Western Desert campaigns

Western Desert campaigns, fought in Libya and Egypt from June 1940 to January 1943, principally by British and Commonwealth forces, to prevent Axis forces severing the Suez Canal, a vital Allied supply and communications artery. The first campaign was a débâcle for the Italians. The second, with Rommel leading a combined German–Italian force, was a 2,145 km. (1,500 mi.) seesaw affair (see Map 110) dominated by the struggle for air and sea superiority in the battle for the Mediterranean and by the logistics of supplying both armies through inadequate ports and over hundreds of kilometres of desert, mostly via a single coastal road.

In most of the confrontations between the two sides Rommel's force was numerically inferior, but his troops were more professional, better led, and thoroughly steeped in the co-operation of all arms. By contrast, British reinforcements for the original Western Desert Force were slow to adapt to desert warfare; the infantry and armour floundered in mutual mistrust and rarely co-ordinated their efforts; and the professional élan of Lt-General O'Connor's early Western Desert Force soon became an indifferently commanded army whose worst faults were not corrected until the arrival of Montgomery in August 1942.

Fighting in the vast expanse of the Libyan desert was unlike any other theatre of war. The distances involved were great, the problem of supply constant, yet the numbers of men involved—compared, say, with those committed to the German–Soviet war—were tiny. The conditions in which both sides fought were harsh and the sickness rate was high (see medicine). But helped by the absence of SS units and large numbers of civilians it was a chivalrous war; and, with the exception of El Alamein—and, of course, the siege of Tobruk—a very mobile one. Rommel, writing to his wife in March 1941, said that speed was the one thing that mattered, and he later wrote that territory was less important than to keep moving until a tactically favourable position for battle was found, and then to fight.

The fighting, in which British special forces such as the Long Range Desert Group and Popski's Private Army played a notable part, was often confused and confusing: the terrain was mostly flat and featureless; dust and sand, churned up by artillery fire and tanks, obscured the battlefield; each side used the other's vehicles and armour, often making identification impossible until too late; radio communications were unreliable; and desert navigation was an art few could master. Close air support was another crucial factor (see Western Desert Air Force) and signals intelligence warfare also played its part. For the British, ULTRA intelligence gave unique insight into German plans, though sometimes the intentions Rommel signalled his superiors were not what he actually did. For the Germans, Rommel's radio monitoring unit, and what he called the ‘Good Source’—decrypted messages despatched by the US military attaché in Cairo in the Black code (see also Italy, 6)—gave him equally vital insights into British plans until the one was destroyed and the other ceased in mid-1942.

Italy declared war on 10 June 1940, but it was not until 13 September that the C-in-C of Italian forces in Libya, Marshal Graziani, was ordered by Mussolini to launch his Tenth Army, commanded by General Mario Berti, on an invasion of Egypt. The Western Desert Force, comprising only two partially equipped, but mobile, divisions, withdrew before Berti's five (later nine) ill-equipped divisions. But when Berti arrived at Sidi Barrani on 16 September he stopped to await supplies, and on 9 December, after receiving additional tanks from the UK, the C-in-C Middle East Command, Wavell, launched a successful surprise attack (COMPASS). The Italians suffered heavy losses and these increased further when Bardia fell the following January. They then withdrew to Tripolitania, which Hitler helped them defend by sending a ‘special blocking detachment’ (5th Light Division), the first of two German formations that were to comprise the legendary Afrika Korps. He also ordered Fliegerkorps 10, then assembling in Sicily, to extend its operations to the Western Desert. But these moves did not immediately affect O'Connor's triumphant advance westwards: Tobruk fell to him on 22 January and then, with a daring inland cross-desert thrust, he cut off the retreating Tenth Army at Beda Fomm before the threatened German invasion of Greece (see Balkan campaign) siphoned off his best troops. All that remained was a weak screening force, commanded by Lt-General Philip Neame, but Wavell calculated that Rommel would not attack before May, a judgement ULTRA appeared to support by revealing the determination of the German Army High Command, to keep Rommel in a defensive mode. But neither Wavell nor the German High Command had reckoned with Rommel. Within a week of landing he had pushed a reconnaissance screen up to Nofilia; he then captured El Agheila on 24 March 1941 and Mersa Brega on 1 April.

Initially, Rommel had regarded his attack as just a raid, but once he saw his chance he ignored the orders of both Hitler and his immediate superiors—he was always, at least nominally, under the Italian High Command (see Comando Supremo)—and, with the Italian Ariete Division under Afrika Korps command, launched himself further into Cyrenaica. Order, counter order, and disorder followed for the British. Neame and O'Connor were captured, Tobruk was invested, and Rommel was not halted until he reached Sollum. This dramatic advance, which reversed nearly all O'Connor's successes and gave the Germans vital airfields from which the siege of Malta could be imposed by air raids on the island, was an unwanted success for the German Army High Command, whose attention was focused on Greece and the forthcoming invasion of USSR (see BARBAROSSA). Its chief of staff, General Halder, commented that Rommel had gone ‘stark mad’. His deputy, Lt-General Paulus, sent to investigate, recommended to Rommel that he stay on the defensive, even after he had been reinforced by 15th Panzer Division, then in the process of arriving in Libya.

