origins of the war

origins of the war. The events which led to the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe and the Pacific followed a well-known path—the via dolorosa of mankind in the 1930s and early 1940s. The great economic depression which began in 1929 destroyed the growing economic and political stability achieved during the 1920s and set every great power on the road to economic nationalism. It provoked, especially in Europe, a sharp rise in political extremism, and notably the advent of Hitler to power in Germany. In Europe, events then moved with accelerating speed. In March 1935 Germany openly proclaimed its rearmament, in defiance of the disarmament clauses of the Versailles settlement of 1919. In October 1935 Italy invaded Abyssinia, and in the process robbed the League of Nations of its remaining credibility as a safeguard of international security. In March 1936 Germany occupied the Rhineland, previously demilitarized under the Versailles settlement and the Treaty of Locarno. In March 1938 the Germans first occupied and then annexed Austria. At the end of September 1938 the Munich agreement accepted German annexation of the Sudetenland, and in March 1939 the remains of Czechoslovakia were broken up, mostly falling under German control. In April 1939 Italian forces occupied Albania. Meanwhile, from July 1936 to March 1939, the Spanish Civil War was being waged, threatening from time to time to spill over into the rest of Europe. For some three years there was a sense of undeclared war. Then on 1 September 1939 Germany attacked Poland, two days later France and the UK declared war on Germany, and the war was formally under way. Poland was rapidly conquered by Germany during the Polish campaign, with the USSR joining in from the east. After a pause—the phoney war—German aggression was resumed, this time at headlong speed. In April the Germans launched their Norwegian campaign; in May they invaded the Low Countries and France (see FALL GELB); and by the end of June the fall of France was accomplished. In October 1940 Mussolini opened the Balkan campaign by attacking Greece; and Germany joined in by invading Yugoslavia and Greece in April 1941. Finally in June 1941 the German assault on the Soviet Union was launched (see BARBAROSSA), and the climax of the long movement towards total European war was reached.

In Asia and the Pacific events followed a similar course. In 1931–2 the Japanese occupied Manchuria (see Manchukuo). In July 1937 a clash at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking led to the China incident. Nanking was captured in December 1937, and Canton in October 1938. By the end of 1939 Japan had occupied the whole north-eastern quarter of China, together with all the major ports. In July 1940 the Japanese took advantage of the German victories in Europe by forcing the British to close the Burma Road, one of the few supply routes remaining to the Chinese; and in September they compelled France to allow Japanese forces to enter northern French Indo-China. In July 1941 this occupation was extended to southern French Indo-China, where the Japanese stood poised for a move southwards. At that point the USA, which since 1939 had imposed limited economic sanctions against Japan, imposed an oil embargo, which was joined by the British and the Dutch and so became virtually total. The Japanese decided to break it by force. On 7 December 1941 they attacked the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, and elsewhere began a sweeping assault which swiftly overran all the American, British and Dutch colonies in South-East Asia.

The two drives for expansion (German and Italian in Europe, Japanese in Asia) appeared very similar, and there were some links between them (see Axis strategy and co-operation). In November 1936 Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern pact, to which Italy adhered a year later. In September 1940 the three powers concluded the Tripartite Pact, agreeing to co-operate in establishing their respective ‘New Orders’ across the world. Taken together, events in the two continents attained such a momentum and revealed such powerful forces at work that an air of inevitability has come to dominate the whole process, and the phrase ‘the roots of war’ has attained more than a conventional meaning.

Once the search for the roots of an inevitable conflict has begun, there is no shortage of them to be found. Let us look first at Europe, where one root is at once apparent in the profoundly unstable nature of the peace settlements of 1919–20. At the end of the First World War Germany was defeated but not crushed, mutilated in body through loss of territory and wounded in pride by the so-called ‘war guilt’ clause of the Versailles settlement, yet still with a large population and great industrial resources. In such circumstances, a war launched by Germany to reassert national pride and predominance was a distinct possibility. At the same time, eastern Europe was completely transformed, on utterly insecure foundations. No fewer than nine new or renewed states came into being at the end of the war: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. All these states had disputed frontiers. All claimed to be nation states, but nationalities were so scattered across the map that every country contained substantial alien minorities such as the Volksdeutsche. Poland and Czechoslovakia were particularly vulnerable in this respect; but everywhere the problems posed by national minorities were almost insoluble, and an appeal to force was always possible.

