Ripeness and Immediacy

Ripeness and Immediacy A family of jurisdictional problems lumped together under the category of justiciability raise the question whether the challenged litigation can be resolved by federal courts, which are limited to deciding only cases and controversies by Article III, section 2, of the Constitution. Among these are questions of mootness, ripeness, standing, collusive suits, and advisory opinions. Most of these problems have both constitutional and prudential dimensions. Ripeness is the “front‐end” counterpart to mootness. When a case has become moot, it has ceased to exist as a live controversy, whereas if a case has not “ripened,” it has not yet matured into a threat to an individual's property, liberty, or other rights.

The classic ripeness precedent, United Public Workers v. Mitchell (1947), illustrates the sort of problems ripeness poses as a matter of Article III justiciability. The appellants were federal employees who sought an injunction against enforcement of the Hatch Act, alleging that they feared prosecution if they engaged in political activities they believed were protected by the First Amendment. They had not yet participated in any of the activities they feared would subject them to prosecution. The Court refused to enjoin a merely “hypothetical threat” because it presented no actual case or controversy.

Ripeness problems have also complicated litigation involving state antisubversive statutes (Adler v. Board of Education, 1952), the Federal Election Campaign Act (Buckley v. Valeo, 1976), abortion restrictions (one of the would‐be petitioners in Roe v. Wade, 1973), and criminal prosecutions (e.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 1975).

James B. Stoneking