infantry warfare

infantry warfare. In 1939 infantry were still the largest single component of an army. Their organization, doctrine, and equipment were heavily influenced by the experiences of the First World War; indeed, many weapons of that war, and earlier, were still in service. The most important of these were the bolt action rifle and the machine gun, and hand grenades and mortars. But as the war progressed the bolt action rifle was increasingly supplemented, or replaced, by carbines and by a variety of other automatic and semi-automatic firearms (see small arms for types of weapons used by infantrymen) and by portable anti-tank arms (see PIAT and rocket weapons). More importantly, anti-tank weapons organic to infantry units were disposed in specialist platoons in all armies; and, with the exception of the Red Army, radio communications were introduced at least down to the level of rifle companies. The infantry's traditional roles persisted: to seize and hold ground; and to deny ground to an enemy. The evolution of trench lines from a network of individual slit trenches was still envisaged in British, French, and American doctrine. Some believed that infantry machine-guns, behind barbed wire and mines and supported by artillery and anti-tank weapons, were still invincible.

The battalion (see formations and units, Chart 3) remained the operational unit, which fought collectively in brigades or regiments—this latter term being used in the international as distinct from the British sense, that is, a formation of three battalions, similar to a brigade—within infantrons. The evolving mechanized formations disposed motorized infantry, mounted to maintain the pace of armour (see tanks), and specialist units such as machine-gun battalions and heavy mortar and anti-tank companies. Otherwise, infantry marched unless contingencies demanded otherwise. The transport of infantry divisions in some national armies, for example, that of Germany, was horse-drawn throughout the war (see animals).

Germany had concentrated its mobility in armoured or mechanized divisions (see blitzkrieg). The success of these in the Polish campaign and the fall of France showed that conventional infantry defences could readily be broken by mobile striking power, suggesting that tanks had supplanted infantry as the decisive fighting arm. Subsequent campaigns showed that this belief was ill-founded. Infantry were inevitably the primary arm in jungle operations, in mountains, and in some phases of winter warfare before heavy snow packed down. Even in open country, where armour could develop sweeping manoeuvres, infantry frequently provided the means of breaching enemy defensive positions. They were essential in holding key ground and, between offensives, maintaining covering lines.

In the Western Desert campaigns, British tanks and infantry worked successfully as a team against the Italians. However, by early 1942, after struggles with the Germans, British armoured commanders had come to regard the infantry as an appendage. Motor battalions were needlessly hazarded, left to hold ground, for example, without adequate anti-tank defence, a mistake Montgomery corrected when he took command of the Eighth Army in August 1942. He demonstrated the value of infantry strongholds, when they were properly supported, to inhibit enemy armoured thrusts. Later, he employed his infantry offensively at night to break open Axis defences for the launching of armour. Much of his success was due to using the potential of each fighting arm to best advantage.

German commanders employed this principle from the outset of the war. Though the quality of their tanks and anti-tank guns was generally superior, their early victories owed much to judicious grouping and regrouping of armour and mechanized infantry. They enhanced their gains by expecting junior commanders to seize local initiatives.

The Japanese succeeded in winning all the opening rounds of 1941–2 with inferior numbers. Their infantry leadership was seasoned after ten years of fighting in China (see Manchukuo andChina incident), but they had no experience of jungle warfare. In 1941, after an intense study of requirements, they converted five infantry divisions to this role. Their mastery of movement and navigation in dense foliage was enhanced by the quality of their junior leaders, the hardihood of all ranks and their capacity for night attacks. Shock frontal action, using light tank support, and the frequent encirclement of their opponents, cutting off their retreat, carried the Japanese infantry to triumphs in the Malayan and Burma campaigns, and in the Netherlands East Indies. Similar tactics were successful in the first of the Philippines campaigns and the tactic of encirclement was not overcome by the Allies until they had developed the technique of supplying their troops from the air (see Chindits, for example).

These early reverses obliged the Allies to analyse their weaknesses as they mustered huge forces for counter-offensives. The British infantry began this after Dunkirk. They concluded that while their basic principles were sound, command procedures were ponderous, battalions were not mentally and physically attuned to combat, and their organic anti-tank capability was inadequate.

