rivalries

rivalries. It was natural that German troops working with Italians, or British with Americans, were always anxious that their own nation's methods and turn-out should be superior to their allies' the feeling was reciprocal. Inter-service rivalry was commonplace, too. In the RAF, all ranks were conscious that their service was the most junior, but the most efficient and the most up-to-date of the armed forces of the crown; while all ranks of the Royal Navy were aware that they belonged to the oldest organized fighting force in the world; and in the British Army everyone knew that without the army the war could not be won. Within each service, inter-unit rivalry was also normal; it was officially encouraged in the navy, by competitions between ships. In the Brigade of Guards, a (later highly distinguished) Coldstream officer was heard to remark that his object on the battlefield was ‘teaching those damned Grenadiers how to fight’. Even within units, sub-units strove with each other, to be the best platoon in the company, or the best squadron or battery in the regiment.

All this was good for morale, but rivalries could have a damaging effect on operational efficiency. Inter-service rivalry between the US Navy and the US Army was endemic at the start of the war; Pearl Harbor was a classic example of how this attitude encouraged the lack of co-operation that hindered the two services before and during the attack. Rivalry led to Mussolini backing the Italian Air Force's refusal to allow a separate air arm for the Italian Navy, with disastrous consequences for the navy's fighting efficiency in the battle for the Mediterranean. The Imperial Japanese Navy and Army were at such loggerheads that, inter alia, Japanese development of radar was seriously hindered; their respective intelligence departments devoted almost as much time to gathering information about the rival service as they ever did to finding out about the other side. Rivalry also bred lack of trust; allies seldom if ever trust each other entirely. Certainly, Soviet agents kept Stalin better informed about the Americans and the British than about the Axis (see spies).

Inter-secret-service rivalry, notoriously, was often especially bitter—as between the NKVD and the GRU, or the Abwehr and the Sicherheitsdienst (see RSHA), or MI6 and SOE. Towards the end of the war the Sicherheitsdienst hanged the head of the Abwehr; this was extreme.

M. R. D. Foot