This does not exhaust the tale of instability in eastern Europe. In 1918 events of a quite extraordinary nature had occurred. First Russia and then Germany had suffered overwhelming defeat within a year, and it was from the wreckage of that double defeat that new states had emerged, from the Baltic to the Carpathians. But these conditions could not last. As Germany and Russia regained their strength the new states would be threatened: they had been built on a sandbank at low tide, and as German and Russian power rose again they were almost bound to be overwhelmed.

The European settlement of 1919–20 presented a bleak and depressing prospect, offering the likelihood of war in various forms: war by Germany to restore its dominance in Europe; war by France or Poland to prevent any such thing; or conflict in eastern Europe arising out of any of its numerous points of friction. It is this dreary vision which has led many observers to claim that the two World Wars were parts of a single whole—a new Thirty Years War. It is surely true that some causes of renewed conflict were embedded in the consequences of the First World War, from which, despite the signing of the Kellogg–Briand Pact by almost all sovereign states, hostilities of some sort might well arise. But there is a long step from a war of some sort to that which actually developed in Europe between 1939 and 1941. Europe changed a great deal in the period between the wars, notably in terms of ideology, economics, and strategic thought.

It was ideology which produced the most startling changes. Europe in the 1930s was vibrant with ideological conflict, and Italy and Germany were dominated by regimes which proclaimed the virtues of war, dynamism, and expansion. If the doctrines of fascism and Nazism were followed to their conclusion, then war was almost bound to ensue. In the case of Italian fascism, the situation was not too grave, because Italy was not strong enough to sustain a major war; but even so fascism transformed Italian diplomatic style from a cautious Machiavellianism to an erratic bravado, and from 1935 onwards Italian foreign policy was launched upon a career of almost ceaseless aggression and disturbance. The attack on Abyssinia in 1935, intervention in the Spanish Civil War, the occupation of Albania, attacks on France in June 1940 and Greece in October—all added to the tensions in Europe and extended the area of conflict. Moreover, fascist Italy made common cause with Nazi Germany in the Rome—Berlin Axis; and while there may be doubts about the threat posed by Italy, there can be none about Nazi Germany.

Nazi ideology pointed plainly towards war. This does not mean that we should accept Hitler's Mein Kampf as a blue print or a programme of action in foreign policy. But there were powerful and consistent elements in his thoughts and emotions: living space (Lebensraum) for the German people; a racial doctrine directed against both Jews and Slavs; anti-Bolshevism; and a sort of social Darwinism which saw all politics in terms of a struggle for existence. All these pointed towards a great war in the east, where living space was to be found, and where the Soviet Union concentrated Jewish, Slavonic, and Bolshevik enemies into a single whole. If these broad aims of Nazi ideology were seriously pursued, they would lead inevitably to war. Moreover, we must look not only at ideological aims, but at methods. The Nazis applied in foreign policy the tactics which served them so well in their domestic struggles—intimidation, subversion, and deceit, all applied with a malevolent yet inspired boldness. For some time, such methods brought them success without war (as in Austria and Czechoslovakia), but in the long run they produced such revulsion in other countries that they made war certain. A state which behaved in such a way generated total mistrust, so that negotiation became impossible.

Ideological issues, of course, had more than one aspect. The ideologies of fascism and Nazism faced other systems of thought and belief in communism and liberal democracy, both of which were threatened in their very lives by the advance of fascism. This was no illusion: when war came, the successive victors imposed forms of government and ways of life upon the vanquished. Europe was in the grip of a conflict of values and ideas, which was a profound force in the movement towards war.

