Yamamoto Isoroku, Admiral

Yamamoto Isoroku, Admiral (1884–1943),Japanese naval officer who planned and directed the pre-emptive strike against the US Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

Born in Nagaoka, Yamamoto was the son of a schoolmaster. He joined the naval academy at Etajima and passed out in 1904, just in time to participate in the Russo-Japanese war which had begun that February. He served in a cruiser and participated in the battle of Tsushima Strait where he lost two fingers from his left hand and was wounded in the leg. In 1919 he was sent to the USA to study English. He lived in Boston where he learnt to play poker, its mixture of bluff, luck, and anticipation appealing to his temperament. But besides studying the language he was learning about oil, which he knew to be fundamental to the existence of a modern navy.

He returned to Japan in 1921 and in 1924 was given his first major assignment, as executive officer of a naval air station, becoming one of Japan's foremost experts in military aviation. In 1926 he was made naval attaché in Washington and returned two years later with a low opinion of the US Navy which he described as a club for golfers and bridge players, though he never had illusions about American power as a whole. By the time of the 1930 London naval conference, which he attended, he was a rear-admiral and in September 1930 was assigned to Naval Air Corps headquarters. There he did much to improve the quality of naval aircraft as well as demanding the development of a fast carrier-borne fighter which eventually produced the Zero. In October 1933 he took command of 1st Carrier Division and by 1935 was a vice-admiral and vice-minister of the navy. He was a fervent supporter of air power and had, unlike some of his colleagues, little faith in battleships. ‘They are like elaborate religious scrolls which old people hang in their homes,’ he said, ‘a matter of faith, not reality…In modern warfare battleships will be as useful to Japan as a samurai sword.’ When his fellow admirals pointed out that only a battleship could sink a battleship he quoted an oriental saying: ‘The fiercest serpent may be overcome by a swarm of ants’ (see M. Carver, ed., The War Lords, London, 1976, p. 396).

But though he understood the basis of future naval power, and how to exploit it, Yamamoto opposed those who wanted war, and therefore the Tripartite Pact. He was so outspoken against war that during the late 1930s he was in danger of being assassinated by extremists and in July 1939 a plot to kill him was uncovered. To save his life the navy minister promoted him to admiral and sent him to sea as C-in-C of the Combined Fleet. When asked by the prime minister, Prince Konoe, what chance Japan had against the USA and the UK if there was a war, Yamamoto replied prophetically: ‘we can run wild for six months or a year, but after that I have utterly no confidence. I hope you will try to avoid war with America’ (ibid).

Staff studies also soon convinced him that the only hope Japan had in such a war was to destroy the US Pacific Fleet by a pre-emptive strike at its base, Pearl Harbor. His colleagues demurred. It was too risky. Two or three carriers would be lost and that was too high a price to pay. But Yamamoto continued to argue, cajole, and threaten, and eventually his plan was adopted. Its success, and Japanese victories in the Pacific war which followed, brought Yamamoto enormous prestige and though the navy general staff at first rejected his plan to bring the US Pacific Fleet to battle at Midway the Doolittle raid on Tokyo soon resulted in its acceptance. But ULTRA intelligence had forewarned the Americans of the plans and a crushing defeat was inflicted on his forces. During the next six months he had some success against the US Navy around Guadalcanal, directing operations from the super-battleships Yamato and Musashi, but his forces were unable to prevent the Americans from gaining the upper hand at sea and eventually winning the island.

On 3 April 1943 Yamamoto moved his headquarters from Truk to Rabaul and fifteen days later he flew out to inspect Japanese bases in the northern Solomons. ULTRA intelligence revealed his itinerary in advance and Nimitz, C-in-C Pacific, asked Washington if it was in America's best interests that he be eliminated. The answer was ‘yes’ and on 18 April 1943 a flight of fighters intercepted Yamamoto's aircraft as it approached Bougainville and shot it down.

Bibliography

Agawa, H. , The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy (New York, 1979).
Potter, J. , Yamamoto, the Man Who Menaced America (New York, 1965).