tanks

tanks

1. Design and development

Tracked Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs, called tanks by the British) were first used in battle in 1916 as a weapon system incorporating firepower (two 57 mm./2.2 in. guns plus machine-guns), protection (10 mm./.39 in. armour plate) and mobility (a 105 hp engine driving endless tracks to give a maximum speed of 6.4 kph/4 mph across country and obstacles). But after the First World War the original British 28-ton, rhomboid tanks were replaced by lighter types armed with anti-tank guns up to 50 mm. (1.95 in.) calibre mounted in revolving turrets, with 14 to 20 mm. (.54 to .78 in.) homogenous steel armour, speeds up to 29 kph (18 mph), and marginally improved mechanical reliability. Most were modelled on the Vickers Medium of 1922 and were similar in layout to Second World War tanks (see table for principal types).

Experiments in tank warfare during the 1920s and 1930s centred on infantry support tactics, long-range so-called independent operations, and tank versus tank action, all controlled by radio communications. The first role called for ‘infantry tanks’, proof against existing anti-tank weapons but slower than those for the second role which demanded tanks with lighter armour and a wide radius of action. The size of anti-tank weapon dictated a tank's size—the bigger the gun, the larger the turret; therefore the heavier the vehicle and the more powerful the engine. But increased complexity in search of a universal machine, capable of fulfilling all roles, only placed extreme demands on technical feasibility and manufacturing capacity—as well as cost when governments were insisting upon cheapness. Compromise ruled.

British and French tanks in 1939 were either very light (up to 10 tons), fast, and machine-gun armed; slower 20-ton mediums with light armour and an anti-tank gun; and very slow 30-ton machines armoured against 37 mm. (1.44 in.) high velocity (HV) guns. The Germans also built light tanks but no heavies yet; instead their mediums, the Mark III with a 37 mm. gun and Mark IV with a short 75 mm. (2.9 in.) piece firing only shells and smoke, had only 30 mm. (1.17 in.) armour, or less, compared with opponents up to 60 mm. (2.34 in.). The Soviets, on the other hand, built light and heavy tanks (mostly based on British Vickers designs) and 48 kph (30 mph) mediums based on the designs of the American J. Walter Christie (whom the British also copied for one of their medium types, the so-called cruiser tanks). Both the Japanese and Italians were influenced by pre-war Vickers designs and concentrated on infantry support vehicles which, in due course, fell well below the standards of other major combatants in all respects.

After gaining experience in the battles of 1940, the Germans and British accelerated the classic gun versus armour contest. The first German reaction was to equip their infantry, instead of tanks, with the improved 50 mm. anti-tank gun. The British aimed to mount 57 mm. guns and also fit 80 mm. (3.1 in.) armour to their newest medium tanks. The Soviets meanwhile, in great secrecy, produced in quantity in 1941 two revolutionary models—the 43-ton KV 1B, with 110 mm. (4.3 in.) armour, and the 26-ton Christie medium T34/76A with 45 mm. (1.75 in.) sloped armour. The former was proof against the German 88 mm. (3.4 in.) dual-purpose gun and both were armed with the dual-purpose 76 mm. (2.9 in.) gun. These tanks shook the Germans into emergency up-armouring and arming of their Mark III and IV mediums, and hastening the design and production of the 56-ton Tiger I Tank, with 88 mm. gun, and the 45-ton Panther with an extra-long 75 mm. gun.

