Thirteenth Amendment

Thirteenth Amendment Slavery in the United States was abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment. Its adoption was made possible by the confluence of a variety of forces. One necessary element was the precipitate decline of slave‐state influence in Congress. The secession of most slave states in 1860 gave the free states almost complete control of the Union government. In the early 1860s, most members of Congress from the loyal states belonged to either the Republican or Union party, whose policies were influenced by the antislavery movement.

A second critical factor was the Civil War's impact on the American concept of federalism. Before 1861, the belief in states' rights sharply limited the potential scope of federal action on slavery; only the most radical abolitionists advocated removing the authority of each state over slavery within its borders. Although ideas of states' rights remained a strong ideological influence even after the Civil War, by the end of the war Republicans were more receptive to an expanded federal role.

Nonetheless, Congressional approval of the amendment in 1865 came only after a protracted political struggle. Although the amendment passed easily in the Senate in 1864, during the Thirty‐eighth Congress Republicans lacked the required two‐thirds majority in the House of Representatives. When the House first considered the amendment in 1864, proponents were unable to attract the necessary Democratic votes. The Republican victory in the elections of 1864 changed the political dynamic, however. After that election, an intensive lobbying effort by the White House changed enough Democratic votes to allow the amendment to pass the House on reconsideration in 1865. In the same year, the Thirteenth Amendment became part of the Constitution after approval by the requisite number of state legislatures. Some of the ratifications came under duress; Congressional Republicans made clear to the legislatures of the ex‐Confederate states that ratification was necessary before readmission to full participation in the Union (see Constitutional Amending Process).

Section 1 of the amendment specifically prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime. Section 2 grants Congress the authority to enforce the provisions of section 1. Even under the narrowest possible interpretation, the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment was a major change in the American political structure. For the first time, federal law imposed a significant constraint on the power of the states to define the status of their own residents.

The precise scope of the change intended by the drafters was a matter of some debate during the Reconstruction era and continues to be an issue on which scholars differ. Some contend that the drafters intended only to dissolve the master‐slave relationship per se, leaving all other state prerogatives untouched. Others argue for a broader reading, asserting that section 1 constitutionalizes an open‐ended, evolving concept of freedom or, at the very least, that section 2 grants Congress the authority to prescribe and protect the rights that differentiate a slave from a free person.

The Supreme Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases (1883) suggested that section 2 gave Congress the authority to outlaw “badges and incidents” of slavery as well as the institution itself. At the same time, however, the Court defined badges and incidents quite narrowly, holding that the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress no power to reach private action generally (United States v. Harris, 1883) or to prohibit racial discrimination in public accommodations (Civil Rights Cases). Thus it is not surprising that for much of the twentieth century civil rights litigation focused almost entirely on section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was adopted in 1868.

The Thirteenth Amendment made a dramatic reappearance in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. (1968). Jones dealt with the interpretation of a statute that granted to all citizens the same property rights “as [are] enjoyed by white citizens.” The question was whether this prohibition—derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866—prohibited private racial discrimination and whether Congress had authority to reach private action under the Thirteenth Amendment. The Court held that the statute did prohibit private discrimination, and that section 2 of the amendment granted Congress the necessary authority. Thus the Thirteenth Amendment reemerged as an important element of contemporary civil rights jurisprudence.

See also Constitutional Amendments; State Sovereignty and States' Rights.

Bibliography

Earl M. Maltz , Civil Rights, The Constitution and Congress, 1863–1869 (1990).

Earl M. Maltz