, and less northern an area was. It was highest in rural Connacht, where Sinn Féin received 97 per cent of the vote, and lowest in urban Ulster, with 15 per cent.

The influence of Sinn Féin became less the more violent the Anglo‐Irish War became. Its alternative government institutions slowly crumbled under the pressure of British measures, and the Dáil was largely unable to exert influence on the IRA. Like all other republican organizations it split over the Anglo‐Irish treaty, the name ‘Sinn Féin’ being retained, after some initial uncertainty, by the anti‐treaty group.

Following the defeat of the republicans in the Irish Civil War, Sinn Féin was caught in an inescapable dilemma. If it wanted to keep to its civil war principles it had to reject the existing political institutions. However, doing so would inevitably forfeit electoral support as Sinn Féin could not represent its voters. To remain a serious force it had therefore to rely on the potential threat formed by the link with the IRA. Unable to make the republic a reality by political means, Sinn Féin therefore mainly functioned as a mobilizing institution for the IRA. Attempts to represent the people quickly came up against the obstacle of republican resistance to participation in parliamentary politics. The resulting tension has continued to haunt the movement ever since the civil war, leading to a series of splits.

Sinn Féin had become dormant in 1922, and was revived only in May 1923. Rejecting the legitimacy of all institutions set up by the Government of Ireland Act 1920 and the treaty, it continued to recognize the second Dáil, elected in May 1921, as the de jure government of the Irish Republic established in 1916. Sinn Féin nevertheless participated in elections in Northern Ireland and the Free State. It did indeed do quite well in the south, but less so in the north, where the Nationalists received the majority of the Catholic vote. However, it soon became clear that abstentionism was a political dead end. As a result a large section of the party led by de Valera wanted to enter the Free State Dáil and work for the republic from within. This led to a split with the IRA in 1925, and in 1926 the party itself broke in two, with the de Valera section walking out to form Fianna Fáil.

Without the IRA connection the remainder of Sinn Féin became increasingly irrelevant. Fianna Fáil took away most of its national and international support, and it soon ran out of money, preventing it from contesting elections. The IRA provided a new lease of life in 1938, when Sean Russell asked the movement's permission for the bombing campaign in Great Britain. In response the second Dáil transferred its powers as government of Ireland to the IRA army council, which now felt justified in declaring war on Britain. Official links between the IRA and Sinn Féin were again established after the Second World War when the IRA realized it needed a political party to mobilize public support. Sinn Féin enjoyed some electoral success as a result of the border campaign. It won four Dáil seats in 1957, but with the violence going nowhere it lost all of these in subsequent elections. Realizing the republican movement needed to build a mass following, it became increasingly involved in social issues during the 1960s, moving more and more to the left.

The tensions between socialists, who eventually wanted to enter the Dáil, and the militarists who believed in the armed struggle, came to the boil under pressure of the mounting violence in Northern Ireland. As a result the movement split in January 1970 into official and provisional Sinn Féin, mirroring the split within the IRA the previous month. Official Sinn Féin changed its name in 1977 to the Workers' Party, and went on to establish itself as a minor party in parliamentary politics in the Republic.

True to its military objective Provisional Sinn Féin refused to participate in elections in Northern Ireland and functioned mainly as a propaganda machine for the Provisional IRA. However, in the late 1970s, republicans began to realize that the conflict could not be won militarily and that they were losing popular support. Although the campaign of violence was not called off, Provisional Sinn Féin again turned to abstentionist politics after the public response to the hunger strikes in the early 1980s convinced them this could generate support. Although the fusion of military and political means (the ‘bullet and the ballot‐box’ strategy) seemed successful, engagement in party politics slowly led towards a fuller involvement in the political system. In 1986 Provisional Sinn Féin decided to accept the Dáil as a legitimate institution; this led to the secession of Republican Sinn Féin and its military wing, the Continuity Army Council, who refused to accept any diminution of the abstentionist policy. In the last decade, Provisional Sinn Féin has been involved in creating a new political arrangement within Northern Ireland, which also provides for institutional links with the South (see peace process). Their full involvement in the political process in the North has been made possible by an IRA ceasefire first called in 1994 and renewed in 1996. This has again led to opposition within the movement and to the formation of the 32‐County Sovereignty Committee, with a military wing, the Real IRA.

These splits in Sinn Féin and the IRA again reveal the difficulties of operating a dual strategy of political and military action. Although initially closely linked, institutionally and in personnel, the two organizations have experienced different dynamics. The logic of membership of Sinn Féin has tended to the peace process, while IRA volunteers are naturally more convinced of the potential of physical force. These pressures have inevitably led to tensions between the two organizations, each pulling in different directions. However, in recent years the republican leadership has successfully convinced most of the army's rank and file of the value of peaceful means against historical precedent. The fear of extensive splits has created a careful and slow approach to any concessions, such as decommissioning, which could be judged an acknowledgement of the failure of the use of force. The subsequent transformation of Sinn Féin to a fully political organization has enabled it to become the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland and, potentially, a political force to be reckoned with in the south.

Bibliography

Davis, Arthur , Arthur Griffith and Non‐Violent Sinn Féin (1974)
Laffan, Michael , The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Fein Party, 1916–1923 (1999)
Patterson, Henry , The Politics of Illusion: Republicanism and Socialism in Modern Ireland (1989)
O'Brien, Brendan , The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Féin 1985 to Today (1993).

Joost Augusteijn