Tanks: Armoured fighting vehicles, 1939-45

Year	Year entered service	Length	Width	Armour max.	Weight tons	Power plant hp	Max. speed	Main armament	Crew
Source: Contributor.
France
D 1A	1931	4.9 m	2.2. m	30 mm (1.2 in)	12	150	9.3 kph (12 mph)	1 × 37 mm	3
		(16 ft)	(7 ft 3 in)					(1.44 in)
Somua S 35	1936	5.4 m	2.1 m	55 mm (2.1 in)	20	190	40 kph (25 mph)	1 × 47 mm	3
		(17 ft 8 in)	(7 ft 1 in)					(1.83 in)
Renault R 35	1935	4.1 m	1.9 m	45 mm (1.8 in)	9.8	82	20 kph (12.5 mph)	1 × 37 mm	2
		(13. ft 4 in)	(6 ft 2 in)
B 1 bis	1939	16.6 m	2.5 m	60 mm (2.3 in)	32	300	28.2 kph (17.5 mph)	1 ×75 mm	4
		(21 ft 9 in)	(8 ft 3 in)					(2.9 in)
Hotchkiss H 35	1935	4.3 m	1.8 m	34 mm (1.3 in)	11.4	75	28.2 kph	1 × 37 mm	2
		(14 ft 1 in)	(6 ft)
Germany
PzKpfw IA	1934	4 m	2 m	13 mm (0.5 in)	5.4	60	40 kph	2 mg	2
		(13 ft 2 in)	(6 ft 7 in)
PzKpfw IIC	1937	4.8 m	2.1 m	30 mm	8.8	140	25.7 kph (16 mph)	1 × 20 mm	3
		(15 ft 10 in)	(7 ft 1 in)					(0.8 in)
PzKpfw IIID	1938	5.5 m	2.9 m	30 mm	19.3	320	40 kph	1 × 37 mm	5
		(18 ft)	(9 ft 8 in)
PzKpfw IVA	1936	5.7 m	2.8 m	20 mm (0.8 in)	17.3	250	30 kph (18.5 mph)	1 × 75 mm	5
		(18 ft 8 in)	(9 ft 4 in)
PzKpfw IIIJ	1941	5.4 m	2.9 m	50 mm (2 in)	22	320	45 kph (28 mph)	1 × 50 mm	5
		(17 ft 9 in)	(9 ft 7 in)					(1.9 in)
PzKpfw IVG	1942	5.9 m	2.9 m	50 mm	23.6	300	40 kph	1 × 75 mm	5
		(19 ft 4 in)	(9 ft 7 in)
PzKpfw Panther D	1943	7 m	3.5 m	80 mm (3.1 in)	43	650	45 kph	1 × 75 mm	5
		(22 ft 11 in)	(11 ft 5 in)
PzKpfw Tiger I	1942	6.9 m	3.8 m	100 mm (3.9 in)	55	700	37 kph (23 mph)	1 × 88 mm	5
		(22 ft 8 in)	(12 ft 5 in)					(3.4 in)
PzKpfw Tiger II	1944	7.4 m	3.8 m	150 mm (5.9 in)	68	700	37 kph	1 × 88 mm	5
		(24 ft 2 in)	(12 ft 5 in)
Italy
CV 3/33	1933	3 m	1.4 m	14 mm (0.5 in)	3.35	43	42 kph	2 mg	2
		(9 ft 11 in)	(4 ft 6 in)
M 11/39	1939	4.7 m	2.2 m	30 mm	11	105	32.2 kph (20 mph) 1 x 37 mm 3
		(15 ft 6 in)	(7 ft 3 in)
M 13/40	1940	4.9 m	2.2 m	40 mm (1.6 in)	14	105	30.6 kph (19 mph)	1 × 47 mm	4
		(16 ft 2 in)
Japan
Type 89A	1929	5.1 m	2.2 m	17 mm (0.7 in)	13	118	24.1 kph (15 mph)	1 × 57 mm	4
		(16 ft 8 in)	(7 ft 3 in)					(2.22 in)
T95 Kyu-go	1935	3 m	2 m	14 mm	7.4	110	45 kph	1 × 37 mm	3
		(10 ft 1 in)	(6 ft 7 in)
T97 Chi Ha	1937	5 m	2 m	25 mm	14	170	38.6 kph (24 mph)	1 × 57 mm	4
		(16 ft 7 in)	(6 ft 7 in)
T97 Chi-nu	1937	5.1 m	2 m	50 mm	18.8	240	38.6 kph	1 × 75 mm	5
		(16 ft 8 in)	(6 ft 7 in)
UK
Vickers Medium I	1923	5.3 m	2.8 m	6.25 mm	11.7	90	24 kph	1 × 47 mm	5
		(17 ft 6 in)	(9 ft 1 in)	(0.24 in)
Cruiser Mark I	1938	5.8 m	2.5 m	14 mm	12	150	40 kph	1 × 40 mm	6
		(19 ft 3 in)	(8 ft 4 in)					(1.5 in)
Infantry Mark I	1938	4.9 m	2.3 m	60 mm	11	70	12.9 kph (8 mph)	1 mg	2
		(15 ft 11 in)	(7 ft 6 in)
Light Mark VIB	1936	3.9 m	2 m	14 mm	5.5	89	56.3 kph (35 mph)	2 mg	3
		(13 ft)	(6 ft 7 in)
