Johnson v. Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), argued 12 Nov. 1986, decided 25 Mar. 1987 by vote of 6 to 3; Brennan for the Court, O'Connor and Stevens concurring, White, Scalia, and Rehnquist in dissent. This was the first case in which the Court decided the legality of sex‐based voluntary
affirmative action under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber (1979), the Court had held that Title VII does not prohibit voluntary race‐conscious affirmative action where it is necessary “to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories” (p. 209). In
Johnson, the Court expanded this concept to include voluntary sex‐conscious affirmative action where it is necessary to eliminate a “manifest imbalance that reflect[s] underrepresentation of women in ‘traditionally segregated job categories’” (p. 631).
In 1978, the Santa Clara County (California) Transportation Agency adopted a temporary affirmative action plan designed to take into account the sex or race of qualified applicants with regard to promotion within traditionally segregated job classifications in which both women and members of racial minorities had been underrepresented. The agency acknowledged that although women constituted 36.4 percent of the area's labor market, they constituted only 22.4 percent of the agency's work force and were concentrated in classifications that traditionally employed women: women accounted for 76 percent of the agency's office and clerical employees but 0 percent of its skilled craft workers. The affirmative action program did not set aside a specific number of jobs for minority members and women but established annual goals as guidelines in hiring and promotion for a “statistically measurable yearly improvement” so as to attain, eventually, “a work force whose composition reflected the proportion of minorities and women in the labor force” (pp. 621–622).
In 1979, a vacancy for the job of road dispatcher was announced. Of the 238 positions in the skilled craft classifications, which included the road dispatcher's position, none had ever been held by a woman. The agency passed over Johnson, a male employee certified as eligible for promotion, and gave the job to Joyce, the female applicant, who was also certified as eligible but who had a slightly lower interview score. Both were rated as well qualified.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and held that, pursuant to Title VII, the affirmative action plan was appropriate in permitting the agency to remedy the imbalance of men and women in skilled job classifications. The plan established flexible promotional goals, not rigid quotas, and while recognizing
gender to be one of several factors to be considered, it required women to compete for promotion with other qualified applicants. The Court noted that because the plan authorized the agency to select any one of the qualified applicants, Johnson had no absolute entitlement to promotion. The Court concluded that the plan “unsettled no legitimate firmly rooted expectation on the part of the petitioner” (p. 638). The Court also found that the plan was a temporary measure designed to achieve a balanced work force, was not intended to maintain a permanent sexual or racial balance, and did not impose a complete ban on male employees’ opportunities for advancement. It held that such a plan would further the statutory goal of Title VII by encouraging voluntary efforts to eliminate gender discrimination.
The majority limited its interpretation to Title VII prohibitions and did not clarify the relationship between statutory and constitutional standards. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, writing separately, found the constitutional and statutory standards to be identical. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Antonin
Scalia stated that the decision was an “enormous expansion” intended to alter social standards and not merely a decision to eliminate discrimination. He also argued that
Weber should be overruled.
Johnson was the first case in which the Court held that voluntary affirmative action is permissible under Title VII to overcome the effects of societal discrimination.
Johnson also established that the legality of voluntary affirmative action as approved in
Weber applied to sex discrimination and to Title VII claims in public sector employment.
See also
Employment Discrimination.
Herbert Hill