By contrast, Churchill wanted success, and quickly. He had a fast convoy (TIGER) containing tanks and fighters dispatched to bolster Wavell; and when Paulus's signal recommending caution was decrypted at Bletchley Park, he made the first operational use of ULTRA intelligence in North Africa by urging Wavell to attack. But both BREVITY ( 15 May), and the more powerful BATTLEAXE ( 15 June), were hastily planned and executed. Bad radio security, and Rommel's first use of his 88 mm. anti-aircraft guns as anti-tank weapons against the British tanks during BATTLEAXE, played a crucial part in their failure. They also led to Wavell being replaced by Auchinleck on 1 July.

Auchinleck knew that Wavell had been forced to act prematurely and he refused to budge until he was ready. He also cabled Churchill demanding a 50% reserve of tanks, inspiring the prime minister's remark that, ‘Generals only enjoy such comforts in Heaven. And those who demand them do not always get there.’

The date for another offensive (CRUSADER) was eventually agreed and Lt-General Cunningham was appointed to command a newly formed Eighth Army made up of 13th Corps (the Western Desert Force) and a new formation, 30th Corps. Auchinleck, having accumulated a marked superiority in tanks and aircraft, launched CRUSADER on 18 November against Rommel's force (renamed Panzer Group Afrika, July 1941) which now comprised the Afrika Korps and 21st Italian Corps. The attack pre-empted yet another assault by Rommel on Tobruk, the thorn in his side which precluded any advance into Egypt until it had been removed. At first, Rommel thought Cunningham's armoured thrust a raid. But once the size of the threat had been established his forces reacted with their usual vigour. In a series of hard-fought actions around Sidi Rezegh ridge they inflicted such severe casualties on the Eighth Army that Cunningham requested Auchinleck's presence to decide whether to withdraw. This pessimism caused Auchin leck to replace Cunningham with his own deputy chief of staff, Maj-General Neil Ritchie. But these battles, and an impulsive advance, had inflicted heavy losses on Rommel's forces, and had strained his logistics to the limit and beyond, and on 8 December he began withdrawing towards Cyrenaica.

In some respects the Eighth Army had repeated O'Connor's success of the previous year, but this time there was no Beda Fomm. Also, Rommel's supply lines now became more secure as additional Axis U-boats and aircraft began to exert their influence in the central Mediterranean. On 5 January 1942 he received extra tanks and fuel, and on 21 January pre-empted Auchinleck's plan to invade Tripolitania (ACROBAT) by striking at Mersa Brega. The next day his Panzergruppe Afrika, which now included the Ariete and Trieste divisions (20th Corps), was renamed Panzer Army Afrika, and its probing raid again precipitated a hasty British retreat. Ignoring all orders to halt, Rommel surged forward to take Benghazi before his advance ran out of steam.

A somewhat acrimonious debate followed between London and Cairo as to when the Cyrenaica airfields, lost once again and once more helping to neutralize Malta, were going to be recaptured. Auchinleck finally agreed to move in June 1942, but then ULTRA revealed that Rommel intended launching an attack (VENEZIA) in May and the Eighth Army turned its attention to defensive preparations. But though it was known when Rommel was going to strike it was not known where, and, after outflanking the British and French positions at Bir Hakeim, he defeated Ritchie in the Gazala battle, and on 21 June finally took Tobruk.

The crisis was now such that Auchinleck dismissed Ritchie and took personal command. The Eighth Army, efficiently protected by the Western Desert Air Force, retreated to Mersa Matruh where at the end of June it suffered another defeat. The nadir of British fortunes in the Middle East had been reached. The Eighth Army now fell back to the partially-built El Alamein line, and reserves from Syria and Egypt were brought forward. On 30 June Auchinleck told his men to show Rommel ‘where he got off’. But the mood of some of the British commanders was gloomy, if not openly defeatist. The Mediterranean fleet left Alexandria and in Cairo there was an air of panic.

Auchinleck's generalship had created an atmosphere where, as a New Zealand officer memorably described it, ‘the whole attitude of Eighth Army was that of having one foot in the stirrup’. But Rommel's attack when it was launched on 1 July was too hastily mounted and Auchinleck's plans, ably drawn up by Dorman-Smith, were sound. In what is now known as the first El Alamein battle, the Axis forces were held. Both sides introduced reinforcements, but in a series of further confrontations neither gained a decisive advantage.

In early August Churchill and General Brooke arrived in Cairo. They replaced Auchinleck with Alexander and Montgomery was given the Eighth Army after Churchill's first choice, Lt-General William Gott, was killed. Montgomery, supplying badly needed, incisive leadership, made changes to Auchinleck's defensive plans; ULTRA, by revealing Rommel's exact intentions, confirmed that Montgomery's reading of the situation was correct; and at the end of August Rommel, now a sick man, was beaten back at Alam Halfa.

Montgomery then concentrated on training his army for a new offensive (LIGHTFOOT). This was launched on 23 October and in the twelve-day second El Alamein battle that followed Montgomery's tactics of attrition finally broke open Rommel's defences. However, heavy rain, the exhaustion of his pursuers, his own defensive skills, and Montgomery's caution, combined to allow Rommel to extricate his most valuable troops, though he left behind 30,000 prisoners-of-war. Montgomery's inability to destroy Rommel's forces subsequently earned much criticism, but his advance across Libya was a logistical triumph. Rommel stood at several places, but each time he was prised from his positions. On 23 January 1943 Montgomery took the surrender of Tripoli and three days later Rommel withdrew into Tunisia where he then participated in the North African campaign.

Bibliography

Behrendt, H. , Rommel's Intelligence in the Desert Campaign (London, 1985).
Carver, M. , Dilemmas of the Desert War (London, 1986).
Pitt, B. , The Crucible of War, 2 vols. (London, 1980–2).