Cruiser Mark IV	1939	6 m	2.5 m	30 mm	15	340	48.3 kph (30 mph)	1 × 40 mm	4
		(19 ft 9 in)	(8 ft 3 in)
Infantry Mark II	1940	5.6 m	2.5 m	78 mm (3 in)	26	5 2 × 87	24 kph	1 × 40 mm	4
(Matilda)		(18 ft 5 in)	(8 ft 3 in)
Infantry Mark III	1940	5.5 m	2.7 m	65 mm	17	135	24 kph	1 × 40 mm	3
(Valentine I)		(17 ft 11 in)	(8 ft 9 in)	(2.5 in)
Infantry Mark IV	1941	7.4 m)	3.3 m	102 mm	38.5	350	27.4 kph	1 × 76 mm	5
(Churchill I)		(24 ft 5 in)	(10 ft 8 in)	(4 in)			(17 mph)	(2.9 in)
Light Mark VII	1941	4.3 m	2.3 m	10 mm	7.5	165	64.3 kph	1 × 40 mm	3
(Tetrarch)		(14 ft 1 in)	(7 ft 6 in)	(0.4 in)			(40 mph)
Cruiser Mark VI	1941	6 m	2.6 m	40 mm	19	340	42 kph	1 × 40 mm	5
(Crusader I)		(19 ft 8 in)	(8 ft 8 in)
Cruiser Mark VII	1943	6.3 m	2.9 m	76 mm	27.5	600	61.1 kph	1 × 75 mm	5
(Cromwell IV)		(20 ft 10 in)	(9 ft 7 in)	(2.9 in)			(38 mph)
Churchill VII	1944	7.4 m	3.5 m	152 mm	40	350	19.3 kph	1 × 75 mm	5
		(24 ft 5 in)	(11 ft 4 in)	(5.9 in)
Comet	1944	6.5 m	3 m	101 mm	32.5	600	46.6 kph	1 × 77 mm	5
		(21 ft 6 in)	(9 ft 10 in)	(4 in)			(29 mph)	(3 in)
USA
M 3 Light (Stuart I)	1940	4.5 m	2.3 m	43 mm	12.3	250	56 kph	1 × 37 mm	4
		(14 ft 9 in)	(7 ft 6 in)	(1.7 in)
M 3 Medium (Grant)	1942	5.6 m	2.7 m	50 mm	27	340	42 kph	1 × 75 mm	6
		(18 ft 6 in)	(8 ft 9 in)					1 × 37 mm
M 4 Medium (Sherman I)	1942	6 m	2.7 m	76 mm	30	353	40 kph	1 × 75 mm	5
		(19 ft 7 in)	(8 ft 9 in)
M 24 Light (Chaffee)	1944	5.9 m	3 m	38 mm	18 2 × 110	56 kph	1 × 75 mm	4
		(19 ft 4 in)	(9 ft 10 in)	(1.5 in)
M 4 A3 E8 Medium	1944	6.2 m	2.7 m	100 mm	33	450	40 kph	1 × 76 mm	5
		(20 ft 7 in)	(8 ft 9 in)
M 26 (Pershing)	1945	6.5 m	3.6 m	102 mm	41	500	48 kph	1 × 90 mm	5
		(21 ft 4 in)	(11 ft 8 in)					(3.5 in)
USSR
T 26B	1931	5 m	2.4 m	15 mm	9.4	91	28.2 kph	1 × 45 mm	3
		(16 ft 3 in)	(8 ft)	(0.6 in)				(1.7 in)
BT 2	1931	5.8 m	2.2 m	13 mm	10.2	343	61 kph	1 × 37 mm	3
		(19 ft 2 in)	(7 ft 3 in)
T 35	1935	9.8 m	3.3 m	30 mm	45	500	29 kph	1 × 76.2 mm	10
		(32 ft 4 in)	(10 ft 8 in)				(18 mph)	(3 in)
								2 x 45 mm
BT 7	1935	5.7 m	2.3 m	22 mm	13.8	450	53 kph	1 × 45 mm	3
		(18 ft 10 in)	(7 ft 6 in)	(0.9 in)			(33 mph)
Heavy KV1A	1940	6.8 m	3.4 m	90 mm	43.5	600	33.7 kph	1 × 76.2 mm	5
		(22 ft 6 in)	(11 ft)	(3.5 in)			(21 mph)
Medium T 34/76A	1941	6 m	3 m	45 mm	26.3	500	53 kph	1 × 76.2 mm	4
		(19 ft 9 in)	(9 ft 10 in)
Light T 70	1942	4.4 m	2.4 m	45 mm	9.2	2 × 70	43.4 kph	1 x 45 mm	2
		(14 ft 4 in)	(8 ft)				(27 mph)
T 34/85	1943	6.2 m	3 m	75 mm	32	500	49.9 kph	1 × 85 mm	4
		(20 ft 3 in)	(9 ft 10 in)	(2.9 in)			(31 mph)	(3.3 in)
JS II	1944	6.8 m	3.1 m	160 mm	46	600	35.4 kph	1 × 122 mm	4
		(22 ft 6 in)	(10 ft 2 in)	(6.2 in)			(22 mph)	(4.7 in)
T 44	1945	6.2 m	3.2 m	90 mm	32	520	515 kph	1 × 85 mm	4
		(20 ft 3 in)	(10 ft 6 in)				(32 mph)
JS III	1945	6.7 m	3.3 m	230 mm	46	600	40 kph	1 × 122 mm	4
		(22 ft 2 in)	(10 ft 8 in)	(9 in)

