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adverse selection
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adverse selection The tendency for any
contract offered to all comers to be most attractive to those most likely to benefit from it. For example, if an insurer offers
health insurance without any medical examination, t...
Related newspaper, magazine, and journal articles from HighBeam Research
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Adverse selection in insurance markets: an exaggerated threat.
Yale Law Journal
; ... temperament would not have direct knowledge of her probability of an accident, however; there must also be some function that maps these facts onto a probability. The standard account of adverse selection assumes that the insurer estimates the probability ...
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RISK AVERSION AND THE WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR INSURANCE: A CAUTIONARY DISCUSSION OF ADVERSE SELECTION
Risk Management and Insurance Review
; ABSTRACT Textbooks frequently describe adverse selection as an almost inevitable feature of insurance markets with heterogeneous buyers and asymmetric information. But if low-risk applicants are more risk averse than their high-risk counterparts, the former may be as willing or more willing than
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CONSEQUENCES OF EXPANDED EMOLOYEE INSURANCE SELECTION:JAMES H. CARDON, PH.D.
Congressional Testimony
; Congressional Testimony 09-22-2004 Statement of James H. Cardon, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Economics Department of Economics, Brigham Young University Senate/House Joint Economic Committee September 22, 2004 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I have been asked to comment on the problem
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An empirical examination of quality certification in a "lemons market"
Economic Inquiry
; This article examines the effect third-party certification has on a market characterized by adverse selection. Using an original data set from the market for young thoroughbreds, we show that certification alleviates problems of adverse selection by examining the effect certification has on breeder
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ESTIMATING ADVERSE SELECTION COSTS FROM GENETIC TESTING FOR BREAST AND OVARIAN CANCER: THE CASE OF LIFE INSURANCE.
Journal of Risk and Insurance
; ABSTRACT Genetic testing is a concern for insurers if they cannot use test results in underwriting. We model adverse selection in an insurance market with genetic testing for breast and ovarian cancer. Increased forces of mortality resulting from a family history of cancer or a positive test for a
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ESTIMATING ADVERSE SELECTION COSTS FROM GENETIC TESTING FOR BREAST AND OVARIAN CANCER: THE CASE OF LIFE INSURANCE.(Brief Article)
Journal of Risk and Insurance
; ABSTRACT Genetic testing is a concern for insurers if they cannot use test results in underwriting. We model adverse selection in an insurance market with genetic testing for breast and ovarian cancer. Increased forces of mortality resulting from a family history of cancer or a positive test for a
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Adverse selection, seller effort, and selection bias.
Southern Economic Journal
; 1. Introduction Researchers use several approaches to identify adverse selection. (1) Genesove (1993) tests the proposition that, in a lemons market, prices inversely relate with observable seller characteristics that correlate with seller incentives to select goods adversely. Genesove examines the
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On the cost of adverse selection in individual annuity markets: evidence from Singapore.
Journal of Risk and Insurance
; ABSTRACT New evidence is presented on the cost of adverse selection in individual annuity markets using Singapore data. The Singapore annuity market is an interesting setting to examine the cost of adverse selection for three reasons. First, unlike many Western countries, the Singapore government
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REGULATING GENETIC INFORMATION IN INSURANCE MARKETS
Risk Management and Insurance Review
; ... For example, if an individual considers that she may learn more about her risk type in the future, with possibly unfavorable news, then she has an incentive to purchase more term insurance, which includes a guaranteed renewability clause, in order to avoid ...
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Careful pricing counters adverse selection factor.(Benefits Management)(consumer-driven health plans)(Brief Article)
Business Insurance
; Byline: Joanne Wojcik In some cases, real-life experience is contradicting health plans' and consultants' assertions that adverse selection won't occur when consumer-driven health plans are offered as an option rather than as a total replacement. Early studies of CDHPs have shown that,
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