When we turn to economics, the position is less clear-cut. The economic interest of many states lay in avoiding war. This was particularly true for the UK, where governments were unwilling to divert resources into armaments, and where it was correctly calculated that all-out war would speedily render the country bankrupt. Moreover, the UK had excellent short-term reasons for maintaining good economic relations with Germany, which in 1938 was the fifth largest customer for British exports. In France, the effects of the depression were felt later than elsewhere, reaching their worst in 1935. The economy continued to stagnate in subsequent years, and France was acutely conscious of its industrial weakness as against Germany. In economic terms, it had every reason to avoid a confrontation with its powerful rival. The Soviet Union was in a different position, with no inhibitions about devoting a large part of its economic efforts to armaments. But collectivization of agriculture, over-rapid industrialization and the purges of the 1930s brought economic dislocation, and the USSR had compelling economic reasons to avoid war. Italy too, despite its belligerent record, suffered from grave weaknesses, and had an economy incapable of sustaining a serious war (see Italy, 2).

Economic interests, crossing ideological lines, thus generally pointed towards keeping out of war. But from this consensus there was one crucial exception: Germany. The German economy recovered rapidly from the end of 1932 onwards, achieving almost full employment by 1938. From 1935 this recovery was accompanied by large-scale and rapid rearmament. The natural consequence was a sharp increase in imports of raw materials and food; and imports have to be paid for. By 1938 and 1939 Germany was facing a balance of payments crisis, with neither exports nor foreign exchange available on the scale necessary to pay for its imports. One solution would have been to slow down the pace of rearmament, but Hitler ruled this out. Another was expansion and conquest, which might produce direct results (for example, by annexing Lorraine and its iron ore); or it might work indirectly but very effectively. In May 1940, when Germany was enjoying military success all over Europe and the British and French were powerless, it proved easy for Germany to secure from Romania a highly favourable agreement for the export of Romanian oil. Similarly, after Germany had occupied Norway, it was possible to sign an advantageous agreement with Sweden for the export of iron ore. The German government believed that war could be made to pay, and in the short run this proved correct.

This leads to questions of strategic calculation. It is generally agreed that the Second World War in Europe was not brought about by the generals: in most European countries (including Germany) the professional military men urged caution upon their governments. But while the German generals were conscious of the defects in their forces (the German Army was less strong in depth and less well trained than its predecessor of 1914), the Nazi leaders saw that for a few years between about 1938 and 1941 they had a window of strategic opportunity. The German Army and Luftwaffe were amply strong enough to strike terror among potential enemies, as was successfully achieved by ostentatious displays of air power during the Czechoslovakian crisis in 1938. They were also highly capable of rapid assaults and quick victories (see blitzkrieg), as they showed in Poland in 1939 and France in 1940, even if they were not yet ready to wage prolonged war against powerful adversaries. This period of superiority might not last long, and while it existed there was a strong temptation to exploit it.

Thus the picture builds up. A fundamentally unstable European situation, combined with the expansionist drive of Germany (and to a lesser extent Italy), propelled by ideology, economic forces, and the need to seize a fleeting strategic opportunity, make the case for the inevitability of war appear very strong. But it is not yet complete. What of the powers which might have been expected to defend the status quo: France, the UK, and the USSR? All these three powers at best seemed paralysed in face of advancing German expansion, and at worst positively encouraged it. Why was this?

France seemed destined to be an early victim of the German advance, and yet it remained passive. The reasons are not far to seek. The First World war had cost France dear, with some 1,300,000 dead and a calamitous fall in the birthrate during the war, with consequences which worked their way inexorably onwards, culminating in the ‘hollow years’ of 1935 and 1936, when the numbers of men attaining call-up age for the army fell drastically. France had won the First World War, but could it afford any more such victories? In political terms, the country was suffering from sharp internal conflicts, unstable governments, and a stagnant economy. In foreign policy, France was caught in a dreadful dilemma. If it resisted the growth of German power, it risked a war which could at best only end in a Pyrrhic victory. If it acquiesced in that growth, the best it could hope for was to be eaten last. French ministers might not have been directly acquainted with Mr Micawber, but it is not surprising that they waited for something to turn up.