Concurrently with developments in Europe there were advances in the USA, where the need for a medium tank with a 75 mm. gun led first to the stop-gap Lee/Grant design, with 75 mm. gun in a side sponson and 37 mm. in a turret, first used by the British during the Gazala battle in June 1942. Then came the reliable Sherman, with 75 mm. gun in turret, which would be the principal universal battle tank of the Allies for the rest of the war, ousting the British concept of specialized slow Infantry and fast Medium tanks.

After 1942 rapidly expanding Allied production left the Germans far behind in numbers. Only quality and superior tactics could redress the balance. This their Panthers and Tigers—supplemented by an increasing number of tracked assault guns and Jagdpanzers (more easily produced tank hulls mounting guns with limited traverse)—managed to achieve against the British and Americans; but they found it more difficult against the Soviet 46-ton JS tanks, with 100 or 122 mm. (3.9 or 4.7 in.) guns, and the latest mark of T34, with an 85 mm. gun, which provided very tough technical opposition. Indeed, British tanks were outclassed in every respect from 1942 onwards, while the American decision in 1943 to postpone development of the Sherman's successor, and depend upon vast numbers of improved Shermans, was nearly disastrous, a situation which was only partially redeemed when the British fitted the Sherman with their own good 17-pdr. (76.2 mm.) gun in 1944.

In one department the British excelled: the development of specialized AFVs, such as flame-throwers (called Crocodiles) and infantry carriers (Kangaroos), adapted from obsolescent tanks (see also amphibians and engineers, 1(d)).

From their debut in action in 1916 the tanks' demise at the hands of the latest anti-tank weapons had been foretold. Yet in 1945, out of need for mobility and due to improved technology and techniques, they dominated battlefields by the tens of thousands.

2. Tank warfare

Tracked Armoured Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) made their battle debut in September 1916 during the First World War. At first they were used as auxiliaries to infantry, operating within the limits of their slow speed, short range, and poor mech anical reliability. But as improvements were made Colonel J. F. C. Fuller of the British Tank Corps advanced ideas for penetration in depth of the enemy lines by armoured forces, supported by aircraft: a concept he expanded in his celebrated Plans 1918 and 1919 which were blueprints for blitzkrieg (see also land power).

