Admiralty and Maritime Law

Admiralty and Maritime Law Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution empowers the federal judiciary to hear “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.” This jurisdiction is nowhere defined in the Constitution or in any act of Congress. The federal courts have therefore been required to determine the territorial scope and the types of cases that are included within it, as well as the kinds of relief that can be granted. Congress has on occasion broadened the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, and so far the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of these efforts.

The framers of the Constitution conferred admiralty and maritime jurisdiction on the federal courts because of the vital importance that international and interstate shipping had to the new nation. Both in times of war and in times of peace the national interest in an orderly resolution of disputes involving shipping transcended any local interest. Prior to 1875, when federal courts were granted full federal question jurisdiction, the grant of admiralty jurisdiction was the only basis that federal trial courts had for hearing cases that arose between citizens of the same state.

Before the Civil War, the Supreme Court was often severely divided about the proper scope of federal admiralty jurisdiction. Opponents pointed to the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty in England, which was limited to disputes arising solely on the seas, such as collisions, salvage, and seamen's claims for wages. The English Admiralty Court had virtually no jurisdiction over maritime contracts. Those who sought to limit the federal courts' admiralty jurisdiction were concerned about federal encroachment on the power of the states. But most of the Court's decisions gradually expanded the jurisdiction to include cases over marine insurance contracts, bills of lading, and charter parties—matters vital to the shipping industry.

Justice Joseph Story was a leading nineteenth century proponent of expansive federal admiralty jurisdiction. His circuit court decision in De Lovio v. Boit (1815) rejected the applicability of the English precedents and broadly asserted that the admiralty jurisdiction extended to all contracts “which relate to the navigation, business, or commerce of the sea.” This position was consistent with Story's views in the famous Supreme Court case of Swift v. Tyson (1842) that federal courts are not bound by state court determinations of common law in commercial law cases. If a federal court was to be an effective commercial court, Story and others believed that it had to have the power to declare the law in commercial cases and in admiralty cases, which were intimately tied to commercial dealings. A majority of the Court generally adopted Story's broad view.

In England, the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty was limited geographically to cases arising on the sea or within the ebb and flow of the tide. Initially the Supreme Court adopted this rule in The Thomas Jefferson (1825). The rule became unsatisfactory as steamboat traffic on the rivers and Great Lakes substantially increased. In Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh (1852), the Court overruled The Thomas Jefferson. The Court held that the Constitution's grant of admiralty jurisdiction extended to cases arising on internal rivers and lakes, provided only that those waterways be navigable, that is, capable of carrying interstate or international commercial traffic.

When a case is solely within the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction there is no right to a trial by jury. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction as to most admiralty matters. Most admiralty claims are not within the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction because of the famous “Saving to Suitors” clause in section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. In its current formulation, this clause saves to suitors “in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.” The clause embodies the intention of the framers of the Constitution. In the nineteenth century, it was generally understood that the state courts would apply state law to admiralty cases, that federal courts having admiralty jurisdiction would apply general admiralty law, and that federal courts having diversity jurisdiction in admiralty cases would apply federal common law. But following the decision of the Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917), state and federal courts must apply the same law to an admiralty case. That law is usually admiralty law, although state law may be applied to some matters, such as environmental pollution and the regulation of local pilots, where the states are thought to have a strong interest.

There are some admiralty cases in which federal jurisdiction is exclusive, however. Foremost among these is the admiralty in rem suit, which rests on the fiction that the ship is the defendant. To exercise in rem jurisdiction, a plaintiff may actually have a United States marshal seize a vessel. Although rarely tried in this century, prize cases, those brought to condemn an enemy ship or cargo, can also be heard only in federal court. Though it has been traditionally thought that salvage cases are similarly not triable in state court, a few state courts have heard such cases in recent years, and a number of scholars have argued that the “Saving to Suitors” clause empowers state courts to hear salvage cases when the plaintiff sues in personam.

There are also some powers seemingly necessary to an admiralty court that have been traditionally thought to be outside admiralty jurisdiction. Chief among these is the power to grant equitable relief (see Injunctions and Equitable Remedies). The early approach of the Court, summarized in an 1890 case, The Eclipse, was that a court of admiralty jurisdiction had no power to grant equitable relief. The origins of this doctrine are unclear. It may have been grounded in the notion that courts of equity act in personam, that is, they order individuals to do something or to refrain from doing something, whereas courts of admiralty traditionally acted in rem. Or the doctrine may have developed out of a concern for state powers in the federal system and a desire to limit the power of the federal courts. In any event, lower federal courts made exceptions to it in cases where equitable relief was incidental to other relief that the federal court was empowered to grant. And in Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A. (1950), the Supreme Court expanded these exceptions to allow a federal court to set aside a fraudulent transfer by the owner of a vessel that had been attached as security for a maritime claim. More recently, some lower courts have jettisoned entirely the earlier doctrine and will now grant equitable relief in any admiralty case where such relief is appropriate.

Although the general lines of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction have been worked out satisfactorily, there remain a number of anomalies. Contracts to repair a vessel are maritime, while contracts to build a vessel are not, owing to the Court's 1858 decision in People's Ferry Co v. Beers, which rested on the now‐discredited notion that all contracts made on land and that were to be performed on land must be considered nonmaritime. Lower courts have held that contracts to sell a vessel are nonmaritime even though contracts to charter a vessel are maritime. Most surprisingly, courts have held, following the Supreme Court's 1854 decision in Minturn v. Maynard, that a general agency contract to manage all aspects of a vessel's business is treated as being nonmaritime. In 1991 the Supreme Court overturned Minturn v. Maynard and reiterated that federal courts have admiralty jurisdiction to protect maritime commerce (Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc.).

These limited views of the Court's admiralty jurisdiction with respect to contracts are in sharp contrast to its traditional approach to maritime tort cases, where the Court has asserted jurisdiction over any wrong done on the water regardless of its importance to commercial shipping. Lower courts exercised jurisdiction when swimmers were struck by surfboards, when airplanes crashed in territorial waters, and in similar matters. But in 1972 the Court adopted a more restrictive approach for tort cases, requiring that to be within the admiralty jurisdiction a tort must “bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity” (Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, p. 268). But in a subsequent 5 to 4 decision, the Court held that collisions between pleasure craft on navigable waters were within the admiralty jurisdiction (Foremost v. Richardson, 1982). Lower federal courts have struggled to apply these decisions to other types of cases. Although there was initially some disagreement, all appellate courts that have decided the issue now hold that claims by shipyard workers against manufacturers of asbestos for injuries caused by exposure to that product are nonmaritime. On the other hand lower courts are receptive to hearing injury claims by seamen and passengers even when there is nothing uniquely maritime about the tort.

The Supreme Court has largely defined the meaning of the Constitution's grant of admiralty jurisdiction. In addition, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have played a significant role in developing the law relating to commercial shipping in this country. As a result, the federal courts have fulfilled their mission of advancing the federal interest in the uniform resolution of disputes involving maritime commerce.

See also Judicial Power and Jurisdiction; Lower Federal Courts.

Bibliography

Steven F. Friedell , Benedict on Admiralty, 7th rev. ed. (1988).
Grant Gilmore and and Charles L. Black, Jr. , The Law of Admiralty, 2d ed. (1975).
Thomas J. Schoenbaum , Admiralty and Maritime Law (1987).

Steven F. Friedell