The UK was at any rate not paralysed. Its governments were stable, and when Chamberlain became prime minister in 1937 he was determined to pursue an active foreign policy. The basis of that policy was to avoid war if possible (though not at the expense of fundamental British interests), and to secure a lasting European settlement. The policy of ‘appeasement’, meaning the satisfaction of reasonable German and Italian aspirations by negotiation, arose from powerful motives. We have already noted the economic case for avoiding war, or even rapid rearmament. Behind that, as in France, lay the pressures exerted by memories of the First World War, which no one wanted to repeat. There were also compelling strategic arguments. British resources were overstretched, and in 1937 the Chiefs of Staff prudently advised that the task of British diplomacy should be to diminish the number of the country's enemies. Three adversaries—Germany, Italy, and Japan—were too many. The economic, psychological, and strategic constraints placed upon British policy were severe; and if a negotiated settlement could be reached with Germany or Italy, it would be reasonable to try for it.

The Soviet Union was not in principle a supporter of the status quo; indeed by its nature and origins it was revolutionary. But in both ideological and territorial terms it appeared threatened by Nazi Germany, and for some time it followed an anti-German course. In 1935 the Soviet Union concluded an alliance with France, while its adjunct the Comintern proclaimed a policy of Popular Fronts against fascism. In March 1938 the Soviet government proposed a conference of countries opposed to German aggression, only to be ignored by the British and French. In 1939 there were negotiations for a three-power alliance between the USSR, France, and the UK, but the British showed only a half-hearted interest. Finally Stalin opted instead for an agreement with Germany, the Nazi–Soviet Pact of 23 August 1939, by which Poland was to be partitioned and eastern Europe divided into spheres of influence.

In short, all three potential defenders of the status quo accepted the growth of German power, tried to accommodate it by negotiation, and on occasion even encouraged it. A series of occasions for resistance was allowed to pass by. In March 1936 France permitted Germany to remilitarize the Rhineland unopposed, which has been seen (rightly or wrongly) as the best opportunity to stop Hitler with only limited use of force. In 1938 the UK and France virtually coerced Czechoslovakia into surrendering the Sudetenland. In August 1939 Stalin met the Germans halfway in partitioning eastern Europe. It is salutary to reflect that Munich and the Nazi–Soviet Pact were very similar in their nature and consequences, though the name of Stalin is not usually so closely associated with ‘appeasement’ as those of Chamberlain or the French foreign minister, Georges Bonnet (1889–1973).

The ultimate consequence of this behaviour by the potential defenders of the status quo was to permit Germany (Italy was less important) to advance so far that it could no longer be resisted except at the cost of a major war. The occasions when the cost might have been smaller, or when Germany might have been deterred without war, passed by. However, this did not mean that Germany would never be resisted. ‘Appeasement’ did not mean peace at any price for any of its practitioners, who all had fundamental interests which would not be abandoned without a fight. If Germany's drive for expansion continued—as it did—it would certainly at some point be opposed. The questions were when, where, and by whom?

So the case builds up for the inevitability of war; but at the same time the limitations of that case can be discerned. The roots were present, with the potential to grow and bring forth fruit in the shape of a European war. Yet there were also decisions to be made. The idea of decision is inherent in the widely held concept of ‘lost opportunities’ to check Hitler, in the Rhineland or Czechoslovakia. It is also clear that leading figures changed their minds on occasion, and thus were not completely in the grip of inexorable forces. Hitler himself hesitated in September 1938. Up to 27 September there was every sign that he intended to press ahead with an invasion of Czechoslovakia. German forces were moving up to the frontier, and the assault was set for 30 September. Yet two days before he drew back, and accepted the idea of a conference. For whatever reason—the unreliability of Mussolini, the lukewarm response of the crowds in Berlin, or the mobilization of the British fleet or of the Czech Army—he did not take the final step. In August and September 1939 the story was different. This time Hitler was set on war, and seems to have been determined that no one should cheat him out of it. Thus Hitler, who of all the European leaders was the most fixed upon war, decided against it in 1938 and for it in 1939. Similarly Mussolini decided in September 1939 to stay out of the war, though he was supposedly committed to Germany by the Pact of Steel; and then in June 1940 he changed his mind and joined in, to make sure of his share of the spoils.