From brigade level downwards, battle procedures were sharpened. ‘Battle drills’ were instituted within battalions to inculcate the responsibilities of each member down to the rifleman and light machine gunner. Tactical doctrine was widely revised. For example, the sound principle that a commanding officer laid out his defences on his machine-guns was amended; in open country he was to lay them out on his anti-tank resources. The battle drills obliged rifle companies and even platoons to organize all-round defence of their positions; and to practise frequently the simple manoeuvres of ‘fire and movement’ in attack from the rifle section upwards. New standards of physical fitness led to greater energy in fieldcraft, in alertness for observation, and in strength to carry and use effectively the range of infantry weapons. Live rounds were introduced into certain field exercises; given sensible precautions, commanding officers were excused occasional casualties. The quality of training was raised by forming ‘Battle Schools’ for leaders to develop expertise and initiative. A new range of training pamphlets, using cartoons and sketches as much as words to illustrate lessons, was issued widely. Those officers who could not adjust adequately to the new dynamics were replaced. The average age of commanding officers fell by 1943 from 40 to 30 years.

The tactical lessons learned by British, Australians, and New Zealanders in Europe and Africa were circulated among the other Allies. Some were adopted by the USA as the small US Army began its huge expansion programme in 1942. But scale there necessitated individual training en masse; a single infantry instructor would take a class of as many as 200 men at a time. Comprehension levels were thus patchy, performance often indifferent. The American command system tended, moreover, to centralize authority. Battle experience remedied some of these weaknesses but at some considerable cost. Surprisingly, losses due to poor defences did not persuade American infantry to dig ‘foxholes’ as a matter of routine in exposed areas. S. L. A. Marshall in his book Men Against Fire (New York, 1947) records that no more than a quarter of US infantrymen, in whichever theatre they fought, actually fired their weapons during a battle. This was due to the low status of the junior non-commissioned officer in a rapidly and hugely expanded US Army—though not in the US Marine Corps. His responsibility was minimal, and training as a fire team leader or section/squad commander inadequate. The contrary was true in, for example, the German and British armies in which junior NCOs were specially selected, trained, and accustomed to responsibility and respect. In the Japanese Army, ardour for combat was instilled during training to the point that it was not uncommon for junior officers to be borne prematurely into an assault by their men.

By 1944, however, infantry expertise was rising among the Allies in many environments. Experience had been gained, for example, in street fighting, exemplified by the struggle for Stalingrad. Commanders learned that cities absorbed great numbers of infantrymen. Among buildings, struggles were at close quarters; success more than ever depended upon the resolve and enterprise of company and platoon commanders. The grenade and machine carbine were key weapons in this type of fighting. By 1944, the techniques of mountain warfare had also been learned by the Allies while forcing a way forward through the Apennines during the Italian campaign. Mules were required to supply remote positions, and when these were on precipitous heights, infantrymen in reserve turned porter for their comrades in the line. In summer, water supply was a particular problem. Men shaved in their tea or coffee dregs.

Winter conditions in Italy were severe but tolerable in comparison to those on the Eastern Front where Soviet infantry were used to attack on winter nights, often en masse. In summer and autumn they maintained defensive lines in the same way as their German counterparts, from which armoured forces made grand sorties. These lines were highly developed with deep bunkers behind trench networks. Approaches were obstructed by anti-tank and anti-personnel mines and barbed wire, and covered by anti-tank guns and machine-guns. Even in ‘quiet times’, local attacks to capture points of advantage were frequent. Casualties dwindled during deep winter for armoured units but not for the infantry. Battlefield promotions to commissioned ranks were commonplace among Red Army battalions.

In the Pacific war, as in the Mediterranean and Europe, a comprehensive organization was developed for amphibious warfare. Infantry were required to assault across beaches to secure bridgeheads. Portable flame-throwers had been developed for use against fortifications and bunkers. They were valued notably by US Marine Corps and Army infantry rooting out obdurate Japanese defenders in beach and jungle strong-points.

During the closing stages of the war, the availability of fire-power from artillery and air support, and the extension and refinement of weapons and equipment eased the Allied infantrymen's burden considerably, as the lack of these contributed to the defeat of their opponents. Road and air transport had improved supply in Europe and the Far East respectively. Operational efficiency and co-operation between all Arms was greater than in any previous conflict. It is noteworthy that five years later in Korea, and in the development of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) forces, many lessons learned had to be rediscovered, not least the need for infantry and armour to work as a team.

Anthony Farrar-Hockley

Bibliography

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Kippenberger, H. , Infantry Brigadier (London, 1949).
Slim, W. , Defeat into Victory (London, 1956).
Werth, A. , Russia at War (London, 1964).
Zaloga, S. , The Polish Campaign (London, 1985).