In the 1920s, while most armies regarded AFVs as infantry adjuncts alone, the British experimented with the so-called ‘independent’ role of all-arms mechanized forces, in which the tank was the dominant weapon and from which horses were excluded. In the 1930s, while the French and the Soviets were forming mixed divisions either for infantry support or in the traditional cavalry roles of reconnaissance and exploitation of success, the Germans (inspired by Guderian) copied the British by creating armoured (Panzer) divisions. Armoured divisions were organized for all phases of land warfare—reconnaissance, advance to contact, attack, exploitation, defence, and withdrawal by day and night. Ideally, their combat vehicles were to be fully armoured, although this, for economic and industrial reasons, was never achieved. Essentially, however, their flexibility and ability to concentrate rapidly against decisive points, was dependent upon efficient radio communications enabling fluent command and control with maximum economy.

Tank tactics at their most sophisticated, under Guderian's tutelage, revolved around close co-operation by tanks, armoured cars, infantry, artillery, and engineers within ad hoc battle groups, supported by aircraft. After careful reconnaissance they would seek out and attack the opposing side's weak spots to occupy vital ground. This ground they would then hold with infantry and anti-tank weapons as a pivot for further offensive action. Although most tanks were armed for tank versus tank combat, it was hoped to provoke the opposing side into expending tanks against the pivot's anti-tank guns. This conserved the more valuable tanks to spearhead thrusts into their opponents' rear with mobile columns, logistically self-contained for three or four days, which were aimed at strategic and politically sensitive objectives.

In the Polish campaign of September 1939 these methods proved themselves, although the Germans found (as the British and French had realized when providing special infantry support tanks) that the ordinary infantry divisions needed AFVs to stiffen their offensive spirit. Prior to the German invasion of western Europe in May 1940 (see FALL GELB), therefore, a number of armoured assault guns (self-propelled guns) were produced for infantry support—with a significant outcome. For thereafter assault guns, with tanks, played a dominant role in tank warfare, particularly in tank versus tank combat as far larger, high velocity guns were needed to defeat improved armour in the classic gun versus armour race.

Tank warfare dominated campaigns in open terrain—in western Europe, the Eastern Front, the Western Desert, and North Africa—where freedom of movement was least impeded and static defences were easily outflanked and logistical support relatively easy to sustain. It was also effective in the mountains during the Balkan campaign in 1941 when the Yugoslavs, Greeks, and British were hopelessly outclassed. The tank thrived against smaller opponents, even in defensively favourable surroundings, but this superiority tended to diminish once forces of rough equality were pitted against each other in built-up areas, such as Stalingrad, or in adverse terrain.

As the Axis forces lost the initiative after 1942, and their initial offensive superiority was eroded, they developed highly effective anti-tank defences. These were founded upon the maximum utilization of employing counter-strokes within a framework of strategically located static defences keyed to natural or man-made obstacles. The laying of mines, to delay tanks and channel them into killing zones dominated by artillery and anti-tank guns, meant expensive and time-consuming Allied set-piece attacks by all arms; and attacks also frequently needed specialized AFVs to create gaps in minefields, cross water obstacles, and demolish obstructions and strong points (see engineers, 1(d)).

Having at last refined the blitzkrieg technique, the Allies were frequently compelled to indulge in attritional warfare to wear down their opponents' tank and logistical strength before achieving the breakthrough and thrusting enormous armoured forces deep into their opponents' rear. The second battle of El Alamein, successive Soviet offensives from Stalingrad onwards, and the latter phase of the Normandy campaign are outstanding examples of tank warfare in the modern style—offensives which as often as not were halted more by logistical factors (notably fuel shortage) than by force of arms.

Notwithstanding the magnetic drama of massed armoured forces in motion, the effects of small groups or even individual tanks in special situations must not be overlooked. On narrow frontages, such as the jungle trails of Burma, the effect of a single tank pushed forward by immense engineer effort, could be as decisive as a regiment of 60 tanks in a European setting. Regardless of improved anti-tank measures, the mobility, firepower, and protection of tanks, regardless of numbers, was as potent in 1945 as in 1939.

Kenneth Macksey

Bibliography

Macksey, K. , Tank versus Tank (London, 1991).
—— Guderian (London, 1992).
Orgorkiewicz, R. , Armour (London, 1960).