Chamberlain too changed his mind, and indeed his policy. In 1938 he was set on a negotiated settlement with Germany, but by the end of March 1939 he had come to believe that Germany was out to dominate Europe by force, and would have to be resisted, if necessary by war. It would have been possible, and in many ways would have been the logical continuation of previous policy, to permit further German expansion in eastern Europe, but in fact Chamberlain and the British government chose otherwise. The same was true of Daladier and the French government, though with great reluctance and with heavy hearts.

Thus choices were possible. The significant point about the changes of mind just described is that they all brought war nearer. Only one ruler of a great European power continued to the end to believe that he both could and should avoid war: Stalin. The Soviet Union was forced into the war in June 1941 by the brutal imperative of a German invasion (see BARBAROSSA). All the others decided that a point had been reached at which they must fight. In this process, Poland was the catalyst. In 1939 the Poles were determined not to yield an inch of territory, nor to permit a German take-over of Danzig. They were prepared to fight rather than give way, and they were astonishingly confident in their power to resist. In Poland, Hitler encountered for the first time an adversary who could not be bullied; and again the element of choice is demonstrated.

Thus the events of 1939 took shape. German expansion had already made great progress, and by the end of March Poland, the UK, and France had decided that any further aggression must be resisted. A pattern of almost geometrical precision then emerged, and war could only have been avoided in one of three ways. First, Germany might have settled for what it had gained already. Second, Germany's potential opponents (especially the UK, France, and the USSR) might have combined in an alliance so formidable that Germany would have been deterred from any further advance. Third, those opponents, singly or together, might have decided to accept the further growth of German power, and make what terms they could. None of these things happened. Germany pressed on. the Grand Alliance against it did not yet materialize. The Soviet Union struck a bargain with Germany, but Poland, the UK, and France did not. And so war came.

What was it about? It was in a fundamental sense Hitler's war. It is true that in September he found himself in a war which he had not expected, because he had not counted on an Anglo-French declaration of war; but it is more important that he pursued a course which would lead to German dominance in Europe, and which was bound at some point to be resisted. What German dominance meant can be seen by examining the fate of Europe over the next few years. Churchill remarked in the summer of 1940 that those who said they did not know what they were fighting about should stop fighting, and they would see. It was a simple observation, which contained much truth. In practice, Germany's opponents were fighting to protect their own territory, independence, and way of life, and in the long run to overthrow that German dominance which was established over so much of the Continent.

In the Far East, the roots of war are mostly sought in the motives behind Japanese expansion. Among these, one of the most important was economic. Japan was acutely dependent upon foreign trade, and therefore upon the economic and tariff policies of other states. The great depression exposed Japanese vulnerability to outside pressures, and brought home the fact that the country needed secure sources of food, raw materials, and fuel, and also unimpeded outlets for its exports. One way to establish these sources and outlets was by conquest, and by the creation of what was called a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Another motive which pushed in the same direction was racial—a reaction against western predominance in the Far East, crudely expressed in the slogan ‘Asia for the Asians’. Another mainspring of Japanese action, rather in contradiction to this slogan, was fear of China. The Japanese looked with dismay on the possibility of Chinese unification and restoration as a great power, and sought to pre-empt any such development. Finally, there was a strong impulse towards adventure and martial endeavour, to be found particularly deeply-rooted in the officer corps of the Japanese Army, which itself held a commanding position in Japanese society and government.

