Political Parties

Political Parties have an ambiguous status in American constitutional law. On the one hand, they are essentially voluntary associations of citizens organized to seek elective offices and share the political process. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has recognized the central and semiofficial role played by political parties in the American system of government.

The justices' characterization of parties as voluntary organizations imbued with First Amendment rights has led the Court to avoid undue interference with party activities and to strike down laws that would have a similar effect. Thus, the Court in O'Brien v. Brown (1972) refused to interfere with the seating of convention delegates at the 1972 Democratic convention, citing the political question doctrine and the desirability of avoiding judicial interference with the electoral process. Similarly, the Court has struck down state laws interfering with party rules for the selection and seating of delegates.

The justices, however, have recognized the authority of states to enact reasonable regulations of parties, elections, and ballots in an effort to reduce ballot clutter and to ensure that elections are fair and honest. Although regulations imposing a severe burden on freedom of association are subject to strict scrutiny, lesser burdens will generally be upheld if they serve important regulatory interests. Thus, in Anderson v. Celebrezze (1983), for example, the Court struck down an early filing deadline that restricted third‐party opportunities to challenge existing candidates. And in California v. Jones (2000), the Court invalidated a state law requiring a “blanket primary,” in which candidates of every party appeared on the same ballot, and in which voters were free to vote for candidates of any party. Such a process, the Court ruled, unconstitutionally forces parties “to have their nominees, and hence their positions” determined by those “who at best have refused to affiliate with the party, and at worst have expressly affiliated with a rival” (p. 577). But in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party (1997), the Court upheld a Minnesota regulation prohibiting a candidate from appearing on the ballot as a candidate of more than one party. The ban on such “fusion candidates,” the justices held, did not impose a severe burden on third‐party candidates. Since the early days of the civil rights era, the Court has taken a more vigilant stance to prevent political parties from acting in a racially discriminatory fashion. In *Smith v. Allright (1944), the Court overturned an all‐white Democratic Party primary in Texas, holding that “when primaries become a part of the machinery for choosing officials … the same tests to determine the character of discrimination … should be applied to the primary as are applied to the general election” (p. 664). (See White Primary.) In Terry v. Adams (1953), the Supreme Court went even further, striking down the exclusion of blacks from a “pre‐primary” held by an all‐white private group known as the “Jaybird Democratic Association” whose candidates generally went on to victory in the primary and general elections. The case produced no opinion of the Court, but a majority did agree that, for whatever reason, “the combined Jaybird‐Democratic‐general election machinery” added up to state action in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment (p. 470). And in Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia (1996), the Court upheld the application of the federal Voting Rights Act to ban a party from requiring delegates to pay a fee in order to attend its nominating convention.

The Supreme Court has sustained campaign finance laws that provide financial assistance to political parties, along with laws restricting campaign contributions to political parties and requiring disclosure of such contributions. The Court in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) was unmoved by arguments that the financial assistance provisions would have the effect of reinforcing the dominant position of the two major parties. In the same case, however, the Court struck down limitations on independent expenditures by individuals, along with limitations on the amount a candidate can spend on his or her own campaign. And in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Jones (1996), the Court invalidated federal restrictions on independent campaign expenditures by the party itself. As of late 2003, the Supreme Court was still considering the constitutionality of federal restrictions on “soft money,” that is, contributions to political parties for party‐building activities theoretically independent of particular candidates or campaigns.

The Court has also taken a strong stand against state laws that seek to benefit a particular political party or its members. In 1986, for example, the Court held in Davis v. Bandemer held that party gerrymandering—in which state legislative seats are apportioned so as to benefit one political party over the other—presents justiciable questions and poses potential Fourteenth Amendment problems. Likewise, in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois (1990), the Court invalidated a state law that gave members of one political party an advantage in public employment. The justices were quick to point out that such discrimination was permissible when party affiliation or support was an “appropriate requirement” for the position involved.

See also Financing Political Speech; Political Process; Vote, Right to.

William Lasser