The 1930s also provided an opportunity—perhaps even a last chance—for Japanese self-assertion and expansion. During that decade, other states with interests in the Far East were prepared to stand back and permit the growth of Japanese power. In 1931–2 there was not the slightest chance that other great powers would combine to oppose the Japanese occupation of Manchuria (see Manchukuo). The USA, the UK, and France had only slight direct interest in the province; nor did they have any serious reason to support China, because Chinese nationalism was at the time a greater threat to their commercial interests than any action being taken by Japan. Moreover, all were much preoccupied with their domestic affairs. Only the Soviet Union was seriously concerned about Manchuria, through its common frontier with the province and its stake in the Chinese Eastern Railway; but for overriding internal reasons Moscow chose to accept the Japanese occupation, and even at one stage offered to sell its interest in the railway to Japan.

By the time Japan came to invade China proper in the latter part of 1937 and the following two years, the likelihood of opposition by other powers had if anything diminished. In May 1937 the US Congress placed the Neutrality Act permanently on the statute book, and the tide of isolationism was running strongly. The UK and France were preoccupied with European affairs, and in the USSR the great purges were nearing their height. Germany, which had for some time provided limited but valuable assistance to China, changed its policy in 1938 and sought closer relations with Japan. Thus the Japanese had a virtually free hand; and in 1940 they were presented with an opportunity which they found simply too good to be ignored. Germany defeated the Netherlands and France—both with large colonial possessions in the Far East; and the UK stood apparently on the brink of defeat. These same events confronted the USA with the alarming possibility of German control of the Atlantic, and drew American attention towards Europe. Japan had a clear field.

In this field of golden opportunities there was only one awkward outcrop of rock. In 1939, at Nomonhan in Outer Mongolia, Japanese forces had fought a stiff battle with units of the Red Army—and lost (see Japanese–Soviet campaigns). It was the only serious military check they suffered in this period, and it effectively deterred them from any further northward advance. The main effect, however, was only to enhance the attractions of the south; and in the south Japan pressed on, exploiting the opportunity provided by events in Europe. It occupied northern French Indo-China in 1940, and then moved into southern French Indo-China in July 1941. It was at this point that the pattern of events was broken.

So far, Japanese expansion had been resisted only by the Chinese, whose country was after all being invaded. Other powers had looked on—even the Soviet victory at Nomonhan is not an exception, because it was a battle waged in self-defence. But the occupation of southern French Indo-China was unmistakably the first step into South-East Asia, threatening the American territory of the Philippines, the British colonies of Malaya and Singapore, and the Netherlands East Indies. At that point, in August 1941, the USA imposed an embargo on the export of oil to Japan, an example which was at once followed by the British and the Dutch. This placed Japan in a position in which it would run out of oil within a measurable period. Japanese choices were thus narrowed to two: to negotiate with the Americans under the pressure of the oil embargo, which in effect meant accepting American terms; or to go to war to break the blockade and impose its own control over the whole of the Far East. The terms presented by the Americans during the next few months were Japanese withdrawal from French Indo-China and the whole of China (except Manchukuo), which meant the abandonment of all the gains made since 1937. The furthest the Japanese would go was to offer to withdraw from French Indo-China and to confine their occupation of China to the north, while preserving a special economic position in the whole country. This meant deadlock, and there was no serious doubt as to Japanese action: they would go to war.

The course of these events has left two major questions over which historians continue to ponder: how fixed and determined was Japanese policy; and what were the intentions of the Americans in imposing what proved to be their fateful economic sanctions?

The more closely Japanese policy between 1937 and 1941 has been examined, the less fixed and inevitable does its course appear. In 1937 the Japanese government clearly did not expect the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge to have far-reaching consequences. A local cease-fire was quickly arranged, which was rejected not by the Japanese but by the Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek. The Japanese then embarked on a large-scale campaign in China without working out either their objectives or the likely consequences. During 1938 they hesitated as to what policy to pursue. The army High Command first recommended bringing the war in China to an end, and then intensified its operations there. Negotiations were opened with Chiang Kai-shek, but led nowhere. Much the same happened early in 1940, when the government resolved to withdraw large forces from China but ended by sending reinforcements, and further negotiations were begun but not followed up. There were many signs that the Japanese had become involved in a war which they could neither win nor end by negotiation.

There were other signs of uncertainty later in 1940. It was clear that Japan faced a remarkable opportunity: but what was to be done with it? For a time, the Japanese concentrated on cutting China off from the outside world, and so bringing Chinese resistance to an end—that was the main point of occupying northern French Indo-China. But in October and November 1940 Japanese naval commanders were developing strategic aims which pointed southwards, towards the oil resources of the Netherlands East Indies. If Japan were to move in that direction, it would be prudent to avoid trouble with the USSR; and a neutrality agreement with that country was signed in March 1941. In June 1941 the German attack on the USSR plunged the Japanese into further uncertainty. The government and High Command considered three major options: to try for peace with China and an agreement with the USA; to join the Germans in attacking the Soviet Union; and to advance southwards. The conclusion reached, at the beginning of July, was to try a bit of everything: to construct a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere; to settle the war in China; to prepare for expansion southwards; and to solve the northern problem—whatever that might mean. The first practical step agreed on was the occupation of southern French Indo-China, which as we have seen led to grave consequences.

Examination of Japanese policy-making thus reveals divided counsels and frequent uncertainty. What it does not reveal, however, is any serious willingness to call a halt to expansion. The disputes were usually about whether to advance northwards or southwards, to bite off a lot or a little; and decisions were always in favour of at least one more expansionist move. Thus, while our picture of Japanese policy is more complicated than it once was, the essence remains unchanged.

When we turn to US policy, the puzzle is of a different nature. The Americans in effect accepted the Japanese occupation of large parts of China, and then the northern part of French Indo-China, with only nominal opposition. In 1939 they declined to renew the American–Japanese trade treaty of 1911, and in 1940 they put an embargo on the export of scrap metal to Japan—warning shots, no doubt, but scarcely drastic action. Then, after the occupation of southern French Indo-China, the Americans introduced the most damaging economic sanction in history, and confronted the Japanese with a choice between accepting US terms and running out of oil. Why did American policy change so radically, and why did they impose so tough an economic sanction without realizing that it would in all probability lead to war? To the first question, the likeliest answer is an increasing realization of the nature of Japanese aims, leading to an extremely rigid stance which was in large part a reaction against earlier inactivity. To the second question, answers have varied widely. Some writers have implausibly argued that Roosevelt was deliberately inviting war, as much in the Atlantic as in the Pacific—the so-called back door to war in Europe. It is much more likely that the US government, and Roosevelt in particular, believed that severe economic sanctions together with a tough line in negotiations (see USA, 1) would deter Japan from going to war. American policy was thus based on a disastrous miscalculation, which came home to roost at Pearl Harbor.

The final picture retains a fundamental simplicity. Japan was set on expansion, though its precise course and stages were subject to much uncertainty and debate. For a long time that expansion was accepted by other powers, but in 1941 the USA decided to oppose it by severe economic measures and a demand that Japan should not simply call a halt but retreat to the position before 1937. For the Japanese, this amounted to an impossible surrender. Confident in their military prowess, they preferred to try the arbitrament of war.

Events in Europe and the Far East moved on separate and largely unrelated courses, but they shared a similar pattern. An expansionist great power (Germany in Europe, Japan in the Far East) carried all before it for several years, without serious opposition. Then at a late stage other powers (France and the UK in Europe, the USA in the Pacific) tried to check the course of expansion by an exercise in deterrence, only to find that the only recourse was war. In both cases, historical debate has concentrated on elucidating the motives behind the expansion, the reasons why it was so long accepted, and the question of why it was ultimately resisted. It is from our answers to these questions that we form our views of the origins of the wars.

See also anti-imperialism and nationalism and Introductions to the entries for the major powers.

P. M. H. Bell

Bibliography

Bell, P. M. H. , The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (London, 1986).
Carr, W. , Poland to Pearl Harbour. The Making of the Second World War (London, 1985).
Iriye Akira , The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (London, 1987).
Watt, D. C. , How War Came. The immediate origins of the Second World War 1938–1939 (London, 1989).